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Introduction: Ethics and Drug Resistance
 Background
Drug resistance is widely acknowledged to be one of the greatest threats to global 
public health in the coming decades. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director 
General of the World Health Organization, describes antimicrobial resistance 
(AMR) as ‘a global crisis’ and ‘the perfect example of the complex, multi-sectoral, 
multi-stakeholder challenges we will increasingly face in the future’.1 In addition to 
scientific research, addressing the challenge of drug resistance requires coming to 
grips with numerous difficult ethical questions. This book thus provides up-to-date 
ethical analyses, from multiple perspectives, of many aspects of this crucial public 
health problem.
Infectious diseases cause significant morbidity and mortality worldwide, with a 
disproportionately high disease burden among disadvantaged populations. 
Resistance to drugs for important pathogens also frequently tracks disadvantage, 
meaning that increasing rates of drug-resistant infections threaten to widen global 
health inequalities. Meanwhile, rising levels of resistance make it harder, or in some 
cases impossible, to effectively treat common bacterial (and other) infections. This 
has significant implications for healthcare and seriously jeopardises many of the 
gains of twentieth century clinical medicine, even in well-resourced settings. 
Successful surgery, transplantation, care of newborn children, and chemotherapy 
for cancer, for example, all depend upon effective antibiotics to treat infections that 
could otherwise be fatal.
AMR occurs when pathogens evolve resistance mechanisms in response to anti-
microbial exposure and/or when resistance is spread from one microbe to another. 
Resistant pathogens arise in both humans and animals, and they can spread between 
individuals and between species. Antimicrobial treatment, infection control prac-




inescapable ethical questions about how to make trade-offs between different kinds 
of risks and benefits.
Increasing rates of increasingly drug-resistant infections might be driving 
humanity towards a ‘post-antibiotic era’ – i.e. a future situation analogous to the 
situation before effective antibiotics were discovered and/or became widely avail-
able. This would involve a dramatic increase in harms to patients and the costs of 
treatment. It could also have significant effects on public health policy and poten-
tially dramatic effects on social life.
At this critical moment in the history of medicine, public health ethics has a key 
role to play in the shaping of practice and policy. This book provides unprecedented, 
comprehensive, in-depth analysis of ethical issues associated with drug resistance.
 Part I: Ethics and Drug-Resistance in Context
Part I provides an overview of drug resistance in multiple contexts. Chapter 1 begins 
with a broad survey of the causes and consequences of drug resistance as well as 
potential policy responses to this problem. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 focus on analyses of 
drug resistance in the contexts of tuberculosis (TB), HIV/AIDS, and malaria  – 
which cause especially high disease burdens among the worst off, predominantly in 
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Drug resistance threatens to under-
mine public health programmes to treat and control these diseases and could thereby 
stall progress in global health and socioeconomic development. Chapters 5, 6, and 
7 explore the involvement of different sectors in the development of, and response 
to, drug resistance. These chapters focus (respectively) on private healthcare provid-
ers, the hospital as a nidus of drug resistance, and drug-resistant infections in non- 
human animals.
Chapter 2 focuses on drug-resistant (TB). In the most severe cases, patients with 
active multi- and extensively-drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR- and XDRTB) have 
few (if any) effective treatment options and face high mortality rates. One TB con-
trol strategy involves treating individuals with latent (i.e. asymptomatic) TB infec-
tion (LTBI) before they develop active disease, but the treatment of resistant LTBI 
has until recently been a neglected topic in clinical research. Nguyen et al. focus on 
practical ethical challenges arising in the design and conduct of clinical research on 
MDR LTBI treatment in Vietnam, including community understanding of LTBI and 
the acceptance of such research in low-income settings. Such analyses arguably 
have wider implications, since asymptomatic carriage by otherwise healthy indi-
viduals is a significant feature of many other (drug-resistant) pathogens, and these 
phenomena are often poorly understood and/or neglected by researchers, despite 
having significant implications for research and public health.
In Chapter 3, Bridget Haire explores ethical issues related to drug-resistant HIV/
AIDS.  Highly active anti-retroviral therapy (HAART) can be highly effective in 
suppressing (but not curing) HIV/AIDS, thus significantly reducing rates of disease 
and/or transmission. Unfortunately, resistance to HAART sometimes develops, 
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particularly where HIV/AIDS patients have difficulty accessing a continuous (life-
long) supply of antivirals and/or where patients are (for other reasons) not able to 
take medicines reliably. As Haire points out, since the development of resistance 
can lead to treatment failure and higher risks of disease and transmission, and since 
diagnostic testing for resistance and second line HAART involves significantly 
increased costs, policymakers face difficult trade-offs. Haire highlights the ethical 
aspects of priority setting and cost-effectiveness assessments in the context of HIV/
AIDS control policy, which can be particularly challenging in low-income settings 
where HIV/AIDS is most prevalent and public health resources are most 
constrained.
In Chap. 4, Cheah et al. focus on malaria, a pathogen for which a mid-twentieth 
century global eradication effort failed, in part due to the evolution of antimalarial 
resistance. An especially problematic recent development is the rapid emergence of 
resistance to newer anti-malarials, particularly in South-East Asia (SEA). Though 
there are strong moral reasons to prevent the spread of resistant malaria, relevant 
public health interventions pose numerous ethical and practical challenges. Inter 
alia, several strategies would necessarily involve treating, and thereby imposing 
risks upon, apparently healthy individuals (including some who are asymptomati-
cally infected with malaria) – just as tuberculosis interventions sometimes target 
those with latent infection  – raising questions regarding whether, or when, such 
treatment would be justifiable. Furthermore, preventing the spread of resistant 
malaria parasites to communities with the highest malaria-related mortality (e.g. in 
Sub-Saharan Africa) may require intensifying intervention in other communities 
(e.g. in SEA), thus involving burdens for one group in order to prevent even greater 
burdens for others.
Despite progress towards increasing access to healthcare in SEA, many individu-
als in this region, as in others, rely on private decentralised health providers for 
access to antimicrobial drugs. Chapter 5, by Liverani and colleagues, provides a rich 
analysis of the links between under-regulation of the private healthcare sector and 
the emergence of drug resistance in SEA. Gaps in surveillance systems, high rates 
of overprescription, and the dispensing of low quality (and/or counterfeit) antimi-
crobials are among several causes of increased risks of drug-resistant infections. 
Liverani et al. demonstrate the complexities of drug resistance as a public health 
problem across multiple pathogens highlighting tensions between access to antimi-
crobials and the excesses of profligate use. These tensions, and the associated chal-
lenges in the ethical governance of multiple sectors and countries, are recurring 
themes in the book.
In Chap. 6, Gilbert and Kerridge consider how and why hospitals have often 
become epicentres of antibiotic resistant bacteria – and why in-hospital strategies, 
such as antimicrobial stewardship and infection prevention/control, have often 
been only partially effective. Part of the problem is that even ‘appropriate’ (i.e. not 
just ‘inappropriate’ and/or ‘excessive’) use of antibiotics inevitably contributes to 
the emergence and persistence of resistant strains of bacteria. Ethically salient 
consequences of antibiotic use in hospitals include direct harms related to resistant 
bacterial infections (in patients, staff, and  – through transmission  – the wider 
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community), stigma and other burdens endured by carriers of drug-resistant strains 
and those who care for them, and the significant costs of reactive (as compared 
to preventive) infection control interventions. They conclude by outlining moral 
obligations of individuals and organizations to contribute to reduction of hospital-
acquired drug-resistant infections.
Boden and Mellor, in Chap. 7, consider links between drug-resistance in animals 
and in humans. Although controversy continues to surround questions regarding the 
degree to which drug resistance in animals contribute to infections in humans, they 
characterise antibiotic resistance as a typical ‘One Health’ problem. As such, coher-
ent policy responses are needed across multiple sectors (e.g. human health, animal 
health, food production, and environmental management). Boden and Mellor argue 
that international policy-making in particular should take existing socioeconomic 
inequities in to account, being careful to avoid unnecessarily punitive measures in 
LMICs which could compromise animal health as well as food production, while 
still attempting to reduce the incidence and spread of drug-resistant infections 
(across multiple species).
 Part II: Theoretical Approaches to Ethics and Drug Resistance
In Part II, ethical issues associated with drug resistance are analysed via diverse 
theoretical lenses, appealing to a variety of philosophical and economic concepts 
including virtue, duty, rights, capabilities, justice, and public goods.
In Chap. 8, Justin Oakley approaches ethical dilemmas in antimicrobial prescrip-
tion from a virtue ethics perspective. Oakley argues that prescribers should be 
guided not only by patient-centred virtues, but also by community-centred virtues, 
including the virtue of justice, in order to strike the right balance between the ben-
efits of antimicrobials for patients and the societal harms of promoting resistant 
infections. He argues that this is especially important where the expected benefits to 
the patient from antimicrobial treatment would be low and the wider societal harms 
are potentially significant. Oakley notes that physicians’ decisions are also influ-
enced by a number of cognitive biases and situational factors. A virtuous physician 
would thus need to cultivate practical wisdom and meticulousness in addressing her 
own biases. In addition, individual prescribers need the support of healthcare poli-
cymakers and institutions to situate them in systems that foster and support virtuous 
prescribing practices.
In Chap. 9, Giubilini and Savulescu focus on cases where restricting one 
person’s use of antibiotics could be plausibly described as an ‘easy rescue’. These 
are situations in which, at little or no cost, one can consume less antibiotics and 
thus reduce imposition of risk on others (as well as, perhaps, reducing one’s own 
risk of future resistant infections). The authors argue that individuals have moral 
obligations to avoid imposing risks on others, including by avoiding profligate 
use of antibiotics. Thus, policies restricting antibiotic use would have particularly 
strong ethical justification in situations of ‘easy rescue’ since (other things being 
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equal) there would be few important countervailing moral considerations. They 
note that such cases are particularly likely in high-income countries, where indi-
viduals have a reliable health system to support them in the event that the cost of 
not taking antibiotics (which is ex ante uncertain) turns out to be more significant 
(i.e. that the ‘rescue’ turns out to be less easy than expected). Furthermore, they 
argue that states have reciprocal duties to individuals whose antimicrobial use is 
restricted (e.g. by more stringent prescribing policies), which may plausibly include 
duties to provide various forms of compensation and/or healthcare. Finally, the 
authors situate their claims in broader notions of collective obligations to contribute 
to common goods and argue that antimicrobial effectiveness can be conceived of as 
such a common good – one that is undermined by overuse (as well as therapeuti-
cally justified use) of relevant drugs.
In Chap. 10, Shawa and colleagues apply a human rights approach to the prob-
lem of highly resistant strains of TB, for which the development of new drugs and 
wider access to existing treatments are urgently needed – especially in LMICs. In 
addition to the right to health, the authors argue that there is a right to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and that states and international agencies have duties 
to respect, protect, and fulfil both of these rights (among others). Inadequate access 
to effective TB drugs and the longstanding relative neglect of resistant TB by 
funders, researchers, and diagnostics/drug developers are therefore framed as fail-
ures to fulfil (at least) these two human rights. Shawa and colleagues argue that 
duties to fulfil the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress in particular entail 
wide-ranging responsibilities, for example, to pursue legislation to promote TB 
research and expand access to newer TB drugs (even where this would involve over-
riding or reducing the scope of intellectual property rights such as those implicit in 
patents that often make such drugs unaffordable). Noting that there has not yet been 
international agreement on the minimum core obligations entailed by this right, they 
outline potentially useful ways of specifying these in order to provide more explicit 
guidance for states to respond appropriately to this urgent public health problem.
Carl Coleman, in Chap. 11, looks specifically at the right to refuse treatment and 
the conditions under which legislation and policy should endorse isolation and/or 
non-consensual treatment. He argues that although laws in some jurisdictions per-
mit mandatory treatment for infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, such compul-
sion is ethically justifiable only in rare cases in which certain conditions are met, for 
example, where (i) treatment refusal poses grave risk to others, (ii) the imposed 
treatment is safe, effective, and not overly burdensome, and (iii) less restrictive mea-
sures are infeasible. Coleman surveys international human rights documents and 
laws in multiple jurisdictions regarding non-consensual treatment and/or TB, noting 
that provisions for compelled (diagnostic testing and) treatment often exist, even if 
they are rarely invoked. Even in high-risk cases, such as XDR-TB, the public can 
usually be protected from harm by isolating the patient (whether or not the patient 
accepts treatment in isolation). Coleman thus argues that there would rarely be ade-
quate justification for enforcing treatment on the isolated individual. In cases where, 
for example, isolation facilities are overwhelmed (e.g. during a large outbreak) and 
large numbers of people refuse effective treatment for infection, mandatory 
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treatment might be more justifiable. However, Coleman points out that – in practice, 
particularly with adequate community engagement from public health authorities – 
conditions sufficient to justify such non-consensual treatment will seldom, if 
ever, be met.
In Chap. 12, Jamrozik and Selgelid explore the public health ethics implications 
of asymptomatic carriage and transmission of drug-resistant bacteria by otherwise 
healthy people. This chapter first summarises current evidence regarding the wide-
spread carriage of key drug-resistant bacteria, noting important gaps in current data. 
The authors then analyse potential public health interventions for carriers in light of 
existing public health ethics frameworks, arguing that the relative burdens imposed 
by public health measures on healthy carriers (as opposed to sick individuals) war-
rant careful consideration and should be proportionate to the expected public health 
benefits in terms of risks averted. Ultimately, more surveillance and research regard-
ing community transmission will be needed in order to clarify relevant risks and 
design proportionate policies, although community surveillance itself also requires 
careful ethical consideration.
In Chap. 13, Byskov et al. introduce a capability framework to enrich analysis of 
the burdens of public health interventions among carriers of multi-drug-resistant 
organisms. They note that carriers can face stigma and other harms as well as restric-
tions on their particular opportunities for choices (e.g. regarding freedom to chose 
where to go, with whom to interact, or which occupation to pursue). Thus carriers 
are potentially subjected to a wide range of potential burdens and/or harms, depend-
ing on the policy in question. The authors argue that examining these adverse effects 
in terms of reductions in the capabilities and functionings of carriers helps to illumi-
nate the ways public health policies aimed at controlling the spread of resistant 
pathogens can constrain the lives of those affected. Because adverse effects on car-
riers’ capabilities will be highly context specific, the authors ultimately aim to iden-
tify a rich taxonomy of ethically relevant considerations to help policymakers (i) 
determine the likely burdens of being a carrier and of a given intervention and (ii) 
weigh these burdens against the public health benefits (and costs) of potential 
interventions.
In Chap. 14, Michael Millar likewise draws on ‘the capabilities approach’ to 
illustrate the ways in which access to effective antibiotics among children is critical 
to secure normal childhood development and fully flourishing adult capabilities. He 
notes that there is significant inequality in the distribution of risk of (resistant) infec-
tious disease and access to treatment. Millar argues that this is especially concern-
ing where lifelong capabilities are adversely affected. Uncontrolled (or effectively 
untreatable) resistant infectious diseases can, furthermore, lead to a clustering of 
disadvantage in a particular individual or community, amplifying existing health 
injustices. Millar raises the compelling example of growth stunting among LMIC 
children. Often caused in part by early childhood infections, stunting results in poor 
long-term physical and cognitive outcomes. However, proposals for the mass treat-
ment of children with antibiotics raise familiar tensions between assuring good 
health and promoting the rise of drug resistant infections. Given the global inequali-
ties in the distribution of relevant risks and the potential for resistant pathogens to 
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spread across national borders, international co-operation is required (but can itself 
be threatened by persistent injustice).
In Chap. 15, Francis and Francis examine the collection and use of information 
in the measurement of, and response to, infectious diseases with a particular focus 
on the value of fairness in the context of public health surveillance. Relevant types 
of information, broadly conceived, include data regarding infected individuals and 
disease transmission as well as knowledge arising from research. Francis and 
Francis analyse the use of such information from the interconnected perspectives 
regarding ‘vectors’ (those who transmit infection) and ‘victims’ (those harmed by 
infection), noting that people may experience both of these states (often simultane-
ously). The authors emphasize that excessive focus on the vector perspective may 
lead to unnecessary stigmatization of individuals and punitive policies that can 
become counterproductive since infected individuals will have strong incentives to 
conceal their diagnoses. In contrast (simultaneous) concern for individuals as vic-
tims may help to foster less burdensome interventions and more support for those 
infected, but overemphasizing such concerns may lead to, for example, overuse of 
antibiotics and thus more drug resistance. Francis and Francis argue that the ethical 
principles of fairness and reciprocity should guide infectious disease policy forma-
tion to an appropriate balance of each perspective, especially where difficult trade- 
offs are required.
In Chap. 16, Lynette Reid examines the links between drug resistance and health 
inequalities, illustrated by cases such as the rising resistance of many sexually trans-
mitted infections (including among sex workers) and the risks of resistant intestinal 
parasitic infections. Reid argues that drug resistance undermines global health 
development narratives because worsening drug resistance may make it impossible 
to mitigate the persistent large infectious disease burden associated with poverty. 
Thus, drug resistance is predicted to increase inequality, and a focus on improve-
ments in infectious disease prevention (e.g. by addressing the social and economic 
inequalities that predispose people to infection) would arguably do more to reduce 
long-term health injustice than expanding access to increasingly ineffective treat-
ments. On the other hand, Reid points out that drug resistance in high-income coun-
tries could lead to a ‘levelling down’ in health equality by undercutting the safety of 
high-cost interventions (such as complex surgery and immunosuppression). 
However, as effective antimicrobials become a scarce resource, their use could also 
be unjustly monopolized by the well-off (in both HICs and LMICs). In any case, 
Reid argues that policy should go well beyond assuring minimally sufficient access 
to water, sanitation, and antimicrobials – and address the underlying political and 
economic forces that result in the persistence of unjust risks of disease among 
underprivileged individuals.
In Chap. 17, Coast and Smith focus on intersections between economic and ethi-
cal analyses of antibiotic resistance. This chapter conceptualizes problems associ-
ated with AMR in terms of ‘public goods’ (a concept related to the idea of common 
goods invoked above). In economics, public goods are said to be non-rival (i.e. one 
individual’s use/enjoyment of a good does not limit its use/enjoyment by others) 
and non-excludable (i.e. it is difficult or impossible to prevent access to the good). 
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Coast and Smith note that the lack of new antibiotics is a predictable consequence 
of economic forces leading to market failure. They also highlight alternative sys-
tems that have been proposed to stimulate useful research and development. At the 
level of consumers of antibiotics, they note that although many of the benefits of 
antibiotic use accrue locally and in the present, the harms and costs are (sometimes 
unfairly) distributed across space and time. Current consumption of antibiotics, for 
instance, may compromise interests of future people. Ultimately, they argue that 
economic and ethical considerations will often converge on similar policy recom-
mendations. For example, they note that infection prevention (which is often more 
cost-effective than providing treatment once an infection becomes clinically appar-
ent) and research into non-antibiotic treatments may be part of solutions aiming to 
achieve (economically and ethically) optimal improvements in health via a reduc-
tion in the burden of infectious diseases.
 Part III: Ethics, Regulation, Governance, and Drug Resistance
The chapters in Part III provide unique perspectives on ethical issues associated 
with policy regarding drug resistance. These analyses draw on concepts related to 
game theory, collective action, risk limits in research, solidarity, environmental eth-
ics, law, and social policy.
In Chap. 18, Jonathan Anomaly gives an account of the international co- operation 
urgently needed to regulate the use of antibiotics in animal agriculture. Anomaly 
starts by asserting that the situation of farmers deciding whether to use antibiotics 
as a means to sustain animals in crowded conditions is akin to the game theoretical 
model of a many person prisoners’ dilemma. In short, those who opt not to use 
antibiotics are predicted to lose out economically as factory farmers heavily using 
antibiotics drive down the price of meat. In the long term, resistance becomes ram-
pant and all are worse off. This predictable ‘market failure’ to secure the public 
good of antibiotic effectiveness is one reason in favour of regulating antibiotic use. 
Regulation needs to reduce the negative effect of ‘free riders’ (i.e. profligate antibi-
otic users) and provide assurance for individuals who use antibiotics carefully (i.e. 
in line with the social optimum) that others will do the same. Anomaly argues in 
favour of an international treaty and outlines how such a treaty might be designed 
and implemented.
In Chap. 19, Nichols King analyses an issue raised in many other chapters in this 
volume in more detail. Given what is known about the complexity of the causal and 
perpetuating factors involved in the problem of antimicrobial resistance, will ‘tech-
nological fixes’ (e.g. new diagnostics, drugs, vaccines) alone provide an adequate 
response, or are broader social, behavioural, political, and economic changes more 
likely to achieve sustainable improvements in public health? Noting that multiple 
co-ordinated policy responses are likely required, King traces the history of ‘tech-
nological fixes’ and examines the ways in which over-reliance on such approaches 
has implications for distributive justice.
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In Chap. 20, Littmann, Rid, and Buyx explore the concept of ‘rational use’ of 
antibiotics. They note that, in some cases, there will be ethical conflicts between 
patients’ interests and the need to preserve effective antibiotics for the future. 
Littmann et al. draw an analogy from research ethics regarding the acceptable limits 
to risks to which participants in research may be exposed and provide a framework 
for policymakers to evaluate potential antibiotic use policies ethically, particularly 
with respect to the degree of risk to which current patients are exposed due to poten-
tial reductions in antibiotic use.
In Chap. 21, Holm and Ploug also approach the problem of the ethical justifica-
tion for restricting the use of antibiotics in cases where they will provide patients 
some benefit (but also entail risks of antibiotic resistance). They argue that the con-
cept of solidarity can help to guide physicians and policymakers in such contexts, 
and also that it can help to promote the support of such policies among the general 
public. Once persons realize that each could (or anyone could) easily be affected by 
a drug-resistant infection, it should arguably lead them to act in solidarity with oth-
ers by giving appropriate weight to the risks related to potential increases in drug 
resistance. Thus, such individuals would be more inclined to avoid the use of (or 
prescription of) antibiotics for self-limiting conditions. Furthermore, the authors 
give an account of how solidarity can inform public health policy, and the ways in 
which it might be expanded to the global level in the context of the international 
spread of drug-resistant infections.
In Chap. 22, Nijsingh et al. examine the ethical and evidentiary justification for 
public health policy responses to drug-resistant infections. Evidentiary justification 
can be challenging where little high-quality evidence is available and where the 
underlying causal pathways driving drug resistance are complex and/or poorly 
understood. In turn, ethical analysis of current policy must often be sensitive to the 
(sometimes limited) degree of evidence regarding the (cost-)effectiveness of an 
intervention (or package of interventions). With these complexities in mind, the 
authors give a thorough analysis of the application and limitations of the 
Precautionary Principle in the context of antibiotic resistance, as well as a number 
of other ethical and evidentiary challenges facing policymakers.
In Chap. 23, Anne Schwenkenbecher gives an account of how prospective moral 
responsibility for one’s contribution to antimicrobial resistance – one’s ‘antimicro-
bial footprint’  – can help to support collective action to reduce the problem. 
Shwenkenbecher considers arguments that failing to reduce one’s use of antimicro-
bials (where it is possible to do so at acceptable costs) can contribute to unfairness 
and/or lead to collective harm, concluding that moral reasons to avoid contributing 
to collective harm (e.g. from drug resistant infection) should support individual 
action to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint.
The next two chapters address issues related to global health governance in the 
context of antimicrobial resistance. In Chap. 24, Bennett and Iredell explore the 
challenges of using existing governance frameworks. They begin by giving an 
account of the WHO/World Health Assembly 2015 Global Action Plan for 
Antimicrobial Resistance and the United Nations resolutions that closely followed. 
The complex problem(s) of antimicrobial resistance have been framed in a number 
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of different ways in different policies, and the authors argue that policymakers will 
need to overcome conceptual, practical, and political challenges in order to imple-
ment coherent and effective policy in this complex area. A key conceptual challenge 
is the need to define (and achieve international agreement on) what constitutes 
‘appropriate’ antimicrobial use in order to implement effective regulation and 
accountability measures.
In Chap. 25, Lee and Ho also take the Global Action Plan as a starting point and 
complement the above analysis by offering a legal and regulatory toolkit to support 
effective health governance related to drug-resistant infections. The authors argue 
that an equitable regulatory ‘lever’ should be one key part of co-ordinated policy 
responses and will often be required in order to enable other policies. Lee and Ho 
give a detailed account of how regulation should be used to support (among other 
important priorities) quality assurance in antimicrobial production, optimum pre-
scribing and dispensing practices, and the assurance of equitable access to 
antimicrobials.
Finally, in Chap. 26, Littmann, Viens, and Silva describe antimicrobial resistance 
as a ‘super-wicked’ problem. As noted in many other chapters, drug resistance is a 
complex policy area: there are huge numbers of contributors, stakeholders, and 
causal pathways involved in creating, perpetuating, and responding to the level of 
drug resistance across a wide range of pathogens, sectors, and settings around the 
globe. Littmann et  al. conclude the volume by highlighting the many distinctive 
ethical issues arising in relation to drug-resistant infections and the ways in which 
ethical analysis should inform policy and response activities.
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Chapter 1
Drug-Resistant Infection: Causes, 
Consequences, and Responses
Euzebiusz Jamrozik and Michael J. Selgelid
Abstract This chapter provides an overview of the causes and consequences of, 
and possible policy responses to, the problem of drug resistance. Throughout, we 
highlight the ways that ethical and conceptual analyses can help to clarify relevant 
issues and improve policy, especially in public health, broadly conceived. Drug 
resistant pathogens arise, persist, spread, and produce harm due to a complex set of 
causes: biological processes (e.g., related to microbial evolution, the transmission 
of genetic determinants of resistance between microbes, and human host immunity) 
as well as human behaviors (e.g., antimicrobial use and hygiene practices) and other 
social factors (e.g., access to clean water, sanitation, healthcare, and antimicrobials). 
Furthermore, the ethically salient consequences of drug resistance include not only 
morbidity and mortality from untreatable infections (that are often inequitably 
distributed), but also broader effects on human freedom, privacy, and well-being. 
Public health ethicists are ideally placed to identify and weigh the values that might 
be promoted or compromised by potential policies and/or interventions that aim to 
address the problem of drug resistance. This chapter concludes by discussing poten-
tial policy responses, including those related to surveillance, research, animal and 
human antimicrobial use, the broader social determinants of health, infection con-
trol practices, and vaccination.
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It is widely acknowledged that drug resistance poses one of the greatest threats to 
global public health during the coming decades. Drug resistance compromises the 
treatment of infections (that were commonly debilitating and/or fatal before the 
development of antimicrobial drugs), and thereby undermines many advances in 
surgery, cancer treatment, and immunosuppression that depend on our ability to 
treat infections effectively. Microbes – bacteria, mycobacteria, parasites, fungi, and 
viruses – have, over billions of years and untold numbers of microbial generations, 
developed mechanisms (via evolutionary processes) to protect themselves from 
harm and transmit such portective mechanisms to other microbes (of the same or 
different species) (Holmes et  al. 2016). The rapid increase in antimicrobial drug 
resistance in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is a result of these powerful 
evolutionary mechanisms combined with human activities that affect the microbial 
world, including the widespread production and use of antimicrobial drugs. 
Resistance is a matter of degree (for example, low levels of resistance can be over-
come with a higher dose or longer course of antimicrobials) and its impact is also 
relative to the availability of alternative treatments (where second line drugs are 
readily available, resistance to first line agents may initially be less of a concern). 
Thus, the recent emergence of strains of clinically important pathogens that are 
highly resistant to all, or nearly all, available therapies (e.g. extensively drug- 
resistant tuberculosis (TB) and pan-resistant gram negative bacteria) is an urgent 
challenge for public health (Schwaber et al. 2011; Birgand et al. 2016; World Health 
Organisation 2017a).
Drug resistance is an important topic for ethical analysis since (i) human actions 
and inactions are major contributors to the problem, (ii) the consequences for 
human health and well-being are highly significant and inequitably distributed, and 
(iii) policies aiming to reduce the rates of resistant pathogens may involve balancing 
this reduction in risk with other morally salient risks, burdens, and benefits. Thus, 
this volume aims to provide a timely exploration of many of the ethical aspects of 
the phenomenon of drug resistance. This first chapter highlights the complex causes 
and significant consequences of drug resistance, and the ways in which ethical and 
conceptual analysis can inform and improve relevant policy responses. We link 
these discussions with other chapters in this volume, as well as gesturing towards 
future directions for ethicists, empirical scientists, and public health policymakers.
1.2  Causes
1.2.1  Evolution and Transmission of Resistance Genes
The microbial world is ancient, abundant, ubiquitous, and complex. As a result of 
random mutation over trillions of microbial generations, bacteria have adapted to 
their environments, in part by developing genes that code for mechanisms of resis-
tance to various threats – including, for example, heavy metals, naturally occurring 
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antibacterial compounds (including beta-lactams such as penicillins and carbapen-
ems) and synthetic antimicrobials (e.g. fluroquinolones and sulphonamides) 
(Holmes et al. 2016; D’Costa et al. 2011). Certain microbes are also able to horizon-
tally transfer genes coding for resistance mechanisms to other microbes (Holmes 
et al. 2016; Chang et al. 2015). With the dramatic, unprecedented increase in human 
interventions in the microbial world (especially the widespread use and overuse of 
antimicrobial agents), strong evolutionary selection pressures have been applied to 
microbes leading to the emergence, increasing frequency, and persistence of resis-
tant microbes in humans, animals and the environment (Holmes et al. 2016).
1.2.2  Antimicrobial Use in Humans
In his 1945 Nobel Prize speech, Alexander Fleming (who first discovered the anti-
biotic properties of penicillin) famously noted that ‘the ignorant man may easily 
underdose himself and by exposing his microbes to non-lethal quantities of the drug 
make them resistant’ (Fleming 1945). If antimicrobial treatment is inadequate, that 
is, then resistant strains of microbes that otherwise would have been killed off may 
survive and become more strongly established in the absence of microbal competi-
tors, in the environment of a person’s body. Resistant pathogen strains thus selected 
can then be transmitted to other persons. For pathogens like tuberculosis (TB) 
and HIV, requiring months (or, for HIV and extensively drug-resistant TB, years) of 
multi-drug therapy, undertreatment (e.g. due to ‘noncompliance’ of patients, or 
inadequate access to medicine, etc.) has played a central role in the emergence and 
persistence of highly resistant strains (see Chaps. 2, 3, 5, 10 and 26). In the case of 
malaria – where, for various reasons, parasites may be exposed (in human patients) 
to sporadic and/or sub-therapeutic concentrations of antimalarials, sometimes as a 
result of partial treatment – underuse of drugs likewise plays a role in the emergence 
of antimalarial resistance (White 2017) (See Chap. 4).
In the case of antibiotic resistance in common bacterial pathogens, however, 
overuse of antibiotics is far more important than undertreatment. Despite years of 
rhetoric regarding the need to ‘complete the prescribed course’ for common uncom-
plicated bacterial infections, this now appears, except among a subset of pathogens 
and specific sites of infection, to have been ill-founded1 and, on balance (when 
generalised to all infections), harmful advice (Llewelyn et al. 2017). Overuse and 
‘appropriate’ use are much more dominant causes of resistance. This is because the 
human body (particularly in the digestive and respiratory tracts, and on the skin) 
contains billions of bacteria, many of which are indiscriminately exposed to an 
antibiotic used either appropriately to treat one particular pathogen (e.g. bacterial 
pneumonia) or inappropriately (e.g. a viral infection mistaken for a bacterial 
1 In part because, until recently, few trials had addressed the question of whether shorter courses for 
common infections may be just as effective, with less development of resistance (and less side 
effects) – the few trials that have now been done generally support the use of shorter courses in 
uncomplicated infections.
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infection) (Llewelyn et al. 2017; Carlet 2012). Exposure to more antibiotics in a 
given individual is predictive of a higher rate of asymptomatic carriage of resistant 
pathogens (although this rate does decrease over time) (Nasrin et al. 2002; Bryce 
et al. 2016). These resistant bacteria, although in usual circumstances causing no 
harm, can lead to invasive (resistant) disease – for example when a person’s skin is 
cut or incised by a surgeon, or when bowel bacteria spread to other locations in a 
person’s body, or when a person becomes immunosuppressed (Tischendorf et al. 
2016; Safdar and Bradley 2008). Those who thus become ‘carriers’ of resistant 
bacteria can transmit such pathogens to others (whether the initial carrier is symp-
tomatic or not) (Smith et al. 2004; Lerner et al. 2015; Jamrozik and Selgelid 2019).
Overuse of antibiotics in humans is thus a collective action problem – in some 
respects a classic ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 2009), but complicated, inter 
alia, by the transmission of resistance between pathogens and also the transmission 
of resistant pathogens between humans.2 The (simplified) structure of the collective 
action problem is that each doctor or patient seeks individual benefit of the patient 
(minimising the risk of severe bacterial infection) by, respectively, prescribing and 
taking antibiotics even in cases where this may have only marginal expected bene-
fits for the patient; but their decisions/actions collectively (in conjunction with other 
causal factors) bring about high levels of antibiotic resistance – which, in the long 
term, is a major threat to all.
Problematic treatment decisions (that contribute to resistance) are sometimes 
related to diagnostic uncertainty. When a patient has symptoms associated with 
respiratory illness, for example, there is often no sufficiently rapid and accurate test 
to determine whether it is caused by a bacterial pathogen. As a result of this uncer-
tainty, combined with risk-aversion among doctors and patients, and a (mis)percep-
tion that a course of antibiotics ‘does no harm’ (or that the risks of side-effects and 
generating resistance are outweighed by potential benefits3), millions of antibiotics 
each year are taken when they are not required. Solutions that rely on individuals 
acting in accordance with the social optimum (especially if, in doing so, they take 
on more risk to themselves) are, at best, incomplete or, at worst, doomed.
The problems of both antimicrobial overuse and underuse are magnified in some 
low- and middle-income countries where many people lack access to basic diagnos-
tic testing and antimicrobials—and/or where antimicrobials are commonly avail-
able without prescription (Holmes et al. 2016; Laxminarayan et al. 2016; Dar et al. 
2016) (see Chap. 5). There is an inherent tension between ‘access and excess’, i.e. 
many die because they are unable to obtain diagnosis and/or antimicrobial treatment 
2 In standard commons tragedies, such as overfishing, individuals collectively deplete a common 
resource (e.g. by fishing), ultimately leading to its collapse. In the case of drug resistance, the 
resource (e.g. effective antimicrobials) can be depleted (in a way akin to standard depletion) 
through use of antimicrobial drugs, leading to resistance, but also, for example by the transmission 
of drug resistant strains from one person to another (regardless of whether either has recently used 
antimicrobials)  – thus the relationships at play may be more complex than standard commons 
tragedies.
3 The actual (as opposed to perceived) risks and benefits are rarely quantified ‘at the bedside’.
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when it is really needed while, at the same time, antibiotics are used when they are 
not required, leading to resistance. This, in turn, exacerbates problems of access – 
because the second line drugs required (after first line drugs have been rendered 
useless) are more expensive/less affordable (Laxminarayan et al. 2016; Dar et al. 
2016). In parallel, the transmission of resistant pathogens is amplified by a lack of 
access to readily available clean water, sanitation, and well-resourced healthcare 
institutions. The burden of drug-resistant infections thus tracks poverty and social 
disadvantage both within countries and internationally (Llewelyn et al. 2017; Bryce 
et al. 2016; Guh et al. 2015) (See Chap. 16).
1.2.3  Transmission
Drug-resistant microbes are transmitted between human beings just like other non- 
resistant pathogens – via airborne or droplet transmission, skin contact, the faecal- 
oral route, sexual transmission, contact with infected bodily fluids, contaminated 
water and food, vector transmission (e.g. mosquitoes in the case of malaria), and so 
on. The epidemiological significance of transmission of some pathogens in some 
contexts is relatively well understood, whereas the transmission of the same patho-
gens in other settings may be different and/or less well-studied. In the case of drug- 
resistant bacteria, for example, in-hospital transmission is well-documented. Such 
transmission often occurs via contamination of the clinical environment and via 
healthcare workers – especially those who fail to adhere to basic hand hygiene prac-
tices (see Chap. 6), although controversy surrounds the optimum infection control 
policies to prevent transmission (Morgan et al. 2017). However, the transmission of 
resistant bacteria (and antibiotic resistance mechanisms) in the general community 
(i.e. outside healthcare facilities) is poorly understood, and much more evidence is 
needed to guide policy (Holmes et al. 2016; Dar et al. 2016). Transmission in the 
community is facilitated not only by direct human contact, but also general environ-
mental contamination with resistant pathogens, the mobile genetic elements that 
confer resistance, and even antibiotics themselves – with polluted water systems 
being a key link in indirect transmission between human beings, and between ani-
mals and humans (Pruden et al. 2013; Martinez 2009). This problem is of greatest 
concern in low-income settings with poor access to clean water and sanitation, fur-
ther exacerbating the inequitable distribution of harms from drug-resistant infection 
(Laxminarayan et al. 2016; Dar et al. 2016).
The global spread of drug resistance is greatly facilitated by modern air travel. 
Millions of people become colonised (usually without symptoms) with resistant 
pathogens or other (non-pathogenic) microbes containing genetic determinants of 
resistance every year in locations with high rates of resistance and then fly to regions 
where (whether or not those colonised are sick) resistant pathogens and/or resis-
tance determinants are directly or indirectly transmitted to others (Kennedy and 
Collignon 2010; Östholm-Balkhed et al. 2013).
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1.2.4  Antimicrobial Use in Animals and Agriculture
The widespread use of antibiotics in industrial agriculture and aquaculture, either as 
‘growth promoters’ or in other mass prophylactic uses, has lead to pathogens devel-
oping resistance to the agents used. This has had consequences for both animal and 
human health. Consequences for humans occur when clinically significant patho-
gens (and/or resistance determinants) are transmitted from animals to humans 
(either directly via animal contact or consumption of animal products, or indirectly 
via environmental contamination with resistant pathogens and/or resistance deter-
minants), when humans are themselves exposed to antibiotics used in the food chain 
(either in the products they consume, or because antibiotics and antibiotic residues 
are released into the environment), or when humans are exposed to pathogens (or 
other microbes) that become resistant (and/or carry resistance determinants) as a 
result of exposure to antibiotics in enviroments contaminated by agricultural use 
(Holmes et al. 2016; Schwaber et al. 2011; Birgand et al. 2016; Chang et al. 2015; 
Martinez 2009).4 The links between animal and human health via our shared micro-
biome are complex, and the relative importance of different causal pathways in a 
particular setting is often difficult to quantify (Chang et al. 2015) (See Chap. 7). 
Likewise, although the agricultural industry uses more antibiotics in total tonnage 
than human healthcare, the relative contribution of agricultural antibiotic use to the 
epidemiology of resistant bacterial disease in humans is difficult to study, often 
unknown and likely varies widely in different settings (Holmes et al. 2016).
1.3  Consequences
1.3.1  Direct Harms to Human Beings
The true global burden of death and disease due to resistant infection is unknown, 
and from both ethical and scientific points of view there is an urgent need for more 
accurate estimates. One prominent appraisal published in 2015 suggested that at 
least 700,000 deaths occur each year due to drug-resistant infection worldwide, and 
that this annual death toll could rise to ten million by the year 2050 (Antimicrobial 
resistance: Tackling a crisis for the health and wealth of nations 2015). However, 
this analysis included only 6 pathogens and acknowledged that the true number is 
probably already far higher, especially given that more of the burden of disease falls 
on poor communities that often have incomplete disease surveillance systems and 
limited access to relevant diagnostic technology (Laxminarayan et al. 2016).
4 In (1) microbes become resistant due to their exposure to antibiotics in animals’ bodies; in (2) 
microbes become resistant due to their exposure to antibiotics in people’s bodies (resulting from 
people’s exposure to antibiotics in contaminated environments); in (3) microbes become resistant 
due to their exposure to antibiotics in contaminated environments.
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The inequitable distribution of harms from resistant disease mirrors the inequi-
table distribution of infectious disease burden more generally. In both high- and 
low-income countries, the heavy burden disproportionately shouldered by impover-
ised people and communities is largely explained by ‘social determinants of health’ 
(e.g. lack of access to clean water, sanitation, wealth, education, access to a robust 
health system, etc). On many accounts of justice, wealthy individuals and societies 
have strong moral reasons to improve these basic determinants of public health for 
all (Selgelid 2008). Furthermore, since resistant pathogens (like other pathogens) 
spread across borders, the wealthy have increasingly strong self-interested reasons 
to provide assistance to others and to prevent others from developing resistant 
disease.
High rates of resistant pathogens (especially common bacterial species) under-
mine many of the advances of modern medicine – because the successes of surgery, 
transplantation, cancer treatment, immunosuppression, intensive care, and obstetric 
and neonatal care are very often contingent on being able to treat and cure infec-
tions. Increasing drug resistance thus has widespread implications for health and 
healthcare. Although patients who are unwell with other comorbidities are at the 
highest risk (both of carrying resistant pathogens – due to recurrent treatment and 
hospitalisation  – and of invasive disease from these pathogens), even relatively 
healthy people are, and will increasingly be, harmed by resistant infectious disease.
Before the advent of antibiotics, a simple skin wound could lead to untreatable 
sepsis, amputation and/or death, and a ‘post-antibiotic era’ would entail a return to 
similarly grim prospects. Increasing drug resistance thus severely threatens the 
entire global population and, in addition, future generations.
1.3.2  Economic Consequences
Along with direct harms, drug resistance has severe economic consequences. Drug- 
resistant infections are more difficult (sometimes impossible) and more expensive 
to treat and cure, and they are more likely to result in incapacitation of the patient 
and significant economic losses for society. One estimate suggested that total global 
losses due to resistant infection between now and 2050 could total over $US 100 
trillion (O’Neill 2015), meaning that there are powerful economic reasons to devise 
and implement effective measures to curb the problem (See Chap. 17).
As noted in several chapters in this book, the availability of effective antimicrobi-
als has many features of a ‘public good’ in economic terms. Standard economic 
models predict (more or less accurately) that a free market in antimicrobials (i.e. 
with little or no regulation of access apart from price) leads to ‘market failure’ and 
the erosion of the good in question (i.e. availability of effective antimicrobials). 
In most societies, since access to antimicrobials occurs via healthcare practitioners, 
the ‘market’ is relatively controlled (as opposed to free). The incentive structures 
that lead to a collective action problem for doctors and patients (discussed above) 
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nevertheless lead to a similar erosion of antimicrobial effectiveness – albeit at an 
attenuated rate, depending upon the degree to which regulations on prescriptions 
succeed. Private healthcare providers, in any case, can be difficult to regulate (see 
Chap. 5), especially where they are not part of a centralised and/or universal health-
care system.
1.3.3  Burdensome Public Health Interventions
The consequences of drug resistance for human beings are more than just matters of 
physical health and wealth. In many cases, public health surveillance and related 
public health practices have ethically salient implications for other aspects of well- 
being, including psychological well-being (e.g. due to experiences of stigma among 
carriers of resistant microbes – see below), as well as privacy and other freedoms 
(e.g. which are compromised by mandatory physical/social distancing measures 
such as isolation and quarantine). Well-designed public health surveillance and 
research should be conducted in order to clarify the health risks and costs of resis-
tant infection and the risks, benefits, and burdens of potential public health interven-
tions. High quality data would help policymakers determine whether imposing 
certain burdens on individuals would be justified as a means to improve public 
health (e.g. by reducing infectious disease due to resistant organisms) (Fairchild and 
Bayer 2004). Unfortunately, investment in surveillance for resistance has, globally, 
been very low and is only just starting to be improved, particularly in wealthy 
settings.
Those identified by surveillance as carriers of resistant pathogens while inpa-
tients in healthcare settings sometimes experience stigma (Rump et al. 2017) as well 
as a wide range of effects on well-being, which some argue are best understood 
through a capabilities approach that explores the broader implications of public 
health policies for the flourishing of individual lives (see Chap. 13). Such an 
approach may also help to illustrate the broader aspects of human life that are jeop-
ardised by the lack of access to effective antimicrobials, especially among children, 
for whom early severe infection may impair long term development (see Chap. 14).
Indeed, as more people become aware of resistance, and more community sur-
veillance is conducted, apparently healthy individuals in the community may be 
increasingly identified as asymptomatic carriers of resistant organisms (See Chap. 
12). Furthermore, such individuals might be monitored, offered or required to 
undergo treatment, and have other liberties (freedom of movement, free choice of 
occupation) curtailed by public health policy (Houston and Houston 2015). Those 
who have had recent contact with carriers might be tested and/or quarantined. There 
is thus frequently a tension between the aim to protect public health (by identifying 
infected individuals and reducing transmission of (resistant) disease) and the aim to 
avoid imposing significant burdens (in terms of compromised well-being, privacy 
and/or liberty) on individuals in order to prevent the spread of disease to others 
(Viens et al. 2009).
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1.4  Responses
1.4.1  New Drugs
For many decades, even where the emergence of drug resistance was recognized, 
much of the response (or lack thereof) by individual clinicians as well as policymakers 
was grounded in (apparently unfounded) confidence that new antimicrobial drugs 
would be discovered and developed, meaning that resistance to older drugs was of 
limited significance. Despite early warnings of the consequences (Holmes et al. 2016; 
Honigsbaum 2016) – profligate use continued and indeed accelerated in humans, 
animals, and agriculture. Meanwhile, the restricted use of new antimicrobials as 
‘reserve’ agents – although it may help to slow the emergence of resistance – means 
that there are disencentives to (profit-motivated) research and development of new 
antimicrobials. For this and other reasons, few new antibiotic classes or agents have 
been developed in recent decades (Norrby et  al. 2005). Boosting more relevant 
research and development may thus require more public effort/funding and/or 
realignment of pharmaceutical companies’ incentive structures (i.e. so that profit 
making becomes more compatible with developing products that are most important 
to global public health) (Banerjee et al. 2010).
New drugs (or other means of treatment/prevention) are arguably most urgently 
needed for infections that have become nearly pan-resistant (e.g. extensively drug- 
resistant TB, or multi-resistant gram negative bacteria). Vis-à-vis other responses 
that target particular causal pathways (e.g. restrictions on prescriptions practices or 
agricultural use) they would provide a cross-cutting solution to the problem of drug 
resistance – i.e. addressing the problem regardless of the specific mechanisms by 
which it was brought about.
It is clear, however, that policymakers (and, indeed, patients) cannot rely on new 
drugs to ‘fix’ the problem(s) of drug resistance, since (i) the development of new 
antimicrobial drugs has, in recent decades, been slow and/or relatively unsuccess-
ful, (ii) the challenges underlying difficulties with drug development have thus far 
proven difficult to overcome, and (iii) without other interventions to curb the 
increase in drug resistance, we face a never-ending problem of finding new drugs. 
Thus, drug resistance requires a multi-faceted and global policy response – yet one 
that is also tailored to the specific problems and mechanisms of resistance in a given 
microbe and a given context.
1.4.2  Research and Surveillance
Apart from finding new treatments, other kinds of research are urgently needed, 
including empirical research in diagnostics, microbiology, vaccines (and other non- 
drug interventions), as well as social science and public health systems research 
(Dar et al. 2016). As a starting point, there are large gaps in our knowledge of the 
1 Drug-Resistant Infection: Causes, Consequences, and Responses
12
epidemiology of most resistant pathogens. Improving local and international public 
health surveillance would help to determine the impact of various resistance mecha-
nisms and evaluate the cost-effectiveness of interventions. Yet this, in turn, requires 
development of cost-effective and publically acceptable surveillance mechanisms 
that can be more widely implemented, including in LMICs, and political and scien-
tific agreement on which data will be collected and shared (Tacconelli et al. 2017). 
It also requires careful attention to the ethical conduct of public health surveillance 
(World Health Organisation 2017b).
1.4.2.1  Reducing Use in Humans
There is an urgent need to reduce antibiotic use in human patients. The most ethi-
cally straightforward cases are those in which a person is prescribed (or purchases 
without prescription) an antibiotic (with a risk of side-effects and resistance) for a 
condition for which it will provide no benefit (e.g. a viral illness) or where a shorter 
course of antibiotics is as effective as a longer course but the latter confers an 
increased risk of resistance and/or side-effects. In such cases, antibiotic use consti-
tutes a net harm to the individual and, through the risk of transmission of resistant 
organisms, to others.
One strategy to reduce use is to develop new diagnostics, so that patients and 
doctors can avoid using antibiotics where they are not required. But in the absence 
of perfect tests, changes in professional and public culture are also required. For 
example, doctors should address their own cognitive biases (see Chap. 8) as well as 
patient concerns about avoiding the complications of infection, and public aware-
ness campaigns must emphasize that antibiotics are often not required and can 
themselves entail significant risk (to individuals and public health) (World Health 
Organisation 2015). International data suggest that some countries have made sig-
nificant progress in reducing antibiotic use without a significant increase in severe 
infections (Bronzwaer et al. 2002).
Yet, as effective antibiotics become more and more scarce, there are more diffi-
cult ethical tradeoffs to be considered, involving greater uncertainty. For example, if 
antibiotics become reserved for severe and/or complicated infections – so that use is 
banned or dramatically reduced for patients with simple infections – many patients 
with a simple bacterial infection (e.g. mild pneumonia) may end up being more 
unwell for longer, or even at a small risk of severe outcomes (even though the vast 
majority will ultimately recover without specific curative treatment), because they 
do not have access to antibiotics.
Policy to reduce use in either the low risk or the higher risk cases cannot rely 
entirely on individuals, since the structure of the underlying collective action prob-
lem leads to strong incentives to ‘free-ride’ on others’ reduction in use. Thus, some 
form of regulation is required – e.g. through antimicrobial stewardship (which has 
been a successful but resource intensive approach in healthcare institutions), and/or 
restrictions on physician prescribing. How best to design and enforce such regula-
tion is an important matter for debate in public health ethics.
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1.4.2.2  Reducing Use in Animals and Agriculture
As argued in later chapters of this volume (see Chaps. 7 and 18), antibiotic use and 
overuse in agriculture must also be reduced. First and foremost, many have argued 
that the widespread use in animals of agents that are critical to human health should 
be dramatically reduced and/or prohibited, especially when such agents are 
employed for non-therapeutic purposes (e.g. as ‘growth promoters’) (Marshall and 
Levy 2011; World Health Organisation 2017c). But even other drugs (and non-drug 
agents) may lead to the co-selection of resistance determinants for critical drugs 
among bacteria (and fungi) shared between animals and humans. The overuse of 
antibiotics in agriculture in part represents a palliative for the high rates of infection 
in crowded ‘factory farms’, suggesting that reforming farming practices would have 
the dual benefits of reducing animal cruelty and reducing drug resistant infections. 
Reducing or eliminating meat consumption would also obviate many of the dangers 
to humans of resistance in animals (although not all, since companion animals can 
also transmit drug-resistant infection (Guardabassi et al. 2004)). The fact that some 
wealthy countries have dramatically reduced or eliminated profligate antibiotic use 
in farm animals (in part by giving animals more space and improving infection 
control practices) often at little or no long term economic cost suggests that it is 
possible to minimise this driver of drug resistance (McEwen et al. 2018). Whether 
such practices will be successfully implemented in lower income countries remains 
to be seen (Dar et al. 2016).
1.4.2.3  Addressing Social Determinants of Health
Infectious diseases, in general, are more prevalent among poor people and commu-
nities in both high and low-income countries. Many aspects of social organization 
and the built environment (water and sanitation systems, health systems, etc.) alter 
the risk of acquiring infection, and the risk of transmission of resistance mecha-
nisms. Historically, improvements in living conditions arguably contributed more to 
the decline in infectious diseases in developed/industrialised countries than discov-
eries of vaccines or antimicrobial treatments (McKeown 1976). One way of reduc-
ing the prevalence of drug resistant infection would be to reduce its incidence and 
transmission by addressing these (and other) such social determinants of health.
The rise of untreatable infections provides a new, and urgent, rationale to ensure 
universal access to the social conditions that enable healthy living. Even basic mea-
sures, especially if provided to all, could help minimize the transmission of resis-
tance (e.g. by providing access to clean water and sanitation) and reduce the use of 
antimicrobial drugs (e.g. by providing access to high quality, and well-regulated, 
health systems). Since resistant infections routinely spread via international travel, 
wealthy nations have reasons not only to act locally but also to act globally by 
assisting others with less resources (see Chap.  21) – to reduce the incidence and 
international transmission of resistant infection (Selgelid 2008).
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1.4.2.4  Infection Control
Infection control involves measures that aim to reduce the transmission of patho-
gens in an institution or community. In healthcare institutions, this typically involves 
screening of patients, monitoring of those carrying (and/or suffering disease from) 
resistant pathogens, use of personal protective equipment,  and social distancing 
measures such as isolation and quarantine. In some cases, it also involves decoloni-
zation of patients. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) decoloni-
zation, for example, involves the use of antibacterial solutions on the skin, hair, and 
nasal membranes. More dramatically, recent studies have reported successful use of 
faecal transplantation to decolonize those with highly resistant bowel organisms 
(Freedman and Eppes 2014; Crum-Cianflone et al. 2015). In many cases, screening 
for resistant pathogens in hospital does not involve/require informed consent of 
patients, on the grounds that screening and control measures are required in order to 
prevent harm to others. Such policies should nonetheless be based upon careful 
ethical justification as well as, where possible, evidence of cost-effectiveness 
(see Chap. 6), especially insofar as they infringe on the lives of individual carriers 
(who may or may not be symptomatic) in significant ways (see Chap. 13).
Infection control policies become more complex when they are applied in the 
general community. As more people in the community are identified as carriers of 
highly resistant pathogens, it remains to be seen what kinds of restrictions of indi-
vidual liberty would or shoud be considered justifiable. When, if ever, for example, 
should travellers be screened on arrival from high-risk regions – and when should 
those who test positive for resistant organisms be offered (or required to have) 
decolonization – and/or be subject to monitoring and/or social distancing measures? 
Important questions such as these need to be considered (and re-evaluated) as more 
is learned about community and international transmission of drug-resistant 
organisms.
1.4.2.5  Vaccines
Vaccines are a cross-cutting intervention with the potential to obviate the need to 
prescribe antimicrobials for a range of pathogens. In some cases, furthermore, 
vaccines can prevent infections that would otherwise be untreatable/uncurable 
(e.g., due to high levels of drug resistance). Existing vaccines against tuberculosis 
and some bacterial infections (e.g. Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus 
influenzae) reduce the incidence of infections due to these pathogens and thereby 
reduce the use of relevant antimicrobials (Dar et al. 2016). Vaccines against specific 
resistant strains may also lead to their replacement (e.g. in a given ecological niche 
in the human body) by strains that are easier to treat (Dar et al. 2016), although 
longitudinal surveillance data regarding strain epidemiology and disease burden are 
needed to confirm whether such effects lead to a long-term net public health benefit.
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Even effective vaccines against viral infections (e.g. influenza, common cold 
viruses) can lead to a marked reduction in antibiotic use since viral infections are 
often erroneously treated with antibiotics (Neuzil et al. 2000). New vaccines against 
malaria and typhoid may help to reduce antimicrobial use and resistance relevant to 
these pathogens. Because there is a great number of resistant pathogens for which 
we lack vaccines, however, this is an important area in need of further research and 
development.
Of course, discovering an effective vaccine may lead to the replacement of 
one collective action problem (antimicrobial overuse) with another (assuring high 
vaccination rates) – meaning that even this ‘technical fix’ would have limitations. 
Like the development of new drugs, in any case, new vaccines would form only one 
part of the multi-pronged approach needed to control the problem of drug resistance.
1.5  Conclusions
Drug-resistance is widely recognised to be one of the greatest threats to global pub-
lic health in the coming decades. Its causes are complex, and more work is needed 
to determine the relative importance of different causes. The consequences for 
human health are already highly significant, and, if left unchecked, will be even 
more dramatic in the near future. These harms, taken together, represent a large, 
likely underestimated, and ethically salient burden of disease that disproportion-
ately affects underprivileged people and communities worldwide. Yet the presence 
of untreatable and potentially fatal pathogens and the prospect of such infections 
becoming more common is a threat to all. Despite current uncertainties and urgent 
gaps in our knowledge regarding drug-resistant infection, there is a pressing need to 
develop and implement ethically informed policies to reduce rising levels of resis-
tance and thereby mitigate or avert future harms and injustices. We hope that the 
subsequent chapters of this volume will make a significant contribution to this 
important area of public health ethics.
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Chapter 2
Preventive Therapy for Multidrug 
Resistant Latent Tuberculosis Infection: 
An Ethical Imperative with Ethical 
Barriers to Implementation?
Binh Nguyen, Greg J. Fox, Paul H. Mason, and Justin T. Denholm
Abstract Multidrug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) has a substantial impact on 
individuals and communities globally, including lengthy, expensive and burden-
some therapy with high rates of treatment failure and death. Strategies to prevent 
disease are well established for those who acquire latent tuberculosis infection 
(LTBI) after exposure to drug susceptible TB (DS-TB). However, there has been 
limited research or programmatic experience regarding the prevention of 
MDR-TB.  Accordingly, while global recommendations strongly emphasize the 
need to deliver LTBI therapy after TB exposure, most programs do not do so where 
MDR LTBI is identified.
The paucity of prospective randomized trial evidence for the effectiveness of 
MDR LTBI therapy, and concerns regarding its adverse effects, have been used to 
justify a reluctance to scale up programmatic interventions to prevent MDR-TB, or 
to participate in research evaluating such strategies. However, such a response fails 
to adequately balance potential risks of therapy with the substantial harms associ-
ated with inaction. Furthermore, the cost of inaction falls disproportionately on the 
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most vulnerable members of society, including children. Delays in implementing 
proven preventive strategies may also mask hidden programmatic concerns, particu-
larly regarding the financial cost and other burdens of treating drug resistant infec-
tion. Reticence to engage with preventative therapy for MDR-TB, even in the 
absence of high-level evidence, may run counter to the best interests of individuals 
who have been exposed to MDR-TB.
This chapter will explore ethical tensions raised by expanding access to preven-
tative therapies for MDR-TB, and consider how ethically optimal responses to this 
adverse condition may be evaluated. An ethical perspective on evidentiary burden 
will be addressed, emphasizing how MDR LTBI research may both offer, and be 
shaped by, paradigmatic insights into human research ethics more generally. 
Emerging research and illustrations from the authors programmatic engagement in 
Vietnam are offered as case examples, because social and community expectations 
and norms may challenge, or support, implementation of therapy for drug-resistant 
infection. Such circumstances prompt consideration of the broader questions of 
social impact, such as the potential for widespread preventive therapy to accelerate 
the development of antimicrobial resistance.
Keywords Bioethics · Infectious diseases · Public health · Social justice · Equality 
and human rights · Asian culture
2.1  Background
Multidrug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) is a global pandemic disease, charac-
terised as ‘Ebola with wings’ by public health experts due to its airborne transmis-
sion and significant patient mortality (Voelker 1998). With more than 450,000 cases 
reported in 2015, MDR-TB has become an established global health emergency 
(World Health Organization 2013a, 2015a, 2016; Hoang et al. 2015a). While treat-
ment for drug-susceptible (DS)-TB typically involves multiple antibiotic tablets for 
a period of 6 months, standard MDR-TB treatment involves up to 2 years of both 
oral and injected antibiotics. These toxic regimens frequently cause nausea, liver 
damage and irreversible hearing loss, and may also require surgery or other invasive 
procedures (Fox et al. 2016; Torun et al. 2005). Despite the availability of these 
intensive regimens, MDR-TB therapy is successful in only around half of cases 
globally, with a high risk of treatment failure and death (Orenstein et al. 2009). In 
addition, the burden of MDR-TB extends far beyond its medical impact. The pro-
longed illness, and its associated treatment, has major financial implications for 
patients and their families - incurring significant financial and housing instability 
(Tanimura et al. 2014). In short, MDR-TB is costly, prolonged, and complex for 
both individuals and health care services (Keal et al. 2013).
As TB is a contagious infectious disease, those who live in close contact with 
affected individuals are themselves at a high risk of developing disease  - around 
10% of contacts with latent (asymptomatic) TB infection (LTBI) due to M. tubercu-
losis will subsequently develop disease (Marks et al. 2000). Current strategies to 
prevent the spread of MDR-TB mainly focus upon interrupting the transmission of 
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infection, by identifying and treating patients with active disease (World Health 
Organization 2011, 2013b; Fox et al. 2013a). Such strategies are important for indi-
viduals with MDR-TB, but have limited impact on preventing disease in those 
around them who are likely to have already been infected prior to the diagnosis of 
the treated patient. Transmission studies indicate that close contacts of MDR-TB 
patients have an elevated risk of infection. Not only are contacts exposed directly to 
the recognised patient, but they also share socio-economic determinants of disease 
(World Health Organization 2014; Grandjean et al. 2011; Fox et al. 2017a). This 
confers an increased risk of exposure to other affected individuals, and susceptibility 
to developing this dangerous and burdensome disease (Fox et al. 2013b).
Given the high risk of developing active disease after infection with either DS- or 
MDR-TB, interventions to reduce risk among close contacts are of considerable 
clinical and public health importance (Trauer et al. 2016). In cases of DS-TB expo-
sure, international guidelines recommend screening of exposed contacts, and a 
period of antibiotic therapy to prevent progression for those at highest risk of dis-
ease progression – such as children under 5 years of age, or those with HIV infec-
tion (World Health Organization 2015b). The effectiveness of preventative 
chemoprophylaxis for DS-TB is well established, including through randomized 
controlled trials in a variety of global settings (Lobue and Menzies 2010; Sterling 
et al. 2011). The importance of strategies for preventing MDR-TB has recently been 
summarised in national and international guidelines for the programmatic manage-
ment of drug-resistant TB based on the risks of transmission, high morbidity and 
mortality, and the further development of drug resistance (World Health Organization 
2014, 2015c; Ministry of Health 2015; European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control 2012). However, most guidelines have not recommended the routine use of 
targeted chemopreventive therapy for contacts of MDR-TB (Fox et al. 2017b), cit-
ing insufficient evidence of effectiveness in preventing disease, instead recommend-
ing programmatic surveillance of contacts. While such surveillance may lead to 
earlier identification of those developing disease, it fails to reduce the risk of disease 
among infected contacts, and hence does not prevent the consequent social and 
economic hardship caused by drug-resistant disease. Thus, current approaches to 
MDR-TB contacts recognise the high risk of disease among contacts, but do not 
offer routine use of preventive therapy in most settings, including Vietnam.
2.2  Discussion
2.2.1  Ongoing and Proposed Clinical Trials to Evaluate 
Antibiotic Therapy to Prevent Drug-Resistant Infection
In this section, we will introduce ongoing and planned clinical trials that aim to 
establish the effectiveness of preventive therapy for MDR-TB in order to highlight 
ethical issues arising from this research and reflect upon possible solutions. The first 
of these is the V-QUIN MDR Trial - a randomised placebo-controlled trial among 
infected contacts of patients with MDR-TB.  Contacts are recruited from district 
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tuberculosis clinics (DTUs) where MDR-TB treatment is delivered, throughout the 
Southeast Asian nation of Vietnam. The trial is underway within the Programmatic 
Management of Drug Resistant TB (PMDT) program at 132 clinics across 10 
Provinces of the country. The primary aim of the VQUIN MDR Trial is to evaluate 
the effectiveness of levofloxacin (a fluoroquinolone antibiotic) in the prevention of 
active TB among household contacts of patients with MDR-TB with latent tubercu-
losis infection. Adult contacts will receive either levofloxacin or placebo daily for 
6 months. In accordance with international recommendations, contacts will then be 
monitored for disease progression over a further 2  years to detect incident TB 
disease.
Vietnam has the twelfth highest TB burden in the world, and is listed among the 
top 27 countries with the highest burden of MDR-TB (WHO 2015). The country 
applies regimens recommended by WHO for the treatment of MDR-TB in Vietnam, 
including at least 19 months of treatment. This comprises, a minimum of 6 months 
of intensive phase treatment (including a second line injectable antibiotic, kanamy-
cin or capreomycin) and 13 months of continuation phase therapy. Antibiotic treat-
ment is provided free of charge for patients meeting the eligibility criteria for the 
program.
Despite having a nation-wide TB Program network and a structured, well- 
organized health service, and reporting impressive rates of treatment completion 
(WHO 2015), Vietnam still faces many challenges in implementing effective 
MDR-TB screening and treatment. Ongoing difficulties include a lack of communi-
cation and consistency in implementing policy changes, a lack of integration 
between general district hospitals and the National TB Program network, and lim-
ited resources. These health-system factors contribute to a significant gap between 
the estimated number of cases and the number of patients commencing treatment 
(Hoang et al. 2015b).
In the hope of gaining more data for evidence of effective regimens in MDR-TB 
contacts, two other clinical trials are planned, TB-CHAMP and PHOENIx (ACTG 
A5300) (Clayden et al. 2015; ACTG and IMPAACT Networks 2015). Similar to 
V-QUIN MDR Trial using levofloxacin and placebo for intervention and control 
groups, TB-CHAMP study is aimed to test levofloxacin as chemoprevention in chil-
dren recruited from four clinical sites in South Africa. In this trial, children under 
five who are household contacts of MDR-TB patients are randomized into two 
groups taking levofloxacin or placebo every day for 6 months and followed-up for 
up to 2  years (Tuberculosis child multidrug-resistant preventive therapy: TB 
CHAMP trial 2016). PHOENIx (ACTG A5300) run by AIDS Clinical Trials Group 
(ACTG) and International Maternal Pediatric Adolescent AIDS Clinical Trials 
Network (IMPAACT) presents another different approach in which it aims to assess 
the efficacy of delamanid which is a new TB drug treatment for MDR-TB and XDR 
TB (Xavier and Lakshmanan 2014) in treating LTBI for high risk groups of house-
hold contacts of MDR-TB patients by comparing its daily use in 6 months with 
isoniazid preventive therapy then follow up study subjects in 2 years. The trial is 
planned to be conducted in Africa, South America and Asia (ACTG and IMPAACT 
Networks 2015).
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Observational studies of LTBI treatment are limited. The three randomized con-
trolled clinical trials on LTBI treatment in MDR-TB contacts that we outline here 
could well be the only research projects currently designed to address this research 
gap (Mitnick et al. 2016). In the following section, we will present issues and chal-
lenges in more detail, informed by our work in Vietnam and discussion with other 
research teams and experts in the field. Programmatic and research ethics are con-
textual, and specific settings may provide useful insights into the range of issues 
which consideration of MDR LTBI generates. In this chapter, we aim to draw on 
Vietnamese experience to illustrate and reflect on key ethical issues, which may be 
more broadly applicable in other contexts.
2.2.2  Challenges in the Use of Antibiotics as a Research 
Intervention in LTBI Treatment
2.2.2.1  How to Balance Between Uncertainties and Risk of Harm: 
A Common Issue in Public Health Practice
Medical decision-making for LTBI is replete with medical uncertainty. Diagnostic 
tools with the capacity to identify resistance patterns in LTBI are unavailable. 
Similarly, diagnostic tools capable of identifying which cases of LTBI will progress 
to TB disease are lacking. Developing appropriate responses with this diagnostic 
repertoire requires reflective engagement with medical uncertainty and the ethical 
challenges of emerging practices (Mason 2014a; Mason 2014b). An effective treat-
ment for LTBI may well be the best method to stop progression to active disease 
(World Health Organization 2011; Hill et al. 2008), but puzzling questions persist 
about who should receive treatment for LTBI. The problem is complex enough for 
LTBI cases where the index patient has drug sensitive TB, but even more compli-
cated for MDR LTBI, where high risk of progression is recognized but uncertainty 
regarding potential side effects of the drugs and the impact of preventative therapy 
persists. For LTBI cases who have been exposed to MDR-TB, there is little consen-
sus to guide clinicians and programs towards the risk/benefit of MDR LTBI treat-
ment. In contexts where existing programmatic guidelines recommend against 
MDR LTBI treatment on the basis of such uncertainty, additional difficulties are 
faced for researchers seeking to establish a study protocol, which may not align to 
traditional clinical views and practices in a study country site even if evidentiary 
equipoise is present.
In the balance between benefits and harms to receivers of MDR-TB preventive 
treatment, a default approach of ‘surveillance’ is frequently assumed in which 
“strict clinical observation and close monitoring for the development of active TB 
disease for at least two years is preferred over the provision of preventive treatment 
for contacts with MDR-TB cases” (World Health Organization 2015c). However, 
such a conclusion perhaps does not follow reasonably from the available evidence 
and resource availability in resource-limited settings. First, strict observation and 
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close monitoring in order to early detect active TB disease requires many resources 
for TB screening, diagnosis and case follow-up at a community level over a long 
period of time. In resource-limited settings where there is a lack of healthcare staff, 
diagnostic tools and competency, this approach is likely neither feasible nor sustain-
able. Even if such an approach to surveillance were in place, some may argue in 
support of providing additional chemoprophylactic agents such as isoniazid (INH) 
for contacts exposed to MDR-TB patients, thus raising a question of ethical accept-
ability for study protocols which use a placebo as a control arm.
Based on the fact that INH or RIF has been proven to reduce the risk of develop-
ing active TB by at least 60%, and widely adopted in international and national 
guidelines for LTBI as a standard treatment for those exposed to TB (World Health 
Organization 2015c; Ministry of Health 2015), the argument in favour of giving 
INH for MDR-TB contacts involves three rationales. The first reason is that a pro-
portion of contacts with LTBI will have been infected previously, or infected by 
another index patient, and so will benefit from the therapy. The second is that giving 
INH is recommended as the standard of care in many countries, and that it would be 
inappropriate to deprive people of that option because even if it is less effective, it 
still will be somewhat effective. The third reason is INH is a relatively safe drug, 
particularly for those under 35 years. For small children, on the balance of risks and 
benefits, using INH is preferred where the risk of untreated infection leading to dis-
seminated disease is high. However, considering that equipoise may be present 
given the lack of evidence to guide LTBI treatment for MDR-TB contacts, random-
ized controlled trials using placebo with periodic follow-ups could be considered 
ethical for the following reasons: (a) INH is unlikely to be effective, given the most 
proximate exposure is with MDR-TB; (b) in settings where there is a high rate of 
INH resistant TB—for example, in Vietnam, at least 17% of all newly diagnosed TB 
is INH resistant (Nhung et al. 2015)—the effectiveness will be less even if the per-
son has been infected by non-MDR-TB; (c) the current standard of care for adults is 
either passive case-finding or screening for prevalent TB, (d) INH has a degree of 
toxicity associated with its use (Denholm et al. 2014). If a drug is toxic, ineffective, 
and unlikely to benefit patients, then it cannot be ethically administered. Given the 
diagnostic and therapeutic tools available, serial follow-up by chest Xray is a prefer-
able form of active intervention that exceeds the current standard of care, and will 
detect cases early enough to reduce serious consequences and allow referral for free 
treatment.
Recognising that MDR-TB preventive treatment is important, more efforts 
should be made in finding out effective therapies when there is no standard treat-
ment, or when no proven effective and safe treatment is known to exist. This brings 
us to our second theme about assessing the effectiveness of LTBI treatment in 
MDR-TB contacts. Systematic reviews highlight the lack of data and limits of stud-
ies conducted in assessing the effectiveness of LTBI regimens available in relevant 
settings (Fraser et al. 2006; van der Werf et al. 2012). Small observational studies on 
LTBI regimens have reported promising results. In these studies, a combination of 
first and second-line TB medications, including a fluoroquinolone antibiotic, is pre-
scribed to both adult and child contacts as preventive therapy from 2 to 12 months 
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with post treatment follow-up mean periods less than 2 years comparing with pla-
cebo or no intervention. High rates of treatment completion, low rates of incident 
TB disease with low rates of adverse events and good tolerability are reported from 
the studies (Lobue and Menzies 2010; Seddon et al. 2013; Bamrah et al. 2010). Put 
together, this evidence suggests that LTBI treatment may be beneficial and further 
research on LTBI alternative therapies is necessary in producing more comprehen-
sive data on both effectiveness and safety on LTBI therapies.
As the risk of developing MDR-TB is acknowledged to be high in recent con-
tacts, the risk of serious adverse effects from any preventative treatment would need 
to outweigh the potential benefits in order to justify withholding treatment. While 
sensible responses to identified MDR-TB exposure should prioritise those at highest 
risk, the institution of a surveillance strategy instead of provision of treatment with 
potential adverse effects would preferentially advantage those at lowest risk of 
developing disease. On this basis, despite imperfect objective estimation of the risks 
and benefits of different therapeutic options, we would argue that programs may 
default towards provision of potentially effective therapy for those with MDR LTBI, 
provided reasonable measures to minimize harms (such as pharmacovigilance pro-
grams to identify adverse effects) are in place. In parallel, however, it is also contin-
gent on clinicians and programs continuing to strengthen knowledge of both risks 
and benefits associated with MDR LTBI therapy, so that future care may be opti-
mally targeted and individuals appropriately informed.
2.2.2.2  Development of Acquired Drug Resistance during 
Preventive Therapy
Research collaborators and infectious disease clinicians participating in the VQUIN 
MDR-TB Trial raised valid concerns about administering drugs with unknown 
effectiveness and the potential harm of selecting new strains of drug resistant 
TB. The use of antibiotics whose effectiveness has not been demonstrated raises 
potential problems for individuals and the community. An ineffective regimen may 
fail to protect the individual, or even result in acquired drug resistance if taken infre-
quently. Consequently, acquired drug resistance, particularly fluoroquinolone resis-
tance, may then lead to transmission of more advanced strains of drug resistant 
TB. In the case of the VQUIN MDR-TB Trial, concern hinged on two issues. First, 
fluoroquinolones (such as levofloxacin) are a part of the backbone of the standard 
regimen used to treat MDR-TB. Treatment of active TB requires effective multidrug 
therapy, in order to prevent resistance. If active disease is not excluded prior to com-
mencing preventive therapy, single drug therapy could lead to acquired drug resis-
tance. This concern underpins the reluctance of some physicians to use 
single-antibiotic preventive therapy in these patients. Second, in settings where 
LTBI is not routinely managed, clinicians and patients report reluctance to prescribe 
treatment in the absence of symptoms. In high-burden, low-income settings such as 
Vietnam, LTBI is not perceived as a disease or condition requiring treatment. Such 
concerns are compounded by lack of programmatic experience with the use of LTBI 
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therapies more generally in resource-limited settings, as clinicians have few oppor-
tunities to confidently exclude active disease and develop experience with preventa-
tive therapies.
Responding to perceptions of risk in relation to amplification of drug resistance 
is challenging, particularly when public health messaging regarding good antimi-
crobial stewardship emphasizes the need to avoid unnecessary antibiotic use to pre-
serve drug effectiveness (Doron and Davidson 2011). Some evidence suggests that 
isoniazid monotherapy to treat drug-susceptible LTBI is unlikely to contribute to 
drug resistance (Balcells et al. 2006). In fact, modeling data suggest that preventive 
therapy may actually reduce the overall prevalence of resistance in a population by 
its secondary effect of reduced propagation among cases that would otherwise have 
been generated (Fox et al. 2015). One priority is clear: assisting clinicians and com-
munity members to appropriately distinguish active from latent TB is an important 
issue if preventive therapy is to be scaled up. This requires concerted efforts to 
provide education, clear guidelines and updated knowledge of TB management and 
research.
2.2.3  Challenge in Conducting Research Using 
Fluoroquinolone in Children
A significant challenge in conducting research using levofloxacin to treat LTBI in 
contacts of MDR-TB patients is that fluoroquinolones are generally contraindicated 
in children and growing adolescents by drug manufacturers and cautiously pre-
scribed by doctors, due to theoretical concerns about the toxicity of the drug class 
(Goldman and Kearns 2011). In Vietnam, the study proposal to use levofloxacin to 
treat MDR LTBI in children under 15 years old has caused some controversy among 
local scientists and members of national ethics committee in considering appropri-
ate assessment of risks and benefits to conducting the research on children. 
Scientifically, the debate mainly revolves around possible adverse effects of levo-
floxacin to tendon and musculoskeletal system of children. This concern originated 
from an association between fluoroquinolone use and irreversible joint cartilage 
defects in juvenile animals (Ingham et  al. 1977) and reversible musculoskeletal 
events in children (Schaaf et al. 2006). Considering that children have an increased 
risk of both developing active disease and more severe disseminated forms of dis-
ease, and only indirect evidence for a link between fluoroquinolones and musculo-
skeletal harm exists, there is a strong argument for the inclusion of children in 
studies such as VQUIN. However, while strategies to deal with potential risks have 
been considered, including enhanced adverse effect monitoring of younger partici-
pants, at present the study has only been approved for adult contacts of MDR-TB.
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2.2.4  Poor Understanding about LTBI and the Use 
of Diagnostic Tests
LTBI is generally poorly understood (Colson et al. 2010). Interviews with commu-
nity members in a variety of contexts consistently identify confusion regarding the 
difference between latent and active TB, the extent of risk associated with infection, 
and the availability of treatment to prevent progression to disease (Wieland et al. 
2012). A lack of knowledge about LTBI and its attendant risks of progression to 
disease presents difficulties for the introduction of preventative therapies, particu-
larly where they involve prolonged treatment with some potential adverse effects.
Such uncertainty exists among healthcare workers as well as in the general com-
munity. In the research of LTBI therapy given to contacts of MDR-TB patients in 
Provincial Hospitals and District TB Units in Vietnam, we have identified particular 
issues including low level of knowledge of LTBI and a general lack of knowledge 
of treatment options for both active MDR-TB and suspected MDR LTBI. While TB 
is commonly known as a transmissible airborne infection, the pathways to active 
disease following exposure are still poorly understood by most healthcare staff. 
Uncertainties have been repeatedly expressed over the use of diagnostic tests for 
LTBI, the type and duration of LTBI treatment, presumably reflecting a lack of 
familiarity with preventative therapies in this context.
2.2.5  Challenges in Obtaining Informed Consent 
and Following-up Study Participants
The requirement to obtain informed consent is central to the ethical conduct of 
research involving human subjects. As clinical research has become more global, 
bringing with it a requirement to obtain consent in different places where many 
disparate values are held, the obtaining of valid consent increasingly raises a range 
of challenges. Consent practices in resource-limited settings may be impacted by 
time constraints for researchers to provide detailed research information, the lack of 
familiarity with medical research, traditionally paternalistic doctor-patient power 
dynamics and communication styles, involvement of family members and commu-
nity members in the decision making process, conflict of duty of healthcare provider 
acting as researcher (Cheah and Parker 2014; Nguyen 2016), not to mention the 
significant cultural dimensions involved in adapting (and asserting) this research 
practice in settings where it is a foreign concept (Mason et al. 2017). Suffice to say 
that obtaining consent in research on LTBI treatment presents complex issues posed 
by its research context and clinical practice in addition to the complexities of 
explaining LTBI to a naïve audience.
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Based on our experience in conducting research on LTBI therapy given to con-
tacts of MDR-TB patients in Vietnam, we outline challenges generated by different 
understandings about research and preventive treatment. When the term “research” 
is translated directly into Vietnamese, it arouses commonly-held negative percep-
tions within the lay Vietnamese population. Healthcare workers also often express 
concerns that patients will decline to participate in research studies due to these 
negative associations, and prefer to avoid the term. An inability to refer to a study as 
being “research” may obstruct appropriate consent practices, since participants may 
not be aware of the experimental nature of the involved procedures. This difficulty 
is further complicated by differing understandings about LTBI and the appropriate-
ness of preventive treatment.
The practical experience of obtaining consent in Vietnam for this study has been 
explored in series of research staff interviews, highlighting misperceptions about 
preventive therapy and the low priority people give to it. A staff member who 
worked on the community studies of the V-QUIN TB screening commented:
“Our Vietnamese common perception is that “no disease, no treatment”. Preventive treat-
ment is not a priority to our people, especially people in farming regions. Their educational 
level is low so they don’t think about preventive treatment. They only buy drugs when they 
get sick” (Study staff – N01).
With limited information about LTBI treatment in national guidelines, and spe-
cific recommendations against MDR LTBI treatment, challenges to effective con-
sent and study participation are likely. In the traditionally hierarchical Vietnamese 
healthcare system, the existence of guidelines recommending against MDR LTBI 
treatment is a strong disincentive to both clinicians and community members’ par-
ticipation in research. Research into MDR LTBI treatment may be perceived as 
being in opposition to existing recommendations, despite the limited evidence on 
which they are based.
2.2.6  Stigmatization
The stigmatization of TB may impact upon the management of and research into 
LTBI.  In research practice, we experienced that some MDR-TB patients are self 
stigmatised, or are isolated by their family members due to their disease status. Such 
patients may want to hide the disease from household contacts and neighbors (there-
fore prefer going to a private clinic to keep their privacy) and have poor medical 
adherence. Those most concerned about stigma may also avoid providing accurate 
information about their household contacts. Study staff in collaboration with local 
healthcare providers have to explore the information on household contacts by grad-
ually building the relationship between patients and their care-giver, if there is any. 
This can be achieved through talking with them and providing them more informa-
tion about TB, LTBI and preventive treatment in clinical assessments performed at 
hospitals or district tuberculosis clinics. The same stigma may drive healthy 
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household contacts with LTBI to avoid sharing their infection status with neighbors 
and friends. As a result, these infected individuals do not want any home visit made 
by NTP staff/study staff, and do not want to be contacted and asked about the 
patient. This can create difficulties and challenges in approaching potential study 
subjects who may participate in the research. It also impedes monitoring of drug 
adherence and post-treatment following up. As expressed by a study staff about 
stigmatization in TB:
“TB is a social disease. It makes participant feel ashamed of getting infection, and thus not 
wanting to talk about their disease status or being followed up for a long period of time in 
the study to have their health checked. They also avoid their neighbors knowing about the 
disease” (Study staff – S01).
2.3  Solutions for Identified Ethical Problems and Challenges
So far, we have attempted to map out a range of issues arising in the prevention of 
MDR-TB, current approaches to MDR LTBI therapy and in the context of doing a 
randomized controlled trial in LTBI with our experiences in Vietnam as an exem-
plary case of high burden TB and limited resource countries. What we will propose 
as solutions in this chapter accordingly will be general solutions to be considered in 
providing LTBI treatment and in doing MDR LTBI research. They are put forward 
in light of the nature of the problems, challenges occurring in the research practice 
and practical conditions in the setting.
2.3.1  Developing a Comprehensive LTBI Research Agenda
Clinical studies are crucial in advancing medical care. They are needed to produce 
systematic information on pathogenesis, clinical course, potential interventions and 
response to treatment. Especially in LTBI, it is important to address a key ethical 
challenge which is balancing between uncertainties and risk of harm involved in 
screening and treatment provision, and from that to derive lessons and possible 
ways to scale up interventions at the community level. Any new scientific informa-
tion or breakthroughs can bring about alterations to current accounts of scientific 
and ethical considerations about existing interventions. Concerns about how best to 
apply systematic screening of LTBI and its related accounts of risk and benefit with 
beneficiaries (Degeling et  al. 2017) is an example which can be expected to be 
resolved via promising outcome of studies on new LTBI diagnostic methods and 
indicators of reactivation risk (Dodd and Schlesinger 2017). From our experience 
drawn in the setting as outlined above, we argue that systematic research, especially 
randomized clinical trials in evaluating the effectiveness of preventive therapy for 
LTBI in the contacts of patients with MDR-TB are imperative to better inform clini-
cal decisions, to benefit future infected people and the public in general.
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2.3.2  Collaboration
Efforts toward the elimination of tuberculosis call for wide collaboration of various 
stakeholders including, but not limited to, clinicians in both public and private sec-
tors, public health practitioners (Hauck and Panchal 2009; Taylor et  al. 2005), 
researchers of all groups of expertise, funders, research communities and the public 
(Sablan 2009). This would serve as a ground for developing a comprehensive and 
balanced research agenda to inform clinical and public health practice, and to create 
sustainable research and public health platforms with long term facilities and com-
munity support. This type of collaboration can be conducted through the format of 
national and international collaborative research networks, for example, The 
Tuberculosis Network European Trials group (TBNET) (Giehl et  al. 2012), The 
Australasian Clinical Tuberculosis Network (ACTnet), The Union World Conference 
on Lung Health, and the involvement of research community, public and mass 
media. The primary aim of such collaborations is to engage relevant stakeholders 
from the beginning of a research initiative to translating research findings into prac-
tice in community level on the basis of mutual understanding of a shared account of 
vision and mission and benefit generating for afflicted population.
While collaborations are recognized as crucial to successful research schemes, 
effective collaborations, in our view, need to be characterized by ‘openness’ in 
which collaborative partners see each other having supplementary role rather com-
petitors, and a shared common interest that is to contribute to the knowledge of the 
disease for the public good through sharing data and samples. Contributing to the 
framework of global health, such an open form of collaboration is aimed to protect 
the common interest towards the global health and stress on the duty to protect 
affected members of the public and the public good.
2.3.3  Provide Education and Raise Community 
Awareness of LTBI
Provide necessary scientific training to healthcare workers and study staff.
In order to help ensure success in LTBI treatment program and research initia-
tives, given the issues related to the lack of knowledge of current LTBI diagnostic 
methods and therapies which we have outlined above, training on scientific knowl-
edge of LTBI and the role of research in producing systematic information to inform 
practice is necessary. It is importantly required for frontline health workers who 
directly provide healthcare to patients and communities where are most needed. 
These can include pharmacists, nurses, clinicians, and public health officers who 
serve in hospitals and community clinics. As the first and sometimes the only link 
to essential healthcare services in limited resource settings, this group of experts 
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hold great potential to make a direct impact on individual and community health 
through supporting research activities, delivering good healthcare services and 
community consultation. Studies and our experience have shown that interaction 
and communication between health workers/study doctors and patients/study par-
ticipants brings significant effect to the level of recruitment, medication adherence 
and treatment outcomes (Horne 1999; Dwamena et al. 2012; Sumartojo 1993). In 
this case of LBTI and TB control, it is knowledge of current approaches for TB 
control and prevention available locally and internationally, important health impli-
cations of LTBI, the need to provide LTBI treatment, and associated adverse events 
and their management that needs to be provided and updated to health workers and 
study staff to equip them in delivering healthcare services at the best level and 
standard.
Public education.
When research participants are subject to possible sources of vulnerability, the 
consent process with consideration of some additional protections should aim to 
protect the safety and the rights of research participants and benefits of afflicted 
population. This duty should be taken on by ethics committees, physician- 
researchers, local and international research institutions and other entities involved 
in the research in designing, reviewing and implementing research projects. At the 
same time, the consent process should be developed in a way that will enhance 
“voluntary actions that are intended to help or benefit another individual or group of 
individuals” (Eisenberg and Mussen 1989a) of research participants, family mem-
bers and community.
In addressing the key issues in consent and the awareness of LTBI and the role of 
MDR LTBI treatment in the prevention of TB, we propose that educating the public 
about the nature of research and its necessity for the improvement and advancement 
of science in medicine as an overarching plan to make people understand more 
about the meaning of research and therefore to encourage their participation. For the 
purpose of raising community awareness of LTBI and the importance of doing more 
research on this subject, along with the general public education as mentioned 
above, it also requires providing education programs about clinical research and 
LTBI to the population and disseminating information about LTBI treatment in the 
forms of national guidelines with references to international guidelines, health pro-
motional materials and community consultation. This form of education should be 
carried out on a long term and regular basis. Specific aims of these plans would be 
(1) to change negative attitude towards research, e.g. ‘being a Guinea Pig’; (2) to let 
people have a better understanding of research, scientific methods in treatment and 
healthcare, and the role of research in support of medicine; and (3) to maintain trust 
and nurture pro-social behavior that will enhance “voluntary actions that are 
intended to help or benefit another individual or group of individuals” in society 
(Eisenberg and Mussen 1989b) for research and public health agenda.
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2.3.4  Strengthen Communication Between Research Ethics 
Committees (RECs) and Researchers
Facilitating cooperation between RECs and scientists/researchers is necessary for 
mutual understanding and a rapid response in LTBI research context. One way to 
achieve this is to establish and maintain communication between researchers and 
RECs throughout research scheme. On the part of RECs, effective communication 
strategies with researchers will help the RECs to improve transparency in their deci-
sions, understand practical challenges in doing research in the local context, develop 
expertise in a particular topic area, understand researchers’ perspectives and make 
researchers mutually understand the challenges and duties of RECs. This mutual 
understanding would eventually place both RECs and researchers in an engaged 
process whereby research participants are better protected and research can be con-
ducted effectively without being subject to unnecessary delays, misunderstanding 
and uncertainties.
2.4  Conclusion
In this chapter, we have outlined key issues in preventative therapies for MDR-TB 
and challenges in conducting research to assess potentially effective MDR LTBI 
therapies. We have raised possible solutions, derived from our own work in the 
Vietnamese setting in juxtaposition with broader ethical considerations. We have 
argued that preventive therapy for MDR-TB should be a high priority. There is a 
need for appropriately conducted systematic research to address the spread of 
MDR-TB in limited-resource settings globally. Engagement with local cultural 
norms and priorities is critical for ensuring that such research is conducted in both 
ethical and effective fashion.
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Chapter 3
Providing Universal Access While Avoiding 
Antiretroviral Resistance: Ethical Tensions 
in HIV Treatment
Bridget Haire
Abstract The provision of effective antiretroviral therapy is an ethical imperative, 
and global access to antiretroviral drugs is an important aspect of this. The other less 
recognised aspect of effective HIV management is in ensuring that HIV does not 
become resistant to the drugs used in treatment (and increasingly also in preven-
tion), as multi-drug resistant HIV poses a major threat to the sustainability of cur-
rent responses to HIV control. In resource-constrained environments, the rapid 
scale up of access to life-saving anti-HIV treatment was achieved using a public 
health approach that standardised antiretroviral regimens, minimised laboratory 
monitoring, and devolved responsibilities from clinicians where necessary. In recent 
years demand for antiretroviral treatment has increased due to new understandings 
of the clinical importance of early treatment, but global investment has declined. 
Exponential growth of the population using antiretrovirals without careful monitor-
ing increases the risk of significant antiretroviral drug resistance. In this chapter, I 
consider the example of single-drug interventions to prevent parent-to-child HIV 
transmission, and how the implementation of that strategy increased health risks for 
mothers. I argue that while global antiretroviral scale up must continue, laboratory 
monitoring at individual and national levels needs to improve to maintain treatment 
effectiveness, and protocols for moving people from failing regimens need to be 
strengthened.
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With an estimated 36.9 million people living with HIV worldwide (WHO 2018), the 
provision of effective antiretroviral therapy (ART) is an ethical imperative. Ensuring 
that people with HIV can access ART is an important part of this, but another less 
recognised aspect is ensuring that the HIV does not become resistant to the drugs 
used in the treatment, as multi-drug resistant HIV poses a major threat to the sus-
tainability of current responses to HIV control. There are, however, ethical tensions 
about striking the right balance between maximising ART access and minimising 
the risk of the emergence of drug resistant HIV. In resource-constrained environ-
ments these tensions are concerned with relative investment in drugs as compared 
with laboratory monitoring, and sometimes ‘blaming’ discourses regarding non- 
adherent people with HIV.
In 1996 it was established that antiretroviral drugs used in combination could 
control HIV replication (‘viral load’) in individuals and thus prevent HIV from 
destroying the CD4 cells that protect against infection (Arts and Hazuda 2012). 
Over time, the control of viral replication was shown to prevent people with HIV 
from becoming immune suppressed and developing the opportunistic infections 
associated with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) (Moore and 
Chaisson 1999). ART could also reverse immune damage, to some extent (Kaufmann 
et al. 2005). Thus, combination ART could prevent AIDS and prolong, and perhaps 
save, the lives of people with HIV. Initial drug regimens however were often highly 
complex. The drugs were associated with serious side effects and were prohibitively 
expensive, as were the laboratory tests used to monitor both the impact of the drugs 
on viral load (viral load tests) and the degree of immune functionality (measured by 
CD4 cell tests). Hence there were significant barriers to access to these regimens for 
the majority of people living with HIV.
The stark injustice of life saving medication being inaccessible to the majority of 
those living with HIV, concentrated predominantly in low and middle income coun-
tries (LMIC) and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, was the catalyst for a worldwide 
treatment access movement that put pressure on governments, drug companies and 
non-government organisations to find solutions to make ART access more equita-
ble. In response to the treatment access movement the World Health Organization 
launched its first ‘public health’ program for HIV treatment, an approach that aimed 
for universal access, starting with the initial goal of getting 3 million people onto 
ART by 2005, the ‘3 by 5 Programme’ (WHO 2003a, b). This approach was sup-
ported and facilitated by the creation of two major donor organisations – The Global 
Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria (the Global Fund), and the (US) President’s 
Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)  – that supplied drugs to LMIC 
(Smart 2006). Even with these donors, it was not feasible to mimic the highly indi-
vidualised approach to ART prescription in affluent countries that relied heavily on 
expensive and resource-intensive laboratory monitoring. Accordingly, the program 
standardised both ART regimens (the drugs) and monitoring (including tests that 
measure the effect of the drugs on viral load and those that measured the impact of 
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HIV on the immune system). In some LMIC, nurse-practitioners performed roles 
usually reserved for doctors. Thus, the ‘public health’ approach was designed to 
facilitate ART delivery in resource-poor settings with limited health infrastructure, 
simplifying, standardising and devolving responsibilities as required (WHO 2003a, 
b). (Note, while the ‘3 by 5 Programme’ was the initial iteration of this approach, 
the WHO has continued to champion universal access programmatically using a 
public health approach. For simplicity’s sake, in this chapter I will treat the WHO 
universal access/public health approach as a strategy that started with ‘3 by 5’ and 
has continued to this day, albeit with various adjustments and shifts in 
nomenclature.)
This chapter will first describe the mechanism for the development of HIV drug 
resistance and detail elements of the ‘public health’ approach to ART. It will then 
discuss how and why the ‘public health’ approach to ART in lower income countries 
was a reasonable trade-off that enabled widespread access to HIV treatment, despite 
increasing the likelihood of the development of drug resistance. In the medium to 
long term, however, strategies to avoid, contain and diagnose drug resistance will be 
critical to the sustained management of the epidemic, and to reaching the global 
goal of virtual elimination of new HIV infections. The tensions between a public 
health approach that focuses on access and an increasing emphasis on effective use 
of resources will be explored, using the history of mother-to-child prevention pro-
grams as a case study. The increasing use of ART-based prevention strategies for 
sexual transmission will also be considered. Finally consideration will be given to 
issues likely to impact on responses to drug resistant HIV in a context where guide-
lines recommend universal treatment, but access to uninterrupted drug supplies and 
high quality monitoring standards are limited.
3.2  Drug Resistant HIV
HIV is a highly mutable virus, meaning that as it replicates it makes errors and 
hence changes and evolves over time within the human host. These changes are 
random, though the principles of natural selection mean that over time and in the 
absence of treatment, changes that make the virus more replication competent will 
crowd out those that make it less fit.
Drug resistant HIV develops when a person is taking ART that is insufficient to 
fully suppress viral replication. This creates the conditions of selective pressure, so 
that viral copies that are less sensitive to the drugs have a competitive advantage 
over other viral copies, and begin to push the evolution of HIV in the particular body 
to become increasingly resistant. If the ART regimen is sufficient to fully suppress 
replication, this will not occur and hence resistance will not develop. Standard ART 
regimens will fully suppress viral replication if adherence is good, if no biological 
event disrupts individual drug absorption and metabolism, and unless the person 
was infected with a strain of HIV that had already evolved to be resistant to some or 
all of the drugs in the particular ART regimen.
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In terms of the potential development of ART resistance, all ART drugs are not 
equal – the strength of antiretroviral action can differ, and some drugs are more 
vulnerable to the development of resistance. ART drugs work by targeting and 
blocking selected enzymes or proteins of HIV that enable it to replicate and infect 
cells. Changes to particular HIV regions that the ART drugs target make the drugs 
less effective. Some regions of HIV are more prone to mutation than others, and 
some drugs lose their effectiveness in the face of HIV evolution faster than others. 
For example, a single mutation reduces susceptibility to the drug nevirapine (this is 
called having a low genetic barrier to resistance) (Luber 2005). Drug resistance is 
also not a black and while phenomenon, in that a particular mutation or set of muta-
tions may diminish susceptibility to particular drugs, but not completely stop work-
ing in terms of controlling HIV replication. For example, a person taking ART who 
has a detectable but low viral load may have some drug resistance, but may also be 
receiving clinical benefit from the drugs.
ART drugs are classified into classes that are determined by where and how they 
target HIV replication. While ART drugs within the designated classes work in 
slightly different ways, developing resistance to one drug in a class can also confer 
either resistance (or at least reduced sensitivity) to other drugs in the class. 
Accordingly, if a person has to change from one ART regimen to another, the sec-
ond regimen needs to comprise drugs to which there is no likely pre-existing cross 
resistance to maximise the likely success. Further, in high income countries like 
Australia, when a person is first diagnosed with HIV, genetic resistance testing 
determines whether the person has been infected with a resistant strain of HIV that 
is less likely to respond optimally to standard treatment (if resistance is found, dif-
ferent regimens are used).
In summary, there are four main causes of drug resistance: acquiring a drug resis-
tant strain; being prescribed a regimen that is incompletely suppressive (usually 
single or dual therapy combinations, or a triple combination that is too weak); 
non-adherence (failing to take pills as prescribed and on time); and taking drugs 
intermittently (where fluctuating blood levels of medication allow HIV replication 
under selective pressure).
3.3  A Word on HIV Monitoring
There are two highly significant tests used to monitor HIV disease progression and 
the effectiveness of ART in an individual: Tests that count CD4 cells per cubic ml of 
blood, and viral load tests. CD4 cells are immune cells that are targeted by HIV. A 
healthy person would have a CD4 cell count in excess of 500. Once a person’s CD4 
cell count drops to 200 or below s/he is at serious, imminent risk of HIV-related 
opportunistic infections. A person with HIV who has a CD4 cell count above 200 
but below 500 is showing some HIV-related damage. There is a strong relationship 
between declines in CD4 cell count and disease progression, and in CD4 cell 
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recovery and effective ART treatment (Mellors et al. 1997). CD4 counts are thus a 
useful tool in the management of HIV disease.
Viral load tests measure viral RNA in the peripheral blood. The higher the viral 
RNA number is, the greater the level of viral replication, and the greater the risk of 
disease progression (Mellors et al. 1996). ‘Undetectable viral load’ means that viral 
replication is suppressed below the level of detection on the test used (tests have 
become much more sensitive since they were first available). An undetectable viral 
load is the individual goal of ART treatment. At the strategic level, having 90% of 
people who know their HIV status on ART, and 90% of those with an undetectable 
viral load is a current global goal (UNAIDS 2017).
3.4  Key Elements of the ‘Public Health’ Approach to HIV
To maximise access to life-saving ART, WHO prioritised getting ART drugs into the 
bodies of people with HIV, and maximising the capacity to deliver ART by pro-
cesses of standardisation, simplification and, where necessary, syndromic manage-
ment rather than laboratory monitoring. The core underlying principles were 
identified as urgency, equity and sustainability (Macklin 2004).
Standardised first line and second line ART regimens were a critical aspect of the 
approach. In determining the drugs used in these regimens, a balance had to be 
struck between user-friendliness (pill burden, dosing routine, side effect profile), 
effectiveness (probability of viral load suppression), and cost (WHO 2003a). 
Further, the second line regimen had to be effective against the ART resistance 
likely to develop (for whatever reason) to the drugs in the first line regimen. (Third 
line regimens are also detailed in guidelines.) These standardised regimens were 
presented as algorithms that were flexible enough to allow for the different avail-
ability of certain drugs in particular countries due to purchasing arrangements, and 
to allow some substitutions for people who had different health needs, such as those 
who were pregnant, had other infections like TB or viral hepatitis. The standard 
algorithms for first and second line treatment have changed since the first iteration 
of the WHO universal access program, as further information about drug efficacy 
emerged (for example, a first line regimen recommended in 2003 was found to be 
insufficient of suppress very high viral loads found in people initiating treatment in 
advanced disease), and alternative drugs became available to replace ART associ-
ated with significant toxicities (Gulick et al. 2004). Both inadequate viral suppres-
sion and high levels of side effects are significant for the development of 
resistance  – incomplete suppression create the conditions for the emergence of 
resistance, and ART toxicities can reduce adherence, also potentially resulting in 
incomplete suppression.
The issue of how to prioritise people for treatment access was another critical 
element of the approach. Utility, equity and concern for the worst-off (the principle 
of maximin) were key considerations (Macklin 2004). Initial WHO guidance for 
resource constrained settings recommended that ART should be commenced in 
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those at high and proximate risk of clinical disease progression and/or death (those 
diagnosed with Stage IV HIV disease regardless of CD4 cell count; those with CD4 
cell counts below 200 regardless of disease staging; those with stage III HIV disease 
and CD4 counts below 35) (WHO 2003a). Targeting ART at those at experiencing 
or at imminent risk of serious HIV disease was acceptable in a moral sense as it 
prioritised treatment for those with greatest clinical need, and it also greatly reduced 
the pool of people eligible for treatment, as only a fraction of those living with HIV 
would require treatment under such guidance. The downside to this approach was 
that many people tested and found HIV positive would not be eligible for treatment, 
increasing the potential of significant loss to follow-up (Rosen and Fox 2011). It is 
important to note that while WHO guidelines play an important normative role in 
shaping standards, they are in no sense binding, and the expectation of their use is 
that countries draw from them and adapt them according to relevant contextual fac-
tors (WHOF 2006).
Laboratory monitoring was simplified in WHO guidance documents, with CD4 
cell tests recommended but not mandatory both at baseline and for subsequent mon-
itoring of treatment efficacy at 6–12 month intervals. Haemoglobin testing would 
occur depending on the drug regimen (it was required if AZT was included.) Other 
blood work such as white blood cell and liver function tests were to be ordered as 
determined by clinical symptoms, and viral load testing  – the gold standard for 
measuring ART response – not even mentioned. Developing guidelines for the sur-
veillance of drug resistance was however one of the itemised strategic actions of the 
initial ‘3 by 5 Programme’ (WHO 2003a, b). The low level of laboratory monitoring 
was contentious, given that the longer a person stays on a failing regimen, the 
greater the opportunity both for the development of resistance and the loss of clini-
cal benefit. Accordingly, a randomised control trial (RCT) investigated whether 
(and to what extent) ART could be delivered safely without laboratory monitoring 
(the DART study). This study, first reported in 2009 and published in 2010, found 
that differences in outcomes occurred after the second year of treatment. Investigators 
argued that this justified only introducing CD4 cell tests at 24 months, and prioritis-
ing spending on ART drugs rather than resource-intensive monitoring (DART Trial 
Team 2010). Of note, this study only looked at clinical outcomes, in people who 
already had advanced HIV disease, not at the drug resistance outcomes.
3.5  Changes in Eligibility for ART
At the inception of the global universal access program, there was no clear scientific 
evidence as to the best time to commence ART, except that it clearly prolonged life 
for those who commenced with low CD4 counts (below 200). From the mid 1990s, 
many argued on the basis of modelling from other infectious diseases that HIV 
replication should be suppressed as early and as completely as possible. ‘Hit hard, 
hit early’, was the catch cry (Ho 1995). Mitigating against this was the fact that seri-
ous HIV disease did not usually occur until 6–10 years after infection, and the 
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problem that ART regimens in the mid to late 1990s were hard to take (with high 
pill burdens, specific food and or fasting requirements for dosing particular drugs, 
and high rates of side effects). Of course the rapacious cost of ART was also signifi-
cant – for example in 1997, 6 months use of the drug AZT was costed at $US 800 – 
it is now an estimated $US 237 (Pharmacychecker 2017).
From the late 90s, a series of RCTs clarified issues pertaining to treatment com-
mencement, indicating that better outcomes were achieved with earlier treatment 
initiation. These included CIPRA-HT001, a study in Haiti that showed that people 
who started ART with CD4 counts higher than 200 had a significantly reduced risk 
of death (Severe et  al. 2010). This result was underscored by findings from the 
SMART Study, which was designed to test whether structured ART treatment inter-
ruptions were safe (people with HIV took treatment interruptions or ‘holidays’ for 
a variety of reasons, including relief from side effects). The SMART Study found 
that not only did treatment interruptions increase the risk of disease progression at 
any CD4 level, but that the greater time spent with a CD4 count below 350, the 
greater the risk of HIV disease progression and death (Strategies for Management 
of Antiretroviral Therapy Study Group 2008). These findings together were the 
catalyst for a revision of WHO guidelines for resource-constrained environments to 
recommend ART commencement at the higher CD4 level of 350 (WHO 2009). Two 
further studies have been critical in pushing WHO ART guidelines toward recom-
mending treatment at higher levels – the HPTN 052 Study, which showed that early 
ART treatment reduced onward HIV transmission to sexual partners by 96 % 
(Cohen et al. 2011), and then the START Study, reported in 2015, which showed a 
clear clinical benefit from early treatment initiation (at CD4 levels of 500 and 
above), with people who initiated treatment immediately showing significant bene-
fit compared with those who did not initiate ART until their CD4 counts had dropped 
to 350 or below (The Insight START Study Group 2015). This finding resulted in a 
revision of WHO guidelines, such that immediate ART therapy is now recom-
mended for any person diagnosed with HIV, regardless of CD4 cell count.
This change to WHO ART guidelines is based in robust evidence about the benefi-
cial impact of immediate ART on health, and where taken up in national guidelines, 
may reduce the numbers of people diagnosed with HIV who get lost to follow -up 
due to being deemed ineligible for immediate ART. It also has some problematic 
implications. Firstly, it increases exponentially the estimates of people living with 
HIV who require ART, which may increase the likelihood of rationing taking place 
where supplies are inadequate. Secondly, notwithstanding the fact that some 
resource-poor countries may continue to align their national guidelines to earlier 
iterations of the WHO guidance, the expansion of eligibility for ART puts greater 
demand on ART stocks, and increases the risks of stock-outs, which could have an 
impact on the development of drug resistance. Even if drug supplies were perfect, 
human adherence will not be, so the logical result of millions more people taking 
lifelong ART over many decades must be an increase in drug resistance. Thirdly, 
increasing the number of people eligible for treatment may increase pressure at 
country level to continue to prioritise wider access to ART drugs at the expense of 
improving monitoring, exponentially expanding the risk that large scale poorly 
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monitored ART use poses with regard to development and transmission of drug 
resistant ART (at higher CD4 cell counts, the risk of death is far more remote that at 
lower one, so the risks of drug resistance are not so obviously balanced by the over-
whelming benefit of prevention of illness and death). Fourthly, there is a major para-
digm shift in terms of health communication in shifting ART treatment from 
something required for people with ill or declining health status to treating people 
who are well, and requiring this treatment to be maintained over a lifespan. Thus, 
well-targeted health promotion, innovative and effective adherence support, 
improved monitoring to detect signs of resistance early, and affordable, tolerable 
second, third and fourth line (or rescue) regimens all need to be integrated into this 
ambitious expansion of ART eligibility.
3.6  ART in Pregnancy in LMIC: A Case Study
“Once started, antiretroviral therapy is for life….” states the introduction to the ‘3 
by 5 Programme’ (WHO 2003a, b). The reason that ART treatment, once started, is 
to be continued for life is to maximise health by maintaining a supressed HIV viral 
load, and preventing the development of drug resistance that could occur if ART is 
started and stopped (as the various drugs in combination ART regimens have differ-
ent half-lives, it is complex to stop a regimen in a way that ensures that there is no 
lingering, suboptimal antiviral activity that could provide the conditions for drug 
resistance to develop). A brief look at the history of interventions aimed at prevent-
ing vertical infection (from mother-to-child), however, shows that the maxim of 
ART therapy being for life has frequently not been the case with regard to provi-
sions of ART to pregnant women. The case study below, I suggest, is an example of 
how the prevention benefit of ART was initially prioritised above the healthcare of 
pregnant women with HIV.
The prevention of HIV transmission from mother to child (PMTCT) was the first 
instance of effective biomedical HIV prevention, achieved in 1994 by the ACTG 
076 study (Connor et al. 1994). Famously, this breakthrough spawned a series of 
placebo-controlled trials in LMIC using less intensive, cheaper regimens (see Wade 
et al. 1998). This chapter will not delve into the ethical quagmire surrounding the 
use of placebos despite an effective preventative intervention having been estab-
lished, as this has been exhaustively covered elsewhere (see Macklin 2001). Instead, 
this chapter will recount and analyse what occurred programmatically in PMTCT 
following the results of the HIVNET 012 Trial, which established that a single dose 
of the ART drug nevirapine to both mother and infant reduced transmission in the 
first 14–16 weeks of life by nearly 50% in a breastfeeding population (Guay et al. 
1999). This regimen, while not as effective as the ACTG 076 regimen, was consid-
ered to be a major breakthrough for LMIC. Unlike ACTG 076, it did not require 
Caesarian section, it did not require treatment uptake in mid pregnancy, it did not 
require intravenous ART during delivery, and it appeared to work in breastfeeding 
populations. All of these factors made it significantly more feasible to implement at 
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scale in LMIC. (Of note, when the Food and Drug Administration looked at the data 
from this trial, it found serious anomalies in the conduct of the trial. Accordingly 
questions remain regarding the validity of this study’s results (Cohen 2004; Institute 
of Medicine Committee 2005).
One of the issues with the early WHO guidelines that recommended ART treat-
ment only for people with signs of immune damage and/or HIV disease was the 
problem it created regarding pregnant women with HIV. Despite pregnant women 
in high income countries achieving excellent health and prevention outcomes with 
early ART, it meant that pregnant women in LMIC without clinical signs of HIV 
disease and with CD4 counts above levels recommended for treatment were deemed 
not to require ART for their own health, despite knowledge that ART would reduce 
transmission to infants. This created an artificial distinction between the treatment 
use of ART and prophylactic use in pregnant women – prophylactic use only was 
recommended. In other words, a pregnant woman with HIV but in otherwise good 
health would get access to ART to protect her infant, but this would be short-term.
Despite its appeal in terms of feasibility, the nevirapine single-dose1 regimen had 
a very specific problem. Although a potent ART drug, nevirapine as noted earlier 
has a low genetic barrier to resistance, and a long half-life. Thus the drug persists in 
the blood stream for a long time after a dose, but at concentrations insufficient to 
fully suppress viraemia. This creates a good environment for the development of 
drug resistance, and a single dose is enough for this to occur. Exposing women and 
their infants to this regimen could thus potentiate the development of drug resis-
tance, which might reduce the efficacy of the intervention for any subsequent preg-
nancies, and limit treatment options for the mother and potentially for the infant, 
should the infant be HIV infected despite the use of nevirapine prophylaxis.
The publication of the long-term results HIVNET 012 trial was accompanied by 
a controversial commentary by Karen Palmore Beckerman (2003) that argued that 
the implementation of single-dose nevirapine would leave ‘between 20–100% of 
women who received prophylaxis resistant to [the class of drugs to which nevirap-
ine belongs]’. While the claim that up to 100% would develop resistance was hyper-
bolic (Wilfert 2003), the issues she raised were prescient. Beckerman argued that 
pregnant women with HIV should be treated with effective ART regimens both for 
their own sake and to enable their survival – citing the devastating example that 
three women who participated in HIVNET 012 died of AIDS within 56 days of 
delivery. She suggested that adding a combination ART ‘tail’ to the nevirapine regi-
men could reduce the likelihood of resistance (a suggestion later taken up in WHO 
guidelines in 2010), and that the primary focus be on sustained and sustainable ART 
treatment.
Beckerman’s (2003) article built on an earlier commentary of hers (Beckerman 
2002) where – again in response to the publication of short-course trial to reduce 
mother-to-child transmission – she argued that the risks of programs using single or 
1 This regimen is referred to in the literature as ‘single dose’ though it in fact involves two doses – 
one to mother and one to infant. For simplicity’s sake I’m adopting the common usage.
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dual ART drugs were increasing as the prospect of good treatment access in LMIC 
grew, given that women who had used short-course ART would be more likely to 
experience treatment failure due to drug resistance. With limited treatment options 
available, failing first line ART options would increase the risk of the mother dying, 
which would in turn increase risk for surviving children, Beckerman argued.
There is a considerable literature on the clinical implications of nevirapine resis-
tance, with much focus on whether or not it ‘fades’ over time such that subsequent 
introduction of an ART regimen containing nevirapine might still have clinical util-
ity as either treatment or prophylaxis (Johnson et  al. 2005; Lockman et  al. 
2007, McConnell et al. 2007; Stringer et al. 2010). Regardless of whether or not 
resistance ‘fades’ to a level that would result in nevirapine-based combination being 
effective in women exposed to single-dose PMTCT, it is clear that, as others have 
noted, the prevention of transmission to infants took precedence over the health 
security of women with HIV, at least for a time when these single-dose nevirapine 
programs were widespread (Eyakuze et al. 2008). As noted in a meta-analysis, these 
programs ultimately resulted in a high burden of drug resistance in women and 
children, with significant potential to contribute to increase failure of first line ART 
therapy (Arrivé et al. 2007; Samuel et al. 2016).
From 2003, WHO guidance recognised that pregnant women should not be pre-
scribed ART regimens likely to result in drug resistance, and had specifically pro-
vided a warning about the single-dose nevirapine regimen. By 2012 the policy of 
women cycling on and off ART with successive pregnancies was superseded by 
‘Option B+’2 – a recommendation that pregnant women with HIV should be pre-
scribed fully suppressive ART regimens, and kept on them for life, regardless of 
CD4 cell count or HIV disease stage. While Option B+ has not been fully imple-
mented in all LMIC, it is the only PMTCT option that fully applies the ‘rules’ of 
effective ART treatment – that regimens should be fully suppressive, and taken for 
life. Ironically, there have been reports of significant loss to follow up with these 
programs, perhaps because women with HIV had being educated to accept intermit-
tent therapy unless they themselves were in poor health (Tenthani et al. 2014)
Reflecting on the history of PMTCT, there are tensions between the prevention 
imperative, emerging knowledge about optimal timing of ART, the status of wom-
en’s health, equity, and the constraints of the early stages of implementation of the 
morally praiseworthy but hugely ambitious goal of universal access. In the late 90s 
and early 2000s, the nevirapine single-dose regimen had appeal in terms of its 
simplicity, its low drug burden, and the fact that it could be implemented during 
2 Option B+ was added to two previous options, option A and Option B. Briefly, Under Option A, 
women received ARV prophylaxis prenatally and during delivery, along with an antiretroviral post-
partum “tail” regimen to reduce risk of drug resistance, and their infants received postpartum 
antiretroviral prophylaxis throughout the duration of breastfeeding. With Option B, all pregnant 
and lactating women with HIV were offered ARV – beginning in the antenatal period and continu-
ing throughout the duration of breastfeeding. At the end of breastfeeding those women deemed to 
not yet require ARV for their own health would discontinue the prophylaxis and continue to moni-
tor their CD4 count, eventually re-starting ARV when their CD4 cell count fell below 350 cells.
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delivery. In short, it had been shown to be better than nothing at a time when ‘noth-
ing’ was still seen in some quarters as an acceptable comparator. While the shift 
away from the single dose regimen happened relatively quickly (at least in terms of 
normative guidance, if not in practice), its impacts are likely to live on in the form 
of suboptimal response to first line ART regimens and transmitted drug resistance 
(Kébé et al. 2014).
It took 6 years from the initial reporting of the SMART study – which showed 
that starting and stopping ART was detrimental – for PMTCT guidance to recom-
mend life-long treatment for women who initiated ART due to pregnancy. On the 
one hand, this seems shocking. On the other hand, due to PMTCT programs even 
with their limitations, women in LMIC tended to access ART earlier than men, and 
hence have had lower risk of death from HIV disease than men (Beckham et al. 
2016; Taylor-Smith et  al. 2010), so further strengthening care access for women 
may have seemed inequitable in some contexts. It could be argued that the history 
of PMTCT in LMIC demonstrates a programmatic emphasis on prevention without 
adequate regard for the potential development of drug resistance, and subsequent 
drug failure in mothers and pregnant women with HIV. It is probably more reason-
able, however to say that the complexity of implementing best practice PMTCT in 
the midst of programmatic scale up of ART access in a context where knowledge 
about ART changed significantly made compromise and incremental steps forward 
hard to avoid, if not inevitable. Nevertheless, exposure to sub-optimal therapy 
through PMCTC programs has left a legacy of drug resistance in some settings 
(Rowley et al. 2016; Cambiano et al. 2013).
Now that lifelong ART from the point of diagnosis is the WHO recommendation 
for everyone, exponentially more people will be accessing ART prior to any clinical 
indications of HIV. That number will be expected to keep increasing, as ART access 
should enable people with HIV to live normal lifespans. In this context the risk of 
the development of drug resistance must necessarily increase, given the difficulties 
of maintaining good-enough adherence for large populations over long periods of 
time. While the low-level clinical monitoring approach to HIV disease had an 
important role in enabling the ‘public health’ roll out of ART in LMIC, this approach 
would not be sustainable in populations accessing treatment much earlier in HIV 
disease.
3.7  Addressing ART Resistance
Addressing the risk of drug resistance requires strategic action at many levels. 
Action is required at the community and local levels, to develop and sustain pro-
grams that support individual adherence and that work to address systemic prob-
lems that can affect adherence (by improving systems of clinic appointments and 
transport and drug access, for example). Scaling up monitoring and investing in 
viral load testing will become critical so that people who are on failing regimens – 
for whatever reason – are identified quickly and either supported to improve adher-
ence or switched to second line therapy. Development of viral load and CD4 testing 
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technologies that are better adapted to use in remote and/or resource constrained 
settings, and which do not require highly trained laboratory staff, should obviously 
be prioritised to reduce the dependence of remote and under-resourced clinics on 
distant laboratory services. Research and development into new effective ART that 
are well tolerated and are effective against current common resistance patterns in 
HIV  – and new modes of delivery, such as periodic injectables  – are of course 
highly desirable.
While some commentators have suggested withdrawing or withholding ART 
from non-adherent people rather than providing practical support and transitioning 
them as necessary to second line ART, this perspective positions poor adherence as 
an individual (and moral) issue (Chawana & Bogaert 2011). A perspective of adher-
ence that is informed by public health and human rights, on the other hand, recog-
nises that while adherence is an individual behaviour, it is highly determined by 
structural factors and social context, which can and should be modified to make 
adherence as simple and as socially acceptable and socially desirable as possible. 
There is evidence that people in certain demographics (such as young people) may 
have more trouble with adherence (Haire 2015). Withholding or withdrawing ART 
on the basis of poor adherence from young people, for example, would not only 
remove the benefits of early treatment from the demographic with the most to gain, 
it would also remove the prevention benefit from a population group highly likely to 
be sexually active. Accordingly, it would seriously undermine global targets for 
universal access. Recognising, working with, and seeking to ameliorate adherence 
problems in the social groups that experience them, while advocating for ART that 
provide different delivery options such as periodic injection, makes sense from a 
public health and human rights perspective. Universal access goals aim for 90% of 
people with HIV knowing their status, 90% of those being on ART and 90% of 
those having undetectable viral loads by 2020 (UNAIDS 2017). Using 2017 figures, 
this would require more than 14 million more people to be on ART within 2 years – 
considerable investment in supportive and responsive programming to achieve, sup-
port and sustain adherence must be factored into such ambitious plans.
3.8  Biomedical Prevention and Drug Resistance
Biomedical prevention is the use of antiretroviral drugs to prevent HIV transmis-
sion. It includes ART use after exposure to prevent transmission (post-exposure 
prophylaxis or PEP), ART use prior to exposure in HIV negative people at high risk 
of HIV acquisition to prevent transmission (pre-exposure prophylaxis or PrEP), and 
ART use in HIV positive people to fully supress HIV replication, preventing onward 
transmission to sexual/injecting partners (‘treatment-as-prevention’). The latter 
two strategies are highly effective and well supported by both RCT and observa-
tional data (data on PEP is less robust as it has not been tested in an RCT). PMTCT 
programs contain elements of two biomedical approaches: maternal viral load is 
reduced to reduce infectiousness, like treatment as prevention, and infants receive 
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ART to prevent or abort HIV acquisition, similar to PrEP and PEP. The preventative 
aspect of early ART treatment is one aspect (in addition to the clinical benefit for the 
person with HIV) that makes implementation of ART programs in people immedi-
ately after diagnosis attractive to governments and donors – it has the potential to 
reduce onward infection. Similarly, while investment in PrEP programs has been 
slow, there is a steady increase in availability (AVAC n.d.).
In adherent participants, both PrEP and treatment -as -prevention have shown 
close to 100% protection in trials (Grant et al. 2014; Anderson et al. 2012; Bavinton 
et al. 2018; Rodgers et al. 2016, 2018; Cohen et al. 2011). There has however been 
at least one verified example of HIV transmission occurring in an adherent PrEP- 
taker, due to being exposed to HIV that was resistant to both the drugs used in the 
PrEP combination (Knox et  al. 2016). With regard to treatment -as -prevention, 
having a lowered viral pool in a population would be expected to translate into 
fewer transmissions at population level. To have confidence in treatment -as -pre-
vention at an individual level, however, the sexual partner with HIV needs to be 
confident that his/her viral load is sustained at an undetectable level, and that 
requires access to viral load tests at regular intervals. A combination of PrEP 
and  treatment-as-prevention is being trialled in LMIC in serodiscordant couples, 
where the HIV positive partner is initiated on ART and the negative partner on PrEP, 
until such time as the positive partner has a sustained undetectable viral load. For 
this to succeed programmatically, viral load monitoring is required for the ongoing 
protection of the negative partner (should the positive partner be non-adherent, the 
negative partner would run the risk of acquiring HIV, and possibly drug resistant 
HIV), and to maintain the efficacy of the regimen for the positive partner. In this 
new era of biomedical prevention and all people with HIV being eligible for ART, 
the need to implement viral load monitoring at scale is increasingly being recog-
nised (WHO 2016).
3.9  Monitoring Drug Resistance Beyond the Individual
In high income countries, when people are diagnosed with HIV, a blood sample is 
sent to a laboratory for genotypic testing – a form of analysis that provides informa-
tion of whether the person has been infected with a strain of HIV that is resistant (or 
less susceptible) to particular ART drugs. The person is then prescribed an appropri-
ate regimen that will be effective against the person’s HIV.3
In LMIC surveillance of HIV drug resistance includes country specific surveys 
of HIV genotypes to determine incidence of transmitted drug resistance in 
3 Genotyping HIV also has some risks in high income countries, such as the potential to use these 
data to track ‘infection trees’ – map pathways of infection. This is ethically problematic in terms 
of maintaining an enabling environment, as it uses information gleaned from people who test posi-
tive for HIV intended to maximise their health outcomes for a purpose that could potentially lead 
to criminalisation.
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populations, through a WHO network of designated laboratories (Bertagnolio et al. 
2008). In LMIC this information is directed towards making country or region-wide 
decisions about first line treatment, and other programs such as the drugs used in 
post- exposure prophylaxis. In addition, early warning indicators provide informa-
tion about critical aspects of whether/how people are accessing ART. These include 
on- time pill pickup; retention in care at 12 months following ART initiation; whether 
pharmacies experience stock-outs; prescribing practices (whether regimens pre-
scribed meet national or international guidance regarding adequate viral suppres-
sion); and, in settings where viral load testing is implemented, viral load suppression 
at 12 months following ART initiation. These early warning indicators are well 
designed to signal structural problems, like interruptions in drug supply and poor 
prescriber compliance with guidelines, and access issues such as whether drug col-
lection systems are ‘good enough’ (reliable and convenient) for people to be able to 
pick up pills on time. In 2017, WHO reported ‘brisk’ implementation of these sys-
tems, with 26 countries having completed or currently completing surveys, and 14 
having reported data (WHO 2017). Of note, in countries or regions where drug 
stock outs are frequent, the benefit of putting people with high CD4 counts onto 
ART would need to be weighed against the individual and public health concern of 
the development of resistance, should ART be repeatedly started and stopped (for 
people with CD4 counts lowered by HIV, the clinical benefit of the ART is likely to 
outweigh the risk). Ideally, of course, the stock out issues should be addressed 
effectively.
3.10  Conclusion
Although hope and hype about vaccines and cures for HIV circulate, ART is cur-
rently the most effective tool for the elimination of HIV as a public health threat, 
both in terms of treatment and prevention (in combination with or as an adjunct to 
condoms). Preventing the emergence of drug resistance at levels that compromises 
treatment efficacy and ART based prevention is crucial.
With PMTCT programs, the emphasis on the simplest and cheapest regimens, 
maintained well after the implications for drug resistance were apparent, has already 
compromised optimal response to ART for too many women and children. This can-
not be repeated in the expansion of ART access. Standardised first, second and third 
line ART has facilitated the rapid scale up of ART in LMIC, and saved many lives. 
To build on this, a highly strategic approach to monitoring drug resistance in popu-
lations and individuals needs to be taken, with viral load monitoring supporting 
more rapid change to second and third line therapies as required, rather than running 
the risk of keeping people on failing regimens. Supporting adherence at health ser-
vice, community, family and individual levels also requires investment – investment 
in research, to find context-appropriate solutions that work, in communities to pro-
vide labour, and in systems to streamline the medical and dispensing processes and 
practices that can facilitate or hinder access and adherence. While refinements in 
drug development may make adherence simpler in years to come, the challenge is 
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to ensure that programming now is responsive to problem of resistance, and that 
existing drugs and monitoring are carefully deployed to optimise longevity of tools 
currently available.
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Chapter 4
Ethics and Antimalarial Drug Resistance
Phaik Yeong Cheah, Michael Parker, and Nicholas P. J. Day
Abstract There has been impressive progress in malaria control and treatment over 
the past two decades. One of the most important factors in the decline of malaria- 
related mortality has been the development and deployment of highly effective 
treatment in the form of artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs). However, 
recent reports suggest that these gains stand the risk of being reversed due to the 
emergence of ACT resistance in the Greater Mekong Subregion and the threat of 
this resistance spreading to Africa, where the majority of the world’s malaria cases 
occur, with catastrophic consequences. This chapter provides an overview of strate-
gies proposed by malaria experts to tackle artemisinin-resistant malaria, and some 
of the most important practical ethical issues presented by each of these interven-
tions. The proposed strategies include mass antimalarial drug administrations in 
selected populations, and mandatory screening of possibly infected individuals 
prior to entering an area free of artemisinin-resistant malaria. We discuss ethical 
issues such as tensions between the wishes of individuals versus the broader goal of 
P. Y. Cheah (*) 
Mahidol Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit (MORU), Faculty of Tropical Medicine, 
Mahidol University, Bangkok, Thailand 
Centre for Tropical Medicine and Global Health, Nuffield Department of Clinical Medicine, 
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 




The Ethox Centre, Nuffield Department of Population Health, University of Oxford,  
Oxford, UK 
Wellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities, Nuffield Department of Population Health, 
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
e-mail: michael.parker@ethox.ox.ac.uk 
N. P. J. Day 
Mahidol Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit (MORU), Faculty of Tropical Medicine, 
Mahidol University, Bangkok, Thailand 
Centre for Tropical Medicine and Global Health, Nuffield Department of Clinical Medicine, 
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
56
malaria elimination, and the risks of harm to interventional populations, and con-
clude by proposing a set of recommendations.
4.1  The Problem, Context and Background
Malaria is the most important parasitic disease of man. It remains a major cause of 
death in tropical countries, and an important cause of illness, particularly in child-
hood. There were an estimated 435,000 deaths from malaria in 2017, of which over 
90% were in Africa (Global Malaria Programme, World Health Organization 2018). 
Although there has been impressive progress in malaria control and treatment over 
the past two decades in recent years progress has stalled and there has been a resur-
gence of malaria in Southeast Asia, where antimalarial drug resistance is increas-
ingly prevalent (Global Malaria Programme, World Health Organization 2018). 
One of the most important factors in the decline of malaria related mortality since 
the 1990s has been the development and deployment of highly effective treatment 
in the form of artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) (Bhatt et al. 2015). 
ACTs are currently the mainstay of antimalarial treatment throughout the world, 
recommended by the World Health Organization as the first line treatment globally 
for falciparum malaria (World Health Organization 2016a). Their widespread 
deployment, along with the expanded use of insecticide treated bed nets, accounts 
for a large part of the reduction in malaria deaths in Africa over the past decade 
(White et al. 2014).
The effectiveness of current and future interventions are, however, at risk from 
the emergence of new forms of drug resistance. In the early 2000s malaria parasites 
that were partially resistant to the artemisinins emerged in Western Cambodia. The 
problem was identified and characterised in 2008 (Dondorp et al. 2009; Noedl et al. 
2008). The hallmark of infection by these resistant parasites was slow parasite clear-
ance rather than outright treatment failure (Dondorp et al. 2009). These slow clear-
ing infections were associated with mutations in the PfKelch13 gene, with multiple 
PfKelch13 mutations described (though each parasite only carried one) (Ariey et al. 
2014). By 2014 slow clearing malaria infections caused by PfKelch13 mutation- 
carrying artemisinin resistant parasites could be found in Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, 
Vietnam and Yunnan province in China, and by 2016 Pfkelch13 mutants were iden-
tified in Arunachal Pradesh state in northeastern India (Ashley et al. 2014; Tun et al. 
2016; Mishra et al. 2016).
The initial response to the emergence of artemisinin resistance had two aspects. 
The major concerns were that: i. artemisinin resistance might lead to or combine 
with partner drug resistance resulting in resistance to ACTs. That is, to the loss of 
the drug combinations that are the mainstay of malaria treatment; and ii. that were 
this to be the case, artemisinin resistance and then ACT resistance then has the 
potential to spread from Southeast Asia to Africa, where the majority of the world’s 
malaria cases occur, with catastrophic consequences. There are precedents for this 
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latter concern; in the last 60 years first chloroquine resistance and then sulfadoxine- 
pyrimethamine resistance arose in Western Cambodia and subsequently spread to 
Africa, leading to millions of deaths (Verdrager 1986; Roper et  al. 2004; Trape 
et al. 1998).
Recognizing the risks and consequences of spread to Africa, the World Health 
Organization initially developed a plan to contain rather than eliminate the problem 
(World Health Organization 2011). However, this approach was criticized by some 
at the time who called for initiatives aimed at eliminating all malaria in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion, on the grounds that the resistant parasites were in fact already 
at that stage contained (Dondorp et al. 2017). They argued that the view that elimi-
nation would be an appropriate strategy was supported by mathematical modelling 
that showed that as malaria was controlled and transmission fell, the proportion of 
infections that were resistant would increase – the ‘last man standing’ would be 
resistant (Maude et al. 2012). This modelling suggested that resistance could not be 
eliminated without eliminating all malaria in the affected regions.
Bolstered by advocacy for global malaria eradication by the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, the WHO did eventually change its policy from containment to 
one of elimination (Global Malaria Programme WHO 2015), but the discovery 
through molecular studies that PfKelch13 mutations had arisen spontaneously and 
independently multiple times within the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) led to 
what some saw as a reduction in the urgency to eliminate malaria to prevent the 
‘spread’ of resistant parasites (Takala-Harrison et al. 2015). Surveillance for resis-
tance and an aim to eliminate malaria everywhere was now the policy of WHO 
(World Health Organization 2017; Global Malaria Programme WHO 2016). This 
necessarily spread resources more widely and reduced the focus on drug resistance. 
Despite this there has been considerable investment in malaria control and elimina-
tion efforts in the GMS, with at least initially substantial reductions in malaria trans-
mission (Dondorp et  al. 2017). These successes have, however, to some extent 
masked the continued threat of increasingly drug resistant malaria parasites emerg-
ing and spreading in the region  – as the mathematical modelling had predicted 
(Maude et al. 2009) – with outbreaks of artemisinin-resistant malaria occurring in 
areas previously considered malaria free (Imwong et al. 2015).
In the 10 years since the first description of artemisinin resistance the concern 
that ACT resistance and failure would develop has come to pass, with rising meflo-
quine resistance on the Thai-Myanmar border and piperaquine resistance in 
Cambodia, Thailand, Southern Laos and Viet Nam (Phyo et al. 2016a; Amaratunga 
et  al. 2016; Imwong et  al. 2017). Recent evidence that most of the resistance to 
dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine is due to the geographical spread of a particularly 
fit artemisinin-resistant parasite clone which has picked up piperaquine resistance 
has rekindled the debate about whether urgent focus should be placed on an acceler-
ated effort to eliminate artemisinin-resistant malaria in Southeast Asia, with the aim 
of preventing the spread of ACT resistance to Africa (World Health 
Organization 2016b).
Although the global pipeline for new malaria drugs in development is healthier 
than it has been for decades, all the most promising candidates (schizonticidals, that 
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kill the asexual blood stage of the parasite which causes the clinical manifestations 
of malaria) are at least five years away from being available in the market (Phyo 
et al. 2016b). The RTS,S/AS01 malaria vaccine which recently received a favour-
able scientific opinion from the European Medicines Agency (EMA) is only par-
tially protective (Vandoolaeghe and Schuerman 2018). This means that protecting 
the efficacy of the currently available antimalarial drugs is of global importance. 
The spread of ACT resistance to Africa would threaten the loss of millions of lives, 
especially those of young African children. This will be a global health issue  – 
untreatable malaria worldwide arising from resistance in Southeast Asia. A problem 
arising in a specific location that has the potential to threaten global health is not 
unique to malaria. Many ‘global health problems’ arise in low-income settings, for 
example outbreaks of Ebola in West Africa and Zika in South America, and are 
recognized as having worldwide implications. In the case of Ebola and Zika the 
World Health Organization formally declared a ‘Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern’ (PHEIC), but for the emergence of artemisinin resistant 
malaria in Southeast Asia WHO has as of 2018 declined to do this despite some 
experts calling for it to do so (World Health Organization 2016b; Talisuna 
et al. 2012).
4.1.1  How Should the Problem of Artemisinin Resistant 
Malaria be Tackled?
There is now broad agreement amongst experts that to prevent the spread of 
artemisinin- resistant P. falciparum it is necessary to completely interrupt P. falci-
parum transmission (Maude et  al. 2009), and that a programme of accelerated 
malaria elimination is warranted in the GMS and surrounding areas. The scientific 
consensus is that a combination of strategies is required to achieve this (Dondorp 
et al. 2017; World Health Organization 2017). These include:
 1. Ongoing surveillance with a network of village malaria workers (VMWs) in 
endemic areas trained and equipped to provide early detection and treatment of 
malaria cases.
 2. Targeting of the asymptomatic malaria reservoir in so called malaria ‘hotspots’, 
identified through surveys of healthy individuals employing highly sensitive 
methods of parasite detection such as large volume quantitative PCR and highly 
sensitive rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs). This may take two forms:
 a. Mass drug administration (MDA) -WHO agrees that targeted mass antima-
larial drug administration may play an important role in malaria elimination 
(World Health Organization, Global Malaria Programme 2015a).
 b. Mass screening and treatment (MSAT) using novel highly sensitive 
diagnostics.
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 3. Vector control with insecticide treated bed nets, despite these being less effective 
in the GMS than in Africa because of the biting habits of many of the vector spe-
cies (biting in the forest rather than in houses, and in the early evening or 
morning).
 4. Targeting ‘source’ populations such as forest workers and migrants, rather than 
‘sink’ populations secondarily affected. This requires an understanding of trans-
mission dynamics and population movements – important in the GMS where 
cross border movement/migration is common.
 5. Mandatory screening may be necessary of possibly infected individuals entering 
an area free of artemisinin-resistant malaria (Houston and Houston 2015; 
Tatarsky et al. 2011).
 6. Use of effective antimalarial treatments. Most currently approved ACTs consist 
of only two drugs (a fast acting short half-life artemisinin and a longer half-life 
partner drug) and are vulnerable to the development of resistance. The testing 
and deployment of new triple artemisinin-based combination therapies (TACTs) 
has been recommended, and several of these are currently being tested in the 
GMS and beyond (Dondorp et al. 2017).
In the face of the global threat posed by increasing ACT resistance, there is there-
fore now an emerging expert consensus that the combination of strategies outlined 
above is the most effective way of halting or slowing its international spread provide 
strong ethical arguments for their rapid adoption. Each of the interventions listed 
above present a wide range of interconnected challenges  – including, scientific, 
technological, governmental, economic and ethical – all of which will need to be 
overcome if the elimination of malaria in the region is to be achieved. In addition to 
these practical scientific, and political challenges, the success of each of the inter-
ventions also depends upon the addressing of a number of important practical ethi-
cal questions, which need to be taken into account in their design and implementation. 
In the next section, we outline some of the most important practical ethical issues 
presented by each of the interventions proposed above.
4.2  Practical Ethical Issues Arising in These Interventions
4.2.1  Ongoing Surveillance
In many countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion, networks of VMWs are the 
cornerstone of malaria surveillance and the delivery of malaria-related interven-
tions. These networks are usually run either directly by the national malaria control 
programmes (NMCPs) or by NGOs working with the NMCPs, but may also be put 
in place by private providers such as companies running palm oil plantations. The 
coverage of such networks has increased impressively in many areas in SEA, par-
ticularly in border areas, conflict zones and areas underserved by government health 
programmes. VMWs are consulted by villagers suffering from fever, and are 
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equipped with RDTs and antimalarial treatments. Where a substantial proportion of 
febrile illnesses are indeed caused by malaria VMWs are a valuable resource for the 
local population. However, the success of malaria control and elimination efforts 
increasingly means that a diminishing proportion of the febrile illnesses they 
encounter are caused by malaria. Unfortunately, VMWs are not usually equipped to 
deal with these alternative causes of illness. This means that as malaria rates decline 
there is a risk that villagers will cease consulting VMWs as more of them are told 
that because their fever is not clinical malaria infection, no diagnosis or treatment of 
the cause of their illness is available or offered. Unless these village workers are 
retrained for a wider role as ‘village health workers’ able to manage other febrile 
illnesses or simple primary health problems, they will become increasingly irrele-
vant and demotivated. The consequences of this would be diminishing effectiveness 
of the malaria surveillance network itself, at the point in the elimination process 
when it is most needed and, in the absence of a wider role, for the goal of malaria 
elimination becoming a disincentive for the VMWs (and NMCPs), for many of 
whom being a VMW is a source of their livelihood. This suggests that, even if the 
elimination of malaria is the primary goal, there are strong arguments in favour of 
the provision of resources for access to health care beyond malaria in the region.
4.2.2  Mass Drug Administration (MDA)
MDA in the context of malaria elimination consists of mass treatment with a schi-
zonticide to kill the asexual blood stage of the parasite which causes the clinical 
manifestations of malaria combined with a transmission blocking drug to kill game-
tocytes. Giving such treatment to all members of a community should eliminate the 
asymptomatic parasite reservoir and speed up the interruption of malaria transmis-
sion. Where and when it is warranted has been the subject of much debate, but the 
consensus is that MDA should be targeted at communities with high transmission 
and a large asymptomatic reservoir (World Health Organization 2011; von Seidlein 
and Dondorp 2015). This requires a functioning surveillance system to identify such 
communities, with surveys of healthy individuals with highly sensitive tests to esti-
mate accurately the scale of the asymptomatic reservoir.
There are a number of important ethical considerations when determining when 
and where to use MDA. The first of these arises out of the fact that MDA by its 
nature involves administering drugs to individuals who will not benefit directly 
from the treatment, i.e. to healthy people in the interests of the wider community 
and the broader goal of elimination. In the case of transmission blocking drugs this 
is the entire community, and for the schizonticidal drugs this is the substantial pro-
portion of the community who are not infected with malaria parasites. However, if 
the MDA is effective and malaria is eliminated from the area, all individuals will 
benefit indirectly by living in a malaria free community. In the GMS the 
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schizonticide currently used in MDA is dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine (DP), 
which in the treatment of malaria is considered a safe drug. Studies of the safety of 
DP in this context have shown that DP is safe (Tripura et al. 2018), but widespread 
deployment of DP exposes much larger numbers of individuals such that its rare but 
serious side effects may occur (Cheah and White 2016). The transmission blocking 
drug currently used in MDA is primaquine, which targets the transmissible sexual 
gametocytes not killed by the schizonticide but has little or no impact on the asexual 
parasites which cause disease. Primaquine is an oxidative drug which causes hae-
molysis (the rupture of red blood cells) in G6PD-deficient individuals (median 8% 
of the population in malaria endemic areas) when given in the large doses needed to 
radically cure vivax malaria (killing the hypnozoites in the liver) (Howes et  al. 
2012). However to kill gametocytes (rather than cure malaria) a single much lower 
dose is required, one considered safe to be administered to all individuals without 
prior G6PD testing (World Health Organization, Global Malaria Programme 2015b; 
Bancone et al. 2016).
A second ethically significant consideration is a worry that there is a risk that 
with the widespread deployment of antimalarial drugs in MDA the resulting 
increased drug pressure may itself lead to drug resistance, particularly in the case 
where elimination is not achieved. It has been argued on theoretical grounds that 
this is unlikely, but the risk however low highlights the importance of achieving 
elimination in areas where MDA is deployed (White 2017). This suggests that the 
initiation of MDA is only ethically justified where there is a genuine commitment to 
complete the elimination task. Once the process of MDA has begun, important ethi-
cal issues are presented relating to the question of when such an initiative should 
be ended.
Thirdly, the effectiveness of MDA is predicated upon high population coverage 
(World Health Organization 2017; Newby et al. 2015). Achieving this is a challenge 
for several reasons: explaining the rationale for taking antimalarials when asymp-
tomatic can be difficult in the absence of an understanding of the underlying scien-
tific concepts, target communities are often remote with poor access and populations 
can be highly mobile. For these reasons, effective community engagement efforts 
are essential, so that individuals are informed of the risks and benefits of malaria 
elimination efforts in general and MDA in particular (Adhikari et  al. 2016; Peto 
et al. 2018). For effective community engagement those implementing MDA need 
to understand and adapt the information they provide and the form of the engage-
ment they adopt, to the cultural and practical requirements of each community. 
Engagement with community leaders is essential, and coverage can be promoted by 
offering healthcare alongside MDA (Sahan et al. 2017; Pell et al. 2017). Effective 
community engagement may also minimize risks of coercion or counterproductive 
misunderstanding of the aims of the public health authorities (Parker and Allen 
2013). The ethical issues around these concerns are similar in some respects to those 
encountered in the context of vaccination campaigns.
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4.2.3  Mass Screening and Treatment (MSAT)
Mass screening and treatment of village populations has been suggested as an alter-
native strategy to MDA for speeding up malaria elimination. Its advantage over 
MDA is that only those individuals with proven asymptomatic malaria infection 
will be exposed to antimalarial drugs and their attendant risks, negating many of the 
ethical concerns described in the MDA section above. However, the likely success 
of this is limited by the sensitivity of the tests available for detecting low levels of 
parasites in the blood. Because the current tests are laboratory based there is inevi-
tably considerable delay between sampling and result, which appears to limit the 
effectiveness of MSAT (von Seidlein 2014). Highly sensitive rapid diagnostic tests 
have now been developed, but these are only now being tested in the field (Slater 
et al. 2015). Such tests have the potential to be much quicker but they are not as 
sensitive as the laboratory based tests, and it possible that up to half of asymptom-
atic carriers will be ‘missed’. However, the contribution to malaria transmission of 
individuals with very low parasitaemias at the time of testing is uncertain, and the 
results of studies of the field effectiveness of MSAT with highly sensitive RDTs are 
awaited with interest. If MSAT with highly sensitive RDTs does turn out to be effec-
tive, effective community engagement will be as important as it is with MDA.
4.2.4  Vector Control
The distribution of insecticide treated nets (ITNs) in Africa has had a major impact 
on malaria there, and as a result it has become almost an article of faith in the global 
malaria community that ITNs should be considered the most important single inter-
vention in the battle against malaria (Bhatt et al. 2015). In a WHO-sponsored meet-
ing on tackling artemisinin resistant malaria in the GMS the chairman suggested 
that all the additional resources being made available to counter resistance in the 
region should be spent on ITNs (NPJD personal communication). Unfortunately, 
Southeast Asian malaria vectors and populations do not behave like African vectors 
and populations, with most transmission occurring in the forest rather than in dwell-
ings (Gryseels et al. 2015; Smithuis et al. 2013a). Several studies have now con-
firmed the limited efficacy of bed nets in malaria elimination effort in this region 
(Smithuis et al. 2013b; Satitvipawee et al. 2012). An important ethical issue here is 
around resource allocation, and overcoming established (but not evidence-based) 
pro-ITN sentiment amongst international and national policy makers. ITNs do have 
an important role to play and are relatively cheap to deploy, but given the evidence 
of differences in vector behaviours in Africa and the GMS, the relative allocation of 
limited resources should be driven by evidence-based health economics studies 
(Drake et al. 2015).
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4.2.5  Targeting ‘Source’ Populations
In the GMS, malaria transmission is concentrated in poor, hard-to-reach, highly 
mobile populations. Transmission is mainly occupationally related, highest among 
men who travel into forested areas to work. Many of the most at-risk populations are 
disenfranchised minority groups, often living in border regions, with little or no 
health infrastructure. Understanding the drivers of transmission in these populations 
entails acquiring better knowledge of population movement/migration, much of 
which is ‘illegal’. Working with these populations requires sensitivity not only to 
the cultural contexts but also to the uncertain legal status of many of the individuals. 
Several of the more endemic areas are mired in armed conflicts, and many popula-
tions are vulnerable as refugees or economic migrants without papers. The area 
currently with the highest endemicity in the GMS, for example, is Rakhine State in 
Myanmar, currently undergoing considerable civil strife and large-scale movement 
of populations. NGOs, government workers and researchers have to work within 
their own externally determined constraints, limiting their ability to engage ‘source’ 
populations. Even if the not inconsiderable task of eliminating malaria from many 
of these areas were to be achieved, political difficulties, the mobile nature of these 
populations, and changes in the ability to access them would leave them vulnerable 
to the reintroduction of malaria. Furthermore, as immunity will have waned because 
of the intervention the public health consequences of this reintroduction could 
potentially be worse than if malaria had not been eliminated in the first place.
4.2.6  Mandatory Screening
There are a number of situations in which mandatory screening for asymptomatic 
malaria may be indicated to prevent individuals unwittingly spreading drug resistant 
malaria parasites. Following the disastrous importation of cholera into Haiti by 
African UN peacekeepers (leading to 8300 deaths), for example, a call has been 
made for Southeast Asian Peacekeepers to be screened for malaria before they travel 
to missions in Africa (Houston and Houston 2015). This would prevent peacekeep-
ers from importing drug resistant malaria to a drug sensitive region, and could be 
implemented by the UN. Another situation where mandatory screening could poten-
tially be introduced in the context of eliminating artemisinin-resistant malaria 
within the GMS, would be screening local people moving between areas where 
malaria has and has not been eliminated. Although practically difficult to imple-
ment, this has the potential to be of real importance in geographical locations with 
highly mobile populations – such as along the Thai-Myanmar Border. There are a 
number of practical barriers to implementing such a policy, which make it unlikely 
to be introduced at present. However, its possibility raises important ethical ques-
tions about the legitimacy of overriding personal autonomy in the global public 
interest and its limits.
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4.2.7  Triple Artemisinin Combination Therapies (TACTs)
The rationale for TACTs is similar to that of triple or quadruple therapy in HIV, 
tuberculosis, leprosy and other infectious diseases – to prevent the development of 
resistance. Two TACTs are currently being studied in 16 sites in Asia and 1 site in 
Africa (web identifier: NCT02453308): dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine + meflo-
quine; and artemether-lumefantrine + amodiaquine. The combination of a short act-
ing artemisinin with two long acting partner drugs ensures that parasites are less 
likely to encounter only one long acting partner drug at any one time, minimizing 
the chance of resistance developing. In addition, it is hypothesized that these triple 
therapies could exploit potential inverse relationships between the parasite molecu-
lar resistance mechanisms to the paired long-acting partner drugs. It is thought that 
the wide implementation of triple therapy in malaria will slow the spread of 
multidrug- resistant malaria in areas where artemisinin and partner drug resistance is 
well established, and slow down or prevent the emergence of drug resistance in 
areas where resistance has not yet emerged. It is in the latter case where TACTs 
should be most effective.
There are several ethical issues to be considered here. TACTs differ from other 
examples of combination therapy in that the objective is to prevent antimalarial drug 
resistance at the population rather than at the individual level. Unlike in chronic 
infections such as TB and HIV development of ACT resistance within an individual 
patient during treatment is rare. Hence individuals are potentially exposed to the 
additional side effects of three rather than two drugs for little or no benefit to them-
selves; it is against the interest of the individual patient (usually a child) to take three 
rather than two drugs. If the strategy works the benefit will be to the population, 
which will only indirectly benefit the individual. In addition, TACTs are expected to 
be most effective at countering resistance in areas where resistance has not yet 
developed to any of the components, so that the long acting partner drugs will pro-
tect each other from the development of resistance and both will protect the short 
acting artemisinin component. Hence the areas where they will be most effective 
will be the ones where currently ACTs remain highly effective at the individual level.
Preliminary evidence of triple therapy is promising but safety and efficacy data 
are not widely available yet. Even if evidence is available, populations where ACTs 
still work such as in Africa where the majority of malaria cases are in children under 
five, may not readily change their prescribing behaviours. Other practical problems 
might be access to the triple therapy, availability of co-formulated drugs and the 
problem of substandard and falsified drugs especially in the private and informal 
sectors (Liverani et al., Chap. 5, this volume).
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4.3  Summary of Ethical Considerations
Above we have attempted to illustrate the ethical complexity of the implementation 
of the strategies widely agreed by experts to be necessary for the control of resis-
tance to antimalarial drugs. It is clear that there are strong ethical arguments in 
favour of the implementation of such strategies in the global public interest. 
However, the considerations outlined above suggest that such interventions raise 
important ethical questions both about the nature and scope of implementation itself 
and about the obligations of countries both outside and within the region to those 
who are to bear its costs. The success of an elimination strategy based on these ele-
ments will depend upon these problems being addressed. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we summarise what we consider to be some of the most important ethical 
tensions and outline some preliminary thoughts about ways these might be 
addressed.
4.3.1  Autonomy and Consent Versus the Global Benefit
There are a number of different ways in which the implementation of the interven-
tion strategies above raises important questions about respect for autonomy. In some 
cases, these interventions may lead to tensions between the interests and wishes of 
individuals and the global benefit. During implementation of each strategy, individu-
als in selected communities are subjected to interventions – ‘treatment’ or surveil-
lance  – not for their own good but for the common good of current and future 
populations both locally and internationally (see discussion on common goods in 
Chaps. 8 and 9) (Jamrozik and Selgelid, Chap. 1, this volume-a; Smith and Coast, 
Chap. 17, this volume). Under current circumstances, such interventions are volun-
tary: making MDA compulsory or imposing travel restrictions on people who have 
come from areas with artemisinin resistant malaria is not considered achievable or 
justified at present. However, it is possible that as in other global health contexts this 
judgement might change and that individuals may lose their right to opt out of, for 
example, MDA. Draconian measures have been taken to contain dangerous conta-
gions such as H5N1 influenza, SARS, MERS-CoV, Ebola virus, Lassa fever, and 
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, which involved restriction of liberty in order to 
protect the public. Were compulsory approaches to be considered in the context of 
malaria, this would present important questions about the legitimacy of restrictions 
of liberty per se but also questions about how this was in fact undertaken, and about 
the nature of the obligations of the wider global community – particularly wealthy 
countries – to those who are subjected to such interventions in the global health 
interest.
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Questions about autonomy also arise in the context of voluntary approaches. 
Where individuals and their communities are being asked to decide about participa-
tion in the strategies outlined above, it is vital that best efforts are made to ensure 
that any consent they give is grounded in a good understanding of the implications. 
However, the evidence is that valid consent is likely to be difficult to achieve in such 
contexts. This places particular importance on the roles of wider communication, 
community participation, political involvement and other forms of public engage-
ment preceding and during the intervention. It has to be acknowledged that even in 
the context of well-resourced, evidence-based approaches to consent and commu-
nity engagement, understanding is likely to be partial given the complexities of 
malaria transmission and how these inventions work. This need not mean that the 
choice to participate is invalid but it does mean that the moral basis for the interven-
tion cannot rest on consent alone, even when the choice to participate is voluntary. 
This suggests that those who are responsible for the conduct of such strategies have 
obligations to ensure that they are conducted to high ethical standards, and that 
appropriate protections, and possibly compensation, are in place.
4.3.2  Risk Benefit
The potential benefits of malaria elimination are substantial, including the direct 
burden averted and economic growth through improved educational attainment and 
productivity; these gains were estimated recently to far outstrip the costs required to 
achieve them (Purdy et al. 2013). That said it is clear from the discussion above that 
those who bear the consequences of malaria elimination efforts are not those who 
will benefit directly. The majority of the populations with the highest prevalence of 
resistant malaria and of submicroscopic malaria in Southeast Asia are poor and 
mobile forest workers (Phommasone et al. 2016; Tripura et al. 2017). This is unsur-
prising as vulnerability to malaria – as is also true of many other infectious dis-
eases – is largely a consequence of social determinants of health such as poverty, 
malnutrition and insufficient access to healthcare. Malaria burden is both a conse-
quence and an illustration of global inequities. These populations are already bur-
dened by their circumstances and environments. Yet they are the very individuals 
who will likely to be shouldering the burdens of any global intervention to curb 
resistant malaria. In the case of MDA, entire communities are treated whether or not 
they are unwell with malaria. That means that many individuals who are neither ill 
nor carriers of the parasite will be asked (or required) to take drugs and therefore be 
at some risk of potential adverse drug reactions. This uneven distribution of indi-
vidual risks and inconveniences – that is individuals in SEA shouldering the burden 
for the benefit of good health outcomes primarily in the interests of populations 
elsewhere – is a key moral challenge. Whilst at the macroeconomic level the costs 
of malaria elimination are outweighed by the benefits, this may well not be true at 
the level of the individuals involved. Important ethical questions concern the ques-
tion of when, if at all, the imposition of risks of harm on (often vulnerable) 
P. Y. Cheah et al.
67
individuals is legitimate in the interests of others and the limits of this. The ethical 
questions here concern not only those related to whether the imposition of such 
burdens is justified but also, where this is the case, both the approach adopted to 
such implementation and the nature and scope of our obligations to those upon 
whom it is imposed. Is there, for example, an obligation to compensate such 
populations?
4.3.3  Data and Sample Sharing
Ethical issues also arise with regard to the international collaboration required to 
ensure high scientific and public health standards in the interventions. This is impor-
tant because it is the achievement of such high standards (and hence the potential for 
success) that justify the imposition of risks and restrictions of liberty on vulnerable 
populations. In order to make the most informed decisions about planning interven-
tions to eliminate malaria, there is a need to ensure that there is access to as much 
good quality data as possible. That is, it depends crucially upon data sharing. 
However, there is generally a lack of transparency and confidence in the quality of 
available malaria data. This can be due to poor quality data and underreporting of 
cases, which can in turn be due to variable availability of diagnostic tools such as 
rapid diagnostic tests and blood slides, unsurprising given that data are frequently 
collected under resource-starved conditions. This contributes to the lack of trust in 
the data on antimalarial resistance, and in the data used in mathematical modeling 
and the resulting predictions. An additional key problem is that many national 
malaria control programmes do not readily share their malaria data for political, 
economic and national security reasons. Data related to population movement and 
migration that could aid interventions such as MDA and engagement with “source 
populations” are, for example, particularly difficult to access. Although there is 
advantage in data sharing, it is also acknowledged that it can pose a number of ethi-
cal challenges around issues of privacy, potential stigma and economic harms 
(Mishra et al. 2016; Bull et al. 2015; Cheah et al. 2015). This suggests that questions 
about the ethical tensions between the interests of individuals and the global health 
interest also arise at the level of institutions, health ministries, and countries.
4.3.4  Scientific Disagreement About the Best Way Forward
We outlined a number of proposed interventions above, and given the current state 
of the evidence there are valid debates in the scientific community about what action 
or actions are appropriate where. Interventions such as TACTs and MDA are still 
under study. An important, as yet unresolved, scientific debate is about the way 
resistance spreads or emerges. There are data supporting both sides of the argu-
ment – geographical spread of sporadic vs. spontaneous distributed emergence (Lu 
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et al. 2017). However, there is also a limited window of opportunity to act. There are 
strong moral reasons for acting to prevent the spread of resistance both within and 
beyond Southeast Asia. Inaction will almost inevitably lead to a repeat of history – 
the loss of safe, inexpensive and highly effective treatments and an increase in cases 
of severe malaria and related deaths. It may also mean that a once in a generation 
opportunity, capitalizing on the combination of the availability of political will and 
effective tools to take a big step towards the eradication of malaria, will have been 
missed. There remains, however, a degree of scientific uncertainty. This raises ethi-
cal questions about the level of scientific consensus required for action. 
Understanding is likely to remain imperfect. Is it legitimate to initiate strategies 
such as those outlined above on the basis of good but imperfect understanding? The 
answer to this question cannot be ‘never’ because there is widespread agreement 
about the urgency of the situation and a residual degree of scientific uncertainty will 
always remain.
4.4  Conclusions
In this chapter, we have described practical ethical issues arising in currently pro-
posed interventions (and the lack of them) to reduce the risk of the movement of 
resistance to the current best antimalarial drugs from Southeast Asia to Africa, as 
well as to prevent resistance emerging in Africa. Whilst strong ethical reasons for 
such interventions are provided by the seriousness and scale of the threat and the 
existence of a degree of scientific consensus on this strategy, its implementation is 
ethically complex. We have outlined some of the most important practical ethical 
problems presented by each of possible components of the proposed strategy, and 
have also argued that even if the various interventions were to be ethically justified 
this would not be the end of the ethical debate. We have argued that important ethi-
cal questions about the mode of implementation of the interventions and about the 
obligations of the wider community to those they affect would remain.
Some of the most important of such considerations are those relating to fairness 
in the selection of interventional populations. All populations which meet a set of 
criteria for an intervention, be it MDA, TACT or travel restrictions, should where 
practical have the same intervention. The intervention should be evidence-based 
and justified, and all relevant stakeholders should be involved in the decision- 
making process and have meaningful input into the deliberations. The manner and 
context in which decisions are made should be reasonable, fair and transparent.
In addition to ethical considerations relating to the selection of such populations, 
we have argued that important obligations exist for those countries and governments 
that can afford it to assist and perhaps to compensate those individuals who are 
subject to such interventions and may experience harms as a result of their partici-
pation (Upshur 2002). Meeting these obligations may call for the provision of com-
pensation, for example where businesses suffer due to lack of mobility or where 
people suffer from side effects of MDA. Or perhaps, in the form of community level 
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benefits such as improved healthcare facilities. An important aspect of the obliga-
tions of the wider world to those who live in the region is that any intervention is 
well-planned and adequately resourced. It is clear that curbing antimalarial resis-
tance, similar to resistance of other antimicrobials, is both a global priority and a 
global responsibility (Jamrozik and Selgelid, Chap. 1, this volume-b). Both scien-
tifically and in terms of effective public health interventions, solutions to this prob-
lem are inevitably going to be collaborative. In addition to the provision of adequate 
resources, communities, countries, researchers and funders must be encouraged to 
work together. It is our view that four key requirements for a successful and appro-
priate collaborative approach to addressing emerging ACT resistance, and hence 
ethically important requirements of those who propose such interventions, are as 
follows:
 i. Encouraging and funding more research. Research should be conducted to 
address the gaps needed for each of the interventions proposed by the scientific 
community such as determining the safety of DP for MDA, the efficacy and 
safety of triple therapy, and determining the way resistance spreads. More evi-
dence would help channel resources to the correct people and places, and facili-
tate a scientific consensus.
 ii. Retraining and supporting village malaria workers so that they are able to man-
age other febrile diseases and hence remain relevant and retain community sup-
port. This could be provision of education and strengthening support from 
provincial health departments.
 iii. Encourage collection of quality malaria data, and sharing and pooling of these 
data. A data sharing initiative, the WorldWide Antimalarial Resistance Network 
(www.WWARN.org) was established by malaria researchers in 2009 to facili-
tate collaborative study groups working to answer specific research questions 
using pooled analyses. WWARN has had considerable success in pooling 
individual- participant data from multiple clinical trials from academic groups 
and pharmaceutical companies, but has been less successful with NMCPs. 
Individual research groups have also established data sharing mechanisms via a 
managed access route (Cheah and Day 2017).
 iv. Engaging with affected communities in creative and sensitive ways. Some work 
has already been conducted to engage forest workers, minority groups and 
mobile populations, and much more is needed (Lim et  al. 2017). This will 
improve understanding of the science behind malaria and malaria elimination 
and will facilitate interventions such as MDAs and MSATs.
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Chapter 5
Antimicrobial Resistance and the Private 
Sector in Southeast Asia
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Abstract Southeast Asia is considered a regional hotspot for the emergence and 
spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). A commonality across countries in the 
region, particularly those with lower incomes such as Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao 
PDR and Vietnam, is the high utilisation of private healthcare providers, often 
unregulated, which may play a role in driving AMR. In this chapter we discuss chal-
lenges to the control of AMR in Southeast Asia, with a focus on the role of the pri-
vate sector. After providing an overview of the problem and current policy responses, 
we consider ethical issues of equity and fairness that may arise from the implemen-
tation of established and proposed interventions.
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5.1  Diversity, Epidemiology and Surveillance Capacity
Southeast Asia is a loosely defined geographic region, whose configuration is vari-
able and depends on different political, institutional, and cultural perspectives. For 
the purpose of this chapter, we refer to Southeast Asia as the ten member countries 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that is, Brunei, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. As such, this region includes small, wealthy countries such as 
Singapore (5.6 million population, US$ 52,960 per capita) and populous, lower 
middle-income countries such as Indonesia (261.2 million population, 3570 US per 
capita) (The World Bank 2017). It is also characterised by socio-cultural differences 
and vast diversity in ecosystems including farming, natural habitats, and urbanisa-
tion. Although gaps remain in our understanding of AMR in Southeast Asia, avail-
able evidence indicates that this is an important and growing challenge  (Cherau 
et al. 2017). For example, studies have identified a high prevalence of antimicrobial 
resistant infections in hospitalized paediatric populations in several regional coun-
tries (Al-Taiar et  al. 2013; Stoesser et  al. 2013; Turner et  al. 2016). The Asian 
Network for Surveillance of Resistant Pathogens (ANSORP) reported rates of 
pneumococcal resistance to penicillin exceeding 50% in some contexts (Song et al. 
1999) and that resistance had spread across the region. Resistance to enteric patho-
gens is becoming increasingly prominent (Coker et  al. 2017), with studies in 
Thailand and Cambodia identifying high Campylobacter coli and Campylobacter 
jejuni rates of resistance to ciprofloxacin among isolate samples from children hos-
pitalized with acute diarrhoea (Bodhidatta et al. 2002; Meng et al. 2011). In terms 
of respiratory infections, the World Health Organization (WHO) 2016 Global 
Tuberculosis Report lists Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam 
among the 27 countries bearing the highest burden of multidrug resistant tuberculo-
sis in the world (WHO 2015). Drug-resistant malaria is also prevalent across the 
region, including resistance of the malaria parasite P. falciparum to chloroquine, 
sulfadoxine–pyrimethamine, and most recently, and of considerable concern, arte-
misinin ( WHO 2017). It is well documented that Western Cambodia, near the bor-
der with Thailand, has been an epicentre of antimalarial resistance since the 1950s 
(Dondorp et al. 2010; Alam et al. 2011; Vinayak et al. 2010). Despite much docu-
mentation of resistance throughout the region (Ashley et al. 2014; Imwong et al. 
2017), the full epidemiological profile of resistance to antimalarials in Southeast 
Asia, as with AMR more broadly, is not known.
Fragmented surveillance systems and weak laboratory capacity remain major 
barriers to acquiring quality surveillance data and information for AMR in the region, 
especially in LMICs (Lee and Wakabayashi 2013). These barriers were echoed in 
the findings of the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) (WHO 2016), a WHO-led pro-
cess to assess country capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to public health 
threats. In Southeast Asia, JEEs have been conducted in Lao PDR, Vietnam, and 
Cambodia. Vietnam and Cambodia, the only countries with public JEE reports at 
present (Joint External Evaluation of the IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of 
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Cambodia 2017; Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Viet Nam 
2017), reported limited capacity for surveillance of infections caused by AMR 
pathogens and advocated improved stewardship to prevent inappropriate use of anti-
microbials (Table 5.1) (see also Chap. 23 in this book).
5.2  Private Health Services and AMR
The private sector is the dominant health care provider in many countries in the 
region. For example, about 70% of Cambodian patients first seek treatment from the 
private sector and private drug sellers are the preferred healthcare providers for the 
majority of those who are ill (NIS Cambodia  2014). Across the region, out-of- 
pocket payment is a common method to finance health care, despite good progress 
toward universal health coverage in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia 
(Van Minh et al. 2014). Out-of-pocket health expenditure as a percentage of total 
health expenditure is more than 50% in Cambodia, Singapore, the Philippines, and 
Myanmar (Table 5.2) (The World Bank 2017). A study including data from 47 coun-
tries indicated that out-of-pocket health expenditure was strongly correlated with 
AMR in low-income countries, with the authors concluding that high demand for 
the private sector may be related to higher AMR owing to heightened incentives 
among private providers to overprescribe and less standardized quality assurance of 
antimicrobials (Alsan et al. 2015).
Prior to discussing the role of private providers in AMR, it is important to briefly 
describe the diversity of the private health sector in Southeast Asia and reasons for 
its popularity. Broadly, private providers include persons operating outside of the 
government-financed system, alone or in groups, to provide diagnosis, treatment or 
advice to individuals for health-related concerns. In Southeast Asia, as in other 
regions, the private sector includes a variety of providers, ranging from large private 
hospitals, small clinics and pharmacies to road-side informal drug vendors and tra-
ditional healers (Khan 2016). The level of training varies greatly. Some private 
Table 5.1 Joint external evaluation scoring for AMR Technical Area Indicator, Cambodia and 
Vietnam (Joint External Evaluation Tool and Process Overview 2016; Joint External Evaluation of 
the IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Cambodia 2017; Joint External Evaluation of IHR 




infections caused by 
AMR pathogens
Healthcare associated 





Cambodia 3 2 2 2
Developed 
capacity
Limited capacity Limited capacity Limited capacity
Vietnam 2 2 3 2
Limited 
capacity
Limited capacity Developed capacity Limited capacity
5 Antimicrobial Resistance and the Private Sector in Southeast Asia
78
practitioners have no training or claim to have qualifications that they do not have, 
while others have several years of specialist training. In addition to allopathic 
healthcare providers, there are alternative therapeutic approaches, which include 
homeopathy and traditional healing. Private providers also vary in terms of the fees 
charged. Some are highly priced and accessible only to a fraction of the population 
while others are more accessible and may offer flexible payment arrangements.
Why do patients use the private sector? A recent systematic review comparing 
the performance of private and public health-care systems in LMICs found that 
patients’ preferences for private providers were related to shorter waiting times, bet-
ter hospitality, increased time spent with doctors, cleanliness of facilities, longer 
and flexible opening times, personal attitude, and better availability of staff (Basu 
et  al. 2012). However, quality of care in terms of competence and adherence to 
guidelines is often low (Morgan et al. 2017).
In terms of AMR specifically, over-prescribing or over-selling of antimicrobial 
drugs by for-profit healthcare providers appears to be fairly common, although 
inappropriate prescribing practices have also been reported in public hospitals and 
health centres (Apisarnthanarak et al. 2008; Om et al. 2017; Yeung et al. 2011). A 
large study of over 400 healthcare providers including drug shops, private clinics 
and hospitals in Vietnam found that 79% would dispense antibiotics for common 
colds with fever and only 19% had knowledge of antibiotic prescribing according to 
national guidelines (Hoa et  al. 2009). Drug sellers were more likely to dispense 
antibiotics inappropriately than other types of healthcare providers in this study. 
Other studies in the region have shown that, among drugs sold, antimicrobials are 
very common as they are reported to be the most profit-generating (Gollogly 2002; 
Chuc and Tomson 1999).
Drug quality is also a problem in the region. There is evidence from Cambodia, 
particularly on antimalarial drugs (Novotny et  al. 2016), and from neighbouring 
countries such as Vietnam, that unregulated drug shops often sell poor-quality 












expenditure as % 





as % of total 
expenditure on 
health, 2014
Brunei 423,196 11.4 2.7% 93.9% 6.0%
Cambodia 15,762,370 20.0 5.6% 22.0% 95.2%
Indonesia 261,115,456 932.3 2.9% 37.8% 46.9%
Lao PDR 6,758,353 15.9 1.9% 50.5% 38.9%
Malaysia 31,187,265 296.4 4.1% 55.2% 35.3%
Myanmar 52,885,223 67.4 2.3% 45.9% 50.7%
Philippines 103,320,222 304.9 4.7% 32.3% 53.7%
Singapore 5,607,283 297.0 4.9% 41.7% 54.8%
Thailand 68,863,514 406.8 4.1% 77.8% 11.9%
Vietnam 92,701,100 202.6 7.1% 54.1% 36.8%
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medications. According to the WHO, substandard drugs are products whose compo-
sition and ingredients do not meet the correct scientific specifications (WHO 2003). 
This could be due to inappropriate storage at high temperature and humidity or poor 
quality assurance during the manufacturing process. Both of these conditions are 
more likely to occur in less-developed countries. Counterfeit drugs are considered a 
subset of substandard drugs that are deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with 
respect to identity and/or source. Antibiotics and antimalarials are at particular risk 
of targeting by counterfeiters and drug manufacturers that use poor practices owing 
to large volumes of sales, their relatively low production cost, and the challenges 
met by regulatory mechanisms and their enforcement. In 2013, a multi- governmental 
investigation across Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and 
Vietnam found that nearly one third of both antimalarials and antibiotics were of 
poor quality and potentially counterfeited (Weraphong et  al. 2013). Similarly, a 
2004 cross-sectional survey of pharmacies and drug shops in Myanmar found an 
“alarming high proportion” of counterfeit artesunate (Dondorp et al. 2004), although 
a recent survey provides encouraging evidence that the quality of artemisinin-based 
combination therapies has improved (Yeung et al. 2015).
As noted earlier, this chapter focuses on the use of antimicrobials in human 
health. But the use in animals is also important, and is a major contributor to AMR 
globally (Nhung et al. 2015), as further discussed in Chaps. 7 and 18. Subtherapeutic 
use of antibiotics in livestock for growth promotion or prophylaxis is of particular 
concern, as the low doses used can lead to the emergence of drug resistance (Van 
Boeckel et al. 2015). While there are regulations around the use of growth promot-
ers in Europe and America, the use of antibiotics by unregulated veterinarians and 
drug sellers in Southeast Asia is poorly understood. Multiple studies in the region 
do, however, indicate a high prevalence of confirmed resistance to ciprofloxacin, 
and gentamicin, and of particular concern, colistin among E. coli isolates in pig and 
chicken farms (Nhung et al. 2015, 2016; Nguyen et al. 2015, 2016). Colistin is one 
of the last line of drugs available for treating multidrug resistant Gram-negative 
pathogens in humans.
5.3  Policy Challenges in Tackling AMR
Most governments in Southeast Asia have recognised the dangers of AMR and 
taken action to control the use of antimicrobials through policy making, legal provi-
sions, and program implementation. Legal frameworks to regulate the pharmaceuti-
cal supply chain have been improved in many countries, providing stronger legal 
bases to counter the problem of substandard medicines and poor management prac-
tices (Lamy and Liverani 2015). Operational capacities of drug regulatory authori-
ties have also increased, leading to more effective quality control, closure of 
unlicensed businesses and a crackdown of the trade in counterfeit medicines, with 
major enforcement operations being conducted throughout the Mekong region 
(Interpol 2015). Further, new laws have been introduced to regulate drug sellers, 
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particularly for antimalarial medications, although provisions are variable across 
regional countries. In Thailand, for example, the sale of antimalarial medications in 
the private sector is banned since 1995, but in other countries regulations are less 
stringent. In Myanmar, there is no prohibition, while in Lao PDR, the ban applies 
only to grocery stores, general retailers and itinerant vendors (Akulayi et al. 2017).
Despite increasing commitment, the control of AMR remains a major policy 
challenge in Southeast Asia, particularly in relation to the sale and use of antibiotics. 
In Thailand, for example, pharmacists can dispense antibiotics without prescription, 
leaving more room to profit-motivated sale (Apisarnthanarak et  al. 2008; 
Saengcharoen and Lerkiatbundit 2010). In 2007, the “Antibiotic Smart Use” pro-
gramme was piloted in community health centres and hospitals to reduce unneces-
sary prescription of antibiotics for respiratory infections, diarrhoea, and simple 
wounds. Based on promotional material and performance-based incentives, this 
programme was subsequently scaled up nationwide and described as a workable 
model to improve the rational use of antibiotics in Thailand (Akulayi et al. 2017). 
However, efforts to engage private pharmacies have been less effective (Chalker 
et al. 2005). In other countries, such as Vietnam and Indonesia, regulations on pre-
scribing and dispensing of antibiotics are more restrictive, but enforcement has been 
difficult to achieve due to either lack of resources, weak sanctions, or challenges in 
monitoring compliance in highly diversified markets (Nga et  al. 2014; Widayati 
et al. 2011; Mao et al. 2015). Antimicrobial use is particularly difficult to control in 
remote rural areas, where access to public health services is more limited, patients 
tend to self-medicate, and medicines of dubious origin are more likely to be avail-
able in road stalls and other informal outlets (Lon et al. 2006; Hadi et al. 2010; Om 
et al. 2017).
In general, AMR is a complex, multi-dimensional health issue which requires a 
comprehensive multi-sector policy approach, able to tackle structural drivers and 
determinants across human and animal health sectors. However, policy develop-
ment and program implementation have often targeted particular diseases, espe-
cially in LMICs where donors have prioritised vertical health programmes. In 
Cambodia, for example, innovative social marketing schemes have been introduced 
to improve access to good-quality antimalarials in the private sector and control of 
pharmaceutical drivers of drug resistance, such as the use of artemisinin monothera-
pies (Yeung et  al. 2011; Yamey et  al. 2012). As in other countries, however, no 
comprehensive policy response to promote the responsible use of medicines has 
been developed to date. Professional development, supervision, and behaviour 
change activities are driven by vertical disease programmes as well as the systems 
for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of surveillance data on antimicrobial 
resistance. Engagement with the agricultural sector has also been relatively weak in 
many countries, with gaps in legal provisions and operational capacities to regulate 
and monitor antibiotic use for animal health prophylaxis and growth promotion 
(Archawakulathep et al. 2014). Further challenges result from the diversity of the 
livestock sector in Southeast Asia. While supervision is more feasible in large 
M. Liverani et al.
81
production units, there is less or no control of antibiotic use in smallholders and 
contracted farmers (Om and McLaws 2016).
In recognition of these challenges and the need for a more comprehensive policy 
approach, action plans on AMR have been adopted in Cambodia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, while the Lao PDR, Malaysia and Singapore 
are currently developing their national plans (Cheng 2016). In line with WHO 
global guidelines (WHO  2015), these plans have been informed by One Health 
approaches and a commitment to strengthening cooperative arrangements across 
sectors and national authorities. To this end, inter-ministerial and inter-agency com-
mittees have been established to guide policy implementation and monitor progress. 
Since these plans have been adopted only recently, it is too early to assess outcomes 
and their value in promoting more effective responses to AMR. However, it is 
expected that the achievement of the stated policy and governance goals will require 
a significant increase in resource allocation, which may be challenging to achieve in 
LMICs. Further, as in other contexts, the divisive forces of institutional mandates 
and professional interests are likely to counteract the imperative of multi-sectoral 
cooperation, requiring political will at the highest level of policymaking. Finally, as 
we will see below, achieving a good balance between access to antimicrobials, as 
well as other vital resources for human and animal health, and curbing inappropriate 
use and excess is arguably one the most important challenges ahead (Das and Horton 
2017), posing key ethical questions about policy choices in the short and the 
long term.
5.4  Ethical Issues
The challenges to controlling the emergence of AMR in Southeast Asia are multi-
sectoral and complex, requiring policies that can address the diverse range of con-
tributing factors, including behaviour and practices, gaps in health service provision 
and regulations, and macro- and micro-economic drivers in the antimicrobial supply 
chain and market at the national, regional, and global level. In the process, particular 
attention should be given to the private health sector and food production systems, 
as these are arguably the largest channels for the distribution, sale, and use of a wide 
range of antimicrobials in many regional countries. Yet policy and planning in this 
area is problematic. In addition to governance challenges noted above, policy 
options to control AMR in the private sector raise ethical issues of equity and fair-
ness, which have been recognised only recently in research and policy communities 
(Heyman et al. 2014; Littmann and Viens 2015). While a reduction of antibiotics 
use is necessary to avert the potentially disastrous impact of future drug-resistant 
pandemics, a single focus on this policy goal may result in undesirable conse-
quences in the short term, particularly in relation to equitable access to essential 
goods and services, as we discuss below.
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Access to Health Services Informal providers account for a significant fraction of 
diagnosis and treatment services in parts of Southeast Asia, raising concerns about 
the quality of care and their role in driving AMR. Efforts are being made in some 
countries to ban unlicensed practitioners. However, “village doctors” and other 
informal providers may be the only accessible source of primary care in some areas, 
particularly in remote rural communities where public health facilities are hard to 
reach and other options are not available. In such contexts, regulatory enforcement 
may be necessary to control potentially harmful practices and key drivers of AMR, 
but may also reduce access to care where it is needed most. Engagement with the 
informal sector, including training and supervision programmes, might be a solu-
tion to this problem. Yet informal providers have weak legitimacy in relation to the 
formal health system. The implicit recognition of unqualified providers as legiti-
mate health workers might be challenging if conducted or sanctioned by govern-
ment agencies and is likely to face strong opposition from established professional 
categories. On the other hand, informal providers may be reluctant to participate in 
projects with public health authorities for fear of being exposed (Khan et al. 2015).
Access to Medicines Policy and regulations on prescription and dispensing of 
antimicrobials raise similar concerns (see also Chap. 24 in this book). Since 1998, 
the WHO has urged Member States to “prohibit the dispensing of antimicrobials 
without the prescription of a qualified health care professional” and to strengthen 
legislation “to prevent the sale of antibiotics on the informal market” (WHO 1998). 
In many countries, however, the government health system or other authorised sup-
pliers might not be able to reach all population groups or gaps may exist in their 
ability to meet the demand for antimicrobials. In Cambodia and Lao PDR, for 
example, health volunteers have been appointed in remote communities to diagnose 
suspected malaria cases by using rapid diagnostic tests, administer subsidised 
artemisinin- based combination therapy (ACT), and refer severe patients to the near-
est public health facility (Liverani et al. 2017; Alum et al. 2017). These programmes 
have been successful in improving adherence to malaria policy and treatment where 
other health services are either lacking or inadequate. However, informal drug out-
lets and grocery stores remain the only accessible and affordable suppliers of medi-
cines in some areas or for some hard-to-reach groups such as mobile and migrant 
workers. In addition, stronger quality control and higher standards are likely to 
increase the cost of medicines, making them less affordable to the poor. While sub-
sidization of particular categories of antimicrobials, such as anti-malarial and anti- 
tuberculosis treatments, has been implemented with good results (Novotny et al. 
2016; Hill and Mao 2007), this approach might not be feasible for mass-market 
drugs such as antibiotics.
Access to Food As noted earlier, evidence indicates that the use of antibiotics in 
the livestock sector is an important driver of AMR (Witte 1998). Thus, it is sug-
gested that this practice should be reduced or banned outright. However, it is also 
known that regulatory restrictions may have significant economic effects on 
farmers, as the use of antibiotics allows larger numbers of healthy animals to be 
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maintained with lower cost to the producer (National Research Council 1999). 
Further, the effects of restrictions or bans are likely to be unequally distributed 
across livestock production systems. While large companies and production units 
may replace antibiotics with other disease prevention practices and veterinary ser-
vices, smallholders may not be able to do so, bearing higher cost of regulatory 
change. Finally, more stringent regulations raise concerns of fairness and equity in 
access to food. Low and sub-therapeutic use of antibiotics contributes to growth 
promotion and improved feed efficiency, resulting in lower costs of meat and eggs 
(National Research Council 1999). While the effect of reduced antibiotics use on 
the price of meat products is difficult to gauge with precision, organic foods are 
generally more expensive and therefore less affordable to lower income groups 
(Chander et al. 2011). As Littman (Littmann and Viens 2015) pointed out, “these 
considerations do not appear to weigh heavily enough to justify the continuation of 
current practices”; however, we should recognise, “who will be disadvantaged by 
proposed policy changes, and discuss what kind of subsidy or compensation may be 
warranted”.
5.5  Conclusion
In conclusion, AMR is a complex problem that extends far beyond the technical 
challenge of reducing or improving the use of antimicrobials, as interventions are 
likely to have externalities on other important issues for human well-being and live-
lihood. Thus, in Southeast Asia as in other contexts, policy and planning in this area, 
and modelling and pilot exercises that provide evidence, will need to incorporate a 
wide range of issues and a calculation of costs and benefits to individuals, enter-
prises, and across the whole of society. This will likely require us to find a difficult 
balance between the urgent need to address the rising challenge of AMR while 
addressing the moral obligations to broad public health benefits and limiting eco-
nomic hardship. And all of this within complex social and political environments. 
Simple solutions are likely to induce undesirable, and perhaps unforeseen, 
consequences.
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Chapter 6
Hospital Infection Prevention and Control 
(IPC) and Antimicrobial Stewardship 
(AMS): Dual Strategies to Reduce 
Antibiotic Resistance (ABR) in Hospitals
Gwendolyn L. Gilbert and Ian Kerridge
Abstract In this chapter we review the development of hospital infection preven-
tion and control (IPC) since the nineteenth century and its increasingly important 
role in reducing the spread of antibiotic resistance (ABR). Excessive rates of 
hospital- acquired infection (HAI) fell dramatically, towards the end of the nine-
teenth century, because of improved hygiene and surgical antisepsis, but treatment 
remained rudimentary until effective antibiotics became widely available in the 
mid-twentieth century. While antibiotics had profound clinical benefits, their wide-
spread appropriate and inappropriate use in humans and animals inevitably led to 
the emergence of antibiotic resistance (ABR). Within 50 years, this could no longer 
be offset by a reliable supply of new drugs, which slowed to a trickle in the 1980s. 
In hospitals, particularly, high rates of (often unnecessary) antibiotic use and ABR 
are exacerbated by person-to-person transmission of multi-drug resistant organisms 
(MDRO), which have, so far, largely resisted the introduction of antimicrobial stew-
ardship (AMS) programs and repeated campaigns to improve infection prevention 
and control (IPC). Despite clear evidence of efficacy in research settings, both AMS 
and IPC programs are often ineffective, in practice, because of, inter alia, insuffi-
cient resourcing, poor implementation, lack of ongoing evaluation and failure to 
consult frontline staff. In this chapter we review reasons for the relatively low prior-
ity given to preventive programs despite the ethical obligation of healthcare organ-
isations to protect current and future patients from preventable harm. The imminent 
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threat of untreatable infections may provide an impetus for a shared organisational 
and professional commitment to promoting the cultural and behavioural changes 
needed to successfully reduce the burdens of ABR and drug-resistant HAIs.
Keywords Medicine and public health · Infectious diseases · History of medicine 
· Infection prevention and control · Antimicrobial resistance · Antimicrobial 
stewardship
6.1  Introduction
Antibiotic resistance (ABR1) has been described as a “slowly emerging disaster” 
(Viens and Littmann 2015). The risk of acquired ABR was recognised before the 
first antibiotics were widely used and its dire consequences have been understood 
by experts for many years, but the magnitude of the threat and the urgent need for 
radical solutions to limit its impact have been widely acknowledged only recently. 
In this chapter, we argue that it is not too late to mitigate the disaster and check its 
progress, at least in hospital settings, if certain contributory factors are acknowl-
edged and addressed without delay. These factors, we suggest, include naïve opti-
mism, ignorance, hubris and nihilism on the part of pharmaceutical companies, 
healthcare professionals (mainly prescribing doctors) and health administrators, 
among others.
By the first half of the twentieth century, improvements in living conditions in 
industrialised countries contributed to rapidly falling infectious disease mortality 
(Armstrong et al. 1999). At the same time, surgical antisepsis, clean wards, hand 
washing by clinicians and skilled nursing care (Larson 1989; Gill and Gill 2005), 
had diminished the risk of death in hospitals from puerperal or postoperative sepsis 
(Gawande 2012). But the remedies for serious infections, such as bleeding, purging 
or toxic infusions of arsenic, mercury or opiates, probably hastened, more than they 
postponed, death (Funk et al. 2009).
Antibiotics changed all that. From the beginning they were hailed as miracle 
drugs. Doctors embraced their use, not only to cure once life-threatening diseases, 
but also, because they seemed so free of adverse effects, to treat minor infections or 
even a perceived risk of infection. But, as early as 1945, Alexander Fleming, who 
shared a Nobel Prize for the discovery of penicillin, warned: “…the public will 
demand [penicillin]…then will begin an era…of abuses. The microbes are educated 
to resist penicillin and a host of penicillin-fast organisms is bred out which can be 
1 Most of what follows applies to antimicrobial resistance (AMR), generally, but antibiotics are by 
far the most commonly prescribed antimicrobials, in human medicine, which is the focus of this 
chapter; therefore, our discussion will mainly focus on ABR.
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passed to other individuals ……In such a case the thoughtless person playing with 
penicillin treatment is morally responsible for the death of the man who finally suc-
cumbs to infection with the penicillin-resistant organism. ” (A.  Fleming, 1945,2 
quoted in (Bartlett et al. 2013)) And, indeed, within a few years most hospital iso-
lates of previously susceptible Staphylococcus aureus were penicillin resistant 
(Barber and Rozwadowska-Dowzenko 1948).
Although they recognised that overuse would promote resistance, pharmaceuti-
cal companies aggressively promoted the benefits and safety of antibiotics to doc-
tors and directly to the public. And, in the 1950s they recognised an even larger 
market when Thomas Jukes, at Lederle laboratories, demonstrated the growth- 
promoting effect of antibiotics in food-producing animals: “Animals receiving 10 
ppm of chlortetracycline in the diet developed resistance in their intestinal bacteria 
in less than two days…[but] their growth rate increased. ….we concluded that if 
[resistant pathogens] appeared … usefulness of the antibiotic supplement would 
vanish and farmers would stop feeding it. …The [company] decision was strongly 
opposed by the veterinarians at Lederle, but their wishes were abruptly denied by 
Dr. Malcolm [Lederle President], who made an individual decision to go ahead. 
Competition was right on our heels...” (Jukes 1985). And it soon caught up: “The 
power of the calliope in the antibiotic bandwagon increased spectacularly during the 
[1950s] while poultry, pigs, and patients danced to its tune.” (T. D. Luckey, 1959,3 
quoted in (Podolsky 2017)).
By the mid-twentieth century, it was predicted that antibiotics (and vaccines) 
would put an end to infectious diseases. “[T]he belief that infectious diseases had 
been successfully overcome was pervasive in biomedical circles - including … a 
Nobel Laureate, medical Dean, and other thought leaders  - from as early as 
1948……..” (Spellberg and Taylor-Blake 2013). It was widely assumed that if bac-
teria developed resistance to one drug, as they often did, there would soon be better 
ones to replace it; and, for many years, there were. Indeed there was such confi-
dence that infections could be easily cured, that preventing them became a lower 
priority. But by the 1970s there was mounting disquiet about the emergence of 
ABR. Methicillin resistant S. aureus (MRSA) (Jevons et al. 1963) and transmissible 
resistance in Gram-negative bacteria (Datta and Pridie 1960) had emerged in the 
1960s and their prevalence was increasing, especially in hospitals (Chambers 2001; 
Aminov 2010; Ventola 2015). The first International Conference on Nosocomial 
Infections, in 1970, was followed by the Study on the Efficacy of Nosocomial 
Infection Control (SENIC), in the USA (Forder 2007); in Australia, the handbook of 
“Antibiotic Guidelines” was published for the first time, in 1978 (Harvey et  al. 
2003). Anxiety that antibiotics would progressively lose efficacy, became more 
acute in the 1980s, when the seemingly unlimited flow of new antibiotics slowed to 
2 Alexander Fleming. Penicillin’’s finder assays its future. New York Times 26 June 1945: 21
3 Luckey TD. Antibiotics in nutrition. In: Goldberg HS, ed. Antibiotics: Their Chemistry and Non-
Medical Uses. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand; 1959:174–321.
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a trickle, and pharmaceutical companies turned their attention to more profitable 
projects.
Antibiotic use is no longer regarded as an unquestioned good. Antimicrobial 
resistance (AMR) is now seen as a threat to global health security and the “end of 
the antibiotic era” predicted; it is broadly accepted that urgent measures are needed 
to salvage what we can of the “antibiotic miracle”: more prudent use of existing 
antimicrobial agents; novel strategies to promote development of new ones; and 
greater attention to preventing the spread of drug resistance organisms (WHO 2012; 
CDC 2013).
6.2  Hospital Infection in the “Pre-Antibiotic Era”
In nineteenth century Europe, medical science advanced rapidly; there was increas-
ing demand for new hospitals, where university-trained doctors could develop and 
experiment with new remedies and advance their knowledge. Anaesthetics increased 
the scope of surgery (Gawande 2012) and pregnant women were more likely to be 
admitted to ‘lying-in’ hospitals, where advances in obstetrics offered relief from 
excessively long, difficult labour (Loudon 1986). But hospitals were overcrowded, 
dirty and poorly ventilated; infectious disease outbreaks were common and mater-
nal mortality from childbed fever much higher in hospitals than in the community.
Alexander Gordon, an Aberdeen physician, had recognised puerperal fever as a 
“specific contagion or infection” that could be carried between parturient women on 
the hands of her attendants, in 1795 (Gordon 1795), but his work was ignored until 
the 1840s, when James Young Simpson, in Edinburgh (Selwyn 1965), Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, in Boston (Holmes 2001), and Ignaz Semmelweis (Nuland 1979; 
Carter 1981), in Vienna, independently came to similar conclusions. Simpson also 
recognised that puerperal and surgical fevers were “intercommunicable” and coined 
the term “hospitalism” to describe outbreaks of surgical infection, which he 
believed were so serious that “…every patient placed upon an operating table … is 
in … greater danger than a soldier entering one of the bloodiest and most fatal bat-
tlefields” (J. Y. Simpson, 1859 quoted in (Selwyn 1965)).
In Vienna, Semmelweis was troubled by the much higher maternal mortality, in 
a clinic staffed by doctors and medical students, than in an otherwise similar clinic 
staffed by midwives. After months of investigation, he realised that the only signifi-
cant difference between the clinics was that, unlike the midwives, the students and 
doctors frequented the mortuary, dissecting the bodies of women who had died from 
childbed fever. When they returned to the clinic, they carried on their hands “cadaver 
particles which are not entirely removed by the ordinary method of washing the 
hands with soap....[Therefore] the hands of the examiner must be cleansed with 
chlorine, not only after handling cadavers, but likewise after examining patients” 
(Semmelweis 1983). After he enforced this strict hand washing regime, the mater-
nal mortality in the doctors’ clinic rapidly fell to a level similar to that in the mid-
wives’ clinic (Nuland 1979). Despite the evidence, Semmelweis’ findings lacked a 
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conceptual basis, 20 years in advance of Pasteur’s germ theory of disease, and were 
largely rejected by his peers. His accusation that anyone who did not follow his 
recommendations would be ‘murderers’, undoubtedly contributed to their antago-
nism (Pittet 2004; Saint et al. 2010a).
During the Crimean war, in 1854, the British public was scandalised by a news-
paper report of deplorable conditions in the British Army hospital at Scutari. When 
Florence Nightingale was sent to investigate, she found vermin- and lice-infested 
wards, excreta on walls and floors, injured soldiers in dirty, bloodstained clothes and 
frequent infectious disease outbreaks. Nightingale believed that disease was caused 
by filth and foul air (miasmas); she overcame bitter opposition from the military 
surgeons and formidable logistic barriers to implement a strict regime - immediate 
wound care; clean dressings, clothes and bedding; nutritious food; and regular 
cleaning and ventilation of wards. Her meticulous records showed that soldiers 
were far more likely to die from preventable infection than war wounds. In the 
January–March quarter of 1855, the mortality at Scutari was 33%, by the July–
September quarter it was 2%. While critics have belittled her achievements, her 
methods remain the basis of good nursing care and hospital infection control (Larson 
1989; Gill and Gill 2005).
In the 1860s, Joseph Lister’s knowledge of Pasteur’s germ theory informed his 
belief that the almost inevitable (and often fatal) suppuration that complicated com-
pound fractures and amputations was due to “minute organisms suspended in [the 
atmosphere], which owed their energy to their vitality” (Lister 1867). By liberal use 
of carbolic acid to soak wound dressings and disinfect his hands, instruments and 
the operative site, he was able to manage most compound fractures without amputa-
tion and the post-amputation mortality fell from 46% (16/35) in 1864–6 to 15% 
(6/40) in 1867–9 (Newsom 2003). Many of his compatriots ridiculed his methods, 
but they were gradually accepted, particularly in Europe. His acknowledged place 
as the “father of antiseptic surgery” owes much to its basis in the germ theory, which 
gave it an authority that Semmelweis’ earlier work lacked.
As antisepsis and later asepsis, environmental hygiene and skilled nursing care 
were gradually incorporated into hospital practice, hospital infection rates fell and 
hospitals became places of healing rather than dying.
6.3  The Antibiotic Era
Acquired antibiotic resistance (ABR), of bacterial pathogens that affect humans, is 
mainly due to nearly 75 years’ of both appropriate and inappropriate antibiotic use 
in human medicine and dissemination of resistant organisms. Antibiotic use in agri-
culture and veterinary practice and environmental contamination are also impli-
cated, but their contributions are contested and vary from region to region (Landers 
et al. 2012; Marshall and Levy 2011; Chang et al. 2015). The dynamics are complex 
and incompletely understood (Turnidge and Christiansen 2005) but, in general, 
exposure of bacteria to antibiotics exerts powerful selection pressure; the greater the 
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total amount and the broader the antibacterial spectra of antibiotics used in any set-
ting, such as a hospital (Willemsen et  al. 2009; Xu et  al. 2013) or community 
(Goossens et al. 2005; Bell et al. 2014), the higher the prevalence of ABR. More 
antibiotics (by weight) are prescribed for non-human animals than people and envi-
ronmental contamination is a major contributor to ABR.  Nevertheless, although 
inappropriate prescribing is probably the main contributor to drug resistant infec-
tions humans, it is now accepted that control of AMR/ABR requires a One Health 
approach (Robinson et al. 2016). However, the focus of this chapter is on ABR in 
hospitals, where multidrug resistant organisms (MDROs)4 are most obvious and 
prevalent5 and preventive measures most likely to be effective.
Most life-threatening infections are treated in hospitals, where the greatest vari-
ety of antibiotics is used, in repeated courses or for prolonged periods. In hospitals, 
busy healthcare professionals often carry MDROs on their hands, exposing patients 
to the risk of healthcare-associated infection (HAI) or colonisation with an 
MDRO. Hospital laboratory reports increase prescribers’ awareness of ABR and, 
perhaps, promote a (mistaken) perception that it is ubiquitous; this may encourage 
defensive prescribing – e.g. of multiple or broad-spectrum agents - to avert treat-
ment failure. Paradoxically, increased awareness of ABR is not necessarily reflected 
in increased adherence to measures designed to prevent it. Now that it is recognised 
that profligate antibiotic use promotes ABR and inadequate infection prevention 
and control (IPC) facilitates transmission, the challenge is to break these intersect-
ing vicious cycles, particularly in hospitals, where they are most apparent.
6.4  Antibiotic Use and Stewardship in Hospitals
Antibiotics are prescribed very frequently in hospitals; studies in USA and Australia 
have shown that more than 50% of hospital patients receive at least one antibiotic 
and up to 50% of prescriptions are unnecessary or inappropriate, according to pre-
scribing guidelines (Turnidge et al. 2016; Baggs et al. 2016; Reddy et al. 2015). 
Making the right antibiotic prescribing decision is difficult, even for an experienced 
practitioner, particularly when the diagnosis is uncertain. For patients with sepsis - 
especially those most at risk of life-threatening infections, e.g. who are neutropenic 
or immune-compromised - delay can lead to serious complications or death from 
septic shock (Kumar et al. 2006). But antibiotics prescribed empirically are often 
continued, even after an alternative diagnosis is made, or not reviewed, despite labo-
ratory results that indicate the empirical choice was ineffective or unnecessarily 
4 MDROs are resistant to more than one - usually several – classes of antibiotic; they include methi-
cillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) and 
extended spectrum β lactamase- and carbapenemase-producing (ESBL and CPE, respectively) 
Enterobacteriaceae.
5 In countries where antibiotics can be used in humans or animals without restriction, high rates of 
ABR occur in the community and in hospitals.
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broad-spectrum (Braykov et al. 2014). Antibiotics are also often given in combina-
tion, in the wrong dose, by the wrong route or for too short or too long a period 
(Dryden et  al. 2011; Gilbert 2015). Any of these errors can contribute to ABR, 
without concomitant benefit to the patient herself and, potentially, with significant 
harm including an increased risk of Clostridium difficile infection, MDRO acquisi-
tion or prolonged disruption of the gut microbiome, with potentially serious adverse 
effects (Dingle et al. 2017; Becattini et al. 2016).
Diagnostic uncertainty is not the only, or even the most common, reason for 
inappropriate prescribing. The prescriber’s rational concern can transform into 
excessive risk aversion, without regard for antibiotic conservation or potential 
adverse effects on the patient. A junior hospital doctor may consider ABR “morally 
and professionally important...” but “of limited concern at the bedside” (Broom 
et al. 2014). Fear of missing something or being criticised, by peers or superiors, 
outweighs consideration of long-term risks to future patients or the environment. 
She may prescribe an antibiotic, even if she thinks it unnecessary or futile, because 
of inexperience, her consultant’s routine practice or a duty of benevolence towards 
her patient that makes her want to do something. Junior doctors are required to 
make complicated prescribing decisions, often in the face of conflicting, inconsis-
tent (or no) advice or feedback (Mattick et al. 2014). Broom et al. (Broom et al. 
2014) concluded that “..social risks, including the peer-based and hierarchical repu-
tational consequences associated with ‘not doing enough’” are far more potent than 
the risk of ABR (Broom et al. 2014).
Over the past 10 years, programs have been introduced into hospital practice in 
many countries with the aim of minimising inappropriate antibiotic therapy. 
Antimicrobial stewardship (AMS) programs aim to ensure that patients are given 
antibiotics when they need them – “the right drug, at the right time, in the right dose 
and for the right duration” (Dryden et al. 2011; Doernberg and Chambers 2017) – 
with the least possible selection pressure. They consist of ‘bundles’ of interventions, 
including: restrictions on the use of certain key antibiotics, except with specific 
authorisation; prescriber education and academic detailing; audit of prescribing pat-
terns, with feedback to prescribers; optimisation of laboratory testing, including 
rapid diagnostics; and technological support such as electronic access to microbiol-
ogy results and computerised decision support systems (Davey et al. 2017).
AMS programs depend on multidisciplinary teams - including infectious disease 
physicians, clinical microbiologists, specialist antimicrobial pharmacists and/or 
IPC professionals - whose complementary expertise and spheres of influence pro-
vide mutual support and greater authority than each has, individually. The specialist 
pharmacist’s expertise in drug dosing, interactions and administration and her role 
in implementing regulations, such as automatic stop orders or restricted drug 
authorisation, and auditing prescribing records, are critical to an AMS program. 
Nevertheless, even the most experienced pharmacist or AMS team can encounter 
resistance from a senior specialist who may regard their advice as a threat to her 
autonomy and clinical experience (Broom et al. 2016).
How effective an AMS program will be depends on what it includes and how it 
is implemented. A recent systematic review (Davey et  al. 2017) showed that 
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providing advice and feedback to clinicians improved prescribing and reduced over-
all antibiotic use more than simply imposing rules and restrictions, suggesting that 
AMS programs that support prescribers help to mitigate the fear of censure or litiga-
tion that often drives inappropriate prescribing. Overall, studies of AMS show that 
it can reduce inappropriate prescribing, pharmacy costs and avoidable drug reac-
tions; improve therapeutic drug monitoring; shorten hospital length of stay by an 
average of 2 days; and may reduce rates of C. difficile, fungal and MDRO infections 
(Davey et al. 2013; Baur et al. 2017). Although some studies have confirmed the 
cost-effectiveness of AMS, more high-quality research is needed (Coulter 
et al. 2015).
Clearly, eliminating inappropriate antibiotic use is necessary, but not sufficient, 
to reduce the impact of ABR, which is exacerbated by hospital spread of MDROs.
6.5  Hospital Infection Prevention and Control 
(IPC) and ABR
6.5.1  Healthcare-Associated Infections 
and Their Consequences
According to WHO “…..HAI is the most frequent adverse event in health care [but] 
its true global burden remains unknown because of the difficulty in gathering reli-
able data” (WHO 2011). A systematic review of HAIs in high and middle/low- 
income countries showed that 3.5%–12% of hospitalised patients develop at least 
one HAI (WHO 2011), of which 50%, or more, are potentially preventable (Harbarth 
et al. 2003; Umscheid et al. 2011). The estimated number of people, globally, who 
die from drug-resistant infections each year – currently at least 700,000 - is pre-
dicted to increase to ten million by 2050 (O’Neill 2016). HAIs caused by MDROs 
are more difficult to treat, more likely to be fatal and more costly than comparable 
HAIs due to antibiotic-susceptible pathogens (Cosgrove 2006; de Kraker et  al. 
2011). HAI risks are associated with patient factors: severity of illness and co- 
morbidities such as chronic organ failure, malnutrition, immune-suppression, seri-
ous trauma or contaminated surgery; and organisational factors: bed occupancy 
rate; staff workload; hospital environment and infrastructure; prevalence of endemic 
or introduced MRDO pathogens; adherence of healthcare workers to basic hygiene 
principles (Clements et al. 2008; Daud-Gallotti et al. 2012; Scheithauer et al. 2017). 
Hospital IPC policies are designed to minimise these risks and the burden of HAIs 
and ABR. Unlike other adverse hospital events, MDRO colonisation and HAIs are 
not confined to individuals; they are communal threats that affect other patients, 
hospital staff and the wider community and add to the burden of AMR.
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Even without clinically significant infection, MDRO colonisation has significant 
impacts. Patients colonised with certain high-impact MDROs6 are identified by 
active admission screening and isolated in single rooms, with contact precautions.7 
These are expensive measures and they can adversely affect patient care and wellbe-
ing. Patients in contact isolation are, on average, visited by healthcare workers less 
often and for shorter periods; less likely to be examined by a doctor; more likely to 
suffer non-infectious adverse effects, such as falls, pressure sores and fluid and elec-
trolyte imbalance; and more likely to express dissatisfaction with their hospital care, 
than other patients (Saint et al. 2003; Stelfox et al. 2003; Morgan et al. 2014). They 
may feel stigmatised and anxious about risks to family members; they and their visi-
tors are often inadequately informed or given conflicting information about the 
implications of MDRO colonisation and how to protect themselves and others 
(Wyer et  al. 2015; Seibert et  al. 2017). Contact isolation is also burdensome to 
healthcare workers. Compliance with hand hygiene and use of personal protective 
equipment (and, thus, the effectiveness of contact isolation) is often relatively poor 
and likely to deteriorate as the number of isolated patients increases (Clock et al. 
2010; Dhar et al. 2014).
Moreover, there is conflicting evidence (Cohen et al. 2015; Morgan et al. 2017), 
as to whether active screening and contact isolation prevent MDRO transmission 
more effectively than less expensive and burdensome measures such as strict adher-
ence to standard precautions8 (Huskins et al. 2011) and/or targeted contact isolation 
of patients with other risk factors (e.g. diarrhoea, open wounds) (Djibre et al. 2017). 
This raises the question as to whether these practices are ethically justified, based on 
the precautionary principle - i.e. that they might prevent harm to others - or cost- 
effective. Patients are rarely asked for their consent to be screened or informed of 
the consequences of a positive result, although contact isolation will restrict their 
liberty for others’, but not their own, benefit. It is arguable that these measures are 
ethically justifiable if: the specific MRDO for which they are implemented is par-
ticularly dangerous; patients are fully informed, before they are screened, of the 
reasons, implications and benefits of MDRO colonisation; and there is adequate 
staffing to ensure they are implemented with optimal effectiveness and minimal 
risk. An alternative approach would be to promote strict adherence to standard pre-
cautions, by all staff, behind a “veil of ignorance” by assuming that any patient 
might be MDRO-colonised and engaging patients - when their condition permits - 
and their visitors as active participants in IPC (Ahmad et  al. 2016). If given an 
opportunity and adequate information, patients can make positive contributions to 
IPC, including how to minimise MDRO transmission and the adverse effects of 
contact isolation (Wyer et al. 2015).
6 MDROs for which special control measures are used are chosen according to criteria such as: 
extent of resistance, transmissibility, virulence and local prevalence: e.g. they often include MRSA, 
VRE and CPE.
7 Contact precautions include routine use of gown and gloves when caring for patients in isolation, 
in addition to standard precautions, which include hand hygiene as the main component, and use 
of personal protective equipment when exposure to patient’s blood or body fluid is anticipated
8 Mainly strict compliance with hand hygiene.
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6.5.2  Hospital IPC Programs
Given the adverse individual and communal effects and excess costs of HAIs and 
MDRO colonisation, healthcare organisations and professionals have an unequivo-
cal duty-of-care and ethical responsibility to take appropriate measures to prevent 
them. Hospital IPC programs include, inter alia: hand hygiene; appropriate use of 
personal protective equipment; aseptic technique for invasive procedures; environ-
mental hygiene; air flow; bundles of measures to prevent certain HAI syndromes, 
such as device-related blood stream infections; surveillance of selected HAIs and 
feed-back of data to clinicians; and isolation of infected and MDRO-colonised 
patients, with the caveats outlined above (Sydnor and Perl 2011).
It is usually impossible to trace an HAI or MRDO transmission event to a spe-
cific action, omission or individual healthcare worker, because there are inevitable 
time gaps and multiple factors and people involved (McLaws 2015). HAIs “do not 
carry fingerprints … to identify the offending healers who failed the patient.” 
(Palmore and Henderson 2012).
The effectiveness of an IPC program depends on organisational commitment, 
adequate resources and participation of everyone in the hospital community. Despite 
the compelling ethical imperative to “do no harm”, the economic burden of HAIs 
(Stone 2009) and proven cost-effectiveness (Dick et al. 2015) of IPC programs, they 
often struggle to attract the necessary support and resources. Their beneficiaries, 
like those of any preventive program, are unknown “statistical lives” whose demands 
are far less compelling than those of known “identified lives” who need immediate, 
often expensive, interventions (Cookson et  al. 2008; Beauchamp and Childress 
2009). The typically low priority of IPC is reflected in a vicious cycle of inadequate 
resources, poor compliance  - and, hence, limited effectiveness  - which can then 
seem to justify further cost cutting.
The basic principles of hospital IPC were recognised in the nineteenth century 
and incorporated into routine hospital policy in the latter part of the twentieth, when 
it became clear that antibiotics, alone, could not prevent morbidity and mortality 
from HAIs. Nevertheless, implementation and maintenance of IPC programs remain 
a major challenge. Variation in HAI rates, between otherwise comparable hospitals, 
presumably reflects differences in organizational cultures, policies, working condi-
tions (Daud-Gallotti et al. 2012; Krein et al. 2010) and professional attitudes, behav-
iours and leadership (Saint et al. 2010a), suggesting that improvement is possible.
6.5.3  The Central Role of Hand Hygiene in IPC
“In the absence of the possibility to directly link individual infectious outcomes to 
individual hand hygiene failures… hand hygiene performance remains the only 
measure to judge the degree of system safety….” (Stewardson et al. 2011). Despite 
the proven effectiveness of hand hygiene in preventing MDRO transmission (Pittet 
et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2005), compliance is often poor. The discovery, about 
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20 years ago, that it could be improved by use of alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR), 
was a major breakthrough. ABHR has significant advantages over traditional hand 
washing with soap and water: it takes less time, is less irritant to hands, accessible 
at the point-of-care and in settings without access to clean water and has more rapid 
and potent antibacterial action (Pittet et al. 2000; Widmer 2000). In 2007, “My Five 
Moments of Hand Hygiene” was introduced to improve healthcare worker training 
and standardise monitoring and reporting of hand hygiene compliance (Sax et al. 
2007); in 2009, the “Five Moments” were incorporated into WHO hand hygiene 
guidelines. Since then, there have been numerous studies and reviews of factors 
affecting compliance and interventions to improve it (Erasmus et  al. 2009; Huis 
et al. 2012; Neo et al. 2016; Kingston et al. 2016).
One review reported an overall average compliance of 40%; it was lower in ICUs 
(30–40%) than other settings (50–60%); among doctors (32%) than nurses (48%) 
and for moment one (before patient contact; 21%) than moment four (after patient 
contact; 47%). Performing dirty tasks, availability of ABHR, and performance feed-
back were associated with better compliance (Erasmus et  al. 2009). A review of 
interventions reported an average pre-intervention compliance of 34% with vari-
able, but modest improvements (8–31%) and mean post-intervention compliance of 
57%. Multimodal interventions included various combinations of staff education, 
facility design and planning, HAI surveillance and/or compliance monitoring with 
feedback, financial incentives and active support by clinical champions and hospital 
administrations (Kingston et al. 2016).
These studies illustrate the enormous effort entailed in achieving even modest, 
often short-term, improvements. They contrast with the, apparently, much better 
compliance achieved by the Australian National Hand Hygiene Initiative, which 
was established in 2009 as a “standardised hand hygiene culture-change program 
throughout all Australian hospitals to improve … compliance among Australian 
health care workers; establish a validated system of …auditing to allow local, 
national and international benchmarking…” (Grayson et al. 2011). Between 2009 
and June 2017, overall compliance increased, steadily, from 63% to 85%, which 
clearly represents major improvement, to above the national benchmark (70%) 
(http://www.hha.org.au/). But it obscures significant variation (e.g. between hospi-
tals, professional groups and moments) and sampling biases, suggesting aggregated 
national data can be misleading. Moreover, the estimated auditing cost is AU$2.2 
million per annum for an annual improvement (adjusted for sampling) of 1% com-
pliance (Azim and McLaws 2014).
How should these data be interpreted? Routine audits, by direct observation, 
necessarily involve short periods of observation (20–30 minutes) at times of conve-
nience and so are not representative of 24 hour/whole-of-hospital activity; it was 
estimated that <2% of total daily hand hygiene opportunities are sampled during a 
60-minute audit (Fries et al. 2012). Auditing by direct observation is subject to the 
Hawthorne effect9 (Srigley et al. 2014) and observer bias; it does not assess whether 
hand hygiene is performed correctly and, when compared with continuous 
9 Hawthorne effect: individuals modify their behaviour in response to awareness of being observed.
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automated monitoring, overestimates compliance (Kwok et al. 2016). Furthermore, 
there is no consensus as to what target compliance rate is necessary or realistic 
(Mahida 2016). Video or electronic monitoring systems would reduce workload, 
measure compliance more consistently and could improve it, by providing rapid 
feedback and prompts (Srigley et al. 2015), but experience with their use is limited 
and there are many logistic, industrial, and ethical challenges (Palmore and 
Henderson 2012; Conway 2016). There is clearly a need to establish realistic com-
pliance targets, more accurate, less labour intensive auditing methods and a more 
holistic approach to IPC monitoring.
6.5.4  Doctors and IPC
There is extensive evidence than doctors’ hand hygiene compliance is consistently 
less than that of nurses, overall, albeit highly variable (Pittet et al. 2004; Cantrell 
et al. 2009). In one hospital it was more than 80% among physicians and paediatri-
cians but only 30% among surgeons and anaesthetists (Pittet et al. 2004). Compliance 
has been associated with an emotional, outcome-oriented, rather than a ‘rational’, 
thinking style – typically associated with nurses and doctors, respectively (Sladek 
et al. 2008) - and inversely correlated with professional education level i.e. senior 
doctors were less compliant than junior doctors or nurses (Duggan et  al. 2008). 
These differences matter: senior doctors have status and power within hospital com-
munities and their attitudes and behaviours disproportionately influence those of 
other staff (Lankford et al. 2003). Poorly compliant, peripatetic junior doctors can 
act as “super-spreaders”, with many opportunities to transmit pathogens between 
the numerous individual patients they encounter each day (Temime et  al. 2009; 
Hornbeck et al. 2012). Doctors are more likely to perform hand hygiene after patient 
contact, to avoid a perceived personal risk, than before contact, to protect patients 
(Scheithauer et al. 2011). Many believe these are equivalent, but overlook the many 
opportunities for contamination of their hands, from bed curtains, patient notes, 
door handles, computer keyboards etc., between patients. In a focus-group study of 
hospital staff, most non-physician participants said they noticed the hand hygiene 
practices of other staff and rated doctors least compliant. Doctors were confident of 
their hand hygiene knowledge but discounted its importance before patient contact. 
They rarely noticed the practices of others, apart from their senior colleagues; medi-
cal students said that senior doctors’ hand hygiene practices influenced their own 
(Jang et al. 2010a, 2010b).
The reasons for some doctors’ apparent lack of commitment to IPC may lie in the 
medical practice model, which focuses on individual patient’s clinical problems, 
which require investigation, decision-making, intervention, often with tangible 
results. IPC policies fit poorly with this model; they lack obvious utility, since they 
do not, meaningfully, influence clinical practice. The common perception that HAIs 
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and MDRO acquisition are rare, but unavoidable, can promote a sense of nihilism – 
that they are inevitable features of contemporary healthcare. Often this is attribut-
able to ignorance of the impacts of HAIs and benefits of IPC, which is partly because 
of inadequate surveillance and feedback to clinicians.
Some doctors’ apparent indifference or even hostility towards IPC may also 
reflect aspects of professional and organisational cultures. Traditionally, IPC has 
been a nursing responsibility; the role of infection control practitioners’ (usually 
nurses) is to implement IPC policies on behalf of hospital management, who have 
to report, against mandatory IPC performance indicators, to a central authority (e.g. 
Ministry of Health). Responsibility for monitoring these indicators, such as hand 
hygiene compliance, is often devolved to nurse managers, who are held to account 
if targets are not met. But they have little influence over doctors, who choose to 
ignore rules they see as unnecessary or excessive or who object, on principle, to any 
regulation, imposed by nurses or managers. “Senior doctors consider themselves 
exempt from following policy and practice within a culture of perceived autono-
mous decision-making that relies more on personal knowledge and experience than 
formal policy” (Charani et al. 2013). This professional antipathy to IPC, may also 
reflect the historical - but gradually changing - gender distribution between nursing, 
which has been a largely female profession, and medicine, traditionally dominated 
by men, particularly in senior positions. Doctors’ attitudes to IPC are consistent 
with a more general failure  - there are many exceptions  - to engage in quality 
improvement activities or comply with organisational policies, which have been 
linked to an entrenched medical culture (Jorm and Kam 2004) and/or to the per-
ceived loss of professional autonomy and dominance associated with managerial-
ism (Davies and Harrison 2003).
How widespread these attitudes are and how the hospital management handles 
them will determine the success or failure of hospital-wide quality improvement 
programs such as IPC or AMS. If they are tolerated or seen as “too hard” to address, 
the morale of other staff and the success of the program will be compromised and 
recalcitrant doctors’ skepticism about its relevance, reinforced. On the other hand, 
some IPC rules are unnecessarily rigid and officiously enforced. They may seem 
straightforward to their authors, but poor compliance is sometimes due to clini-
cians’ finding them confusing, incompatible with the realities of frontline practice 
or inappropriate in some settings (Hor et al. 2017). There are faults on both sides 
when, ideally, all “sides” should be working collaboratively to promote patient 
safety. The issues need to be addressed if healthcare management and staff are to 
fulfil their moral responsibility to support and participate in programs that promote 
patient safety. Individuals “are not somehow ‘outside’ and separate from ‘systems’: 
they create, modify and are subject to the social forces that are an inescapable fea-
ture of any organizational system; each element acts on the other” (Aveling et al. 
2016). The success of any program is likely to hang on the extent to which the val-
ues and goals of all of its members – particularly the most influential - align with, 
and contribute to, those of the organisation.
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6.5.5  The Organization’s Role in IPC/AMS Programs
Government and private healthcare funding bodies generally mandate that each hos-
pital has established IPC and AMS programs and reports regularly, sometimes pub-
licly, against mandatory performance targets. This does not necessarily guarantee 
the programs’ success; there are wide variations in practices and outcomes between 
apparently similar hospitals. Most studies of successful IPC/AMS interventions 
have focused on “what” works, rather than “why” it works. The components of 
organisational culture likely to determine the success or failure of program imple-
mentation are leadership, shared vision and values, inter-professional relationships, 
resources and service priorities (Krein et al. 2010). Successful implementation of 
IPC/AMS, requires commitment by hospital management, strong clinical leader-
ship (Saint et al. 2010b), highly motivated champions (Damschroder et al. 2009) 
and interdisciplinary departmental teams. The goals, benefits and measures of suc-
cess of the programs need to be clearly defined, but flexible enough to allow local 
modification, based on the knowledge and experience of frontline staff. Imposing 
cultural change from without is less likely to be sustainable than allowing frontline 
staff to discover how to change it from within (Iedema et  al. 2015; Zimmerman 
et al. 2013). Measures of success should be defined, monitored and rewarded, at 
least by timely feedback, if not more tangible recognition.
6.6  Conclusions
AMR is an acknowledged threat to global health security and will not be adequately 
addressed by development of new antibiotics. The most urgent priority is to curtail 
the inappropriate use of antibiotics and spread of MDROs, which are most prevalent 
in hospitals where they are also most amenable to control. Despite evidence that 
properly implemented hospital AMS/IPC programs can reduce the burden of ABR, 
the increasing prevalence of preventable HAIs, show that many healthcare organisa-
tions have either not recognised, or failed to meet, the challenge. In this chapter, we 
have identified some of the barriers to successful implementation of AMS/IPC pro-
grams; although they are usually mandatory, in hospitals, their quality and outcomes 
vary. The organisational characteristics most likely to assure successful implemen-
tation include: commitment to a shared vision and values; strong leadership, gover-
nance and systems; respectful, collaborative inter-professional relationships and 
fair, cost-effective resource allocation.
Healthcare organisations and hospital managers have ethical and legal responsi-
bilities to protect existing patients, employees and the public – and future patients 
whose treatment will be compromised by a lack of effective antimicrobial therapy - 
from preventable harm originating in hospital facilities or activities. Unfortunately, 
preventive programs are often a low priority because their beneficiaries are unknown 
future persons whose claims are eclipsed by known, present persons and powerful 
professional or commercial interests. Preventive programs also generally lack the 
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solid, cost-effectiveness data that administrators demand before committing 
resources, especially if it is at the expense of therapies. A case for adequate resources 
to sustain AMS/IPC programs would, ideally, include local, as well as published, 
statistics on current rates, costs and adverse consequences of HAIs and ABR and 
personal histories of known patients who have suffered adverse effects from an 
HAI, contact isolation or inappropriate antibiotic administration.
Successful AMS/IPC policies will be adaptable to unit/department-specific 
requirements rather than rigidly imposed rules and restrictions, which fail to account 
for variable, unpredictable clinical exigencies and so are liable to be ignored or 
circumvented. Effective policy implementation needs frontline ownership of 
“practice- based guidelines”, based on local knowledge, including potential patient 
participation.
Policies and implementation plans often fail to clearly define their goals or how 
success will be measured. Evidence of success that can be rapidly fed back to staff 
is a strong motivator of adherence, but many hospital managers fail to invest in HAI 
surveillance and feedback to clinicians that is relevant, accessible and timely enough 
to motivate improvement. Despite the importance of hand hygiene compliance, its 
prominence as a single (often inaccurate) measure of IPC practice risks neglecting 
other important cultural and behavioural factors – teamwork, interdisciplinary co- 
operation and motivation – that determine the effectiveness of a hospital’s AMS/IPC 
programs.
Securing the commitment, of an often small, but powerful, minority of senior 
medical staff, who regard AMS/IPC programs as a threat to professional autonomy 
and status, remains a challenge for many hospitals. It requires, as a minimum, 
respectful consultation during program planning, recruitment of clinical leaders and 
champions and, once a decision is made to adopt it, clarity that all staff are expected 
to support and participate in programs to which the organisation is committed.
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Chapter 7
Epidemiology and Ethics of Antimicrobial 
Resistance in Animals
Lisa Boden and Dominic Mellor
Abstract Despite a large and rapidly growing volume of research activity and out-
put, primarily on the biological bases of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), epidemio-
logical understanding of the causal mechanisms at play behind the apparent recent 
global rise in prevalence of AMR has, arguably, progressed very little. Despite this 
inconvenient fact, political imperative and expedience, among other drivers, have 
given substantial impetus to an interventionist approach against what are considered 
to be the culprits for the apparent growing prevalence of AMR and its impacts. 
Concern about the rise in prevalence of microbial infections that are resistant to 
therapeutic agents designed to kill them has arisen almost exclusively in relation to 
human health. (Public awareness and concern about antihelmintic resistance, for 
which the impacts are much more substantial for animal health, at least in developed 
temperate countries, are trivial by comparison). Nevertheless, antimicrobial drugs 
have been, and are, widely used in animal health and production throughout the 
world, and the contribution of this diverse usage to the ‘global AMR problem’ has 
historically been controversial. There is growing acceptance, notwithstanding the 
limitations in causal understanding noted previously, of AMR as an ecological prob-
lem of competing populations of microorganisms experiencing both natural and 
anthropogenic selection pressures in compartments that transcend species and other 
boundaries. Typifying what is described as a ‘One Health’ problem, AMR is there-
fore considered to be most amenable to conjoint mitigation efforts in all compart-
ments: i.e. interventions in human health, animal health, food and the environment 
in a coherent manner.
In animals, this calls into question the motivations and practices for antimicro-
bial drug usage, the majority of which are justified on the basis of promoting animal 
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health and welfare and securing a food supply for a growing human population. Not 
surprisingly, there are great differences in animal husbandry and food demand, and 
in availability, access and regulation of antimicrobial usage in animals, and in 
 surveillance of AMR, which are likely to be starkest between developed and devel-
oping countries. Thus, it is unlikely that the impacts of AMR, and the impacts of 
efforts to mitigate AMR that are directed to the ‘animal compartment’ of the ecosys-
tem, will be felt equally across the world.
Keywords AMR · Ethics · One Health · Veterinary · Animal · Causality
7.1  Introduction: Evolutionary History of Antimicrobial 
Resistance as a Natural Phenomenon
Antimicrobial resistance has occurred as a natural phenomenon for millennia, as a 
response to inhibitory substances produced by microbial populations competing for 
resources in different ecosystems (Hall and Barlow 2004). Human discovery of the 
existence of these substances was exploited in the early twentieth century leading to 
the development of the first antibacterial drugs for therapeutic use. The rapid dis-
covery and development of both natural and synthetic antimicrobial drugs (active 
against bacteria, fungi, viruses, and protozoa), and their widespread use to treat and 
prevent human and animal infectious diseases, took place throughout the latter half 
of the twentieth century. As predicted by Alexander Fleming himself, as therapeutic 
use of antibiotics grew there closely followed the emergence of untreatable strains 
of organisms that had hitherto responded to treatment.
Any microorganism that isn’t inhibited or killed by appropriate, effective antimi-
crobials is classified as resistant (Ridge et  al. 2011). This phenomenon is now 
widely explained in terms of a ‘selection pressure’ being exerted on the populations 
of microorganisms which are exposed to antimicrobial agents. Such microbial pop-
ulations are usually comprised of an almost unimaginable number and diversity of 
individual organisms, amongst which the target ‘pathogen’ population for antimi-
crobial therapy may constitute only a fraction of those exposed to the agent. Under 
these circumstances, those organisms susceptible to the agent are inactivated, and 
cease to compete for resources, and those that are equipped with mechanism(s) to 
resist the effects of the agent thrive through access to the resources no longer con-
sumed by the inactivated organisms (Levin et al. 2000). In the case of therapeutic 
use of antimicrobial agents, if the organisms equipped with mechanism(s) to resist 
the effects of the agent are members of the ‘pathogen’ population, the result is likely 
to be treatment failure and prolonged clinical disease for the patient. If the organ-
isms equipped with mechanism(s) to resist the effects of the agent are members of 
the non-pathogen population (usually referred to as commensals), the effect is to 
select for populations that carry resistance mechanisms, but is unlikely to result in 
treatment failure at that time. Nevertheless, and especially for bacteria, many of the 
mechanisms to resist the effects of antimicrobial agents are coded for by genes 
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carried on transmissible genetic elements which can be passed between organisms 
of the same or different species or genera. Thus, selection for resistance in members 
of the non-pathogen population could subsequently lead to transfer to ‘pathogen’ 
populations and increased likelihood of subsequent treatment failure.
7.2  Drug Resistance as an Animal or Public Health Concern
Treatment failure and prolonged and/or more serious clinical disease for the patient 
are probably much more widely recognized consequences of drug resistance in 
human than in veterinary medicine. In efforts to mitigate these principally public 
health effects of antimicrobial resistance in the developed world, much attention has 
been focussed on human healthcare settings, particularly hospitals and care homes 
(Edwards et al. 2012). Efforts to improve infection prevention and control (IPC) in 
these settings are paramount, because they are needed not only to reduce the trans-
mission between people of infectious agents likely to require drug therapy, but also 
the transmission of antimicrobial resistance genes. Principles of IPC form the main-
stays of current strategies to combat antimicrobial resistance and are coupled with 
measures to promote ‘better’ prescribing of antimicrobial agents through guidelines 
and audit, and initiatives to educate the healthcare profession and the public. Judicial 
antimicrobial use (i.e. “better prescribing”) is based on evidence which supports 
using a particular agent against a particular organism in a particular patient for a 
particular reason and period of time (e.g. British Veterinary Association 2015).
The contribution and nature of veterinary use of antimicrobial agents to the prob-
lem of antimicrobial resistance on a global scale has been a controversial issue for 
many years, with conflicting, polarized views espoused by different respected 
research groups (Aarestrup et al. 2000; Collignon 2013; Mather et al. 2013; van 
Bunnik and Woolhouse 2017). Much has been made of the widespread and varied 
use of antimicrobial agents in veterinary medicine and the potential for this to con-
tribute to the (largely) public health problem posed by antimicrobial resistance. In 
this, it is noteworthy that, with few exceptions, relatively little is made of treatment 
failure and prolonged and/or more serious clinical disease for animal patients. The 
use of the broad term ‘antimicrobial’ has been unhelpful in this regard as it is inclu-
sive of agents such as anti-coccidials, which are important for animal health and 
food security, but have no effect on other organisms (such as bacteria or fungi) 
which drive resistance in humans (Mendelson et al. 2017). Mendelson et al. (2017) 
argue for more precision in the language around drug-resistant infections, and for 
more specific terms such as “antibiotic” or “antifungal” to be used in preference to 
‘“antimicrobials” when referring to medicines against a specific type of organism.
There is a growing acceptance that drug-resistant infections are a ‘One Health’ 
problem that transcends species (and other) barriers (Karesh et al. 2012). Expanding 
on this, it is obvious that agents that carry resistance determinants exist very well 
and evolve outside animal or human hosts. There is increasing recognition of the 
need to consider environmental reservoirs, and inanimate vehicles of transmission, 
7 Epidemiology and Ethics of Antimicrobial Resistance in Animals
112
not least among which are foods of animal origin – home produced and imported – 
and integrate these into thinking about the ecology and epidemiology of resistance 
(Wellington et al. 2013). Resistance genes may spread directly from people to ani-
mals and from animals to people through food-borne and environmental contamina-
tion (via wastewater, soil and the spread of contaminated manure from livestock and 
wild animals) (Casey et al. 2013; Kim et al. 2013; Davis and Rutkow 2012; Johnson 
and Becker 2010; Cantas et al. 2013; Roe and Pillai 2003; Soonthornchaikul and 
Garelick 2009; Levy et al. 1976; Thanner et al. 2016; Literak et al. 2011). However, 
the relative importance of these routes of transmission is uncertain; exposure is 
complex and not unequivocally in one direction (Carlet et al. 2011; Mather et al. 
2013; Zhu et  al. 2013). Additionally, there are other epidemiological pathways 
(such as transmission of resistance via irrigation and waste-water, plant production 
and the disposal or presence of disinfectants and heavy metals in the environment) 
that have been shown to be associated with the emergence of drug resistance. These 
are not well researched due to the lack of analytical methods to monitor contami-
nants in waste, surface and drinking water and soil (Thanner et al. 2016). Thus, the 
epidemiological drivers associated with the selection for and against resistant organ-
isms in animals are unlikely to be different to the causal mechanisms believed to 
exist in humans or the environment. There are important caveats to this assertion: 
(1) many parts of the relevant ecosystem are ignored by surveillance approaches 
adopted to date, notably the environment and food (home produced and imported), 
(2) it is difficult to partition antibiotic resistance into that which arises naturally 
from bacterial competition in various ecological niches and that which is selected 
for anthropogenically through therapeutic or other use of drugs and/or biocides. Of 
course, the relative intensity of the various selection pressures for the emergence of 
drug-resistant infections is itself driven in part by broader socio-economic issues 
(e.g. poverty, sanitation, hygiene and public health resources) which are harder to 
quantify and even more difficult for governments to address. These caveats arise 
due to the limitations of the evidence provided by surveillance for drug-resistant 
infections, which has largely focused on trying to compare observations of antibi-
otic resistance in bacterial isolates from human patients to those of antibiotic resis-
tance in animal populations (often using different methods of antimicrobial 
resistance determination) in developed countries.
High rates of drug-resistant infections are found in densely populated, develop-
ing countries where there is corruption and unreliable enforcement of laws and 
regulations pertaining to the practice of human and veterinary medicine (Collignon 
et  al. 2015). Individuals who are exposed to resistant bacteria or fungi in these 
hotspots through international travel and medical tourism can subsequently import 
resistance into other countries, resulting in rapid global spread (World Health 
Assembly Resolution 51.9 1998).
There is still a need to convince some sectors that this is a shared problem with 
shared accountability and shared responsibility, but that principle is pretty much 
implicit in nationally and internationally agreed accords (e.g. Department of Health 
2013; O’Neill 2016). Based on experience from the UK, plans to implement the 
recommendations of such accords, whilst all claiming to be taking a ‘One Health’ 
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approach, can vary even among devolved administrations. In this sense, creation of 
a bespoke ‘One Health’ agency, with appropriately balanced multidisciplinary rep-
resentation (and buy-in and trust), acting in a collegiate manner to coordinate a 
collective and coherent response seems intuitively more likely to succeed than sim-
ply hoping that separate agencies will be able to work in parallel towards a common 
aim without ‘funding the arrows’ (Campbell 2006).
In conclusion, considering the epidemiology of drug-resistance in animals in 
isolation is missing the point.
7.3  Antimicrobial Use in Animals
Similar to antimicrobial use in humans, there is substantial variation throughout the 
world in the availability, regulation, control and administration of antimicrobials to 
animals. Whilst these factors themselves are not expected to alter the postulated 
causal mechanisms by which drug use affects drug resistance in microorganisms, 
they are likely to modify the extent to which these mechanisms have the opportunity 
to act. Simply put, it appears that greater usage of particular antimicrobial drugs, in 
a relevant time and place, is positively correlated with greater proportions of isolates 
tested for susceptibility in that time and place being designated as resistant. Thus, 
greater control over the quality and supply of antimicrobial drugs and greater regu-
lation and professionalism over their administration should correlate with reduced 
proportions of resistant isolates.
It is worthy of note that this general observation appears also to be true of anthel-
mintic drugs, although the ecology of macroparasites is of course different to 
microbes. However, in the developed world, the problem of anthelmintic resistance 
is more of an immediate issue for animals than humans, which means that it has 
received much less attention from a public health point of view. Nevertheless, 
sophisticated guidance on control of parasitic infestations, based on understanding 
their ecology, and seeking to preserve the efficacy of anthelmintic drugs, are seen as 
critical to future food security (e.g. see Sustainable Control of Parasites in Sheep 
(http://www.scops.org.uk/)).
A range of antimicrobial drugs is used widely to treat disease in domestic ani-
mals through a large and internationally varying number of preparations and through 
a number of different routes of administration. In most developed countries of the 
world, the classes of antimicrobial drug available for animal administration, and the 
preparations and routes by which they can be administered, have to be specifically 
licensed for animal use and are highly regulated, especially for animal species likely 
to enter the human food chain. In these countries, there are also strictly enforced 
‘withdrawal periods’ which define for how long an animal must be ‘off’ treatment 
before products form that animal can be used for human consumption. In some parts 
of the world, so-called ‘off-label’ use (i.e. an unlicensed product and/or an unli-
censed route of administration) is sometimes permitted under derogation for the 
treatment of companion animals. Lists of critically important antimicrobials (CIAs) 
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in humans and animals have been agreed, and are periodically updated, by the OIE 
and WHO and others, and the use of these drugs should be restricted to treating 
infections that have been demonstrated to be susceptible (and resistant to less 
important, so-called first-line, drugs) (OIE list of antimicrobials of veterinary 
importance 2007; WHO list of Critically Important Antimicrobials (CIA) 2017). In 
developing countries, due to limitations in infrastructure, such regulations, where 
they exist, are much more difficult to make effective. Coupled with a very high 
demand due to a high disease burden and often high population densities, and issues 
such as uncontrolled, unauthorized markets and counterfeit drugs, the conditions 
appear likely to favour intense selection for antimicrobial resistance and subsequent 
dissemination, though there are few reliable data to provide firm evidence of this.
Much of the controversy around use of antimicrobials in animals has concen-
trated on their use as growth promoters. It has been considered that routine addition 
of some antimicrobial compounds (usually antibacterial drugs and often at sub- 
therapeutic concentrations) to livestock feed increases food conversion efficiency 
by more than enough to outweigh the cost of adding the drugs, though this is dis-
puted (Graham et al. 2007). However, other agents, such as anti-coccidials used by 
the poultry sector, are also included in this broad classification (Mendelson et al. 
2017). Use of antibiotic growth promoters is considered by many to be particularly 
undesirable due to the selection pressure being applied in an almost unrelenting way 
to the populations of microorganisms colonizing these animals, especially in 
instances in which drugs are used at sub-therapeutic concentrations, as this is 
thought to select more strongly for antimicrobial resistance. Much research has 
sought to investigate the impact of the use of antimicrobials for growth promotion 
and has been interpreted by most as demonstrating a positive association with 
increased prevalence of resistant organisms in exposed microbial populations 
(O’Neill (2015)). On the basis of this evidence, their use as growth promoters has 
been banned in many parts of the world, notably Europe, yet still persists in others.
In the EU, “the use of agents from classes which are or may be used in human or 
veterinary medicine (i.e. where there is a risk of selecting for cross-resistance to 
drugs used to treat bacterial infections)” as growth promoters has not been permit-
ted since 2006 (Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003/EC) and withdrawal periods for 
antimicrobial use prior to animal slaughter are designed to ensure that there are no 
antimicrobial residues in food. In the USA, non-therapeutic use is still widespread 
in industrial farming. The USA FDA has historically been slow to respond to calls 
to reduce antimicrobial use and unwilling to exert its authority over the antimicro-
bial approval process (see Natural Resources Defense Council, et  al. v. United 
States Food and Drug Administration, et al.). Until recently, the FDA implemented 
a voluntary approach to antimicrobial conservation that encouraged drug companies 
to withdraw approvals for antimicrobials for non-therapeutic use and replace them 
with approvals for other uses such as chemoprophylaxis (USDA 2012a, b). However, 
this policy has had little real effect on antimicrobial usage because, in many cases, 
the doses and durations of drug use for chemoprophylaxis and growth promotion 
are the same (Outterson 2014).
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In emerging economies, such as the BRICS and MINT countries, it is anticipated 
that non-therapeutic use of antibiotics in animals may exponentially increase 
because of increasing intensification of agriculture/aquaculture, high prevalences of 
production and endemic diseases (which are likely to be better controlled in other 
countries) and lack of resources to ensure appropriate governance over antimicro-
bial use (Carlet et al. 2011; Van Boeckel 2015). In some of these countries, AMR 
and antimicrobial conservation aren’t on the “political agenda” at all (Grace 2015 at 
p 11–12) because addressing other issues such as poverty, starvation, malnutrition 
through (un)sustainable livestock and farmed fish production are more urgent for 
the current population. The impact of antimicrobial use on accessibility of animal 
food sources hasn’t been quantified for most countries, partly due to the variability 
and uncertainty regarding the quantities of antimicrobials used even in similarly 
intensive systems elsewhere (Rushton et al. 2014), and there is no agreement on the 
desired levels of antimicrobial consumption. Even if an enforced ban on the non- 
therapeutic use of antimicrobials were to be introduced, in some places, the absence 
of national R&D investment means that there are few alternative mechanisms (such 
as vaccines) to concurrently improve animal husbandry and avoid production losses 
which could paradoxically increase AMR prevalence through off-label or unpre-
scribed use of poor quality or counterfeit antimicrobials. The relative costs of not 
using antimicrobials on the security of the global food supply and the success of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (in eradicating poverty and hunger in the current 
generation) have not been compared to AMR treatment failure in people (in future 
generations). Although developed countries arguably have sufficient means to assist 
developing countries address some of these issues, they have so far focussed on 
their own national priorities in order to achieve wider international societal benefits 
(Clift 2013).
Distinction is made in veterinary medicine (at least in the developed world) 
between prophylactic (administering antimicrobial drugs to prevent anticipated 
infection) and metaphylactic use of antimicrobials (administering antimicrobial 
drugs to clinically well members of a population in contact with an index case of 
infectious disease to prevent anticipated infection), which is not recognized in 
human medicine. Prophylaxis in veterinary medicine is criticized by many as an 
excuse for poor infection prevention and control (often referred to as ‘biosecurity’ 
in animal production) in a particular animal husbandry system, but presents ethical 
dilemmas to veterinarians who struggle with the notion of withholding treatment in 
the face of what is considered to be almost inevitable disease and associated welfare 
compromise. In many instances, the clinical use of antimicrobials in animals is 
empirical and sensitivity testing of an isolate of the putative causative agent of 
infection is not carried out. The reasons for this are largely to do with cost and expe-
diency in starting treatment to improve the clinical condition of the patient. Thus, 
data that characterize the resistance profiles of clinical isolates from animals repre-
sent a very small proportion of the putative infections treated by veterinarians, and 
their use for epidemiological purposes often appears to overlook this fact. However, 
this is also true of human medicine.
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The notion that antimicrobial resistant organisms somehow ‘arise’ in animals, 
driven by selection pressures applied by veterinary use of antimicrobials, and pass 
to humans, principally through the food chain, has been a popular model of antimi-
crobial resistance ‘acquisition’ for some time. However, some recent research shows 
that transmission is likely to occur in both directions between animals and people 
directly and indirectly through the environment and various fomites (Mather et al. 
2013). As discussed in the introduction, it is probably more reasonable to think of 
animals and people as inextricably linked ‘samplers’ of a shared environmental pool 
of organisms subject to different selection pressures in different compartments.
7.4  Surveillance for Antimicrobial Resistance in Animals
‘Better’ surveillance for antimicrobial resistance in animals is a more or less univer-
sal feature of international concordats, calls to action and other declarations on anti-
microbial resistance (Department of Health 2013; O’Neill 2016). As the bedrock of 
epidemiology, surveillance activity, and the intelligence generated by it, offers the 
greatest potential to understand fully the causal relationships at play within the 
complex landscape ecology underlying the antimicrobial resistance ‘phenomenon’ 
(Singer et al. 2006). Nevertheless, there are a great many limitations, often over-
looked, that can apply to data derived from surveillance of infections in animals 
(and people) for the purposes of exploring causal relationships of relevance to the 
emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance. Chief among these is the ques-
tion of how well the isolate(s) derived from the sample(s) collected from the 
individual(s) and/or their environment(s) under study represent the actual nature 
and dynamics of the interactions between host and microbial populations and the 
selection pressures experienced by them. Confounding this, in many instances, is a 
lack of standardization of the microbiological methods applied and inconsistent 
definitions of how antimicrobial sensitivity or lack of it is defined for individual 
drug/bug combinations derived from different species (animals and humans).
The World Health Organization (WHO) has led international efforts to develop 
action plans to monitor and reduce drug-resistant infections (WHO Strategy 2001). 
However, without a legally-binding mandate, it has been difficult implement this 
strategy within Member States. Indeed, between 1998 and 2015 (when the WHO 
first published its global action plan), there have been at least seven World Health 
Assembly (WHA) Resolutions promoting surveillance of drug-resistant infections, 
but still no internationally coordinated or standardized AMR surveillance strategy 
within either the human or veterinary sectors. Although collaboration between the 
WHO, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and World 
Organization of Animal Health (OIE) is improving coordination between human 
and animal surveillance, within individual Member States the two sectors remain 
distinct and regulated independently of one another. Surveillance, if undertaken at 
all, has hitherto been implemented separately by each sector, without harmonization 
or standardization of approach.
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Existing national action plans within Member States describe broad strategic 
aims to mitigate, and reduce current rates of drug-resistant infections and resultant 
treatment failures. These include: improvements in infection prevention and con-
trol, education and training initiatives, optimization of prescribing practices (par-
ticularly in animals with respect to critically important antimicrobials) and incentives 
to innovate new, effective therapies. For the most part, these aims have not been 
translated yet into specific actions with explicit timescales for delivery or agreed 
outcome metrics. In some countries, technical and financial constraints, such as lack 
of existing public health infrastructure, access to diagnostic technologies and chang-
ing public attitudes towards public health mean that surveillance is poor (STAG-
AMR 2013; WHO 2011). Accurate inferences (and/or between-country comparisons) 
about antibiotic or antifungal consumption rates aren’t always possible because of 
the scarcity and variability of available information on consumption, species treated, 
routes of administration, dose rate, and pharmaceutical costs (Rushton et al. 2014 at 
p 11). Other important differences, such as husbandry practices, diversity of avail-
able drugs and prescribing habits of veterinarians, mean that comparisons of antimi-
crobial use based on animal demographics are potentially misleading. For example, 
Chile is the second largest producer of farmed salmon and the only important devel-
oping country producer. However, it uses around 300 times more antibiotics than 
the largest salmon producer, Norway because Norway has the resources to access 
and implement vaccination and alternative husbandry measures instead of antimi-
crobials to control diseases (Grace 2015 at page 11). Thus, it is currently not pos-
sible to accurately chart progress towards AMR reduction or identify early-warning 
performance indicators for actions that aren’t effective in achieving these aims.
Despite these limitations, surveillance and research data generated, principally in 
the developed world, are subject to ever more sophisticated epidemiological analy-
ses to infer risk factors and causal relationships for resistance emergence, persis-
tence and spread. Entrenched in this aim is the notion that population patterns of 
drug-resistant infections can be explained by a complex web of multiple intercon-
nected factors, which if identified, can be used to inform and target interventions to 
improve public health (Krieger 1994). Increasingly, these analyses seek to be com-
parative and inferential about the impacts of antimicrobial use in one species (ani-
mals or man) on antimicrobial resistance in the other, as the ‘One Health’ construct 
of drug resistance becomes more widely accepted. However, caution is required in 
the interpretation of these findings. ‘Causal webs’ are not unbiased; they are neces-
sarily hierarchical, focusing “attention on risk factors closest to the outcome under 
inspection”, inevitably prioritizing biological factors (amenable to medical or vet-
erinary intervention) over other broader social or environmental determinants which 
could be addressed through social action (Krieger 1994; Thanner et al. 2016). For 
example, addressing a lack of access to education, sanitation and adequate health-
care (including infection prevention and control, scarcity of new antibiotics, poor 
prescribing practices and absence of concurrent diagnostic tools to ensure appropri-
ate treatment) will affect rates of disease, which will influence subsequent amounts 
of antimicrobial used (Buckland Merrett 2013). Reduction of antimicrobial use may 
reduce selection pressure for resistance, but at the same reduces the numbers of 
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antimicrobial ‘customers’ and thus incentives to innovate new drugs. Equally, eco-
nomic strategies that are driven by sales rewards will inevitably conflict with prin-
ciples of conservation and IPC. Understanding of the epidemiology of AMR (and 
this broader socio-economic and ecological ‘web of causation’) and an appreciation 
for the gaps in communication and coordination between stakeholders and regula-
tors involved across multiple sectors and disciplines at each of these foci is therefore 
necessary to ensure policy decisions are robust and ethical.
7.5  Summary and Conclusion
The epidemiology of antimicrobial resistance in animals seems very unlikely to be 
extricable or distinct from that in people. A powerful epidemiological model of the 
causation and dissemination of antimicrobial resistance as a feature of microbio-
logical ecology among a very complex web of interconnected host and environmen-
tal compartments has emerged and gained widespread acceptance under the 
construct of ‘One Health’. However, the limitations in the quality of the data that 
have been used to build this model leave room for uncertainty about its validity. In 
addition, there needs to be ‘thinking time and space’ to consider and account for 
cognitive biases in such models and to incorporate socio-economic modifiers of 
such biological models in order to inform efficient and effective measured interven-
tions. As rapidly developing scientific advances offer the potential to improve the 
quality (e.g. WGS) and representativeness (e.g. through properly and purposively 
designed comparative surveillance programmes) of data, it is to be hoped that epi-
demiological inference will be able to keep pace and offer better, and what yet may 
be surprising, insights into the problem of antimicrobial resistance and ways in 
which it might be tackled.
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Chapter 8
The Virtuous Physician and Antimicrobial 
Prescribing Policy and Practice
Justin Oakley
Abstract In this chapter, I outline some key patient-centred medical virtues and 
several community-centred medical virtues, and I consider what sorts of antimicro-
bial prescribing decisions such virtues would lead physicians to make. I argue that 
practically-intelligent virtuous physicians should also have an awareness of the 
sorts of cognitive biases that are especially likely to distort their antimicrobial pre-
scribing decisions, and I urge physicians to develop ways of avoiding or counteract-
ing such biases. Further, I argue that effectively addressing the impact of these 
biases and other countervailing factors that inhibit virtuous prescribing practices is 
the responsibility not only of individual physicians, but also of institutions and regu-
lators. I outline some strategies that individual physicians, institutions, and health-
care policymakers could develop to help physicians hit the targets of those 
patient-centred and community-centred medical virtues, and to thereby play their 
part in redressing the problems of antimicrobial resistance.
Keywords Medical virtue · Practical intelligence · Justice · Antibiotic 
overprescribing · Cognitive bias
The detrimental health impact of antimicrobial resistance raises significant ques-
tions about physicians’ antimicrobial prescribing decisions, so it is important to 
investigate what sorts of prescribing decisions about antimicrobials would be made 
by a virtuous physician in various contexts. Antimicrobial resistance has become a 
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major global health concern, as the resistance of disease-causing microorganisms to 
antimicrobials can completely undermine the effectiveness of many antibiotics and 
other antimicrobials that are commonly used to treat a variety of diseases, and to 
lower the risks of post-surgical infections. The dwindling effectiveness of many 
antimicrobials has been implicated in a growing number of patient deaths world-
wide, often from conditions such as respiratory and wound infections which had 
previously been responsive to antimicrobial treatments. Addressing what sorts of 
antimicrobial prescribing decisions a virtuous physician would make seems espe-
cially challenging for virtue ethics approaches to medical practice. For such 
approaches typically evaluate physician decision-making by reference to patient- 
centred role virtues like medical beneficence, medical courage, and trustworthiness, 
but tend to say little about broader medical virtues that help physicians act in the 
best health interests of the community, which is a crucial consideration in ethically 
justifiable clinician decision-making regarding antimicrobials.
In this chapter, I discuss some key patient-centred medical virtues and several 
candidate community-centred medical virtues, and I consider what sorts of antimi-
crobial prescribing decisions such virtues would lead physicians to make. I draw out 
the moral significance of these community-centred medical virtues by examining 
certain cases where prescribing an antimicrobial seems likely to be in the best inter-
ests of the patient in question, but seems unlikely to be in the best health interests of 
the community overall. In doing so, I consider some analogies with other sorts of 
cases involving seemingly divergent virtue directives, such as those involving psy-
chiatrists breaching patient confidentiality to protect third parties from harm. Also, 
I argue that practically-intelligent virtuous physicians should have an awareness of 
the sorts of cognitive biases that are especially likely to distort their antimicrobial 
prescribing decisions, and I urge physicians to develop ways of avoiding or counter-
acting such biases. Further, effectively addressing the impact of these biases and 
other countervailing factors that inhibit virtuous prescribing practices is, I argue, the 
responsibility not only of individual physicians, but also of institutions and regula-
tors. Therefore, I also consider the prospects of certain institutional and regulatory 
initiatives which aim to reduce antimicrobial over-prescribing by highlighting and 
undermining such biases in clinical practice.
8.1  Antimicrobial Resistance and Virtue Ethics
Rising global concerns about antimicrobial resistance has prompted many national 
and international agencies, professional medical associations, and policymakers to 
investigate what sorts of factors are contributing to this problem, and to the resulting 
significant increases in morbidity and mortality rates of certain diseases in many 
countries around the world. The accelerating resistance of microorganisms to anti-
biotics and other antimicrobial agents commonly used in medical treatment has 
substantially reduced – and at times entirely removed – effective microbial treat-
ment options for some patients with serious conditions such as pneumonia, 
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tuberculosis, or septicaemia, and a number of those patients have subsequently died. 
Further, antibiotic-resistant ‘superbugs’ like methicillin-resistant staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA) have been found in significant quantities in some of the world’s 
major hospitals, and many patients worldwide have died from hospital-acquired 
MRSA infections.1 Antimicrobial resistance is a major problem in high-income 
countries and also in low- and middle-income countries. For example, China has the 
world’s highest prevalence of MRSA, and this bacterium is associated with higher 
mortality rates for hospitalised patients there.2 Also, the prevalence of multi-drug 
resistant tuberculosis is relatively high in countries such as India and Russia – it has 
recently been predicted that 12.4% of all cases of TB will soon be multi-drug resis-
tant in India, and that 32.5% of all cases of TB will soon be multi-drug resistant in 
Russia.3 It has also been reported that over 50% of microorganisms involved in 
hospital-acquired infections in Greece seem to be resistant to all available antibiot-
ics.4 Effective antimicrobial treatments have therefore become a somewhat scarce 
resource in clinical practice in a number of contexts, and many countries have now 
introduced new government regulations and clinical guidelines aimed at encourag-
ing more responsible use and stewardship of antimicrobials. While antibiotics are 
one among several antimicrobial agents, I will focus here on the prescription of 
antibiotics, as inappropriate antibiotic prescribing appears to be a major contributor 
to antimicrobial resistance, which is why many of the efforts to improve antimicro-
bial prescribing practices are directed at antibiotic prescribing in particular.
This accelerating growth in antimicrobial resistance is due to a range of factors, 
including widespread farming practices, patient misuse of antimicrobials, and inap-
propriate antimicrobial prescribing practices by physicians. These contributing fac-
tors are now being targeted by a range of initiatives from government agencies, 
national and international medical and health care organisations, and at the level of 
hospital management. Thus, the WHO recently modified its longstanding Essential 
Medicines List by introducing recommendations that prioritise the use of some anti-
biotics over others in certain contexts  – for example, the list recommends that 
amoxicillin be made widely available to treat common infections, such as pneumo-
nia, but that other antibiotics should be reserved for use as a last resort when a 
life- threatening infection has failed to respond to other antibiotics.5 And the clinical 
practice guidelines about antibiotic prescribing in Australia’s Therapeutic 
Guidelines: Antibiotic also encourage the responsible use by clinicians of antibiot-
ics in treating a wide variety of conditions, and thus discourage the over-prescribing 
of antibiotics.6 However, questions have arisen about the effectiveness of clinical 
1 Staphylococcus aureus already exist in (e.g.) our respiratory tract, and some of those bacteria will 
already be antimicrobial-resistant, but antibiotic treatment allows those antimicrobial resistant 
S. aureus to potentially multiply.
2 See Dan Cui et al. (2017), and Zhenjiang Yao et al. (2015).
3 Aditya Sharma et al. (2017).
4 Stavros Saripanidas (2016).
5 See http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2017/essential-medicines-list/en/.
6 Antibiotic Expert Groups (2019).
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guidelines aimed at improving antibiotic prescribing. For example, a recent 
Australian study concluded that “Antibiotics are prescribed for ARIs [acute respira-
tory infections] at rates 4–9 times as high as those recommended by clinical guide-
lines. The potential for reducing rates of antibiotic prescription and to thereby 
reduce rates of antibiotic-related harms, particularly bacterial resistance, is there-
fore substantial.”7 Physician decision-making in relation to antibiotics has thus been 
identified as a major contributor to the problem of antimicrobial resistance,8 and so 
this remains a promising context on which to focus in developing effective ways of 
redressing this problem. In this chapter, therefore, I concentrate on the antimicrobial 
prescribing behaviour of physicians, and on what would plausibly be required of a 
virtuous physician in regard to antimicrobial prescribing.
The emphasis in virtue ethics on the character and moral psychology of virtuous 
agents have led some to regard this approach as excessively individualistic, and so 
it might be wondered whether virtue ethics is capable of providing useful guidance 
on addressing antimicrobial resistance, which is a complex multi-dimensional prob-
lem on an international scale. However, as noted above, physician prescribing 
behaviour is a major contributing factor to antimicrobial resistance, and so to this 
extent, focusing on what decisions a virtuous physician would make in relation to 
the prescription of antimicrobials would seem to offer a promising line of response 
to this problem. Further, recent empirically-informed accounts of the Aristotelian 
idea of practical intelligence (phronesis) emphasise the importance of agents being 
aware of, and having strategies to counteract, common decision-making biases that 
can divert their virtuous dispositions from hitting the target of the relevant virtue.9 
Physicians are evidently not immune from such biases,10 and these biases may well 
contribute to physicians’ inappropriate antimicrobial prescribing in certain sorts of 
cases.11 So applying recent empirically-informed accounts of virtues and practical 
intelligence to physicians’ roles and to their antimicrobial prescribing behaviour 
would seem to be a useful way of approaching the problems of antimicrobial 
resistance.
Generally speaking, virtue ethics evaluates actions by asking, ‘what sort of per-
son would do a thing like that?’ For example, we can ask whether an action was 
generous or mean-spirited, courageous or cowardly, and we can examine whether 
this is the sort of thing which a kind person or a just person would do in the circum-
stances. Virtue ethics can therefore draw upon such considerations to provide the 
elements of a criterion of right action. A virtue ethics criterion of right action can be 
7 Amanda R. McCullough et al. (2017).
8 See e.g. the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention statement, ‘About Antimicrobial 
Resistance’: “The use of antibiotics is the single most important factor leading to antibiotic resis-
tance around the world. Simply using antibiotics creates resistance. These drugs should only be 
used to manage infections.” https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/about.html.  [accessed 1 
November 2018].
9 See Justin Oakley (2018a, b).
10 See Blumenthal-Barby and Krieger (2015) and Saposnik et al. (2016).
11 See e.g. Jeffrey et al. (2014).
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stated initially in broad terms as holding that: An action is right if, and only if, it is 
what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances.12 Virtue ethi-
cists have also applied such an appeal to exemplars in developing accounts of right 
action in the context of various professional roles, such as medical and legal prac-
tice. An influential version of these accounts highlights links between the proper 
goal/s of the profession in question – such as health and justice for medicine and 
law, respectively – and an Aristotelian conception of human flourishing, or eudai-
monia. The proper goal/s of a profession can, in turn, provide the basis for an 
account of the role virtues for that profession. Thus in the case of medical practice, 
the role virtues for doctors can be understood as those character traits that enable 
doctors to serve the goal of health. These traits have been thought to include patient- 
centred dispositions such as medical beneficence, medical courage, and trustworthi-
ness, along with community-centred dispositions such as justice.13
8.2  Medical Virtues and Antimicrobial Prescribing
We saw in the previous section that inappropriate prescribing decisions by physi-
cians in relation to antibiotics is highlighted as one of the most important contribut-
ing factors to antimicrobial resistance and its resulting problems. Physicians in 
many countries are evidently over-prescribing antibiotics, and for a variety of condi-
tions. For example, a recent study by Katherine Fleming-Dutra and colleagues 
found that during 2010–2011 physicians in US clinics prescribed antibiotics for 
acute respiratory infections at double the rates that were clinically appropriate for 
such infections – in other words, around half of those antibiotic prescriptions were 
clinically inappropriate.14 Also, the 2018 national survey of antimicrobial prescrib-
ing practices in Australian hospitals found that 21.4% of antimicrobials prescribed 
during that year were classified as inappropriate prescriptions.15 And a recent study 
using survey data from 2010–2015 on antibiotic prescribing rates in general practice 
found that Australian GPs are prescribing antibiotics for acute respiratory infections 
at rates up to nine times higher than those recommended by the national Therapeutic 
Guidelines: Antibiotic. These researchers found, for example, that “Despite the rec-
ommendation in these guidelines against prescribing antibiotics for bronchitis, gen-
eral practitioners were estimated to have prescribed antibiotics for patients with 
bronchitis in 85% of cases during 2010–2015”.16 A subsequent interview with study 
co-author Chris Del Mar reported that he felt “doctors were acting out of a mis-
placed sense of caution, as many conditions requiring treatment with antibiotics 
12 Rosalind Hursthouse (1999).
13 See e.g. Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking (2001).
14 Katherine E. Fleming-Dutra et al. (2016).
15 Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (2020).
16 McCullough et al. (2017), op. cit., p. 68.
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share similar symptoms to those that do not…. doctors needed to stop considering a 
prescription for antibiotics as their first port of call. ‘The idea that we have as GPs, 
that writing a prescription for antibiotics just in case, is probably not so effective…, 
That in fact not using antibiotics at all is actually safe, you don’t end up with missed 
cases of meningitis and Lemierre’s disease – all sorts of really nasty things.’”17
Given that patients frequently request antibiotics for acute respiratory infections, 
and are usually keen to get better sooner, it is perhaps not surprising that there is a 
tendency among physicians in many countries to over-prescribe antibiotics for such 
infections in responding to such requests. But while yielding to patient pressure 
results in physicians over-prescribing antibiotics, there is also evidence that antibi-
otics are prescribed inappropriately because physicians overestimate patients’ 
expectations of receiving these drugs. Thus, in a 1997 study of antibiotic prescrib-
ing decisions by UK General Practitioners, Macfarlane and colleagues found that 
“Non-clinical factors influence the decision to prescribe antibiotics for nearly a half 
of those receiving one. Patient pressure was cited most frequently…and identified 
by the Audit Commission as an important reason for the excess use of antibiotics in 
the community. Pressure from patients to prescribe antibiotics, particularly for 
respiratory symptoms, has been identified as the commonest reason for doctors’ 
discomfort with prescribing decisions. General practitioners can, however, overesti-
mate patients’ expectations. A quarter of our patients received antibiotics when they 
stated that before the consultation they had not wanted antibiotics”.18 A survey of 
544 patients of inner London general practitioners found further evidence that phy-
sicians are overly influenced by their perceptions of patients’ hopes and expecta-
tions of receiving a medication prescription, and those perceptions frequently 
seemed to be inaccurate: “A third [31%] of the prescriptions [which were some-
times for antibiotics] written in this study were either not indicated or not hoped for, 
with 3% being neither indicated nor hoped for…. The writing of nonindicated pre-
scriptions was primarily associated with the doctor’s sense of feeling pressurised 
[by the patient to write a prescription]”.19 This survey also found that “In a fifth 
[22%] of consultations in which a prescription was written, the prescription was not 
strictly indicated on purely medical grounds”.20 Overall, the strongest influence on 
a physician’s decision to prescribe a medication was found in this study to be the 
physician’s perceptions of their patients’ hopes and expectations about receiving 
that medication.
17 Angus Randall (2017).
18 John Macfarlane et al. (1997), p. 1213. There is also evidence that UK General Practitioners have 
overestimated patients’ expectations of receiving a prescription, not only in cases involving antibi-
otics, but also with other sorts of medication: see Nicky Britten (1995), p. 1084: “When general 
practitioners are surveyed they describe high levels of demand, but objective evidence consistently 
suggests that doctors overestimate patients’ expectations. Reanalysis of published data shows that 
about a fifth of patients leave general practice consultations with prescriptions they did not expect.”




In some of the above types of cases where physicians prescribe antibiotics inap-
propriately, they may well be acting from a beneficent motivation to serve the best 
interests of their patient in some way – particularly where, as mentioned above, 
physicians prescribe an antibiotic “just in case” the patient has a serious, albeit rare, 
type of infection where antibiotic treatment at that stage would likely benefit the 
patient in the longer-term. However, physicians are frequently in a position to accu-
rately diagnose that a patient has the less serious condition of acute bronchitis, and 
to recognise that it is in the long-term best interests of such a patient not to be pre-
scribed an antibiotic now.21 Where physicians prescribing antibiotics are acting in 
misguided ways from motives of beneficence towards their patients, these cases can 
be usefully characterised as involving a failure of such motives to hit the target of 
the patient-centred virtue of medical beneficence.22 Cognitive biases seem to be an 
important factor in explaining why physicians’ beneficent motives can fail to hit the 
target of the virtue of medical beneficence in their prescribing decisions. An illumi-
nating recent study of Australian GP trainees (registrars) describes their decision- 
making processes in deciding whether or not to prescribe an antibiotic for the 
patient. A number of these registrars explained that, while they realised prescribing 
an antibiotic was often not in the patient’s best interests, and that it was important to 
avoid antibiotic over-prescribing, the registrars indicated how they rationalised pre-
scribing an antibiotic in certain cases – for instance, telling themselves that it was in 
the patient’s best interests to receive an antibiotic. The study found that: “Many 
registrars were concerned about patient safety and avoiding subsequent hospital 
presentations [for example, one registrar said]: ‘I tend to probably cover things a bit 
more because…if something goes wrong I want to make sure that the patient is 
going to be safe.’ (Registrar 9)”.23 In certain cases this seems to be an overly cau-
tious approach, which may indicate that a registrar is unduly influenced by the well- 
known ‘framing effect’, whereby possible losses loom larger to the agent than do 
possible gains.24 The researchers also mentioned that: “Barriers to evidence-based 
prescribing included role-modelling outdated practices, or setting a precedent of 
21 See McCullough et  al., op.  cit. For a useful systematic review of studies on how individuals 
treated with an antibiotic for respiratory and urinary infections can subsequently develop a higher 
level of bacterial resistance to that antibiotic for several months, see Céire Costelloe et al. (2010).
22 Christine Swanton emphasizes the importance of virtues ‘hitting the target’ of the contextually-
relevant virtue, and she discusses various examples of candidate virtues that fail to hit their target 
(see Christine Swanton 2003). Similarly, Dean Cocking and I have argued that each virtue involves 
being guided by a ‘regulative ideal’: “To say that an agent has a regulative ideal is to say that they 
have internalised a certain conception of correctness or excellence, in such a way that they are able 
to adjust their motivation and conduct so that it conforms – or at least does not conflict – with that 
standard” (Oakley and Cocking 2001, op. cit., p. 25).
23 Anthea Dallas et  al. (2014), p. e564. While antibiotic over-prescribing seemed due in part to 
certain cognitive biases in the registrars, “many registrars described a dissonance between their 
attitudes to guidelines and their prescribing behaviours, producing dissatisfaction with their own 
prescribing…: ‘There’s probably been times where I’ve given them the script and kind of felt a bit 
disappointed in myself afterwards.’(Registrar 14)” p. e563.
24 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981).
8 The Virtuous Physician and Antimicrobial Prescribing Policy and Practice
132
prescribing that created patient expectations and pressure on the registrar: ‘I do 
know one supervisor in particular will give his patients antibiotics even for some-
thing that sounds very viral, and therefore when I see his patients, I feel I’m expected 
to do that as well, because his patients have been seeing him for many years. So they 
expect it too, so I’m definitely more likely to give his patients antibiotics even when 
I don’t think it’s justified.’”(Registrar 10)25 This sort of approach may manifest a 
form of ‘authority bias’, whereby the registrar shows undue deference towards the 
antibiotic prescribing practices of his or her clinical supervisor.26
According to some influential recent empirically-informed accounts of virtue 
and virtue ethics, acting virtuously requires (among other things) agents to employ 
certain deliberative strategies to counteract common decision-making biases and 
other countervailing factors which can impede virtuous actions. These accounts 
develop a comprehensive conception of virtuous character-traits, which include an 
awareness of situational factors that conduce to or inhibit virtuous behaviour.27 The 
misguided beneficent efforts of those registrars who were (or could reasonably have 
been) aware that prescribing an antibiotic was not in their patient’s best interests can 
be helpfully understood as failures to exercise the central Aristotelian virtue of 
phronesis, or practical intelligence, in this context.28 Broadly speaking, phronesis is 
an overarching normative disposition that regulates the more specific dispositions 
involved in particular virtues, to enable their more context-sensitive expression. 
Developing such practical intelligence can help well-motivated agents to avoid two 
potential deficiencies that can undermine their attempts to hit the target of the rele-
vant virtue – i.e. moral ineptitude, and failures of meticulousness. Moral ineptitude 
is shown by agents who are well-intentioned but lack sufficient practical know-how 
or emotional intelligence to succeed in bringing about the good which they intend 
to bring about. Unmeticulous agents have the relevant practical know-how and emo-
tional intelligence, but their efforts fall short as they do not apply strategies to cir-
cumvent decision-making biases (and similar countervailing factors) that are 
prevalent in the context.29 Thus, the registrars who prescribed antibiotics against 
their patients’ longer-term best interests failed to exercise the virtue of practical 
intelligence here, because the registrars were not sufficiently meticulous in prevent-
ing cognitive biases and other countervailing factors from undermining their efforts 
to make prescribing decisions in their patients’ best interests.30
25 Dallas et al., p. e565.
26 The phenomenon of ‘authority bias’ was famously observed in Stanley Milgram’s experiments 
on obedience to authority. See Stanley Milgram (2010).
27 See e.g. Daniel C. Russell (2009), e.g. p. 140; Nancy E. Snow (2009), p. 563; and Nancy E. Snow 
(2010), especially her pp. 34–7 discussion of how people can effectively confront and combat any 
prejudices they might hold. These conceptions of virtue and virtue ethics have been developed in 
response to ‘situationist’ critiques of earlier accounts of virtue ethics.
28 Aristotle (1980); and Russell (2009), op. cit.
29 For further details about these executive failings, and their relevance to practical intelligence and 
medical virtues, see Oakley (2018b), op. cit. See also Oakley (2018a), op. cit.
30 See also Daniel Russell’s helpful discussion of how agents may ascertain the specific ends of 
virtuous actions, in: Daniel C. Russell (2015).
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Indeed, there is evidence of other cognitive biases diverting physicians’ prescrib-
ing decisions from patients’ best interests. For example, a recent US study found 
that as the number of prescribing decisions made by each primary care physician 
increased through the morning and into the afternoon, each physician became more 
likely to issue an antibiotic prescription that was not in the patient’s best interests. 
This study suggests that good prescribing behaviour can be undermined by a form 
of ‘decision fatigue’ (a phenomenon seen in many other contexts), which seemed to 
lead the physicians to become less able to resist providing inappropriate antibiotic 
prescriptions.31 So, developing ways of effectively addressing these (and potentially 
other) cognitive biases that appear to be contributing to physicians prescribing anti-
biotics in cases where this is likely to be contrary to the patient’s long-term best 
interests, would seem a promising strategy supported by an empirically-informed 
virtue ethics approach (and perhaps also by certain other ethical approaches) to the 
problems of antimicrobial resistance.
8.3  Community-Centred Medical Virtues and Antimicrobial 
Prescribing Practice and Policy
Virtue ethics approaches to medical practice have tended to focus predominantly on 
patient-centred virtues, such as medical beneficence and medical courage, which 
help an individual doctor serve well the best interests of their patients. But while it 
is important that these virtues correct any physician tendencies to make unreflective 
assumptions about what prescribing decisions are best for their patients, patient- 
centred virtues are not the only role virtues which are relevant to ethically justifiable 
prescribing behaviour and the problem of antimicrobial resistance. For the antimi-
crobial prescribing decisions by physicians have also contributed to broader com-
munity harms, such as the diminishing effectiveness of antibiotic treatments for 
other patients, and the scarcity of more expensive, last resort, antibiotics due to their 
increasing use as first-line treatments (and which have become unaffordable to 
patients in some countries). So, ethically responsible antibiotic prescribing prac-
tices by physicians must also take into account the broader effects that their pre-
scribing decisions are likely to have on the community. The virtuous antimicrobial 
prescriber thus needs to take account of a wider moral universe, beyond that of the 
best interests of their own patients. They would therefore be guided in their antimi-
crobial prescribing decisions by community-centred medical virtues, such as justice 
and a readiness to serve the broader community, along with patient-centred virtues 
such as medical beneficence. The virtue of justice requires physicians to allocate 
fairly the medical resources under their control.32 In Aristotelian terms, allocating 
31 Linder et al. (2014), op. cit.
32 For a useful discussion of how medical benevolence should be constrained by the virtue of jus-
tice, see Roger Crisp (2015).
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medical resources fairly (particularly when medical resources are scarce) can be 
understood as making allocation decisions in such a way as to provide each person 
who is affected by the decision an equal chance of developing and exercising 
their capabilities to live a flourishing human life. These capabilities include those 
elaborated in the Nicomachean Ethics, such as being able to understand the world, 
to engage in practical reasoning about our lives, and to form personal relationships 
with others.33 The readiness to serve others is another community-centred medical 
virtue, which requires physicians to make their services broadly available to the 
community, and so (for example) to avoid picking and choosing their patients 
according to the physician’s personal preferences. This virtue is plausibly under-
stood as applying to physicians qua professionals, who ought to provide this readi-
ness to serve the community in return for being granted a monopoly of expertise 
over the provision of key goods – i.e. those that serve patients’ health.34
In the context of antimicrobial prescribing, the virtue of justice requires physi-
cians to consider whether prescribing antibiotics for patients in certain circum-
stances is likely to detrimentally affect the availability of effective antibiotics for 
other patients, even if there are grounds for believing that an antibiotic prescription 
is likely to be of some benefit to the former patients. While it is plausible to believe 
that physicians often serve the health of the community best by making antibiotic 
prescribing decisions that are in the best interests of their own patients, there will be 
cases where these two goals come into conflict – because the community’s interest 
in constraining antimicrobial resistance can sometimes be served best by the physi-
cian refraining from providing an antibiotic which may be of some benefit to their 
patient. Where the likely benefit to the patient in such conflict cases is only mar-
ginal, the virtue of justice will require a physician not to prescribe antibiotic treat-
ment to their own patient. Of course, it is possible that justice could also sometimes 
require withholding from a patient an antibiotic that is likely to be of greater than 
marginal benefit – for instance, where there is only a single last-resort antibiotic 
available, and one patient is likely to derive much greater benefit from receiving this 
antibiotic than is another patient, then justice could arguably require that the first 
patient be provided with this antibiotic. (This is analogous to situations where jus-
tice can plausibly require the allocation of the only available ICU bed to a patient 
who is likely to benefit more from this resource than will another patient, even if this 
second patient may suffer considerable harm as a consequence.) In what follows, I 
will concentrate on the first kind of conflict cases.
Suppose a child presents to their physician with acute otitis media. Prescribing 
an antibiotic in such cases would appear likely to confer marginal benefits for the 
child – but as Collignon explains, “with an absolute reduction in pain in only 5%. 
Most cases resolve spontaneously. Seventeen children must be treated to prevent 
33 See the capabilities approach developed by Martha C. Nussbaum (2006). Nussbaum draws on 
Aristotle’s view that “the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act 
best and live happily” (Politics 1324a23–5). See also Justin Oakley (1994); and Millar, M. (2020).
34 This community-centred virtue becomes especially relevant in discussions of ethically justifiable 
limits on conscientious objection by physicians.
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one child having some pain after two days. Antibiotics have no effect on hearing 
problems or other complications”.35 In these sorts of cases, despite the possible 
minor benefits of the child receiving an antibiotic, the detrimental impact which 
such patterns of antibiotic prescribing have on antimicrobial resistance in the 
broader community suggests that the virtue of justice would require physicians not 
to prescribe antibiotics in such cases, and to provide the child with other medica-
tion, to relieve their symptoms. The dictates of justice in these sorts of cases can be 
compared with what justice would plausibly require of psychiatrists deliberating 
about whether to breach patient confidentiality to protect third parties from harm. 
Where a patient confides to his or her psychiatrist a credible threat to significantly 
harm a third party, and the psychiatrist is able to take steps to see that the third party 
is warned about this threat, the virtue of justice plausibly requires the psychiatrist to 
take such steps in the interests of this third party.36 While maintaining absolute 
patient confidentiality might sometimes be in the best interests of the patient 
involved, and so might be thought consistent with the virtue of medical beneficence, 
the overarching virtue of justice requires that confidentiality be breached here. 
(Indeed, in many such cases this course of action will not be contrary to the virtue 
of medical beneficence – for instance, where confiding such a threat is actually a 
‘cry for help’ from the patient  – even if beneficence provides some grounds for 
maintaining confidentiality here).
But while the virtue of justice and its concerns for the broader interests of the 
community can in certain circumstances require physicians to refrain from provid-
ing a patient with an antibiotic that is likely to benefit that patient, there is evidence 
that physicians relegate these broader interests to the periphery of their antibiotic 
prescribing decision-making. A 2002 US survey of 400 generalist physicians and 
429 infectious diseases specialists found that: “The risk of contributing to the prob-
lem of antibiotic resistance was ranked lowest, overall and by generalists, and sec-
ond lowest by ID specialists”37 The researchers concluded that “…neither generalists 
nor infectious disease specialists emphasize the relative societal risks of antimicro-
bial drug selection in their treatment decisions for patients with community-acquired 
pneumonia. Instead, they emphasize providing the newest and best treatments for 
each individual patient even though this approach may not be supported by current 
guidelines or public health policy”.38 One explanation of the insufficient weight 
given by these doctors to the risk of generating antimicrobial resistance was an 
overconfidence that their own antibiotic prescribing decisions were unlikely to 
 negatively impact on antimicrobial resistance. This can be seen as an example of the 
cognitive bias known as ‘the overconfidence effect’, whereby agents have greater 
confidence in their judgements than is warranted by the evidence. There is much 
35 Peter J. Collignon (2002), p. 328.
36 See, for example, the much-discussed 1969 case of Tatiana Tarasoff, as described in Marilyn 
McMahon (1992), pp. 12–16.
37 Joshua P. Metlay et al. (2002), p. 90.
38 Ibid., p. 93.
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evidence that physician decision-making can be distorted by an overconfidence 
bias, which is one of the most frequently studied biases in medical decision- 
making.39 Further evidence that cognitive biases can lead physicians to give insuf-
ficient weight to their own contributions to antimicrobial resistance is provided in 
an illuminating recent survey of 889 US physicians, which indicated that they often 
lacked insight into the broader harms of their own antibiotic prescribing decisions. 
Most of the respondents expressed concern about the problem of antimicrobial 
resistance. However, the researchers found that: “While 62% of respondents agreed 
that other doctors overprescribe antibiotics, only 13% agreed that they themselves 
overprescribe antibiotics”.40 The researchers concluded that “While most respon-
dents agreed that other doctors overprescribe antibiotics, a much smaller proportion 
(especially of faculty) felt that they themselves overprescribe”.41 This significant 
underestimation by physicians of the contribution that their own antibiotic prescrib-
ing decisions are likely having on the broader problems of antimicrobial resistance 
can be characterised as an example of confirmation bias, where an agent interprets 
information in a way that confirms a view that they already hold, regardless of 
whether this information actually supports or undermines that view.
Thus, cognitive biases also seem to be diverting physicians’ community-centred 
dispositions to act in accordance with the virtue of justice from hitting its target, in 
the context of their antibiotic prescribing decisions. A promising way of addressing 
this problem is for physicians to develop various ‘debiasing’ strategies, which can 
help them carry out what justice requires of them here in more practically intelligent 
ways. For example, Ian Scott and colleagues suggest that physicians’ awareness of 
their cognitive biases, and their ability to counteract the detrimental effects such 
biases can have on medical decision-making, can be enhanced by providing them 
with powerful narratives of patients who have been harmed (e.g. by antimicrobial 
resistance), and by reflective practice and role modelling.42 But while the prescrib-
ing decisions of individual physicians are clearly a significant contributor to the 
problem of antimicrobial resistance, effectively addressing this problem goes well 
beyond the responsibility of each individual physician to ‘smarten up’ their own 
decision-making about antibiotic prescribing by strengthening their medical virtues 
on their own initiative. For these individual efforts must be complemented by the 
responsibilities of governments, international organisations, policymakers, and 
healthcare institutions to create institutional and regulatory environments which are 
conducive to physicians hitting the targets of the role virtues of medical beneficence 
and justice. For it can sometimes be difficult for physicians in their antibiotic pre-
scribing behaviour to succeed in hitting the targets of the virtues of medical benefi-
cence and justice, when they are working in contexts where they are frequently 
39 See Saposnik et al. (2016), op. cit. Overconfidence and availability bias are the two most fre-
quently researched biases in medical decision making, and they appear to be highly prevalent in 
this context (though their precise prevalence levels here have not been determined).
40 Lilian Abbo et al. (2011), p. 715.
41 Ibid., p. 716.
42 Ian A Scott et al. (2017). See also Ateev Mehrotra and Jeffrey A. Linder (2017).
J. Oakley
137
confronted with patients’ requests for antibiotics, in circumstances where prescrib-
ing an antibiotic would be clinically inappropriate.
A good example of such government efforts is the Australian ‘Choosing Wisely’ 
initiative, which aims to reduce antibiotic overprescribing (and other forms of poor 
clinical practice) by providing patients and physicians with guidelines and specific 
examples of when medications such as antibiotics would be inappropriate. For 
instance, one such guideline advises against prescribing antibiotics for patients with 
uncomplicated acute bronchitis.43 These guidelines and examples on the Choosing 
Wisely website encourage discussions between physicians and patients about the 
appropriateness or otherwise of such medications in the circumstances, and make 
the boundaries of good medical practice more transparent to patients and doctors. 
Similarly, the UK Behavioural Insights Team successfully reduced the overpre-
scription of antibiotics by sending letters to GPs in practices with relatively high 
rates of antibiotic prescription, stating that “80% of practices in your local area 
prescribe fewer antibiotics per head than yours”.44 Providing these doctors with 
such benchmarking information helped nudge them to recognise and counteract 
their biases towards prescribing antibiotics, and thereby helped enable these 
doctors’ medical dispositions to hit their proper targets.45
Also, a worthwhile institutional initiative here could be to address authority 
bias through the creation of ‘safe spaces’ for junior doctors to be able to 
anonymously report established practices of poor antibiotic prescribing, without 
necessarily jeopardising their professional relationships with consultants and senior 
physicians.
8.4  Conclusion
The antibiotic prescribing decisions made by physicians have clearly played a sig-
nificant role in increasing antimicrobial resistance. Due to their monopoly of exper-
tise in their professional roles, physicians are especially well-placed to be aware of, 
and to combat, the broader problems which certain sorts of antimicrobial prescrib-
ing decisions can result in. Virtuous physicians owe the community a readiness to 
serve it by taking steps to reduce – and hopefully eliminate altogether – antibiotic 
prescribing decisions that are contrary to the virtues of medical beneficence and 
justice. In this chapter, I have outlined some strategies that individual physicians, 
institutions, and healthcare policymakers can develop to help physicians to hit the 
targets of those virtues, and to thereby play their part in redressing the problems of 
antimicrobial resistance.
43 See Choosing Wisely Australia, https://www.choosingwisely.org.au/.
44 Michael Hallsworth et al. (2016). See also David Halpern (2015).
45 See also Kiran Iyer (2017), and Fay Niker (2018).
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Effectiveness
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Abstract Restrictive policies that limit antimicrobial consumption, including ther-
apeutically justified use, might be necessary to tackle the problem of antimicrobial 
resistance. We argue that such policies would be ethically justified when forgoing 
antimicrobials constitutes a form of easy rescue for an individual. These are cases 
of mild and self-limiting infections in otherwise healthy patients whose overall 
health is not significantly compromised by the infection. In such cases, restrictive 
policies would be ethically justified because they would coerce individuals into ful-
filling a moral obligation they independently have. However, to ensure that such 
justification is the strongest possible, states also have the responsibility to ensure 
that forgoing antimicrobials is as easy as possible for patients by implementing 
adequate compensation measures.
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9.1  The Problem of Antimicrobial Resistance
When Alexander Fleming was awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1945, he 
warned in his acceptance speech of the risk that some bacteria could develop resis-
tance to penicillin, which he had discovered 17 years earlier. It cannot be overstated 
how longsighted Fleming was. Today, “bacteria are resistant to nearly all antibiotics 
that were earlier active against them” (Herrmann and Laxminarayan 2010, p. 4.2), 
and “700,000 people die of resistant infections every year” (O’Neill 2016, p. 4). As 
estimated by the Review on Antimicrobial Resistance commissioned by the UK 
government, “by 2050 10 million lives a year are at risk due to drug resistant infec-
tions, as are 100 trillion USD of economic output” (O’Neill 2016). Examples of 
diseases associated with antimicrobial resistance (AMR) include tuberculosis, gon-
orrhoea, typhoid fever, and group A streptococcus (Van der Velden et al. 2013). The 
problem of AMR has been framed by some in terms of a “slowly emerging disaster” 
(Littmann and Viens 2015) and of a “global health security issue” (Balasegaram 
et al. 2015).
AMR is a naturally occurring phenomenon: microbes naturally tend to adapt to 
antimicrobials and develop resistance. However, AMR is accelerated by human 
behaviour (Jamrozik and Selgelid 2019), and particularly the use and abuse of anti-
microbials, both in livestock (Anomaly 2019; Giubilini et al. 2017; O’Neill 2015; 
Anomaly 2009) and in humans (O’Neill 2016). This paper is focussed on AMR 
caused by human consumption of antimicrobials, and therefore on the human factor 
in the development of AMR. There is a positive correlation between antimicrobial 
resistance rates and antimicrobial consumption in humans (Van der Velden et al. 
2013, pp. 318–19). In fact, in the case of antibiotics, it is now widely accepted that 
“the use of antibiotics is the single most important factor leading to antibiotic resis-
tance around the world: simply using antibiotics creates resistance” (CDC, About 
antimicrobial resistance), even when antibiotic use is medically indicated to treat 
infections (which is what makes AMR a particularly difficult ethical issue). Thus, 
the paradox of antibiotic and certain other kind of antimicrobial consumption is that 
while certain antimicrobials can be beneficial to individuals, their use also poses a 
threat to public health, to the lives of millions of people, and to the world economy. 
If they are not used more wisely than they currently are, i.e. if their consumption is 
not reduced, we might face a “post antibiotic” era (Alanis 2005; WHO 2014) char-
acterized by two undesirable outcomes. First, we might no longer have effective 
means of treating severe infections. Second, medicine’s achievements that require 
effective antibiotics, such as organ transplantation, cancer chemotherapy, and major 
surgery, might no longer be available (WHO, Antimicrobial resistance).
To be sure, the problem of reducing antibiotic and certain type of antimicrobial 
consumption mainly concerns those countries with easy access to and massive con-
sumption of antimicrobials. These are mainly high-income countries (HICs). The 
consumption rate of antimicrobials in most low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs), although it increased dramatically in recent years, remains much lower 
than that in HICs, and in many LMICs the burden of infectious disease still out-
weighs the burden of resistance; the increase in consumption in such countries 
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ought to be closely monitored, but drastic measures to reduce antibiotic consump-
tion need to be implemented primarily in HICs (Klein et al. 2018). Reduction of 
therapeutically justified antimicrobial consumption in LMICs for conservation pur-
poses might have undesirable outcomes, especially in those countries where the 
level of public health is already poor. There might be exceptions, of course; for 
instance, India is a lower-income country and one of the major contributors to resis-
tance through very high consumption rates (Kumar et al. 2013; WHO India 2018), 
so perhaps significant restrictions on antibiotic access  – that is, restrictions that 
apply also to therapeutically justified use – should be implemented in such context 
as well. However, to make our arguments the least controversial possible, we take 
them to apply only to HICs where a good level of public health might allow leaving 
certain mild and self-limiting infections untreated without posing significant costs 
on patients.
This paper is focussed on two often neglected aspects of the problem of AMR, 
namely on the individual moral obligations with regard to antimicrobial consump-
tion and on the type of justification that health authorities could and should offer for 
restricting access to antimicrobials in order to preserve antimicrobial effectiveness. 
As we will argue in Sect. 9.3, these two aspects are closely related: the state has an 
obligation to provide the strongest justification possible for restrictive interventions 
aimed at limiting antimicrobial consumption, and the strongest justification is one 
based on the existence of an individual moral obligation to forgo antimicrobials, 
perhaps (as we will suggest in Sect. 9.4) even in case of mild self-limiting infections 
that do not significantly risk worsening the individual’s general health. The fact that 
even justified use of antimicrobials, i.e. the use that is medically necessary to treat 
infections (as opposed to unjustified use, e.g. when antibiotics are prescribed for 
viral infections, a practice that is not uncommon unfortunately), contributes to anti-
microbial resistance determines a moral conflict between individual interest and 
collective interest that might require individuals to make sacrifices for the sake of 
the common good.
Such moral conflict gives rise to a “tragedy of the commons” scenario (Hollis 
and Maybarduk 2015), which will be presented in Sect. 9.2: we will argue, follow-
ing Garrett Hardin, that the tragedy of the commons has an ethical solution, which 
will be presented in Sect. 9.4, where we will argue that there is a moral obligation 
to contribute to the preservation of the common good of antimicrobial effectiveness 
which might entail a moral obligation not to use antimicrobials in some cases of 
mild, self-limiting infections, provided that certain conditions obtain and that the 
state takes all the measures that are necessary to ensure that forgoing antimicrobials 
in those cases approximates a form of “easy rescue”.
Thus, in Sect. 9.4 we will draw the policy implications of this ethical solution to 
the tragedy of the commons: the moral obligation to sometimes forgo antimicrobi-
als, grounded in a duty of easy rescue, strengthens the justification for state inter-
ventions that prohibit or discourage the use of antimicrobials in certain cases. Since 
states should be able to provide the strongest justification possible for implementing 
restrictive policies that discourage or prohibit antimicrobial consumption, appeal to 
individual moral obligations to sometimes forgo antimicrobials has a political 
weight in terms of justification of state-imposed restrictions on antimicrobial use.
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However, as we will suggest in conclusion of Sect. 9.4, the moral obligation of 
the state to provide the strongest justification possible for restricting access to anti-
microbials implies an obligation on the state to ensure that forgoing antimicrobials 
does represent a form of easy rescue, i.e. that individuals bear as small a cost as 
possible for leaving certain infections untreated with antimicrobials (assuming this 
measure is necessary). This means, in practice, that the state has moral obligations 
towards individuals who are requested to forgo antimicrobial for the sake of the col-
lective good, such as the obligation to provide enhanced medical follow up and to 
adequately compensate, financially or in other ways (e.g. higher priorities on wait-
ing lists for other medical treatments), these individuals.
9.2  Public Goods, Tragedy of the Commons, and Policies 
to Address Antimicrobial Resistance
It has been claimed that “if effective antibiotics are seen as a public good, their 
overuse may be likened to the tragedy of the commons scenario” (Littmann and 
Viens 2015, p. 214). This statement is not entirely correct in the way the notion of 
‘public good’ is applied. As we are going to see in this section, antibiotic and more 
generally antimicrobial effectiveness shares an essential feature with common 
goods or common pool resources, rather than with public goods. Let’s see more in 
detail what this terminology means when the concepts of “public goods” and of 
“common goods” are applied to the case of antimicrobial effectiveness.
Some benefits associated with antimicrobial effectiveness can certainly be con-
sidered public goods. These include freedom from infectious diseases (Selgelid 
2007, p. 226), the containment of infectious diseases (Woodward and Smith 2003, 
p. 10), or the reduced risk of infection by a resistant disease (Smith and Coast 2003, 
p. 78). These benefits are public goods in the technical sense of the term: they are 
non-excludable, in the sense that people cannot be excluded from benefitting from 
them; and they are non-rivalrous, in the sense that the fact that a person benefits 
from them does not affect the way and the extent to which others benefit as well 
(Cowen 2008). More precisely, freedom from infectious diseases, infectious disease 
containment, and the reduced risk of infection can be conceived as global public 
goods, i.e. goods “exhibiting a significant degree of publicness (i.e. non- excludability 
and non-rivalry) across national boundaries” (Woodward and Smith 2003, p, 8).
Effective antimicrobials are the means through which such public goods are pre-
served. But antimicrobial effectiveness is a common good rather than a public good 
because antimicrobial effectiveness is rivalrous in consumption, in virtue of what 
Anne Schwenkenbecher in a chapter of this volume calls “the antimicrobial foot-
print” of antimicrobial consumptions: “simply using antibiotics [or other antimicro-
bials] creates resistance” (CDC, About Antimicrobial resistance) and “more 
consumption of antibiotics directly leads to more resistance” (O’Neill 2016, p. 17), 
regardless of whether antimicrobial use is therapeutically justified or not. The use of 
the resource of antimicrobial effectiveness through antimicrobial consumption erodes 
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the resource and therefore diminishes its availability. As put by Jonny Anomaly, 
“individually rational choices produce substantial social costs by creating reservoirs 
of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in human hosts and more generally in our shared 
microbial environment” (Anomaly 2013, p. 753). It is important to point out that, 
while antimicrobial use might benefit individuals in the short term, this is not neces-
sarily the case in the long term: individuals can incur a portion of the costs associated 
with antimicrobial resistance (Anomaly 2013, p. 752). For example, the individual 
who takes antibiotics can become a carrier of resistant bacteria, which means that the 
individual is at greater risk in case of subsequent infections (Cars et al. 2008).
It has been observed that the effectiveness of antimicrobials can “be modelled as 
a natural resource in much the same way as are fish, tree, oil, and other resources” 
(Herrmann and Laxminarayan 2010, p. 4.3). According to John Conly, for example,
antimicrobial resistance may be likened to [the] overfishing scenario, to cattle overgrazing 
the grass in the commons or to deforestation on Easter Island, which led to population dying 
out. Antimicrobial resistance is a consequence of continued overuse of antibiotics com-
bined with the constant growth of resistance overtime. (WHO 2010)
Typically, consumption of natural resources determines a ‘tragedy of the com-
mons’ scenario (Ostrom et al. 1999,). Garrett Hardin first described the “tragedy of 
the commons” in an article he published in Science (Hardin 1968). Hardin illustrated 
the problem through the example of a commons to which some herdsmen have access. 
The tragedy occurs when many herdsmen, acting merely out of self-interest, have 
their cattle overgraze the commons, thus eroding the resource (Hardin 1968, p. 1244). 
Particularly in a context of growing population, all herdsmen acting in the same way 
deplete the common good. In the context of antimicrobial effectiveness, the same 
problem arises (Hollis and Maybarduk 2015). As Jonny Anomaly put it, “the benefits 
of [antibiotic] use are borne by the individual, the costs are socialised, and the conse-
quent harm is the product of many independent actions” (Anomaly 2013, p. 752).
According to Hardin, one characteristic of a tragedy of the commons is the fact 
that there is no “technical” solution to the problem, meaning that there is no solution 
“that requires a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding 
little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality” (Hardin 
1968, p. 1243). On the contrary, Hardin argued, the solution requires a “fundamen-
tal extension” of our morality (Hardin 1968, p. 1243), i.e. acting in view of protect-
ing the public interest rather than in a merely self-interested way.
However, Hardin seemed to be sceptical about the possibility that such an exten-
sion of morality could occur, at least without some external coercive intervention 
(which on most accounts of morality would arguably undermine the authentically 
“moral” nature of the change invoked). He believed that the best way to solve a 
tragedy of the commons is through some degree of “mutually agreed upon” coer-
cion (Hardin 1968, p. 1247), for example in the form of taxation that would allow to 
internalize the negative externalities of individual consumption.1
1 Another solution Hardin proposed is the privatization of the commons (Hardin 1968, p. 1245), 
which in the case of antimicrobials might consist in “extending the period of exclusivity, possibly 
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And indeed, some have suggested that the negative externalities of antimicrobial 
use could be internalised through the introduction of user fees or consumption taxes 
(Littmann and Viens 2015; Anomaly 2013; Herrmann and Laxminarayan 2010). 
Internalization is typically achieved by “taxing negative externalities (…) at a rate 
that would offset the social cost of the activities that generate the externalities, and 
then (ideally) using the revenues from the tax to fund socially useful projects” 
(Anomaly 2009, p. 433). The idea behind the concept of internalization is that it is 
those who are responsible for a negative externality that should bear the cost for it.
However, it might not be possible to fully internalise the collective cost of anti-
microbial consumption and to disincentivize consumers through a tax: selection for 
AMR will probably continue to occur in spite of the tax and in spite of the invest-
ment of the revenue in strategies to contain AMR such as research on new antimi-
crobials. For this reason, it has been suggested that we might need at some point to 
introduce policies to restrict antimicrobial use only to the most serious infections, 
i.e. that it might be necessary to prevent, if necessary through legal prohibition, their 
use in the case of milder self-limiting infections (Foster and Grundmann 2006, 
p. 179). We will return to this point in Sect. 9.4.
Policies might therefore aim to disincentivize individuals from using antimicro-
bials, in the case of taxation; or they might coercively impose restrictions on antimi-
crobial use, in the case of outright prohibition of antimicrobial use in certain 
circumstances. As said before, we are interested here not so much in determining 
which policies would be more effective and ethically acceptable. Thus, we do not 
intend to provide arguments for or against taxation of antibiotics or restrictions on 
their use. Rather, we are interested in what justification an authority might offer for 
implementing restrictive policies, whatever form they take. While such policies 
might be justified by considerations of public interest, it is important that the type of 
justification that a state can provide for interventions that limit or discourage anti-
microbial use be the strongest justification possible, given that such interventions 
might require individuals to sacrifice some significant personal interest, such as the 
interest in accessing effective health care, for the sake of the common good. As we 
are going to argue in the next section, considerations about the morality of individ-
ual choices regarding antimicrobial consumption can strengthen the justification for 
such policies.
9.3  Morality and Antimicrobial Consumption
Restrictive and coercive interventions might be efficacious at protecting the com-
mon goods associated with AMR containment and in preserving the common good 
of antimicrobial effectiveness. However, the “tragedy of the commons” scenario 
indefinitely” of the patents, thus giving “the patentee the ability to charge high prices and thus 
indirectly restrain overuse by some users” (Hollis and Maybarduk 2015, p. 33).
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which preservation of antimicrobial effectiveness gives rise to suggests that there is 
an independent ethical dimension to the problem of AMR. In this section we will 
explain why discussing such an independent ethical dimension is important from a 
political point of view, i.e. in view of justifying coercive policies aimed at restricting 
antimicrobial use.
Establishing an independent moral responsibility to make a more appropriate use 
of antimicrobials would make the justification that a state could provide for policies 
that restrict or discourage antimicrobial use the strongest possible. And, arguably, 
the state does have a duty to provide individuals with the strongest justification pos-
sible for implementing policies that restrict or discourage a treatment that is in the 
individuals’ best interest, as is often the case with antimicrobials.
Restrictive policies might be justified in light of a state’s duty to protect certain 
common goods and public goods, such as the public goods associated with AMR 
containment. These possible interventions range from those that are minimally 
intrusive to those that more substantially infringe rights or important interests of 
individuals. Thus, at one end of the spectrum we find policies such as information 
campaigns, nudging, or incentivisation of certain pro-social behaviours; and at the 
other end we find more restrictive policies such as taxation and compulsion. In all 
such cases, the authority enforcing such policies should be able to provide the stron-
gest justification possible for its interventions, but the more restrictive the policies 
become, the more difficult it is for the authority to meet such requirement. A state’s 
duty to protect public goods and common goods by itself does not provide the stron-
gest justification possible for interventions that sacrifice important individual inter-
ests. The justification would be stronger if, in addition to considerations of public 
interest, there were independent individual moral obligations to make those indi-
vidual sacrifices that are required by the restrictive policy (Giubilini et al. 2018) 
Thus, one way to strengthen the justification for state interventions such as taxation 
of antimicrobials or prohibition of certain antimicrobial uses is to identify a pre- 
existing individual moral obligation not to use antimicrobials in certain cases. Such 
independent moral obligation to prioritize other-regarding choices over self- 
interested choices would make the case for introducing restrictive policies that limit 
or discourage antimicrobial use as compelling as possible: such policies would sim-
ply impose or encourage choices that individuals have an independent moral obliga-
tion to make anyway.
9.4  Individual Responsibility and Duty of Easy Rescue: 
The Ethical Solution to the Tragedy of the Commons 
and the Responsibilities of the State
We have noted above that, as Hardin himself acknowledged, the tragedy of the com-
mons is first and foremost an ethical problem. Therefore, it has an ethical solution 
that is independent from the justification for legislative coercive solutions. Now, 
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“ethical solution” means, according to Hardin’s phrasing, a change in “human val-
ues” informing human behaviour. Thus, in the case of antimicrobial consumption, 
the ethical solution to the tragedy of the commons consists in justifying the exis-
tence of an individual moral obligation to act contrary to one’s (short term) self 
interest in order to contribute to the preservation of the common good of antimicro-
bial effectiveness. In other words, the ethical solution consists in finding a justifica-
tion for a moral duty not to use antimicrobials, if necessary even at the cost of 
leaving some infections untreated, in order to protect the common good of antimi-
crobial effectiveness. In this section we are going to provide this justification.
It is plausible to assume that individuals have what might be called a “duty of 
easy rescue” (Savulescu 2007). That is, if doing X (or refraining from doing Y) 
entails a small cost to an individual and a large benefit (or prevention of a large 
harm) to others, the individual has a clear prima facie moral obligation to do X (or 
to refrain from doing Y). Morality is essentially different from prudence, and 
requires the sacrifice of one’s own interests for others. It is debatable what kind of 
individual sacrifices morality requires, but if morality requires anything, almost 
everyone would agree that it certainly requires at least small sacrifices for the sake 
of preventing great harm. This does not mean that an individual does not have a 
moral obligation when the cost to her is not small. However, in easy rescue case, 
such moral obligation seems uncontroversial. A formulation of the duty of easy 
rescue was famously provided by Peter Singer, according to whom “if it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing any-
thing of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 1972, 
p. 230, emphasis added). A roughly equivalent, though way less demanding, formu-
lation has been provided by Tim Scanlon, according to whom “[i]f we can prevent 
something very bad from happening to someone by making a slight or even moder-
ate sacrifice, it would be wrong not to do so” (Scanlon 1998, p. 224). The fact that 
some version of a duty of easy rescue can be defended both from a utilitarian per-
spective- in the case of Singer  – and a contractualist perspective- in the case of 
Scanlon  – supports the idea that it is a fundamental requirement of morality on 
which reasonable people could agree.
The existence of a duty of easy rescue implies an individual moral obligation to 
forgo antimicrobials for the sake of the common good of antimicrobial effective-
ness, when forgoing antimicrobials comes at a sufficiently small cost to individuals. 
This would be the case, for example, when antimicrobials are not necessary to treat 
an infection (for example in the case of viral infections), in which case there would 
be no cost at all in forgoing antimicrobials. But forgoing antimicrobials would also 
come at a relatively small cost to individuals when individuals have minor self- 
limiting infections or low risk mild infections (for example, skin infections which 
could be treated topically with antiseptics) that do not significantly worsen the gen-
eral state of health of the individual, where the risks of complications is adequately 
monitored, and when the individual is adequately compensated for any financial and 
non-financial cost she might incur as a consequence of leaving that infection 
untreated. As some have suggested (Foster and Grundmann 2006) it might at some 
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point be necessary to leave such self-limiting infections untreated in order to pre-
serve antimicrobial effectiveness.
The moral duty of easy rescue represents the ethical solution to the tragedy of the 
commons in the context of antimicrobial consumption that Hardin advocated: indi-
viduals have a moral obligation to prioritize the public interest in the preservation of 
the commons of antimicrobial effectiveness over their own interest in treating with 
antimicrobials any type of infection (including mild and self-limiting ones), because 
doing so comes at a small cost to individuals, at least when all that is required of 
individuals is to leave self-limiting mild or minor infections untreated in circum-
stances in which this would not significantly worsen individual health and where 
adequate compensatory measures are in place.
Now, since it is necessary that a large number of individuals fulfil a duty of easy 
rescue in order for a public benefit to obtain, we can say that there is not only an 
individual, but also a collective responsibility to forgo antimicrobials when doing so 
is a way of fulfilling a duty of easy rescue. Now, in some cases of collective action, 
any individual contribution to a collective good, or to the prevention of a collective 
harm, is insignificant; for example, the contribution each individual could make to 
the realisation of herd immunity through individual vaccination, or the contribution 
each individual could make to the prevention of global warming by avoiding driving 
just for fun, are both negligible. However, in the case of containment of antimicro-
bial resistance every single individual forgoing antimicrobials could make a differ-
ence, because every single individual could become the carrier of resistant microbes 
that are then passed onto other people. For example, it has been shown that individu-
als who take antibiotics for respiratory and urinary infections might develop bacte-
rial resistance that could last up to 12 months (Costelloe et al. 2010). Thus, the need 
to preserve the common good of antimicrobial effectiveness implies not only a col-
lective responsibility, but also an individual responsibility not to use antimicrobials 
so as to benefit others by contributing to the preservation of antimicrobial effective-
ness, at least as long as forgoing antimicrobials comes at a small enough cost to 
individuals.
When forgoing antimicrobials is a moral duty of easy rescue, we can claim that 
the state is in the position to fulfil its obligation to provide the strongest justification 
possible for prohibiting or at least discouraging the use of antimicrobials: as we said 
in Sect. 9.3, the state would be discouraging or preventing individuals from doing 
only what they have a moral obligation not to do anyway. Therefore, being the state 
in the position to fulfil its moral obligations in implementing restrictive measures, 
such restrictive measures regarding antimicrobial use are ethically justified. As one 
of us put it, “when the cost to us of forgoing some activity is small (…) and the harm 
to others which thereby does not occur is great (prevention of serious disease), then 
liberals might require that the state prevent this harm” (Savulescu 2007, p. 10).
“Duty to rescue” laws exist in many European countries; for instance, in Germany 
and France it is illegal not to assist a person in danger when providing assistance 
entails a small or no risk to the potential rescuer. From what we have said so far, 
laws restricting antimicrobial use could be ethically justified as special cases of 
“duty to rescue” laws of this kind.
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The individual moral responsibility to forgo antimicrobials in certain circum-
stances implies that there are two other actors with specific moral responsibilities, 
besides patients with minor or mild self-limiting infections.
First, doctors have the responsibility to assess whether a certain infection is self- 
limiting and, more in general, whether leaving a certain infection untreated is com-
patible with a good enough level of individual health. In one important sense, the 
fact that the state has the strongest justification possible for imposing bans on anti-
microbial use or for discouraging through taxation antimicrobial consumption takes 
the responsibility for decisions about antimicrobial prescription out of the hands of 
doctors: if a certain infection is mild and self limiting and leaving it untreated does 
not significantly worsen the general state of health of the patient, then the state, 
rather than the doctor, is justified in preventing the use of antimicrobials for the sake 
of the common good. However, the doctors would still have the important responsi-
bility of determining whether the conditions specified in such laws would apply, and 
thus they would still be the ultimate gate-keepers of antimicrobials.
Second, but equally important, healthcare systems and states have important 
moral responsibilities too. We have said that having an uncontroversial individual 
moral obligation based on a duty of easy rescue to sometimes forgo antimicrobials 
strengthens the justification for state interventions that forbid or discourage antimi-
crobial use. Therefore, the state or the healthcare system have the responsibility to 
ensure that forgoing antimicrobials does represent a form of easy rescue, i.e. that it 
is not too burdensome for patients, so that the justification for state intervention is 
the strongest possible. This means, at the very least, that patients who are denied 
antimicrobials should be carefully monitored and provided with adequate and 
enhanced medical follow up to make sure that forgoing antimicrobial treatment 
does not significantly worsen the general state of health of the individual. It is the 
responsibility of states and of healthcare systems to ensure that adequate measures 
are in place in order to guarantee monitoring and medical supervisions of those 
patients who sacrifice their self-interest for the sake of the collective good, so that 
their sacrifice would represent a form of easy rescue.
However, we claim that the responsibility of states extends beyond the provision 
of medical supervision and follow up. We propose that a further measure that might 
be implemented in order to ensure that the rescue is an easy rescue is that of com-
pensating individuals who make a sacrifice for the sake of the collective good. 
Compensation  – financial or of other kind  – would be an appropriate measure 
because it would provide individuals with an additional reason for forgoing antimi-
crobials in certain circumstances, it would be fair in consideration of the sacrifice 
individuals are making for the sake of the collective good, and, more importantly, if 
the right type of compensation is offered, it could make their condition easier to 
bear, thus approximating a form of easy rescue and providing a further reason for 
the existence of an individual ethical obligation. For example, those who forgo anti-
microbials and leave infections untreated could be offered first call on future medi-
cal treatments, even for conditions that are not related to the current infection; or 
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they might be offered discounts when they buy other medicines, such as painkillers, 
or discounts on future medical treatments; alternatively, they might be offered out-
right financial compensation, for example in the form of tax relief or by directly 
paying them, which would account for any financial loss that might result from 
enduring a prolonged infections. In this way, they would derive at least some benefit 
from the sacrifice they are making, which would render the sacrifice easier to bear, 
and at the same time society would be “making up” for the sacrifice it is imposing 
on these individuals.
Granted, preserving antimicrobial effectiveness by financially compensating 
those who forgo antimicrobials might involve a significant cost for the state. 
However, we saw in the introduction that there will be significant costs associated 
with AMR if we don’t intervene now; therefore, investing money now to compen-
sate and to guarantee adequate medical follow up to those who make sacrifices in 
order to contain AMR might be a good strategy also from the point of view of 
cost-effectiveness.
9.5  Conclusions
When is it necessary to leave infections untreated in order to preserve the common 
good of antimicrobial effectiveness? This is an empirical issue and the answer 
depends on whether and to what extent the societal optimum of antimicrobial con-
sumption differs from the individual optimum. In other words, it concerns the issue 
whether and to what extent the level of individual consumption that is consistent 
with satisfactory AMR containment (the societal optimum) differs from the level of 
consumption that would effectively treat infections in any individual (the individual 
optimum). As Kevin Foster and Hajo Grundmann (2006, pp. 178–9) have explained, 
if individual and societal optima were similar, it would be sufficient to avoid inap-
propriate antimicrobial use, such as using antibiotics in the case of viral infections, 
an abuse which often occurs (Van der Velden et al. 2013). Only inappropriate use of 
antimicrobials would then be morally impermissible. However, if individuals and 
societal optimum differed significantly, in order to protect the societal interest in 
AMR containment individuals might be required to leave minor and mild self- 
limiting infections untreated in order to reserve antimicrobials for serious major 
infections. In such cases, coercive policies that restrict access to some therapeuti-
cally justified use of antimicrobials are ethically permissible, or so we have argued. 
However, when implementing such restrictive policies, state and health authorities 
have responsibilities not only towards the collective, but also towards individuals 
who make (small) sacrifices for the sake of the collective interested, and who should 
be guaranteed adequate compensation in exchange for leaving certain infections 
untreated.
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Chapter 10
Access to Effective Diagnosis 
and Treatment for Drug-Resistant 
Tuberculosis: Deepening the Human 
Rights-Based Approach
Remmy Shawa, Fons Coomans, Helen Cox, and Leslie London
Abstract The lack of access to effective diagnosis and treatment for drug-resistant 
tuberculosis (DR-TB) remains a persistent ethical, human rights and public health 
challenge globally. In addressing this challenge, arguments based on a Human 
Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) to health have most often been focused on the 
Right to Health. However, a key challenge in multidrug-resistant (MDR-) and 
extensively drug-resistant (XDR-) TB is the glaring absence of scientific research; 
ranging from basic science and drug discovery through to implementation science 
once new tools have been developed. Although the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of 
Scientific Progress and its Applications (REBSP) is a little theorised human right, it 
has the potential to enrich our understanding and use of the Rights-Based Approach 
to health. In this chapter, we argue that States’ duties to respect, protect and fulfil the 
REBSP within and outside their borders is an important vehicle that can be drawn 
on to redress the lack of research into new drug development and appropriate use of 
existing drugs for DR-TB in high burden settings. We call for urgent attention to 
minimum core obligations for the REBSP and the need for a General Comment by 
a UN human rights monitoring body to provide for its interpretation. We also note 
that conceptualization of the REBSP has the potential to complement Right to 
Health claims intended to enhance access to treatment for DR-TB on a global scale.
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10.1  Introduction
In this chapter we explore how the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress 
and its Applications (REBSP), a little theorized human right found in both the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), can deepen our understanding of 
a Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) to health, taking access to effective treat-
ment for drug-resistant tuberculosis (DR-TB) as an example. We bring attention to 
the slow progress in research, development and implementation of new and repur-
posing of existing drugs for treating DR-TB.  Further, we attempt to frame poor 
access to effective diagnosis and treatment as a human rights problem, not only with 
respect to the right to health, but also with respect to the REBSP. In locating DR-TB 
within this right, we articulate what we mean by scientific progress, or lack of, in 
DR-TB, and discuss the broad context in which scientific progress must occur. 
Finally, we highlight some of the challenges in the conceptualization and realization 
of the REBSP, and make recommendations calling for urgent attention to minimum 
core obligations for the right and the need for a General Comment by a UN human 
rights monitoring body to provide for its interpretation.
Tuberculosis remains the world’s deadliest communicable disease, responsible 
for more than 1.6 million deaths in 2017 alone (WHO 2018). More than a century 
after the bacterium causing TB was first identified, it continues to kill millions of 
people because diagnostic tools remain poor and current life-saving, essential medi-
cines require a minimum of 6 months to effect cure. TB is particularly difficult to 
both diagnose and treat when TB bacteria have become resistant to available drugs. 
While standard care for drug-sensitive TB requires 6 months of treatment, DR-TB 
treatment may take up to 2 years. Access to diagnostic tools for DR-TB remains 
limited with currently available technology, despite some progress such as the 
GeneXpert MTB/RIF (a relatively rapid test that can, in some cases, quickly diag-
nose TB and some types of resistance) (Evans 2011), for which accessibility is 
limited due to the slow pace of implementation and high costs. In 2016, only 25% 
of the estimated number of multidrug-resistant (MDR-) or rifampicin-resistant 
(RR-) TB patients emerging that year were diagnosed, and even fewer started on 
treatment(WHO 2017). Of those who received treatment, only 54% of MDR/RR-TB 
patients are successfully treated and only 26% of those treated for extensively drug- 
resistant (XDR-) TB were successfully treated(WHO 2017). Current treatments for 
RR-TB (which includes MDR- and XDR-TB) are long, and have debilitating and 
often severe side effects, including irreversible hearing loss in more than a third of 
patients (Seddon et al. 2012). Other drugs included in the currently recommended 
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MDR/RR-TB regimen have been known to cause renal failure, cardiac arrhythmias, 
and psychiatric disturbances (Skrahina et al. 2016).
As much as DR-TB is a public health problem, it is also a human rights problem 
because it compromises the rights and dignity of the individuals who get infected. 
DR-TB highlights the glaring divide that exists between high-income countries 
(HICs) and low-middle income countries (LMICs), as well as the divide between 
the rich and the poor within countries. The majority of those who get TB and DR-TB 
reside in LMICs (WHO 2016). In HICs, TB and DR-TB are predominantly among 
the vulnerable and marginalized such as migrants and refugees (Figueroa-Munoz 
and Ramon-Pardo 2008). This skewed burden of TB disease effectively makes it a 
disease of the poor, who have little capacity to pay for medical care. Eliminating TB 
will require special attention to these marginalized populations as part of the moral 
duty of HICs and LMICs alike. Therefore, framing poor access to effective treat-
ment for DR-TB as both a public health and human rights issue calls for solutions 
beyond public health, into the sphere of human rights. Moreover, human rights and 
public health are irrevocably inter-related; the promotion of one significantly con-
tributes to the realization of the other, while, conversely, the infringement of human 
rights has negative effects on public health (Mann et al. 1994).
10.2  Access to Effective DR-TB Diagnosis and Treatment
Access to effective diagnosis and treatment for DR-TB is constrained by multiple 
problems; three of which are discussed in this chapter. The first problem is slow, or 
lack of progress and innovation in TB with regard to the development of new drugs 
or diagnostic technology. For example, since the introduction of the inexpensive and 
effective four-drug (isoniazid, rifampicin, pyrazinamide and ethambutol) treatment 
regimen, in the 1970s (Zumla et al. 2013), there were no novel drugs developed 
until the appearance of bedaquiline in 2012 (Cox et al. 2015); this is in spite of TB 
being one of the oldest diseases, spanning centuries (Daniel 2006). The current vac-
cine for TB, BCG, is almost 100 years old, and is considered effective in reducing 
severe and disseminated TB in young children but is not effective in adults 
(Kernodle 2010).
In most high TB burden settings the mainstay of TB diagnosis remains sputum 
smear microscopy, a test essentially unchanged in a century (Steingart et al. 2006).
The slow or absent innovation in TB diagnosis and treatment arises from major 
challenges at different stages of the research continuum from basic science through 
to product availability. TB drug research is hugely underfunded, and key players in 
the pharmaceutical industry have been withdrawing from or cutting down on their 
investment in TB research and drug development, predominantly due to the real or 
perceived lack of a profitable market (Frick 2016). While treatment of drug sensitive 
TB still relies on the four drug combination developed more than 40 years ago, 
treatment of DR-TB has utilized both older drugs previously replaced in TB treat-
ment due to lower efficacy and/or high side effects, along with drugs that were 
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originally meant to treat other illnesses, repurposed for TB (Zumla et  al. 2013). 
Currently, these repurposed drugs, together with some of the new drugs on the mar-
ket are being used to improve treatment success rates for MDR-TB (Ndjeka 
et al. 2015).
The second problem is inadequate evidence-based guidance on effective use of 
new or repurposed drugs. New drugs need to be registered through clinical trials, 
which are often lengthy and costly; and guidance on use of new drugs is restricted 
until further clinical trials are conducted. For example, bedaquiline is not registered 
for use by the FDA and other agencies in pregnant women, children or people living 
with HIV who are co-infected with MDR-TB (Mase et al. 2013) because there were 
no clinical trials on its use in these populations. Yet, in many high burden countries, 
co-infection with HIV and TB is very common, and in reality bedaquiline is being 
used in these populations (Ndjeka et al. 2015). Similarly, for repurposed medicines, 
the evidence base to inform guidelines for their use is inadequate (London et al. 
2016; Mafukidze et al. 2016). The third problem, which is often a result of the first 
two, is the high cost and complexity of diagnostics and treatment, and the lack of 
feasible models of care for scale-up in high burden settings.
10.3  Rights Based Approach to DR-TB
To appreciate a rights-based approach to DR-TB, one needs to have an appreciation 
for human rights in general. Human rights are entitlements and freedoms that peo-
ple have simply because they are human. They refer to moral principles or norms, 
which describe certain standards and moral beliefs that people have. For example, 
the right to food was a result of the moral belief that people should not die of starva-
tion. Similarly, moral beliefs have been significant in defining human rights, “from 
resisting torture and arbitrary incarceration to demanding the end of hunger and of 
medical neglect” (Sen 2005). This view of human rights as morally justifiable 
claims entails that, if a moral claim is that no person should be enslaved to another, 
then the claim not to be enslaved is, by a matter of law, a human right (McFarland 
2015). Likewise, the moral belief that everyone deserves equal opportunities to be 
in a state of mental, physical and emotional wellbeing, gives credence to the right to 
health. But the right to health alone is not adequate to fulfill this moral belief. 
Without scientific progress in prevention, treatment, or in addressing determinants 
of ill-health, the aspiration of good health cannot be realized. Similarly, without 
good trade policies, proper housing adequate food or adequate infrastructure, secur-
ing good health becomes an unrealistic aspiration.
A human rights-based approach (HRBA) to health is a way of analysing health 
through the framework of human rights. It entails examining the impact of health 
policies and programmes on human rights, and likewise, how promotion or viola-
tion of human rights impact public health. A rights-based approach to health focuses 
on equity of health outcomes by analyzing and addressing the inequalities, discrimi-
natory practices (de jure and de facto) and unjust power relations which are often at 
the center of health problems. Under a rights-based approach, health is anchored in 
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a system of the recognition of individuals as right-holders and states as duty- bearers. 
A State has obligations to realize the human rights of its people, governed by inter-
national law. Perhaps, even more importantly, a rights-based approach to health 
means that citizens have the power and means to hold their governments account-
able to their duties and responsibilities, and in turn, governments account to their 
citizens in a just and transparent manner.
The right to health is included in the ICESCR, which is a legally binding treaty. 
Article 12(2d) provides for an obligation for States to take steps for the creation of 
conditions which would assure medical services and medical attention to all in the 
event of sickness. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights summed up the obligations of the State as the obligation to respect, protect 
and fulfill. Each treaty body adopts its interpretation of the provisions of its respec-
tive treaty in the form of “general comments” or “general recommendations”. The 
Committee’s guidance on the right to health in General Comment no. 14 provides 
an authoritative interpretation of the right to health), and unpacks state obligations 
and what this right looks like in real terms.
The emergence of the rights-based approach to health in recent years brought 
with it a paradigm shift in the fields of public health and human rights, owing, in 
part, to the HIV epidemic, but also to stronger civil society movements working on 
both health and human rights. But what does a rights-based approach to health mean 
for access to effective treatment of drug-resistant tuberculosis? And what human 
rights, other than the right to health can this approach be anchored in? Previously, 
public health concerns focused on the epidemiology of diseases, analysis of risk 
factors and interventions to control morbidity and prevent mortality. Particularly for 
TB, a communicable disease, the concern was around infection control and protect-
ing the health of the public rather than those affected (London 2008). In this “public 
health view” of the TB disease, the State embarks on efforts to respond to TB 
because it is a public health threat, and not because the State is obligated to provide 
for the right to health of its citizens.
10.4  The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress
The REBSP is proclaimed in article 15 paragraph 1(b) of the ICESCR; that [every-
one has the right] to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. 
This right is closely related to other rights contained in article 15; namely, the right 
to take part in cultural life (article 15, paragraph 1(a); the right of everyone to ben-
efit from the protection of moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which they are the author (article 15, paragraph 
1(c)); and the right to freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative 
activity (article 15, paragraph 3).
Although it is proclaimed in these two important human rights documents, the 
REBSP is one of the least theorised human rights, and consequently, one of the least 
realized. Despite its textual existence dating back to the 1940s, in the UDHR, this 
right is relatively new in terms of its conceptualisation (Shaver 2015). Even human 
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rights activists and lawyers are all too often unaware of the existence of the REBSP, 
much less of its meaning (Chapman 2009). As such, the REBSP is one right whose 
conceptual content needs to be interrogated and further developed (Shaver 2015). 
Despite its lack of clarity, the REBSP cannot be isolated from other human rights; 
because of the interdependent nature of human rights (United Nations 2005), but 
also because science is a vehicle that is used in almost every sphere of human devel-
opment (UNDP 2012). This interrelation is best exemplified in debates about 
unequal access to the benefits of scientific progress – not only in relation to access 
to essential medicines (the right to health) (FM’t Hoen 2002) but also in access to 
seed technology (the right to food) (Dommen 2002) to scientific discoveries that can 
improve environmental protection (the right to a safe environment) (Maskus 2002) 
and to information and communication technologies (right to privacy and access to 
information).
Three types of obligations result from the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress.
10.4.1  The Obligation to Respect
For the REBSP, the State’s obligation to respect this right means that the State must 
desist from curtailing, or interfering with people’s ability to access the benefits of 
scientific progress. In relation to access to treatmemt for DR-TB, the state must 
therefore not interfere with the production of medicines and technology necessary 
for treatment and prevention of DR-TB. Such interference can take many forms, 
from having overly bureaucratic procedures for acquiring ethical clearance for 
research in drug development to unnecessary delay in approval of new drugs that 
have already been approved in other countries. Another interference might be in the 
form of patent protection laws and policies that prioritise protection of patents 
resulting from research and development ahead of access to treatment. The World 
Trade Organization adopted rules on intellectual property rights, which impose 
obligations on states to protect patents on new and existing medicines. Such rules 
often act as obstacles to making medicines available and accessible to all.
10.4.2  The Obligation to Protect
While a State may not engage in deliberate efforts to violate the REBSP, a failure to 
protect people from third parties constitutes a potential infringement on the right, 
and a violation of its obligation to protect. High pricing of life-saving medicines by 
private corporations through, for example, anti-competitive protectionism, requires 
the State to act in defence of people’s REBSP. For example, where a pharmaceutical 
company holds a patent of essential TB drugs, the State can incorporate into its 
R. Shawa et al.
161
laws, some of the TRIPS1 flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing. In both South 
Africa and Kenya, the States compelled pharmaceutical companies holding patents 
to Antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), to enter into “voluntary” licencing agreements with 
local producers (Musungu et al. 2006).
10.4.3  Obligation to Fulfill
The obligation to fulfill is the third obligation. It speaks to the State’s duty to adopt 
positive measures, and create an enabling environment for human rights to be 
realised. These measures may include “legislative, administrative, judicial, promo-
tional and other measures” (CESCR 2006). Some of the challenges in drug develop-
ment, or in research and development in general, are lack of infrastructure and 
unfriendly regulatory policies. For the state to fulfill the REBSP for TB patients, 
therefore, it has to take deliberate steps, within its means, to create an environment 
for science to thrive. These steps do not necessarily require financial expenditure, 
but would entail mobilising political will for agenda setting and intentional policies 
to encourage the sharing of scientific knowledge.
For DR-TB, the State’s duty to respect, protect and fulfil, does not solely apply 
to the state with the burden of the disease; countries with a low DR-TB burden, but 
whose multinational corporations manufacture drugs for use in high burden coun-
tries, have an ethical obligation to protect citizens of in other countries from exploi-
tation by their multinational corporations. This speaks to what others have termed 
‘extraterritorial obligations’- human rights obligations that a state has beyond its 
borders (Coomans and Kamminga 2004). And in the context of extraterritorial obli-
gations, states that have the skills and resources to develop better and effective med-
icines, need to also put in place deliberate measures that would make access to such 
drugs possible outside their jurisdiction.
10.4.4  Realising the REBSP
Crucial to the realisation of the REBSP is the understanding of who the right hold-
ers and duty bearers of the right are. Primary duty bearers of any given right are the 
States, but also the International community (other States and international agen-
cies); they have the duty to respect, protect and fulfil rights. The people, as individu-
als and as a collective, are therefore rights holders, in that they have individual and 
collective rights, and hold claims to entitlements provided for in a particular right. 
One of the most important issues in human rights is to understand different actors 
and the relationship between rights holders and duty bearers. A distinction should 
1 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
10 Access to Effective Diagnosis and Treatment for Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis…
162
be made between duties and responsibilities. For example, under the right to health, 
the state has the duty to provide health care to the people, and may do so through 
private and public health providers; in that case, health providers assume the respon-
sibility to provide health care, but the State still holds the duty under international 
law. Similarly, under the REBSP, the state has a series of obligations such as creat-
ing an enabling environment for scientific progress to thrive, ensuring that people 
benefit from such scientific progress; non-state actors, such us the private sector 
(corporations), and academic institutions, have the responsibility to meaningfully 
contribute to scientific progress through their work. Under international law non-
state actors, such as companies or private health providers, do not have legal obliga-
tions, only responsibilities. The legal nature of the latter is much weaker.
10.4.5  Minimum Core Obligations
Core obligations are important in realising human rights as they provide a frame of 
reference in determining what the State needs to do, at the bare minimum (and not 
subject to progressive realisation2). Minimum core obligations require the State to 
demonstrate that it has made every effort to use all available resources to satisfy, as 
a matter of priority, those core obligations. In the General Comment on the interpre-
tation of the nature of ICECR obligations, General Comment No. 3 (1990), the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that “States parties have 
a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of minimum essential levels of each of 
the rights enunciated in the Covenant.” Core obligations should be framed as both 
positive steps to be taken by the State, and actions that the state will need to 
refrain from.
Unfortunately, for the REBSP, there are, as yet, no defined core obligations, mak-
ing the application of the right difficult. As a result, there is no standard or bench-
mark against which people and Civil Society can compel the State’s immediate 
efforts to realize the right. Secondly, the State lacks guidance on what it has to pri-
oritise within its minimal resources. There is therefore an urgent need for agreed 
minimum core obligations under the REBSP, which would also apply to scientific 
progress in DR-TB.
For example, minimum core obligations in REBSP could be used to prevent 
harmful effects of science, to promote access to benefits and to encourage interna-
tional cooperation:
 (a) To monitor the potential harmful effects of science and technology, to effec-
tively react to the findings and inform the public in a transparent way; for 
2 Given the resource and knowledge restraints faced by many countries, the CESCR recognizes that 
the fulfillment of economic and social rights can only be achieved over time, and calls for the 
progressive realization of ESCR.
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instance, where drug development for TB poses threats to the people, the state 
does not need to wait before it intervenes and prevents such harm.
 (b) To promote access to the benefits of science and its applications on a non- 
discriminatory basis including measures necessary to address the needs of dis-
advantaged and marginalized groups. This includes ensuring that TB patients, 
especially the poor and marginalized, benefit from scientific progress that 
informs the development of new drugs, the use of repurposed drugs as well as 
the application of such drugs in high burden settings;
 (c) To take measures to encourage and strengthen international cooperation and 
assistance in science and technology to the benefit of all people and to comply 
in this regard with the States’ obligations under international law. This includes, 
inter-alia, the state entering into international agreements that fosters exchange 
of knowledge and products of such knowledge. It also implies that states push 
for better patent laws, which promote access to scientific knowledge even for 
those in LMICs.
10.5  Lack of Scientific Progress in DR-TB
A critical element of scientific progress is research and development (R&D), which 
is key to ensuring access to effective medicines, especially when coupled with 
deliberate policies to address access-related challenges for the poor and the margin-
alized. In the current environment, research can either be for-profit or not, regard-
less of whether it is meant to add value to people’s health. Unfortunately, investments 
in not-for-profit research tend to be significantly lower than investments in for-profit 
research. Modern research is largely driven by funding external to the researchers/
scientists and that how research is financed will determine how the knowledge aris-
ing from it will be used (Yamey 2008).
While not being the only element of the right, access to the benefits of scientific 
progress is one that is most controversial as it involves navigating the political land-
scapes in the production of science itself (Besson 2015a, b) and foregrounds the 
need for universal agreement on what defines scientific progress (Donders 2015). 
Moreover, the context in which the production of science takes place, often stretches 
beyond national jurisdictions (Besson 2015a, b). For example, for pharmaceutical 
companies based in HICs to test the effectiveness of new and repurposed drugs for 
TB, they need to conduct clinical trials in high burden settings like South Africa. 
Therefore, defining scientific progress is not the responsibility of one state, but 
requires a shared understanding by both those on the giving and receiving end of 
scientific development. Progress in TB is not just about the development of new 
drugs. It is also about the discovery and sharing of knowledge; and ensuring that 
such knowledge is accessible to those who need it the most.
Nevertheless, one of the main barriers is that countries from the North and the 
pharmaceutical companies domiciled there are reluctant to share and transfer 
knowledge with and to the South because of economic competition and return upon 
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investment reasons. To counter the current static positions, the WHO, in partnership 
with United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, initiated a project on 
Improving Access to Medicines in Developing Countries through Technology 
Transfer and Local Production. One of the findings of the project has been that local 
production has the potential to enhance access to affordable medicines if supported 
by appropriate and accessible technology (WHO 2011).
Furthermore, the benefits of scientific progress, as opposed to the protection of 
scientific discoveries and production have not been well explored. The latter has 
been a topic of thorough discussion and debate under intellectual property rights 
and law (Besson 2015a, b). This has arguably led to a situation where attention (and 
legal protection) is typically given to creation of scientific knowledge most likely to 
benefit the innovators (Yamey and Torreele 2002), while knowledge to address key 
public health problems of significant magnitude, particularly for poor populations 
unable to purchase the applications of scientific progress, have been neglected. Or 
if pursued, the scientific discoveries have been too costly to benefit the majority in 
need (Yamey 2008). International treaties and agreements on the development, 
sharing and use of science need to account for the fact that, although the capacity of 
most LMICs to contribute to scientific progress is more limited than for high income 
countries, their need to benefit is far greater than that of high-income countries. This 
imbalance in need versus capacity should be factored into the discourse on intel-
lectual property rights, particularly in terms of impact on access to essential life- 
saving medicines.
10.6  Intellectual Property Rights and Access 
to Essential Medicines
The dominant paradigm in scientific development favours the strengthening and 
protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in efforts to encourage and reward 
innovation. This paradigm was institutionalised after the introduction of patents, 
which in turn made scientific research more lucrative (Timmermann 2014). A patent 
is a “government-granted limited property right to exclude others from making, 
using or selling the patented invention” (Clark et al. 2000).
Patents can have a dramatic impact on access to medicines when they are used to 
prevent competition. A drug company that holds patents on a medicine has the right 
to prevent others from manufacturing it and therefore can charge an artificially high 
price. When a company is selling commodities such as computer components, for 
example, this might be of no great significance. But when life-saving treatments for 
diseases such as HIV or cancer become unaffordable to those that need them, the 
consequences can be – and are – devastating. In many LMICs, where people pay for 
drugs out of their own pockets and very seldom have health insurance, the high 
price of medicines becomes a question of life and death.
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To advance the protection of intellectual property rights, the Member States of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed on the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) legal regime that progressively became effec-
tive from 1994 onwards (Correa 2007). TRIPS elicited a challenge from developing 
countries and from Civil Society across the globe, who saw them as an impediment 
to access to essential medicines. Prior to TRIPS, patent protection on pharmaceuti-
cals was almost non-existent in developing countries and the absence of patents led 
to the flourishing of generic medicine production in these countries, which signifi-
cantly lowered the cost of essential medicines. While rewarding innovation is 
important, it should not occur at the expense of access to the benefits. What is 
needed is a system for balancing promotion of innovation and access to benefits, 
which is what the REBSP potentially provides.
For example, in 2001, developing countries initiated negotiations on the interpre-
tations of TRIPS Agreement because they restricted access to drugs for patients 
with HIV infection, the majority of whom live in developing countries (Correa and 
WHO 2002). Although the TRIPS agreement itself did not change, a compromise 
was reached in Doha3 in the form of a Declaration that clarified that TRIPS should 
not prevent developing states from dealing with public health crises, that they should 
not restrict universal access to essential medicines and provided for mechanisms to 
bypass potential IP obstacles when public health was at stake. This is a case where 
the right to health was used as a basis to facilitate international trade agreements that 
would favour access to life-saving medicines, thereby also opening opportunities 
for realising the benefits of scientific progress.
10.7  Creating an Enabling Environment
In order for scientific progress in TB to thrive, states need to create an enabling 
environment for research. State duties to meet this right might include those pro-
posed by London, Cox and Coomans (2016): – (i) measures to ensure that research-
ers have access to infrastructure and equipment to conduct research such as drug 
development; (ii) adoption of research policies and strategies that foreground 
research to develop applications for neglected diseases of the poor; (iii) shaping of 
research funding opportunities to make more attractive research that has lower com-
mercial opportunity; (iv) capacity building of researchers; but also, (v) Public- 
Private Partnerships to encourage the public sector to contribute to access to 
treatment; (vi) strengthening collaboration with other countries, especially those 
contributing to R&D; (vii) reprioritising resources from other sectors such as mili-
tary to health; and (vi) putting in place more efficient regulatory laws and policies, 
for providing approval for both research and new drugs.
3 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted 14 November 2001 by the 
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation.
10 Access to Effective Diagnosis and Treatment for Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis…
166
However, for the realisation of the REBSP, there has to be a vehicle or pathways 
for benefits to be derived from this progress and its applications. Put simply, such a 
system needs to ensure access to effective treatments for people needing treatment. 
Where appropriate, the State should make use of the TRIPS flexibilities to develop 
domestic policies that foster scientific progress in TB as a neglected disease. The 
case of South Africa and Kenya, which made use of TRIPS flexibilities to enforce 
compulsory licencing of patents to local producers (Musungu et  al. 2006) is an 
example of the State ensuring access to ARVs. Others efforts can take the form of 
subsidies for researchers, and tax benefits to encourage research in DR-TB.
10.8  International Cooperation to Improve Access 
to DR-TB Drugs
International cooperation is integral to the international human rights framework, 
requiring states to recognise the role of international cooperation in realising human 
rights globally.. Article 2 of the ICESCR sets out that governments are obligated to 
“[…] take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
[…] to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progres-
sively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant […]. The 
REBSP is not exempted from the international cooperation. Science is too broad to 
be pursued within the confines of one country, and its benefits, particularly in TB, 
are far reaching. The new drugs bedaquiline and delamanid have a larger market in 
LMICs than in high-income countries in which they were developed. Similarly, 
with ARVs, the market is larger in less-developed countries hit by the HIV epi-
demic, than it is in the high-income countries, where most R&D takes place. The 
REBSP, like other social and economic rights, has collective dimensions, in that its 
realization requires functioning social systems involving population-wide applica-
tion rather than being a right exercised for any particular individual. This is further 
underscored by the international dimensions of cooperation across communities 
and territories. Furthermore, while the REBSP can benefit from international coop-
eration, it can also be a vehicle to promote such cooperation through the sharing of 
knowledge and its application.
Some initiatives have been established, proposing how this global ethical respon-
sibility might actually be operationalised in the DR-TB response. One of such ini-
tiatives is the 3P project,4 which seeks to encourage the development of affordable, 
effective new drugs to treat TB. It makes use of an open collaborative approach to 
conduct drug research and development (R&D), and recommends some new ways 
of funding and coordinating the drug research and development process. The 
4 https://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/TB/Docs/TB_briefing_3P-2016 
_EN.pdf.
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process has identified significant weaknesses in the process that hamper develop-
ment of new regimens and proposes three interventions to address the weakness, 
these are
• Push funding to finance R&D activities upfront (i.e. through grants);
• Pull funding to incentivise R&D activities through the promise of financial 
rewards on the achievement of certain R&D objectives (i.e. through mile-
stone prizes)
• Pooling of data and intellectual property to ensure open collaborative research 
and to ensure fair licensing for competitive production of the final products.
10.9  Conclusion
In conclusion, the REBSP offers great potential for deepening the rights-based 
approach to health, as well as for enhancing access to effective diagnosis and treat-
ment of DR-TB, and by extension other neglected diseases of the poor, by promot-
ing the development of new drugs, and research in the use of existing regimens in 
high burden settings. However, the right needs clarity and a universal understanding 
of the entitlements it confers on right-holders and corresponding obligations of duty 
bearers. There is also need for clarity on the application of the right beyond national 
borders, to account for the broad scope of science or global trade-related policies. A 
thorough conceptualisation of the REBSP will require more than the attention of 
human rights experts, but also trade experts as well as research and development 
practitioners.
Despite progress made to advance the right to health, health inequality continues 
to undermine human rights. For DR-TB, health inequality is apparent at multiple 
levels; the burden of disease is higher in poorer countries, while access to effective 
treatment is lower. The moral belief that every human being has the right to health 
entails a collective global responsibility to those people or countries with poor 
health outcomes. Therefore, “Everyone with TB should have access to the innova-
tive tools and services they need for rapid diagnosis, treatment and care” (WHO 
2015) particularly with DR-TB, ensuring access to products and services will not 
only benefit patients of TB, but will also benefit global health security. This requires 
a closer look at how other human rights can, together with the right to health, 
advance health for all. The REBSP is such a right.
The responsibility to ensure scientific progress in DR-TB and access to such 
progress cannot lie on most affected countries alone. DR-TB will require a global 
response and a collective responsibility in an effort to advance the right to health. 
States’ duties to respect, protect and fulfill the REBSP within and beyond their bor-
ders is an important vehicle to redress the lack of research into new drug develop-
ment and repurposing existing drugs for DR-TB and their use in high burden 
settings. REBSP provides some practical ways in which countries can strengthen 
their rights based approaches to DR-TB.  This includes creating an enabling 
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environment for R&D, promoting public-private partnerships, strengthening inter-
national cooperation, prioritizing resources to DR-TB, and implementing more effi-
cient regulatory process for new drugs.
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Chapter 11
The Right to Refuse Treatment 
for Infectious Disease
Carl H. Coleman
Abstract One of the central tenets of contemporary bioethics is that mentally com-
petent persons have a right to refuse medical treatment, even if the refusal might 
lead to the individual’s death. Despite this principle, laws in some jurisdictions 
authorize the nonconsensual treatment of persons with tuberculosis (TB) or other 
serious infectious diseases, on the grounds that doing so is necessary to protect the 
safety of others. This chapter argues that, in the vast majority of situations, overrid-
ing a refusal of treatment for infectious disease is not justifiable, as the risk to third 
parties can be avoided by the less restrictive alternative of isolating the patient. At 
the same time, it rejects the extreme position that the nonconsensual treatment of 
infectious disease is never appropriate. Instead, it concludes that compelling an 
individual to undergo treatment for infectious diseases may be ethically justifiable 
in exceptional situations if a refusal of treatment poses a grave risk to third parties, 
the treatment is not overly burdensome and has been established to be safe and 
effective, and less restrictive alternatives, including humanely isolating the patient, 
are not feasible under the circumstances. The burden should be on those seeking to 
compel unwanted treatment to demonstrate that these requirements have been met.
Keywords Bioethics · Public Health · Infectious Diseases · Medical Law · 
Human Rights
11.1  The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
If there is one unifying concept that runs through the field of bioethics, it is the 
doctrine of informed consent — i.e., the principle that individuals have the right to 
make their own decisions about medical treatment after having been informed of the 
risks, potential benefits, and reasonably available alternatives (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2013). The principle of informed consent is grounded in two interrelated 
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justifications. First, by conditioning the imposition of medical treatment on the indi-
vidual’s authorization, informed consent protects persons’ right to bodily integrity. 
Second, by requiring the provision of information needed to evaluate the desirabil-
ity of proposed treatments, informed consent shows respect for individuals as 
autonomous decision-makers. The right to refuse medical treatment is “the logical 
corollary” of the informed consent doctrine: if there were no right to refuse pro-
posed treatments, the process of soliciting consent would be a hollow charade 
(Cruzan v. Director 1990).
In addition to its ethical foundations, the right to refuse medical treatment is sup-
ported by internationally-recognized human rights principles. These principles 
include the right to security of the person (International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1976), the right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976; 
European Convention on Human Rights 2010), and the right to health (International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976). The United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has specifically recognized 
that the right to health includes the “right to be free from … non-consensual treat-
ment” (United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2000).
Courts have upheld mentally competent individuals’ right to refuse medical 
treatment in a variety of situations, including those in which the refusal of treatment 
might strike some observers as irrational or unwise. For example, in the case of 
Fosmire v. Nicoleau, the New York Court of Appeals found that an adult Jehovah’s 
Witness had the right to refuse blood transfusions prior to and immediately after the 
delivery of her baby, despite her physicians’ belief that without the transfusions she 
was likely to die (Matter of Fosmire v. Nicoleau 1990). While some older judicial 
decisions in the United States suggested that the right to refuse treatment must be 
balanced against the state’s interests in the preservation of life, the prevention of 
suicide, and “the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession” 
(Annas 1992), there are no recent cases in which any of these state interests has 
been deemed sufficient to override the refusal of treatment by a mentally compe-
tent adult.
However, like most individual rights, the right to refuse treatment is not absolute. 
First, refusals of treatment may be overridden when the patient lacks the mental 
capacity to provide informed consent and the imposition of treatment would be in 
his or her medical best interests (Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community Mental Health 
Bd. 2000). This justification for compelled treatment typically arises in the psychi-
atric context, where a refusal of treatment may be the result of an underlying mental 
illness rather than the manifestation of a genuinely voluntary choice. The main 
issues in these situations involve the standards and procedures for determining the 
patient’s mental incapacity (Klein 2012), as well as the appropriate role of family 
members and other surrogates in making decisions on the patient’s behalf 
(Vars 2008).
Second, the nonconsensual treatment of mentally competent persons may be 
authorized when doing so is necessary to protect the safety of others. For example, 
courts have upheld the forcible medication of violent patients in emergency 
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situations “when there is an imminent danger to a patient or others in the immediate 
vicinity” (Rivers v. Katz 1986). Courts have interpreted the danger-to-others ratio-
nale particularly broadly in the context of prisoners. For example, some courts have 
authorized the forcible feeding of prison inmates on hunger strikes on the theory 
that a hunger strike can threaten “institutional order and security” (Matter of Bezio 
v. Dorsey 2013).
Finally, competent individuals may sometimes be compelled to submit to medi-
cal interventions as part of the process of investigating or adjudicating criminal 
responsibility. For example, criminal suspects may be required to undergo physical 
examinations, which may include the collection of bodily fluids such as saliva or 
blood (Maryland v. King 2013; Missouri v. McNeely 2013). In addition, courts in 
the United States have authorized the government to administer medications to ren-
der mentally ill criminal defendants competent to stand trial, citing the governmen-
tal interest “in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime.” However, 
the forcible medication of criminal defendants is permissible only “if the treatment 
is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may 
undermine the trial’s fairness, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is 
necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests” 
(Sell v. United States 2003).
11.2  Existing Approaches to Compelled Treatment 
for Infectious Diseases
Several jurisdictions have laws that authorize the nonconsensual treatment of per-
sons with serious communicable diseases. For example, in the early 1990s, in 
response to a dramatic increase in TB cases, New York City amended its health code 
to authorize the Commissioner of Health to compel TB patients to complete treat-
ment and, if necessary, to detain them during the process (Gasner et al. 1999). Under 
the law, detention can be authorized for persons with active TB “where there is a 
substantial likelihood, based on such person’s past or present behavior, that he or 
she can not be relied upon to participate in and/or to complete an appropriate pre-
scribed course of medication for tuberculosis” (N.Y.C. Health Code §11.21(d)(5)). 
In most cases, treatment under detention is sought only after other less restrictive 
alternatives, including directly-observed therapy, have already been attempted 
(Gasner et al. 1999). However, the Department of Health has the discretion to order 
treatment under detention as a first resort if it concludes attempting outpatient treat-
ment would be futile in light of the patient’s history of nonadherence.
Similar laws exist in other jurisdictions. For example, South Africa’s National 
Health Act provides for an exception to the requirement to obtain informed consent 
to medical treatment in cases where “failure to treat the user … will result in a seri-
ous risk to the public health” (Republic of South Africa National Health Act §  7(1)
(d)). Relying in part on this provision, the High Court of South Africa has upheld the 
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involuntary isolation and treatment of patients with multi-drug resistant (MDR) TB 
(Minister of Health v. Goliath 2008). Similarly, Canadian courts have upheld orders 
requiring patients with TB to submit to mandatory detention and treatment (Ries 
2007), relying on provincial legislation authorizing the board of health to issue 
orders requiring the “care and treatment” of persons with “virulent” communicable 
diseases (Ontario Health Protection and Promotion Act § 22(4)(g); Silva 2011). The 
state of Alabama also has a law authorizing the “compulsory treatment and quaran-
tine” of TB patients, but with an unusual exception: Confined patients are permitted 
to refuse treatment if they “desire treatment by prayer or spiritual means” (Ala. 
Code § 22-11A-10). The Alabama law does not permit patients to refuse treatment 
for reasons unrelated to religion.
In contrast, laws in some jurisdictions provide that patients with infectious dis-
eases can be subject to mandatory detention but not forcible treatment. For example, 
the state of Minnesota authorizes the involuntary isolation of persons with diseases 
“that can be transmitted person to person and for which isolation or quarantine is an 
effective control strategy,” but it specifically provides that isolated patients have “a 
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment” (Minn. Statutes 144.419). Similarly, 
Israeli law permits the involuntary isolation of persons with TB or other serious 
infectious diseases, but isolated patients may not be forced to undergo unwanted 
medical treatment (Weiler-Ravell et al. 2004). The law in Iceland appears to follow 
a similar approach (Eggertsson 2004).
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, a proposed law developed by 
the Center for Law and the Public’s Health, initially included provisions authorizing 
forcible treatment of patients during an infectious disease outbreak, but after exten-
sive criticism, those provisions were eliminated from the proposal (Annas et  al. 
2008). The proposed law now provides that “persons who are unable or unwilling 
for reasons of health, religion, or conscience to undergo treatment” may be subject 
to isolation (Center for Law and the Public’s Health 2001). The implication is that, 
once isolated, infectious persons may not be subjected to treatment involuntarily.
It is unclear whether compelled treatment for infectious disease would be permit-
ted under international human rights law. On the one hand, some human rights doc-
uments cite “the prevention and control of communicable diseases” as a situation in 
which “coercive medical treatments” could be justified on an “exceptional basis” 
(United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2000). In 
addition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has found that requiring 
individuals to undergo TB screening by means of a tuberculin skin-reaction test or 
chest X-ray “can be considered necessary in a democratic society for the protection 
of health” (Acmanne and others v. Belgium 1984). On the other hand, no human 
rights tribunal has directly addressed the permissibility of compelling individuals to 
undergo treatment (as opposed to testing) for infectious diseases. Moreover, citing 
ECHR decisions condemning the force-feeding of prisoners, a World Health 
Organization (WHO) mission to the Ukraine concluded that “administering a TB 
treatment without the consent of the patient is an intrusive major intervention that 




Finally, it is worth noting that, although “compulsory vaccination” laws are 
sometimes cited as support for overriding the right to refuse treatment for patients 
with infectious diseases (Valenti 2012), those laws do not actually support the forc-
ible imposition of medical interventions over a patient’s objection. For example, in 
the United States, unvaccinated children who have not received an exemption from 
a state’s vaccination requirements may be denied enrollment in the public schools 
(Barraza et al. 2017), but they will not be forcibly given vaccines to which their 
parents have objected. In a few other countries, parents can be fined for refusing to 
vaccinate their children (Reuters 2017), but, again, forcible vaccination does not 
appear to be authorized. Similarly, in the frequently-cited U.S. Supreme Court case 
of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, which upheld a Massachusetts law requiring indi-
viduals to be vaccinated for smallpox, the plaintiff was never actually required to 
undergo vaccination. Instead, the consequence of his refusal of the vaccine was a 
fine of five dollars (Jacobson v. Massachusetts 1905).
11.3  Ethical Analysis
As discussed in the preceding section, there are two dominant legal approaches to 
protecting third parties from the risk of serious infectious diseases: compelling such 
persons to undergo medical treatment, or isolating them without forcing them to 
accept treatments to which they object. While the latter approach does not techni-
cally override the individual’s right to refuse treatment, an offer of treatment that 
can be refused only by submitting to isolation is inherently coercive. Because 
“[v]oluntary consent is usually thought incompatible with coercion” (Eyal 2012), 
both approaches can be seen as exceptions to the general principle that medical 
treatment requires the patient’s voluntary informed consent.
Recognizing an exception to informed consent for patients with infectious dis-
eases can be compared to cases authorizing nonconsensual medical treatment when 
necessary to protect third parties from violence. As an ethical matter, both situations 
implicate John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle,” which provides that individual liberty 
does not include the right to cause harm to third parties (Brink 2014). As Marcel 
Verweij explains, “[i]f patients with infectious diseases neglect the treatment they 
need, this could have harmful implications for others, and that may be reason to 
overrule the requirements of informed consent” (Verweij 2011).
However, even if the harm principle can justify an exception to informed consent 
in some situations, the mere possibility of harm, standing alone, is an insufficient 
basis to justify compulsion. Instead, a full analysis must consider factors such as the 
likelihood and magnitude of the potential harm, the burdens of compulsion on the 
individuals affected, the likely effectiveness of the proposed interventions, and the 
alternatives that are realistically available under the circumstances. This kind of 
fact-sensitive inquiry is an implicit requirement of consequentialist ethical theories, 
which require assessing the aggregate balance of potential benefits and harms of any 
proposed course of action (Sinnott-Armstrong 2015). It is also supported by the 
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human rights principle of proportionality, which requires a “fair balance between 
the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights” (Soering v. UK 1989).
Coercive action is most justifiable in cases of highly contagious, life-threatening 
illnesses, such as MDR-TB. As the likelihood of transmission and/or the conse-
quences of infection lessen, the justification for coercion diminishes as well. The 
precise point at which a refusal of treatment becomes sufficiently dangerous to jus-
tify coercion can be difficult to determine. For example, as Richard Coker asks, 
“given that the risk of relapse is higher if compliance with [TB] treatment ceases 
after two months of treatment compared with, say, five months (where, in most 
cases it is probably very small indeed), should those who fail to comply after two 
months face the prospect of detention if they fail to comply, whereas those who do 
so only after five months remain at liberty?” In answering these questions, “one is 
forced to question issues relating to utility, about how one measures the burden of 
risk, and utility gains and losses. Objective evidence to support decisions is largely 
lacking” (Coker 2000).
For many diseases, both the likelihood and magnitude of potential harm exist on 
a lengthy continuum. With respect to the likelihood of transmission, consider the 
case of sexually-transmitted infections (STIs). Many persons with STIs pose little 
or no risk to others because they are either sexually inactive or consistently use bar-
rier protection. However, the level of risk increases if they engage in unprotected 
sexual encounters with multiple partners. The likelihood of transmission is particu-
larly high for persons whose sexual partners do not recognize the need to take pre-
cautions against transmission, such as spouses who may mistakenly assume that 
their relationships are exclusive. In light of these uncertainties, is the likelihood of 
harm to unknowing third parties sufficient to justify the use of compulsion? While 
public health authorities generally favor a voluntary approach to STI testing and 
treatment (WHO Statement 2012), efforts to use compulsion sometimes occur. For 
example, under 2017 guidelines from the British Columbia Centre for Disease 
Control, public health authorities may issue orders compelling HIV-positive indi-
viduals to initiate and continue HIV treatment if they engage in high-risk sexual 
behavior or share needles and/or other drug paraphernalia with other persons and do 
not disclose their HIV status (British Columbia Centre for Disease Control 2017). 
Violation of such orders can result in court-ordered detention under the British 
Columbia Public Health Act, which allows medical health officers “to do anything 
that the … officer reasonably believes is necessary … to prevent the transmission of 
an infectious agent” (British Columbia Public Health Act). In 2018, a man from 
Vancouver was charged under these provisions for allegedly refusing to comply 
with a medical officer’s order to submit to HIV treatment (Proctor). Similarly, a man 
in Fayetteville, Arkansas was charged in 2016 for a misdemeanor public health vio-
lation for refusing to undergo treatment for syphilis (Vendituoli 2016).
Similar uncertainties relate to the magnitude of harm resulting from an individu-
al’s refusal of treatment. For example, seasonal influenza typically resolves itself 
without any long-term consequences, but it can be life threatening for elderly 
patients or those with compromised immune systems. If a treatment were developed 
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that quickly made patients with seasonal influenza incapable of transmitting the ill-
ness, would the magnitude of avoidable harm justify imposing this treatment over a 
patient’s objection? Even seemingly innocuous infections diseases, such as athlete’s 
foot, can cause severe consequences in some subgroups of patients (e.g., persons 
with diabetes). So far, no one has seriously proposed compelling individuals with 
athlete’s foot to use anti-fungal medications, or to threaten infected persons with 
detention if they visit a public swimming pool with bare feet during an outbreak. 
Yet, the idea of invoking the harm principle in this situation might seem perfectly 
reasonable to a diabetic patient who is forced to undergo a foot amputation after 
being exposed to an untreated fungal infection.
In determining whether the likelihood and magnitude of harm are sufficient to 
justify compulsion, some commentators have suggested that the risks posed by an 
individual’s refusal of treatment should be compared to the other risks that individu-
als typically confront on a day-to-day basis. For example, Mark Cherry argues that 
compelled treatment for infectious disease can be justified when necessary to pre-
vent “significant and unusual risk” to “non-consenting others.” He gives the exam-
ple of legally-mandated treatment for patients with extensively drug-resistant TB, 
explaining that “[t]he risks associated with such diseases are significantly greater 
than the background risks that one generally assumes in daily life” (Cherry 2010).
Yet, while a comparison to the risks of daily life provides a useful framework for 
analysis, it does not follow that, as long as the risks of refusal are greater than the 
risks of daily life, the use of compulsion is necessarily warranted. Instead, the exis-
tence of a “significant and unusual risk” should be considered a necessary but insuf-
ficient criterion for justifying compulsion. In other words, if the risks of treatment 
refusal are less than the risks of daily life, the use of compulsion should not even be 
considered; if the risk are greater, compulsion might be justifiable, but additional 
considerations must also be factored into the analysis.
One of these additional considerations is the burden of compulsion on the indi-
viduals affected. For example, in upholding Belgium’s policy of mandatory skin- 
tests and chest X-rays for TB, the ECHR pointed to the absence of evidence 
suggesting that those interventions involved “disadvantages comparable to the for-
mer ravages of tuberculosis” (Acmanne and others v. Belgium 1984). The implica-
tion was that more burdensome interventions would require a more compelling 
justification.
Some interventions might be too burdensome to be justifiable under any circum-
stances. By way of analogy, in refusing to authorize a Caesarean section on a dying 
woman who had refused the procedure, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
noted that, to perform the procedure, the patient “would have to be fastened with 
restraints to the operating table, or perhaps involuntarily rendered unconscious by 
forcibly injecting her with an anesthetic, and then subjected to unwanted major 
surgery.” It concluded that “[s]uch actions would surely give one pause in a civilized 
society, especially when [the patient] had done no wrong” (In re A.C. 1990). For 
similar reasons, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which it would be acceptable 
to force a patient with an infectious disease to submit to a major surgical procedure, 
even if doing so were the only way to render the patient non-infectious.
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Another consideration is the likelihood that the proposed intervention will be 
effective in reducing the risk that the disease will be transmitted to third parties. At 
a minimum, as the World Health Organization emphasizes, overriding an individu-
al’s refusal of a medical intervention for the treatment of an infectious disease 
should not be considered unless the proposed intervention “has proven to be safe 
and effective and is part of the accepted medical standard of care” (World Health 
Organization 2016). Likewise, requiring individuals who refuse treatment to 
undergo isolation would not be justifiable if the disease is already so prevalent in a 
population that isolating untreated patients is unlikely to make a significant differ-
ence in reducing transmission.
Finally, even if an individual’s refusal of treatment creates a sufficient risk of 
harm to others to justify the use of compulsion, the type of compulsion used should 
be the least restrictive option reasonably available under the circumstances. The 
“least restrictive alternative” requirement is a well-established principle of human 
rights jurisprudence. For example, the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides that any restrictions on human rights must be “strictly necessary” and that 
“there must be no other, less intrusive means available to reach the same objective” 
(American Association for the International Commission of Jurists 1985). The 
United States Supreme Court applies a similar standard in analyzing restrictions on 
fundamental constitutional rights (Chemerinsky 2015), as does the European Court 
of Human Rights (Brems and Lavrysen 2015).
In light of this principle, if it is possible to protect the public from harm by isolat-
ing the patient, there would be no justification for insisting that the patient, once 
isolated, submit to medical treatments to which he continues to object. The WHO 
Ethics Guidance for the Implementation of the End TB Strategy makes this point 
forcefully:
While contagious persons with TB who do not adhere to treatment or who are unable or 
unwilling to comply with infection prevention and control measures pose significant risks 
to the public, those risks can be addressed by isolating the patient. Patients who are isolated 
should still be offered the opportunity to receive treatment, but if they do not accept it, their 
informed refusal should be respected. Forcing these patients to undergo treatment over their 
objection would require an unacceptable invasion of bodily integrity, and also could put 
health care providers at risk. Moreover, as a practical matter, it would likely be impossible 
to provide effective treatment without the patient’s cooperation. Nevertheless efforts to con-
vince the patient and re-examine his or her refusal should not be abandoned (World Health 
Organization 2017).
The Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics takes a similar position, finding that 
“if an MDR patient who does not have any psychiatric problems rendering him 
incapable of giving his consent refuses a treatment, the health authorities can hold 
him in isolation to avoid the spread of the disease but cannot force him to receive 
treatment” (Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics 2013).
This position is consistent with the logic of the danger-to-others exception to the 
informed consent requirement. In particular, cases involving the forcible medication 
of violent patients emphasize that the use of force is justified only as a temporary 
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measure, “continuing only as long as the emergency persists” (Rivers v. Katz 1986). 
Once a violent patient has been medicated to a point that he can safely be isolated, 
there would be no justification for further medication unless another basis for over-
riding consent, such as mental incapacity, also exists.
Taken together, the considerations discussed above suggest that nonconsensual 
treatment for infectious disease will rarely be justifiable. Even if the magnitude and 
severity of harm resulting from a treatment refusal are significant, and even if the 
proposed treatment is not especially burdensome and is likely to work, the less 
restrictive alternative of isolating the patient will usually be sufficient to protect the 
public from harm. While involuntary isolation still involves an element of coercion, 
in most cases it should be up to the patient to decide whether this option is prefera-
ble to submitting to an unwanted medical intervention.
Yet, it would be a mistake to think that the option of isolation will always elimi-
nate the need to consider the appropriateness of nonconsensual treatment. One situ-
ation in which isolation may be impractical is when individuals are already living in 
confined settings, such as in prisons or the military. While isolating a small number 
of individuals in these settings may be possible, the available space for isolation is 
likely to be limited. In addition, there may be other persons with a stronger case for 
access to these limited facilities — for example, prisoners who need to be separated 
from the general population because they are at heightened risk of violent attack.
Another situation in which isolation may not be a practical alternative is during 
an epidemic outbreak involving substantial numbers of persons with contagious 
infections, particularly in low-resource settings with a limited capacity to provide 
humane isolation facilities. In some cases, voluntary isolation at home may be a 
reasonable alternative, but this will work only if the patient is willing and able to 
follow infection control precautions (World Health Organization 2017). Otherwise, 
if isolation facilities are limited, protecting the public may sometimes require con-
sideration of nonconsensual treatment. Yet, even in these scenarios, compelled treat-
ment would be justified only if a safe and effective treatment exists that would not 
be unduly burdensome to the patient. If there is such a treatment, it seems unlikely 
that the number of people refusing it would be high enough to overwhelm available 
isolation facilities, particularly if public health authorities have engaged in an ade-
quate process of community engagement (World Health Organization 2016). Thus, 
as a practical matter, the need to invoke this exception may be more theoretical 
than real.
In all cases, the burden should be on those seeking to compel unwanted treatment 
to demonstrate that no less restrictive alternatives, including isolation, are realisti-
cally available under the circumstances. As the World Health Organization recom-
mends, “objections to diagnostic, therapeutic, or preventive measures should not be 
overridden without giving the individual notice and an opportunity to raise his or 
her objections before an impartial decision-maker, such as a court, interdisciplinary 
review panel, or other entity not involved in the initial decision” (World Health 
Organization 2016). Such a process provides an important check against abuse and 
can avoid undermining public trust in the integrity of the public health system.
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Chapter 12
Surveillance and Control of Asymptomatic 
Carriers of Drug-Resistant Bacteria
Euzebiusz Jamrozik and Michael J. Selgelid
Abstract Drug-resistant bacterial infections constitute a major threat to global 
public health. Several key bacteria that are becoming increasingly resistant are 
among those that are ubiquitously carried by human beings and usually cause no 
symptoms (i.e. individuals are asymptomatic carriers) until a precipitating event 
leads to symptomatic infection (and thus disease). Carriers of drug-resistant bacteria 
can also transmit resistant pathogens to others, thus putting the latter at risk of infec-
tions that may be difficult or impossible to treat with currently available antibiotics. 
Accumulating evidence suggests that such transmission occurs not only in hospital 
settings but also in the general community, although much more data are needed to 
assess the extent of this problem. Asymptomatic carriage of drug-resistant bacteria 
raises important ethical questions regarding the appropriate public health response, 
including the degree to which it would be justified to impose burdens and costs on 
asymptomatic carriers (and others) in order to prevent transmission. In this paper, we 
(i) summarize current evidence regarding the carriage of key drug- resistant bacteria, 
noting important knowledge gaps and (ii) explore the implications of existing public 
health ethics frameworks for decision- and policy-making regarding asymptomatic 
carriers. Inter alia, we argue that the relative burdens imposed by public health mea-
sures on healthy carriers (as opposed to sick individuals) warrant careful consider-
ation and should be proportionate to the expected public health benefits in terms 
of risks averted. We conclude that more surveillance and research regarding com-
munity transmission (and the effectiveness of available interventions) will be needed 
in order to clarify relevant risks and design proportionate policies, although extensive 
community surveillance itself would also require careful ethical consideration.
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12.1  Introduction
The human body contains more bacterial cells than human cells. We all, thus, 
“carry” bacteria--especially in our digestive, respiratory, and urogenital tracts – and 
on our skin (Sender et al. 2016). Bacteria travel with and between human beings, 
following the daily flux of commuters in cities and crossing the world with interna-
tional travellers. These ‘fellow travellers’ are often unsuspected since most of these 
bacteria cause no overt symptoms (i.e. the human carriers are mostly ‘asymptom-
atic’), and some even have symbiotic benefits for humans.1 Yet, under certain cir-
cumstances (e.g., skin breakdown, bowel surgery, or the use of immunosuppression), 
some ubiquitous species of bacteria cause ‘invasive’ disease that may require anti-
biotic treatment and be life threatening if such treatments are ineffective or unavail-
able. With increasing use (and overuse) of antibiotics in recent decades, such 
ubiquitously carried bacteria have in many cases become increasingly resistant to 
first line (and, in some cases, second line and/or ‘reserve’) treatments (See 
Table 12.1). Some have become effectively untreatable with standard antibiotics, 
and those who develop invasive disease are at high risk of death and/or permanent 
morbidity (Klein et al. 2007; Tischendorf et al. 2016).
Asymptomatic carriers of resistant ubiquitous bacteria vastly outnumber symp-
tomatic cases (Tischendorf et al. 2016; Smith et al. 2004; Safdar and Bradley 2008) 
and may carry them unknowingly for months or years (Smith et al. 2004; Carlet 
2012; Zimmerman et al. 2013; Marchaim et al. 2007; Kennedy and Collignon 2010), 
creating risks of disease for carriers as well as risks of transmission to others 
1 Others can lead to indirect benefits because their presence in the ecological niche of asymptom-
atic carriage excludes and/or inhibits other more harmful organisms.
Table 12.1 Pathogens frequently carried by healthy individuals
Pathogen
Examples of resistant form(s) of public health 
importanceb Site of carriage
Enterobacteriaceaea CRE (carbapenem resistant enterobacteriaciae) Digestive tract
Enterococcus faecium VRE (vancomycin-resistant enterococci Digestive tract
Clostridium difficile Vancomycin resistant strains Digestive tract
Staphylococcus aureus MRSA (methicillin-resistant S. aureus) Skin, nose
Streptococcus pneumonia Penicillin resistant strains Respiratory 
tract
Haemophilus influenzae Penicillin / macrolide resistant strains Respiratory 
tract
aEnterobacteriaciae include: Klebsiella pneumoniae, Escherichia coli, Enterobacter spp., Serratia 
spp., Proteus spp., and Providencia spp, Morganella spp. bAdapted from WHO List of Priority 
Resistant Pathogens
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(Klein et al. 2007; Tischendorf et al. 2016; Safdar and Bradley 2008; Carlet 2012; 
Giske et al. 2008). In light of the potential transmission of resistant bacteria from 
asymptomatic carriers to others, asymptomatic carriage (otherwise referred to as 
asymptomatic infection, colonization, commensalism, persistence, the carrier state, 
etc. (Casadevall 2000)) has underexplored ethical implications for public health 
programs aimed at controlling the spread of drug resistant bacteria.
Though infection control policies often focus on symptomatic cases, in some 
cases they also apply to apparently healthy individuals (for example, quarantine 
involves those suspected, but not known, to be infected (Morgan et al. 2017; Kass 
2001; Selgelid 2009; Millar 2009)). As more knowledge is gained regarding com-
munity (as opposed to in-hospital) transmission of drug-resistant bacteria, policy-
makers will need to determine appropriate responses to this relatively new set of 
public health problems in the general community. Policy options could include 
screening and other kinds of interference with the lives of apparently healthy indi-
viduals. When potentially transmissible (resistant) asymptomatic carriage is diag-
nosed, there may sometimes be an ethical rationale for public health interventions to 
prevent transmission, and these measures (as well as screening itself) may entail 
significant burdens2 for carriers (and others) as well as public health benefits. Beyond 
screening, interventions could include reporting the diagnosis of asymptomatic car-
riage to authorities, notification of third parties, monitoring of carriers, restrictions 
on freedom of movement (e.g. quarantine, isolation, travel bans), exclusion of carri-
ers from working in certain occupations, and/or possibly even requirements for treat-
ment of carriers in certain circumstances (See Table 12.1). Where the rate of carriage 
of highly resistant (i.e. effectively untreatable) bacteria is increasing and/or where 
community transmission poses significant risks, such public health interventions 
could have wide-ranging effects on social norms and the everyday lives of healthy 
individuals (as was the case for tuberculosis and HIV prior to the availability of effec-
tive treatments (Fitzgerald 2007)) resulting in stigma and/or social exclusion, in addi-
tion to the direct burdens of complying with public health interventions.
A key ethical question concerns whether or not, or the extent to which, public 
health decision makers should be especially reluctant to impose public health mea-
sures that infringe upon the lives of those who are healthy (as opposed to those who 
are sick). In this chapter, we summarize current knowledge regarding asymptomatic 
carriage and community transmission, and argue that (i) beliefs that only those with 
symptoms pose risks to others (and related views, such as ‘microbial determinism’ 
– i.e. the idea that all those who acquire a pathogen will develop symptoms) should 
be discarded, (ii) policymakers should consider the risks posed by asymptomatic 
carriers of resistant organisms, and (iii) policy formation should be guided public 
health ethics frameworks such that the burdens imposed on carriers (and others) are 
minimized (and/or offset) and proportionate to the public health benefits in terms of 
risks averted; and (iv) designing proportionate interventions will require, inter alia, 
careful assessments of the risks related to asymptomatic carriage, including through 
expanded, ethically designed, public health surveillance programs.
2 In this chapter we use the term ‘burden’ to refer to compromises of people’s (especially carriers’) 
liberties and/or wellbeing.
12 Surveillance and Control of Asymptomatic Carriers of Drug-Resistant Bacteria
186
12.1.1  History
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pioneering microbiologists such 
as Robert Koch significantly improved scientific understanding of the microbial 
agents of infectious disease. In 1890, Koch laid out criteria for inferring causal links 
between pathogens and disease states, including a requirement that every person 
with the microbe must show signs of the relevant disease. Only 3 years later Koch 
realized that this was an error since many people carry pathogenic microbes and can 
transmit them to others, without themselves showing signs of disease. This insight 
went against common wisdom at the time and was illustrated in famous cases such 
as that of ‘Typhoid Mary’ in New York in 1907: despite being asymptomatic, Mary 
Mallon transmitted typhoid to many other people through her work as a cook, result-
ing in several deaths (Soper 1939).
12.1.2  Against Microbial Determinism
Despite this, people might be tempted to think that such cases (of asymptomatic 
carriage) are exceptions and that the acquisition of potentially pathogenic microbes 
by a human being (or other animal) will always (or almost always) lead to symp-
tomatic infection (i.e. disease). In some ways, the false view that one’s infectious 
disease status is determined by the pathogens in one’s body (which we call ‘micro-
bial determinism’) is akin to an erroneous view in genetics (‘genetic determinism’), 
according to which phenotype is determined by genotype (de Melo-Martín 2005). 
Just as particular genetic polymorphisms do not always give rise to particular phe-
notypes (because many environmental factors as well as cellular and other causal 
processes are required), acquiring particular pathogens does not always lead to the 
relevant infectious diseases. Upon acquisition of a pathogen, a complex set of host- 
pathogen interactions (involving immunological and other causal processes) can 
lead to a variety of outcomes – e.g. the microbe being eliminated without symp-
toms, short- or long-term asymptomatic carriage, or symptomatic infection/disease 
(with rapid or delayed onset)(Casadevall 2000).
12.1.3  Key Drug-Resistant Pathogens
This chapter focuses on the ethical implications associated with a subset of WHO 
Priority Resistant Pathogens (World Health Organisation 2017a): among those with 
resistance profiles of public health concern, we concentrate on pathogens that are 
ubiquitous organisms in the bacterial flora of the human body in healthy individuals 
(Table 12.1) where – in the majority of carriers, whether the bacteria are resistant or 
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not – they usually cause no symptoms3 until a precipitating event leads to invasive 
disease (Tischendorf et al. 2016; Safdar and Bradley 2008; Carlet 2012). Such inva-
sive disease can occur in otherwise completely healthy carriers, although it is more 
common in those with comorbidities, especially those associated with reduced 
immune function (e.g. diabetes, HIV etc.). We are also particularly concerned with 
community as opposed to in-hospital transmission, as the latter has received more 
analysis elsewhere (Millar 2012), including in this volume.
Many of our arguments may be relevant to other increasingly resistant bacteria, 
including (i) gastro-intestinal and sexually transmitted pathogens that are associated 
with a high rate of symptomatic infection when a person is first exposed (e.g. 
Campylobacter, Salmonella (including typhoid), Shigella, and Gonorrhea) follow-
ing which only some people will become chronic asymptomatic carriers, and (ii) 
Helicobacter pylori, a less ubiquitous pathogen for which carrier status is associ-
ated with a range of clinical severity from no symptoms to mild indigestion to overt 
peptic ulcer disease and/or stomach cancer.
12.2  The Public Health Problem
With widespread use (and overuse) of antibiotics, the number of asymptomatic car-
riers of resistant bacteria (henceforth ‘asymptomatic carriers’) is increasing. It is 
difficult to characterize the overall carriage rates of the many different types of 
clinically significant resistant organisms, since the rate of carriage (and the rate of 
invasive infection) of each varies considerably between populations, and quoted 
rates will depend on the quality and extent of public health surveillance in different 
settings (Laxminarayan et al. 2016; Bryce et al. 2016; Bernabé et al. 2017; Nordmann 
et al. 2011; Schwaber and Carmeli 2013). In any case, symptomatic resistant bacte-
rial infections already cause hundreds of thousands of deaths globally per year 
(although few estimates of the total burden are available)  (Laxminarayan et  al. 
2016; O’Neill 2015) and increase healthcare costs by billions of dollars (Klein et al. 
2007; Giske et al. 2008; O’Neill 2015). The true population prevalence of asymp-
tomatic carriage of resistant bacteria is often unknown, because not enough com-
munity surveillance data are available. Most data come from hospital settings and 
are biased by the inclusion of a disproportionate number of symptomatic cases and 
a focus on patients who have contact with healthcare institution(s) as opposed to the 
wider community (World Health Organization 2014).
Globally, the rate of carriage and/or disease from resistant organisms tracks dis-
advantage, with higher rates in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
(Bernabé et al. 2017). For example, a recent study in a Malaysian hospital found 
that around 50% of patients screened on arrival to hospital were carrying 
3 Emerging microbiome research programs are, however, seeking links between strains of coloni-
zation and a wide range of ‘subclinical’ physical and mental health outcomes.
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carbapenem resistant Enterobacteriaciae (CRE)4 in their digestive tract  (Zaidah 
et al. 2017) – of whom perhaps up to 1 in 6 can be expected to develop invasive 
disease, with overall mortality among carriers reportedly around 10% (Tischendorf 
et al. 2016). In general, there is a much higher rate of mortality from resistant infec-
tions in poor communities, including among infants – some of whom acquire resis-
tant infections from mothers and/or family members (and/or, for infants admitted to 
hospital, from staff or other patients) who are asymptomatic carriers (Chan et al. 
2013). One 2016 estimate suggested that of the 680,000 annual neonatal deaths due 
to bacterial infection, the vast majority of which occur in LMICs, around 31% 
(214,500) were due to resistant infections (Laxminarayan et al. 2016).
Yet the problem is by no means confined to developing regions. A 2016 system-
atic review of E. coli5 urinary infections among children (with the usual source of 
such infections being asymptomatic carriage of E. coli in the child’s digestive tract) 
found that the highest rates of resistance to first-line penicillin antibiotics occurred 
in (lower income) non-OECD countries (79.8%), but rates in (higher income) 
OECD countries were still relatively high (53.4%) (Bryce et al. 2016).
More epidemiological research is urgently needed to quantify the rates of car-
riage of key pathogens in different populations, as well as the rates of disease among 
carriers and the rates of transmission from (symptomatic and asymptomatic) carri-
ers to others in different contexts. Novel, less expensive, genomic screening tech-
niques are expected to facilitate such investigations (Kwong et al. 2017).
12.2.1  Antibiotic Use and Drug Resistance
The use of antibiotics that kill sensitive bacteria in the human microbiome inevita-
bly leads to the evolutionary selection of drug resistant bacteria. Despite concerns 
regarding underuse, the vast majority of drug resistant bacteria in humans arise due 
to antibiotic overuse and ‘appropriate’ use (Llewelyn et  al. 2017).6 Importantly, 
when antibiotics are prescribed/taken to treat one type of (suspected or confirmed) 
infection, many other bacteria carried in the body are exposed to the same antibiot-
ics, which select for resistant strains by killing sensitive ones. It is mainly these 
‘off-target’ effects that lead to asymptomatic carriage of resistant forms of ubiqui-
tous bacteria (Llewelyn et al. 2017). This means that whether a given prescription 
for antibiotics is ‘appropriate’ (e.g. because the patient actually has a symptomatic 
infection with the pathogen for which she is being treated) or not, each additional 
dose of antibiotics potentially adds to the burden of resistant bacteria carried in the 
4 i.e. highly resistant bacteria predominantly found in the digestive tract, a group considered “criti-
cal” (i.e. of highest importance) on the WHO Priority list.
5 E. coli is an important species in the family of Enterobacteriaciae, carried primarily in the diges-
tive tract (see Table 12.1 and footnote above).
6 In this paper we focus on human use, although animal and agricultural use is an important con-
tributor to drug-resistant human infection.
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body (Carlet 2012). Furthermore, at the population level, it is otherwise relatively 
healthy occasional users of antibiotics (taken together) who contribute the most to 
the prevalence of (asymptomatic carriage of) drug-resistant bacteria, rather than the 
relatively few, relatively sick individuals whose antibiotic use is more frequent and/
or intensive (Olesen et al. 2018). In any case, although reducing the use of antibiot-
ics is one important policy to reduce carriage of drug-resistant bacteria, this chapter 
focuses on other potential community interventions that have received less ethical 
analysis in this context (Bryce et  al. 2016; Barbosa and Levy 2000; Bronzwaer 
et al. 2002).
12.2.2  Transmission
Even those who never use antibiotics can acquire resistant pathogens through (direct 
or indirect) contact with carriers (Zimmerman et al. 2013; Schwaber and Carmeli 
2013; Waters et  al. 2004; Paterson 2006). Living in close contact with carri-
ers (Eveillard et al. 2004; Granoff and Daum 1980), hospitalization(Eveillard et al. 
2004; Cronin et al. 2017), working in healthcare (Eveillard et al. 2004; Albrich and 
Harbarth 2008), and travel to countries with high rates of resistant organ-
isms (Kennedy and Collignon 2010) are all risk factors for the acquisition of resis-
tant pathogens via transmission. Increasingly, outbreak investigations have 
demonstrated transmission networks that connect symptomatic and asymptomatic 
individuals both within hospitals and in the wider community (Smith et al. 2004; 
Kwong et al. 2017). Community transmission of some pathogens is relatively well 
understood; for example, colonization with methicillin resistant S. aureus (MRSA) 
is associated with transmission within families  (Eveillard et al. 2004; Fritz et al. 
2014; Manian 2003), while the transmission of many other resistant pathogens has 
been primarily studied in the hospital setting (if at all).
12.2.3  Duration of Carriage
Once an individual becomes a carrier of resistant bacteria, the duration of carriage 
depends on complex local factors at the site of carriage including competition from 
other strains or other species of bacteria, as well as the carrier’s immune response, 
and whether (more) antibiotics are used (Andersson and Hughes 2010). Few studies 
have estimated the average duration of carriage of key resistant bacteria in the gen-
eral population; studies in returned travellers have suggested a decrease in carriage 
over months, with most individuals carrying detectable levels of resistant strains for 
a few months and a minority (around 10%) developing long-term carriage of 
6 months or more (Kennedy and Collignon 2010).
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12.3  Potential Public Health Responses
Strategies for preventing the transmission of drug-resistant bacteria from asymp-
tomatic carriers include a wide range of potential interventions (Table 12.2). Each 
of these interventions could involve burdens for carriers (and others, for example 
family members) – to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the chosen policy and 
its implementation. Such burdens may include reduced well-being, infringements 
on privacy,7 restrictions of other freedoms (including freedom of movement and 
freedom to decide on the medical interventions to which one will be subjected 
(Table 12.2)8) (Inness 1996), and significant financial costs.9 Interventions can be 
more or less coercive ranging from being offered, recommended, or self-enforced to 
strictly coerced and/or backed by legal sanctions including fines and/or prison terms.
Thus, the design and implementation of infection control policy will inevitably 
involve ethical tradeoffs  (Millar 2009; Millar 2012). The focus of most drug- 
resistant infection policy regarding asymptomatic carriers has been on healthcare 
contexts (primarily hospitals), yet  – with few exceptions  (Millar 2009; Millar 
2012) – there has been little explicitly ethical analysis of such policies. There has 
7 We consider privacy to be a freedom; see, for example, Inness (1996).
8 This paper focuses on burdensome interventions for carriers; there are of course a range of other 
interventions including nudging or minimally-burdensome behavioral interventions (we thank an 
anonymous reviewer for pointing this out) and interventions to change healthcare worker behav-
iors such as antibiotic prescribing (which have received some discussion elsewhere).
9 Costs arise both for the individuals directly affected and, where public health measures are 
financed through taxation, for the whole community.
Table 12.2 Infection control interventions and potential burdens
Public health interventions that could lead to reduced well-being, privacy infringements, and 
reductions in other freedoms (e.g. freedom of movement, freedom to decide on medical 
interventions)
Intervention Types Description/examples
Screening Testing apparently healthy 
individuals for carriage
Informing carriers of their status Communicating and explaining the 
diagnosis of a carrier state
Notifying public health authorities Requirements for health workers to 
report the diagnosis of carrier status
Monitoring Serial (re)testing to assess carrier 
status
Treatment or decolonization Skin/nasal decolonization of 
MRSA; faecal transplant for CRE
Limitations on freedom of movement Isolation, quarantine, travel bans
Limitations on social practices Change of occupation, altered 
norms of social interaction
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been even less ethical analysis of public health infection control interventions to 
prevent the transmission of drug resistant bacteria in the general community (i.e. 
outside healthcare settings).
12.3.1  Surveillance, Notification, and Monitoring
Screening is routinely used to detect asymptomatic carriage of resistant bacteria 
among hospital patients (Morgan et al. 2017; Perencevich et al. 2004; Cooper et al. 
2004). In many jurisdictions, hospitals are required to notify or report the diagnosis 
of asymptomatic carriage to local infectious diseases departments and/or central 
agencies, resulting in exceptions to the usual right to privacy over one’s own health 
information (Morgan et al. 2017; Inness 1996; World Health Organisation 2017b). 
In order to form a more accurate estimate of the reservoir of asymptomatic infection 
in the community, and accurately assess the transmissibility and invasiveness (i.e. 
propensity to cause symptomatic disease) of a given pathogen, surveillance would 
ideally go beyond (hospital) patients and include members of the general commu-
nity such as (but not necessarily limited to) the close contacts of those known to be 
carriers. Yet this raises questions regarding how policy should address potential sce-
narios in which large numbers of asymptomatic carriers of highly resistant patho-
gens are identified. Furthermore, the accuracy of tests used in surveillance has 
ethical implications especially where, for example, a false positive test result leads 
to significant burdens for someone who is not actually a carrier of resistant microbes 
(or where a false negative result provides false reassurance).
12.3.2  Restrictions of Freedom of Movement (Isolation, 
Quarantine, Travel Bans)
Although isolation and quarantine of asymptomatic carriers and/or their contacts 
have sometimes been successful in hospitals, whether such measures would be fea-
sible and/or successful in the general community (e.g. where community members 
are identified as carriers by public health surveillance) remains uncertain. Restricting 
the freedom of movement of healthy carriers (or those suspected to be carriers) in 
the general community would plausibly involve significant infringements on indi-
vidual liberty, and such restrictions might often lead to greater burdens for healthy 
carriers than for those suffering with the symptoms of the relevant disease (or, for 
example, confined to hospital for other reasons), as discussed below (See Sect. 
12.4.2).
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12.3.3  Treatment and Decolonization
Many asymptomatic bacterial infections in certain populations  – for example, 
asymptomatic bacteriuria in most females – do not require treatment because they 
lead to a low rate of disease in the carrier (Nicolle et al. 2005). In other cases, either 
because of risks to the carrier or to others, treatment may lead to a net benefit 
(although not necessarily to the carrier herself). Treatment of asymptomatic resis-
tant bacteria is often more difficult and sometimes referred to as decolonization. 
Decolonization strategies have been used for MRSA, primarily carried on the skin 
and in the nose – which allows for topical (i.e. non-invasive) bactericidal treatment10 
(Coates et al. 2009). Although decolonization has primarily been used in carriers 
with recurrent symptomatic infection in order to benefit the carrier herself, they 
have also been used in family members (and pets) of at-risk patients and healthcare 
workers in order to prevent harm to others (Albrich and Harbarth 2008; Guardabassi 
et al. 2004).
Decolonization for organisms carried in the digestive tract is sometimes more 
invasive than decolonization of the skin. For example, an effective, last-line treat-
ment for resistant C difficile11 is faecal transplantation (i.e. decolonization (Morgan 
et al. 2015)), whereby the bowel microbiome of the patient is replaced by feces from 
a healthy donor (Van Nood et al. 2013). There have been recent reports of the suc-
cessful use of fecal transplantation to clear (symptomatic or asymptomatic) carriage 
of ubiquitous bowel organisms that have become highly resistant (e.g. CRE), 
Freedman and Eppes 2014; Manges et al. 2016; Crum-Cianflone et al. 2015). At 
present, the use of such procedures has been largely confined to unwell patients, 
including in intensive care units  (Carlet 2012). Yet if such strategies prove to be 
safe, effective and reliable, they could be more widely implemented to address the 
carriage and transmission of resistant bowel organisms.
12.4  Ethical Issues
Asymptomatic infection raises a number of important ethical issues. In this chap-
ter we focus on ethical considerations related to policy responses to the problem of 
asymptomatic carriage of resistant strains of ubiquitous bacteria because, as 
described earlier (i) asymptomatic carriers of such pathogens vastly outnumber 
symptomatic cases, (ii) carriers are at risk of severe and difficult to treat invasive 
disease, (iii) carriage of resistant pathogens places others in the community at risk, 
10 One limitation of S. aureus decolonization is that it uses bactericidal products (albeit with differ-
ent formulations to other relevant antibiotics) to which the organism can also become resistant.
11 C. difficile: a species of bacteria that is commonly (but not ubiquitously) carried asymptomati-
cally in the bowel and most frequently causes disease in individuals already treated with antibiotics 
for other conditions.
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and (iv) public health interventions to prevent the transmission of resistant bacteria 
are potentially associated with significant burdens for carriers (and others). 
Determining the appropriate responses will thus require scientific data regarding the 
risks involved (e.g. for a given pathogen or resistance mechanism in a given popula-
tion) as well as moral judgments about the degree to which burdensome interven-
tions to prevent these risks would be justified. An initial question relates to the 
extent to which the ethical permissibility of a burdensome infection control measure 
depends on whether contagious carriers are symptomatic as opposed to asymptom-
atic (i.e. ‘healthy’). We begin by arguing for a useful way of applying existing pub-
lic health ethics frameworks to policy questions, and then give an account of how 
the principles in such frameworks should be used to inform policy related to asymp-
tomatic carriers.
12.4.1  Applying Public Health Ethics Frameworks
Existing public health ethics frameworks are applicable to the problem of the car-
riage and community transmission of resistant bacteria by asymptomatic carriers. 
The principles in different frameworks overlap considerably; Table 12.3 provides a 
list of relevant principles and examples of how they might be interpreted (based on 
previous work (Selgelid 2009)). These principles are usually framed as necessary 
conditions for determining when a given intervention would be justifiable. However, 
were this to be so, it might seem that certain principles would be difficult to satisfy 
Table 12.3 Principles from public health ethics Frameworks
Public Health Ethics 
Principle Interpretation/Example
Need for evidence Evidence of efficacy is needed to justify imposition of potentially 
burdensome public health interventions.
Least restrictive 
alternative
Where two interventions are expected to be equally effective, the 
intervention that involves the least restrictions of liberty should be 
selected.
Proportionality The burdens involved in an intervention should be outweighed by public 
health benefits achieved.




Where two interventions are expected to be equally effective, the 
intervention that involves the least harms should be selected.
Reciprocity Those who benefit from public health policies/interventions have a 
reciprocal duty to assist and/or compensate those on whom burdens are 
imposed.
Due legal process Appropriate legal procedures should be followed and individuals should 
have the right of appeal.
Transparency Policymaking should be transparent and democratic.
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(as necessary conditions) in the context of asymptomatic carriage of drug-resistant 
bacteria (and/or in many other public health contexts). If the existence of evidence 
of an intervention’s effectiveness is conceived as a necessary condition, for exam-
ple, then some might think that the current lack of evidence (e.g. of the risks of 
community transmission of resistant bacteria) precludes the implementation of rel-
evant public health interventions. Such an approach would likely reduce the scope 
of legitimate public health interventions to a very narrow set (for example, those for 
which we have very substantial evidence regarding the effectiveness of relevant 
interventions, and where the attendant burdens are well characterized, etc.). For this 
and other reasons it is arguably more useful to conceive of such principles as point-
ing to ethically relevant desiderata the are achieved to a greater or lesser degree (i.e. 
on a scale) rather than as necessary conditions that are either satisfied or unsatisfied 
depending on whether some threshold has been crossed (Selgelid 2016).12 For 
example, there can be more or less (reliable) evidence regarding the expected public 
health benefits associated with a given intervention—and a relative lack of evidence 
(such as the current gaps regarding our knowledge of community transmission of 
drug-resistant pathogens) might suggest that an intervention should first be insti-
tuted as (public health) research (rather than suggesting that it would be ethically 
unacceptable to implement it at all), and re-evaluated as more evidence comes to 
light. Furthermore, since there is not likely to be widespread agreement among pub-
lic health practitioners on any threshold that could be used to characterize a suffi-
cient amount of evidence to justify the implementation of a given intervention (in 
public health practice, rather than in research), policymakers should consider both 
evidence and ethical acceptability as matters of degree existing on a scale—the idea 
being that the more (reliable) evidence one has that an intervention is likely to create 
a net public health benefit, the more ethically acceptable it would be to implement 
it in policy, other things being equal.
Likewise the harms of potential interventions should be considered to exist on a 
spectrum from least to most harmful, liberty infringements on a spectrum from least 
(e.g., minor and/or short-term) to most restrictive (e.g. major and/or longer 
duration),13 and transparency of policy making on a spectrum from least to most 
12 For illustration of how such an approach might work in the context of public health policy 
regarding gain-of-function research see Selgelid (2016).
13 Although the Least Restrictive Alternative and Least Harmful Alternative principles are usually 
framed as necessary conditions, there are often cases where policymakers will be uncertain 
whether one intervention is more effective and/or less restrictive or harmful than another. In such 
cases of uncertainty, a scalar framing of the principles might run as follows: “The more confidence 
policymakers have that two interventions are associated with similar expected public health bene-
fits and significantly different restrictions, the more moral considerations would support selecting 
the less restrictive alternative, other things being equal. The more confidence policymakers have 
that two interventions are associated with similar expected public health benefits and significantly 
different burdens, the more moral considerations would support selecting the less harmful/burden-
some alternative, other things being equal.” However, in a restricted set of cases where policymak-
ers are very certain that one intervention is equally (or more) effective and less restrictive or 
harmful, interpreting the principles as necessary conditions will yield similar guidance, other 
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transparent, and so on—the idea being that the ethical acceptability of interventions 
will be a matter of degree, and a function of the extent to which they are harmful, 
restrictive, transparent, etc., other things being equal  (Allen and Selgelid 2017). 
There might often be reasonable disagreement about exactly how the estimated 
degrees of evidence, harmfulness, restrictiveness, transparency, etc. can/should 
determine what ultimately ought to be done; but, as a starting point, policymakers 
should consider how well, or poorly, each available intervention fares with respect 
to the values/concerns highlighted by each principle before making judgements 
regarding what policies/interventions should be implemented. We consider this to 
be a practical approach to ethically sensitive public health policymaking; in the next 
section we illustrate such an approach in the context of asymptomatic carriage of 
drug resistance.
12.4.2  Public Health Intervention for Healthy Carriers
One might think that public health agencies should be more reluctant to interfere 
with the lives of healthy asymptomatic carriers as opposed to sick individuals who 
carry, and/or are suffering from clinical infection due to, the same (resistant) patho-
gens. The proportionality principle may help to explain such intuitions. Firstly, one 
way in which it may make a difference, ethically speaking, whether a carrier is 
symptomatic or not when imposing potentially burdensome public health interven-
tions is that asymptomatic carriers are more likely to be living active lives in general 
society; whereas the more symptomatic one is, the more likely it is that they will be 
bedbound and/or admitted to a healthcare facility. In the latter kind of case, one’s 
liberty and well-being are in a sense already impaired by illness, and so some 
restrictions (to prevent transmission of drug-resistant bacteria) may impose few, if 
any, additional burdens.14 For example, public health measures limiting the freedom 
of movement of carriers (See Table 12.2) would be a more significant burden for 
healthy carriers whereas the isolation of sick individuals is a relatively minor addi-
tional burden, since such individuals are more likely to be restricted in their move-
ment (e.g. confined to a healthcare facility) due to illness.15 Thus, if the risk of 
transmission from a healthy individual is similar to, or less than, the risk from a sick 
things being equal. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this point. For more on this 
kind of approach to public health ethics frameworks, see Allen and Selgelid (2017).
14 Those who are ill may also be more likely to understand and comply with burdensome restric-
tions because they can more easily perceive that they are infected and a risk to others; in some such 
cases restrictive measures may even be unnecessary since voluntary measures suffice. We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
15 Some might worry that the systematic imposition of additional burdens on those who are already 
(in one sense) badly off due to illness would be inequitable; arguably, this would be particularly 
worrisome if these burdens were disproportionate (see following discussion of proportionality) to 
the risks averted which is less likely in cases where (i) the additional burden is small and/or (b) the 
risk of transmission from sick individual carriers is at least as high as, or higher than, the risk from 
healthy carriers (i.e. most cases).
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individual, the burdens would be higher when imposing a given intervention on 
healthy carriers. Secondly, there may be cases in which healthy carriers and sick 
carriers impose different risks of transmission to others. Sick carriers may impose 
higher risks of transmission because (i) in at least some cases, the degree of symp-
toms (e.g. related to the resistant bacterial infection in question) is correlated with 
the risk of transmission16 (Lerner et al. 2015) or because (ii) hospitalisation for ill-
ness places one in (direct or indirect) contact with other patients who are at particu-
larly high risk of acquiring and suffering from (resistant) infection due to medical 
comorbidities and/or contamination of the shared hospital environment. In cases 
where such conditions hold, not only would the burdens of certain interventions be 
lower among sick carriers (as discussed above), but the risks (to others) averted 
would be greater, meaning that imposing similarly restrictive interventions on 
healthy carriers would be comparatively less proportionate (because more signifi-
cant burdens would be imposed to avert lower risks). On the other hand, there might 
be cases in which healthy carriers impose higher risks on others. For example, 
healthcare workers or food handlers who carry resistant pathogens might impose 
increased risks on others because of the nature of their work. In such cases, it may 
be more justifiable to impose burdensome restrictions on such individuals, because 
these would be more proportionate to the risks involved (c.f. vaccination of health-
care workers (van Delden et al. 2008)).
12.4.3  Burdens of Interventions and Support for Carriers
As noted previously, public health interventions to control the spread of resistant 
bacteria in the general community could potentially burden carriers to a greater or 
lesser degree. They may also involve burdens for family members and contacts of 
known carriers, as well as direct financial costs for those involved and funding costs 
of relevant public health policy options (which are borne by the wider community 
and/or lead to forgoing other opportunities to improve public health)17. While the 
threat of drug-resistant infections as an urgent public health problem might prompt 
some to consider or propose particularly far-reaching and/or coercive interventions, 
several other public health ethics principles (in addition to the proportionality prin-
ciple) can provide useful guidance regarding the ethical reasons to ensure that the 
burdens (and costs) of an intervention are not only proportionate to the public health 
benefits but also as low as possible (i.e. without unduly compromising the goals of 
a policy to reduce risks and thereby lead to public health benefits).
16 for example, urinary frequency and incontinence related to urinary tract infection (e.g. with 
E. coli), diarrhea (e.g. from resistant Clostridium difficile), etc. potentially increase the risk of 
transmission to others.
17 We thank anonymous reviewers for emphasizing the implications for family members and for 
pointing out the opportunity cost of public health policies.
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First, the least harmful alternative principle holds that interventions must be no 
more harmful to carriers than necessary (i.e. minimally harmful) – because compro-
mising individuals’  well-being requires justification. If two alternative policies/
interventions are expected to be equally beneficial interms of public health protec-
tion, then the alternative that is less harmful to carriers should be preferred, other 
things being equal – See Table 12.3. Second, the reciprocity principle entails that 
policymakers should consider obligations to assist and support carriers as part of 
policy implementation so as to reduce or offset the ‘net burdens’ for those affected. 
This could include preferential/non-discriminatory access to healthcare, psycho-
logical support, assistance with finances or finding other employment, etc.
More broadly, public health agencies should aim to reduce burdens related to 
stigma through public education campaigns and through informing carriers about 
important aspects of carriage (for example, that carriage of resistant organisms is 
frequently not permanent) at the time of diagnosis. Overly burdensome interven-
tions may also lead to perverse incentives for (potential) carriers to avoid diagnosis 
and/or contact with health authorities, which could lead to greater risks for the car-
rier and others, undermining the purported public health benefits of a given policy 
(meaning that the need for evidence includes evidence regarding how well a policy 
actually works in practice).18
12.5  The Need for More Surveillance and Research
Practical ethical deliberations guided by the above principles should always be 
informed by the best available empirical data on the relevant risks related to carriage 
of a given pathogen and the expected benefits of an intervention. An initial chal-
lenge is that, for many infections transmitted by asymptomatic carriers, the risks are 
not yet well understood because few data are available. There is thus an ethical 
imperative for increased public health surveillance and research on such infections, 
including programs aimed at collecting and analyzing long-term data (i.e. involving 
monitoring) related to asymptomatic carriage in the general community. This again 
requires careful ethical consideration, since ethically appropriate surveillance also 
requires striking a balance between public health goals and individual interests; 
here, too, public health ethics principles and analysis should help to guide policy 
formation (World Health Organisation 2017b). Likewise, there is an urgent need for 
more research regarding the relative effectiveness of different potential public health 
interventions, as well as qualitative research aimed at better characterizing the bur-
dens experienced by carriers. Being able to draw on such empirical data will only 
serve to improve public health ethics analysis and, ultimately, public health policy.
18 We thank the participants at the 2018 Brocher workshop “Invisible epidemics: ethics and inter-
ventions for asymptomatic carriers of infectious diseases.”, in particular Niels Nijsingh and 
Christian Munthe for helpful discussions of this point.
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12.6  Conclusions
All human beings are asymptomatic carriers of bacteria, meaning that ‘microbial 
determinism’ is false. The increasing prevalence of carriage of resistant strains of 
ubiquitous bacteria is an urgent public health issue, and many apparently healthy 
individuals are at risk of resistant infections and risk transmitting such pathogens to 
others. Deliberations regarding the design and implementation of public health pol-
icy should be guided not only by empirical data regarding the health risks of a given 
resistant strain and the public health benefits of a given intervention (and much 
more data are needed to clarify these risks and benefits), but also by ethical analysis 
regarding the justification of burdens imposed on carriers. Principles of existing 
public health ethics frameworks should help policymakers identify important con-
siderations that have particular implications for the design and implementation of 
infection control policies regarding asymptomatic carriers. The proportionality 
principle in particular provides reasons for being wary about imposing potentially 
burdensome interventions on otherwise healthy carriers of drug resistant patho-
gens—which is not to say that such interventions would never be ethically 
appropriate.
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Chapter 13
Conceptualizing the Impact of MDRO 
Control Measures Directed at Carriers: 
A Capability Approach
Morten Fibieger Byskov, Babette Olga Rump, and Marcel Verweij
Abstract Many countries have implemented specific control measures directed at 
carriers of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO) in order to prevent further intro-
duction and transmission of resistant organisms into hospitals and other healthcare 
related settings. These control measures may in many ways affect the lives and well- 
being of carriers of MDRO, resulting in complex ethical dilemmas that often remain 
largely implicit in practice. In this chapter, we propose to conceptualize the impact 
of MDRO control measures on the well-being of individual carriers in terms of 
capabilities and functionings. A capabilitarian framework for the ethical treatment 
of MDRO carriers commits us to conceptualize the harm done to carriers in terms 
of the impact that MDRO control measures have on what they are able to do or be. 
Adopting and adapting Nussbaum’s list of ten central human capabilities, we pres-
ent a taxonomy of capabilities and functionings that are normatively relevant for the 
design and evaluation of MDRO control measures.
Keywords Bioethics · Moral philosophy · Public health · Drug resistance
13.1  Introduction
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has been described as one of the major threats to 
individual and public health (WHO 2014). This threat has justified extensive restric-
tions on the freedom of individuals (Krom 2011; Littmann 2014; Littmann and 
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Viens 2015). Many countries have implemented control measures in order to pre-
vent further introduction and spread of MDRO. Some more general, as addressed in 
Chap. 6 by Gilbert et al., and some more specific, like those targeting the individual 
who is found to carry an MDRO. Measures directed at MDRO carriers aim to limit 
the introduction and further transmission of multidrug-resistant organism (MDRO) 
in hospitals and other healthcare-related settings. The measures vary per micro- 
organism and include for instance isolation and quarantine; contact precaution; 
eradication treatment; restrictions in the workplace; refusal of access to important 
activities; or contact restrictions at the one’s family farm. They may in many ways 
affect the lives and well-being of carriers, resulting in complex ethical dilemmas 
that often remain largely implicit in practice.
Within the literature, little attention has been paid to how we treat carriers of 
MDRO, however, and Littmann et al. (2015) includes it as one of four ethical issues 
that needs further examination when addressing MDRO. In this chapter we aim to 
start filling this lacuna by proposing to conceptualize the impact of MDRO control 
measures on the well-being of individual carriers in terms of capabilities and func-
tionings. A capabilitarian framework for the ethical treatment of MDRO carriers 
commits us to conceptualize the harm done to carriers in terms of the impact that 
MDRO control measures have on what they are able to do or be. Adopting and 
adapting Nussbaum’s list of ten central human capabilities, we present a taxonomy 
of capabilities and functionings that are normatively relevant for the design and 
evaluation of MDRO control measures. Chapter 16 addresses the implications of 
AMR for child development and adult capabilities.
The chapter is structured as follows: In Sect. 13.2, we shortly present the issue of 
treating MDRO carriers as an ethical problem before we turn, in Sect. 13.3, to pro-
pose a capabilitarian framework for the conceptualization of the impact that MDRO 
control measures have on the well-being of carriers. In Sects. 13.4 and 13.5, we 
adapt Nussbaum’s list of ten central human capabilities in order to develop a tax-
onomy of normatively relevant capabilities and functionings in the context of 
MDRO.  In Sect. 13.4, we first present Nussbaum’s list of capabilities before we 
argue that this list needs further specification when applied to the case of MDRO. In 
Sect. 13.5, we proceed to propose a taxonomy of ethical domains and normatively 
relevant capabilities and functionings in the context of responsible care for MDRO 
carriers. In Sect. 13.6, we finally argue that and show how this capabilitarian tax-
onomy can provide a crucial input to procedures for ethical decision-making on 
appropriate MDRO control measures.
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13.2  The Ethical Treatment of MDRO Carriers: 
A Neglected Issue
Treating MDRO as an ethical issue is a double-sided coin. On the one side, it 
involves a concern for public health and how we can ensure that everyone, now and 
in the future, have access to antimicrobial treatment while minimizing the risk of 
further spread of MDRO. From this side of the coin, addressing MDRO is primarily 
an issue of global distributive justice (Littmann 2014; Littmann et al. 2015, 360): 
how can we distribute antimicrobials in a way that, on the one hand, adequately 
protects public health by ensuring that everyone has access to antibiotics while, on 
the other hand, ensuring that antibiotics do not become useless? In the following, 
however, we shall not primarily be concerned with this distributive question.1
The distributive focus has often been accompanied by a discussion of what kinds 
of control measures we can take to prevent the further spread of MDRO (Selgelid 
et al. 2009; Coleman et al. 2010): how can we treat carriers in a way that minimizes 
the risk that they contaminate other individuals? An important element in the fight 
against MDRO is to adequately treat infections with multi-resistant microbes in 
patients and to prevent that these persons are re-infected or will infect others with a 
resistant organism. Due to the threat that MDRO poses to individual and public 
health (WHO 2014), many countries have implemented specific MDRO control 
measures in order to prevent further introduction and spread of MDRO. Measures to 
prevent and control the spread of MDRO may include isolation and quarantine; 
eradication therapy; restrictions in the workplace; refusal of access to important 
activities; or contact restrictions with one’s family (Verweij and Dawson 2010).
Many of these control measures threaten to seriously affect the lives of individual 
carriers, however, and as important as such prevention and control is, it may have 
burdensome implications for infected patients and healthy persons in whom a resis-
tant organism has been colonized: they may feel stigmatized, face restrictions in 
their work or private life, or might be refused access to certain institutions. For 
example, in a healthcare context, control measures may mean that surgeons should 
refrain from operating due to carriership, that infected nurses should not perform 
patient-related activities, or that we ask infected residents of a nursing home to keep 
away from social activities.
In some extreme cases it is almost impossible to eradicate the resistant organism 
and then it may be impossible for the person to return to what used to be his/her 
normal life. Consider, for example, the case of a medical student who was repeat-
edly diagnosed as carrier of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) 
(Rump 2011; Rump et al. 2016). In line with the MDRO control guidelines, the 
student was not allowed to be involved in patient-care, which is an implicit part of 
completing the internships necessary to graduate. Because of this, the student had to 
1 For a discussion of different approaches to the distribution of antimicrobials, see especially 
Anomaly (2010, 2013), Daulaire et al. (2015), Littmann (2014), and Selgelid (2007). For an intro-
duction to and overview of distributive justice in general, see Lamont and Favor (2016).
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eventually discontinue his studies. Whether this outcome was indeed necessary or 
not remains unclear, though, since the risk of further contamination could have been 
minimized through proper hygiene and guidance.
The consequences of MDRO carriership certainly have the potential to affect the 
lives and well-being of not only carriers themselves, but also their social connec-
tions, such as family members, friends, and colleagues. Yet, it is unclear in what 
ways MDRO and MDRO carriership affect these individuals. In the remainder of 
this chapter, we will offer a novel conceptualization of how MDRO control mea-
sures can harm carriers and other affected individuals and further reflect on how this 
conceptualization, and the normatively relevant issues that are thereby revealed, 
influences the design and evaluation of MDRO control measures. We argue that 
adopting a capabilitarian framework for the conceptualization of ‘harm’ done to 
(potential) carriers can help us make better and more informed decision about what 
control measures to implement. According to a capabilitarian framework, MDRO 
control measures may harm individual carriers by negatively affecting their capa-
bilities and functionings.
13.3  A Capabilitarian Framework for Conceptualizing 
the Impact of MDRO Control Measures
What is the capability approach and how can it be used to conceptualize the (nega-
tive) impact that MDRO control measures have on the lives and well-being of indi-
vidual carriers?2 Originally conceived by the Indian philosopher-economist Amartya 
Sen (1979) and further developed by a number of theorists, such as Martha 
Nussbaum, David A. Crocker, and Ingrid Robeyns, the capability approach is a 
normative framework for the conceptualization of human well-being (Robeyns 
2016a). According to this framework, human well-being should be conceptualized 
in terms of capabilities and functionings. Capabilities are the real freedom that peo-
ple have to do or be certain things, such as falling in love, getting an education, 
being politically active, riding a bike, reading a book, and so on. Functionings are 
2 It is possible that the capability approach can also be used to conceptualize ‘harm’ within three 
other related domains of application, which we will not discuss in this chapter. First, we can con-
ceptualize the risk that the spread MDRO poses to the well-being of members of the public in 
terms of their capabilities and functionings. For a discussion of how to conceptualize public health 
in terms of the capability approach, see Prah Ruger (2010), Venkatapuram (2011), and Nielsen 
(2014). Secondly, the capability approach can be used to conceptualize the ‘harm’ of control mea-
sures within infectious disease control in general. While the taxonomy that we provide in Sect. 
13.5 may also apply within infectious disease control in general, more research needs to be done 
in this regard as different capabilities may be relevant in relation to different diseases. Thirdly, the 
capability approach has been used to conceptualize the idea of ‘person-centered healthcare,’ what 
it means to treat patients as persons (Entwistle and Watt 2013).
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capabilities that have been realized either by choice or by chance. A person’s 
capability- set refers to all the capabilities and functionings that that individual has.3
Real freedom in this sense means that there are no restrictions on achieving a 
particular functioning. Whether or not one has such real freedom crucially depends 
on certain conversion factors. Conversion factors are personal, social, and environ-
mental circumstances that affect the extent to which one can achieve certain doings 
and beings. For example, whether or not one has the real freedom to be healthy – 
that is, whether or not one has the capability of achieving the functioning of being 
healthy  – depends on one’s physical health, for example the strength of one’s 
immune defense system (personal conversion factors), the extent to which one can 
rely on family and social relations for care (social conversion factors), and where 
one lives and whether there are adequate infrastructures, such as accessible health 
care facilities (environmental conversion factors).4
Through the notion of conversion factors, the capability approach captures the 
fact that human beings are diverse: different people living in different societies 
would have different needs and capabilities. As we shall see in Sect. 13.5, the differ-
ent conversion factors are relevant when we consider how MDRO control measures 
affect the lives and well-being of individual carriers.
The capability approach moves the focus from the means that people have to 
their ends – what they are able to do or be with these means, such as goods, resources, 
and formal freedoms. As Sen (1979) argues, this shift in focus is justified because 
resources and goods alone do not ensure that people are equally able to convert 
them into doings and beings. Consider, for example, two persons – one disabled, the 
other able-bodied – with the same amount of resources. According to Sen, the dis-
abled person is disadvantaged relative to the able-bodied person in two regards. 
First, she is disadvantaged in terms of what she can do or be with her means and 
resources. She may, for example, be less able to move around because she is con-
fined to a wheelchair. Secondly, she may even be doubly worse off because she only 
receive the same amount of resources as the able-bodied person, even though she 
has more expenses in order to correct for her disability, whereas the able-bodied 
person, ex hypothesi, can spend all of her resources to pursue her valued ends. 
Hence, when evaluating the well-being of individuals, we cannot merely compare 
the amount of resources that they have without also looking at what they are able to 
do or be with these resources.
3 Capabilities and functionings can be both positive and negative, as well as neutral (Robeyns 
2016b). Positive capabilities are what we consider valuable for someone to do or be. Examples of 
positive capabilities are good health, adequate nutrition, falling in love, and getting an education. 
While most applications of the capability approach are primarily concerned with positive capabili-
ties, there are also cases where we want to consider their negative capabilities. When evaluating a 
person’s well-being, for example, it is relevant whether her capability-set include the capabilities 
to be murdered or raped. Insofar as we, usually, do not consider these capabilities to be valuable, a 
capability-set that allows for the risks of being murdered or raped would be less valuable than a 
capability-set that protects the individual from these risks.
4 This example is adapted from Crocker and Robeyns (2010).
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The concepts of capabilities and functionings can help us to better understand 
how MDRO control measures can ‘harm’ (potential) carriers of MDRO in terms of 
how MDRO control measures influence the real freedom that MDRO carriers have 
to do or be certain normatively relevant things. MDRO control measures can affect 
the capability-sets of (potential) carriers in at least two ways. First, they may impose 
certain requirements on (potential) carriers. This is, for example, the case when we 
subject nurses to strict hygiene regimes or demand that carriers undergo mandatory 
screenings and eradication therapies. In terms of the capability approach, MDRO 
control measures thus impose certain doings and beings – that is, functionings – on 
carriers. Secondly, MDRO control measures can reduce the choices that carriers 
have to choose from (i.e., the capabilities that they can choose to turn into realized 
functionings). This is, for example, the case when we place carriers in isolation or 
ban them from social activities.5
Rather than merely focusing on whether or not the autonomy of carriers is being 
respected (Beauchamp and Childress 2001), by conceptualizing the potential impact 
of MDRO control measures in terms of capabilities and functionings, we get a 
broader picture of the many ways in which carriers are affected. In other words, it 
allows us to move from a singular basis for evaluation, namely in terms of their 
autonomy, to a multi-dimensional one. The same carrier may be impacted in many 
different ways by a particular control measure. For example, restricting a resident of 
a nursing home from participating in the weekly bingo nights not only restricts her 
capability for participating in social activities, but may also take away an important 
source of pleasure and happiness or may even lead to stigmatization. Likewise, a 
particular control measure may impact different carriers in different ways. For 
example, a child who is at a crucial stage in her social and cognitive development 
would arguably be negatively affected to a greater extent from being taken out of 
daycare (even for a short period of time) than a child who is not in this crucial stage 
of development (Piaget 1971).
Moreover, the capability perspective gives substance to carriers’ autonomy: it 
allows us to identify in which ways MDRO control measures have the potential to 
(negatively) impact the capabilities of (potential) carriers. We are not merely con-
cerned with the limitation of options that carriers can choose from. Rather, the capa-
bility perspective tells us that carriers are concerned with particular opportunities 
for choice (Sen 1991), such as access to day care centers, nursing homes, and phys-
iotherapy; participation in social and leisure activities; opportunities for education 
and employment; freedom from stigmatization and discrimination; and possibilities 
5 That is, there might still be good normative reasons to override this concern for carriers’ capabili-
ties, for example out of a concern for the public health. While we do not engage with the discussion 
on how to weigh the violation of carriers’ capabilities against concerns for public health in this 
paper, do see Sect. 13.6 for an example of how such weighing can take place within an open-ended 
decision-making framework. The point here is, rather, that there are certain capabilities that are so 
normatively relevant that we should take them into consideration when deciding on appropriate 
MDRO control measures  – again, even if we do not consider them to have overriding norma-
tive status.
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for forming and sustaining relationships to friends, family, and pets. Indeed, by 
employing the capability approach to conceptualize the ‘harm’ done by MDRO 
control measures to individual carriers we gain a greater, more in-depth, and more 
specific understanding of this impact.
As noted, this focus on particular opportunities for choice – rather than freedom 
or autonomy, in general – moves the discussion away from the singular dichotomy 
between public health versus the freedom of the individual carrier. The restriction of 
freedom is not necessarily a bad thing on the capabilitarian view.6 The restriction of 
an individual carrier’s freedom out of concern for public health is perfectly compat-
ible with the protection of her valued capabilities. What the capability perspective 
does highlight, though, is that the restriction of some freedoms and opportunities, 
however prima facie insignificant, may affect capabilities that we do find norma-
tively valuable. For example, restricting an MRSA positive child from attending 
kindergarten for just a few months may not seem like a big deal. However, that 
restriction may negatively affect a normatively crucial aspect of a person’s life, 
namely the opportunity for a normal social, cognitive, and physical development if 
the MRSA positive child were, at the moment of isolation, at a crucial stage of her 
development.
To see how MDRO control measures can (negatively) affect the lives of MDRO 
carriers, it is crucial to identify what capabilities and functionings that are norma-
tively relevant for carriers in the context of MDRO. In the following two sections, 
we present a taxonomy of capabilities and functionings that may be normatively 
relevant when deciding on appropriate control measures. This taxonomy builds on 
one prominent instantiation of the capability approach, namely Nussbaum’s list of 
ten central capabilities. We first discuss Nussbaum’s list in Sect. 13.4 and argue that 
it needs further adaptation and specification when applied to the context of deciding 
on appropriate MDRO control measures before we explain the taxonomy in greater 
detail in Sect. 13.5. In Sect. 13.6, we finally show how this capabilitarian taxonomy 
can help us make better and more informed decisions when deciding on appropriate 
MDRO control measures.
13.4  Nussbaum’s Ten Central Capabilities: A Starting Point
What capabilities should we be concerned about protecting when implementing 
certain measures to prevent the spread of MDRO?7 A good starting point is 
Nussbaum’s influential list of ten central capabilities that, she argues, every 
6 See, though, Carter (2014) for a dissenting view.
7 We have employed what Byskov (forthcoming) refers to as a synthesizing method to identify the 
relevant capabilities. Synthesizing methods compare and reconcile two or more lists of capabilities 
derived from different theoretical and empirical sources. We have here reconciled Nussbaum’s 
(2000) list of central human capabilities with (i) other lists of relevant normatively domains in 
healthcare literature, such as Entwistle and Watt (2013) and Huber et  al. (2016), (ii) empirical 
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 government should provide for their citizens. While Nussbaum’s list is thus derived 
from a discussion on global justice, it can nevertheless be useful for conceptualizing 
what kinds of capabilities that are important because it helps us to identify how 
well-off individuals truly are.8 The most influential version of Nussbaum’s list of 
capabilities can be found in her book Women and Human Development 
(Nussbaum 2000)9:
 1. Life: Ability to live to the end of a normal length human life, and not to have 
one’s life reduced to not worth living.
 2. Bodily health: Ability to have a good life, which includes – but is not limited 
to – reproductive health, nourishment, and shelter.
 3. Bodily integrity: Ability to change locations freely, in addition to having sover-
eignty over one’s body, which includes being secure against assault (e.g., sexual 
assault, child abuse, and domestic violence) and the opportunity for sexual 
satisfaction.
 4. Senses, imagination, and thought: Ability to use one’s senses to imagine, think, 
and reason in a ‘truly human way’ informed by an adequate education. The 
ability to produce self-expressive works and engage in religious rituals without 
fear of political ramifications. The ability to have pleasurable experiences and 
avoid unnecessary pain. Finally, the ability to seek the meaning of life.
 5. Emotions: Ability to have attachments of things outside of ourselves, including 
being able to love others, grieve at the loss of loved ones, and be angry when it 
is justified.
 6. Practical reason: Ability to form a conception of the good and critically 
reflect on it.
 7. Affiliation:
 (a) Ability to live with and show concern for others, empathize with and show 
compassion for others, and the capability of justice and friendship. 
Institutions help develop and protect forms of affiliation.
 (b) Ability to have self-respect and not be humiliated by others (i.e., being 
treated with dignity and equal worth). This entails at least protections from 
being discriminated on the basis of race, sex, sexuality, religion, caste, eth-
nicity, and nationality. In work, this means entering relationships of mutual 
recognition.
analysis of a database of ethical and practical questions concerning MDRO raised within the Dutch 
healthcare system as well as (iii) participatory case discussions with practitioners working with 
infectious disease control. For overviews of the various methods for the selection of capabilities, 
see Ballon (2013) and Byskov (forthcoming).
8 Several scholars have taken build on Nussbaum’s list and made changes to it, as necessary, when 
applied in practice (e.g., Alkire 2002). Thus, to be clear, we do not take Nussbaum’s list at face 
value but rather hold that we can compare and specify this list to the particular case of MDRO.
9 See also Nussbaum (1992, 2011) for similar iterations of her list, albeit based on different norma-
tive justifications.
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 8. Other species: Ability to have concern for and live with other animals, plants, 
and the environment at large.
 9. Play: Ability to laugh, play, and enjoy recreational activities.
 10. Control over one’s environment:
 (a) Political: Ability to effectively participate in the political life, including 
having the right to free speech and association.
 (b) Material: Ability to own property, not just formally but materially. 
Furthermore, having the ability to seek employment on an equal basis and 
the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure.
Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities provides a good starting point for our 
attempt to identify what capabilities and functionings that are relevant for evaluat-
ing the extent to which MDRO control measures excessively interfere with the lives 
of MDRO carriers. However, when Nussbaum specifies a list of capabilities she is 
not concerned with the case of MDRO control measures and the well-being of indi-
vidual carriers of MDRO but rather with setting out a partial theory of justice. For 
this reason, when adapting Nussbaum’s list to the context of MDRO carriership, we 
still need to ask (a) whether all items on her list are relevant and (b) to what extent 
they need to be further specified and/or supplemented by additional capabilities.
First of all, while some of the items on Nussbaum’s list may also be relevant for 
the evaluation MDRO control measures other capabilities are clearly not applicable. 
For example, while the capability for bodily integrity, seems to be of utmost impor-
tance for this discussion, the capability for senses, imagination and thought do not 
seem to be at stake here. The reason for this is not that being able to use one’s 
senses, imagination, or thoughts are not important human characteristics. Rather, 
the reason that these capabilities are of little importance in the context of MDRO is 
that it can be argued that there are no control measures that have the potential to 
restrict one’s use of the senses, imagination, and thoughts. Likewise, it is question-
able whether the capability for practical reason – one’s ability to form a conception 
of the good and critically reflect on it – would be thwarted or under threat by any 
conceivable measure we can take to control MDRO. (However, do note that we sug-
gest to subsume (and expand) the capability for education, which is part of the 
capability for practical reason, under the capability for life as the capability for 
proper social, physical, and cognitive development.)
This leaves us the following list of capabilities that we can tentatively assume are 
relevant for the context of MDRO: Life, bodily health, bodily integrity, affiliation 
(in both senses), other species, play, and control over one’s environment (in both 
senses). Now, we still need to ask whether these seven items are sufficient for our 
present purpose. This is so in two ways. We need to ask, first, whether these seven 
capabilities are comprehensive in the sense that we do not need to add additional 
capabilities and, second, whether they are sufficiently specified to capture what is at 
stake in the context of MDRO.
In the first case, are the seven capabilities that we retain from Nussbaum’s list 
sufficient to capture all relevant ethical aspects of the context of MDRO? Do we 
need to add any further capabilities? In order to answer this, let us first distinguish 
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between Nussbaum’s categories of capabilities and the more specific capabilities 
that are included within the categories. Thus, for example, the category of ‘bodily 
health’ includes the more specific capabilities of adequate health, nourishment, 
shelter, and reproductive health. Though all of these specific capabilities support the 
more general categorical capability of bodily health, they can neither be reduced to 
each other nor to the general category. In other words, the more specific capabilities 
are distinct capabilities in themselves.
Are the seven categories of capabilities sufficient to capture all ethical aspects of 
MDRO? In general, the categories on Nussbaum’s list seem comprehensive. 
However, it may be helpful to distinguish carriers’ mental well-being from 
Nussbaum’s category of bodily health. Many of the MDRO control measures have 
little impact on one’s physical or bodily health. Even decreases in bodily health – 
for example, the displeasure caused by eradication therapies – are only temporary. 
The mental impact, however, may be just as profound and long lasting. Being sub-
ject to isolation measures, for instance, is known to increase the levels of perceived 
stress and anxiety and the stigma of having been a carrier can continue long after 
carriage has ceased. Thus, the mental impact of MDRO control measures can and 
should be seen independently from their physical impact. Let us therefore add an 
additional category, namely mental health.
How about the more specific capabilities on Nussbaum’s list? Does Nussbaum 
identify all relevant capabilities to adequately capture what is at stake within the 
seven general categories in relation to the context of MDRO? Given the particular 
focus of her own list, Nussbaum naturally leaves off many capabilities that are rel-
evant in the context of MDRO. For example, when deciding on how to treat children 
and adolescents, a major concern is how the control measure affects their physical 
and mental development. Prolonged isolation of children in certain age groups may 
cause setbacks in speech or reading that will disadvantage them later in life. 
Moreover, Nussbaum does not explicitly address concerns related to healthcare, 
such as access to timely and effective treatment and protection against intrusive and 
excessive examinations and therapy.
Nor are Nussbaum’s capabilities sufficiently specified to the context of MDRO 
carriership and MDRO control measures. For example, the way Nussbaum defines 
sovereignty over one’s body (a part of bodily integrity) seems overly abstract. In the 
context of MDRO, what we mean by bodily integrity and sovereignty concerns not 
being subjected to unnecessary, intrusive, or excessive examinations and eradica-
tion therapies. Likewise, since a large issue in relation to MDRO is how it might 
contribute to the stigmatization of carriers (Rump et al. 2015), we need to include 
protection from stigmatization along with the protection from discrimination (a part 
of the capability for affiliation).
Thus, we can also answer the second question that we asked above, namely 
whether Nussbaum’s capabilities are sufficiently and adequately specified to cap-
ture the context of MDRO. There are good reasons to argue that Nussbaum’s list 
needs to be further specified and supplemented with additional capabilities when 
setting out a taxonomy of normatively relevant capabilities and functionings in the 
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context of how MDRO control measures and carriership may affect the lives and 
well-being of carriers.
In sum, although Nussbaum’s list of ten central capabilities provides a useful 
starting point for identifying the normatively relevant aspects of how MDRO con-
trol measures have the potential to impact the lives of individuals, it still needs to be 
adapted and specified to this particular context. This is so in several ways: first, 
some capabilities on Nussbaum’s list are irrelevant for the case of MDRO; secondly, 
Nussbaum’s list does not distinguish all relevant capabilities, such as mental health; 
and, thirdly, Nussbaum’s capabilities must be specified to the context of MDRO. In 
the following section, we proceed to present a taxonomy of normatively relevant 
capabilities and functionings that we need to take into consideration when deciding 
on and evaluating MDRO control measures.
13.5  A Taxonomy of Normatively Relevant Capabilities 
in the Context of Addressing MDRO Carriership
What does a taxonomy of normatively relevant capabilities and functionings look 
like in the context of MDRO? How can it help us understand what is at stake when 
deciding on measures to contain the spread of MDRO? Building on Nussbaum’s list 
of central human capabilities, in this section we present a taxonomy that adapts and 
specifies Nussbaum’s list to the particular context of assessing and evaluating 
MDRO control measures. The taxonomy supplements Nussbaum’s list through an 
analysis of empirical literature and studies on what practitioners and MDRO carri-
ers express as normatively relevant and divides the relevant capabilities into four 
ethical domains.
Table 13.1 presents a systematic overview of how MDRO control measures can 
potentially affect the lives and opportunities of individual carriers. The table is 
divided into three columns, which, from left to right, moves from four general 
domains of human life (the personal, the social, the institutional, and the environ-
mental) to the more specific capabilities and functionings that are relevant in the 
context of MDRO.
On the right-hand side of the table, we find a list of the various capabilities and 
functionings that are (a) normatively relevant for living a decent or flourishing 
human life, as revealed by Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, and (b) specifically rel-
evant within the context of MDRO, as revealed by our empirical analyses.
In the first case, capabilities such as nourishment, shelter, the right to association, 
and being treated with dignity and equal worth are relevant for human life regard-
less of whether it involves MDRO or not. In the second case, there are capabilities 
that only or primarily come become relevant when combined with MDRO, such as 
protection against stigmatization and pathologization, protection against unneces-
sary or intrusive examinations and therapy, and the ability to engage in recreational 
activities.
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Table 13.1 Ethical domains and normatively relevant capabilities and functionings for the 
evaluation of the impact of MDRO control measures on (potential) carriers, partly adapted from 
Nussbaum (2000). Additional items and specifications in bold
Domain Category Specific capability
Personal Life Not having one’s life reduced to not worth 
living (especially for elderly)
Proper social, physical, and cognitive 
development (especially for children and 
adolescents)





Mental health Happiness and peace of mind
Self-respect and self-esteem (e.g., being 
able not to see oneself as sick or as merely 
a patient)
Protection against internalized 
pathologization
Future prospects (e.g., of a speedy 
recovery)
Bodily integrity Sovereignty over one’s body (e.g., not 
being subjected to unnecessary, intrusive, 
or excessively costly examinations and 
intensive eradication therapy)
Appearance (i.e., being able to appear in 
public without shame)
Freedom of choice and opportunity, both 
in life and in relation to one’s body
Choice in matters of reproduction
Protection against internalized 
pathologization
Play Ability to enjoy social and recreational 
activities
(continued)
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Table 13.1 (continued)
Domain Category Specific capability
Social and community Bodily integrity Protection against assault (e.g., not being 
seen as merely a threat), also in the case 
of relatives of carriers
Affiliation A Ability to live with others
Friendship
Family (incl. reproductive rights)
B Being treated with equal dignity and respect
Social status and prestige
Play Ability to engage and participate in social 
and recreational activities
Control over one’s 
environment A
Right to association





Bodily health Access to adequate (i.e., timely and 
effective) health care
Bodily integrity Security against assault in the form of 





A Access to just and fair healthcare 
treatment
B Freedom from unwarranted search and 
seizure (e.g., having to pay oneself for 
excessively expensive examinations)
Affiliation A Institutions help develop and protect forms 
of affiliation, self-respect, and dignity
B Being treated with dignity and equal worth
Protection from discrimination and 
stigmatization
Public life Control over 
one’s 
environment
A Ability to effectively participate in political 
and public life (incl. free speech and 
association)
Access to just and fair institutions
B Ability to seek employment on an equal 
basis
Decent working environment (incl. 
protection against discrimination and 
abuse)
Freedom from unwarranted search and 
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The eight categories of capabilities can, in turn, be relevant within one or more 
of four domains of human life, identified on the left-hand side of the table: the per-
sonal, the social, the institutional, and the environmental. Within the personal 
domain, MDRO control measures influence the relationship that a carrier has to 
herself, her own body, and her mental satisfaction. In particular, this includes her 
bodily health, in the sense of being healthy, well-nourished, and having access to 
adequate accommodation, her mental health, including being happy, feeling digni-
fied, and being free from stigmatization, and her bodily integrity, most importantly 
not being subject to excessive and intrusive examinations and eradication therapies.
The social domain concerns individual carriers’ relationships to friends and fam-
ily and the ability to participate in social activities. Human well-being to a large 
degree depends on well-functioning social relationships, both instrumentally and 
intrinsically. Not only do we count on friends and family to help us realize certain 
ends and goals in life; we also attribute intrinsic value to social relationship: we 
engage in and enjoy social relationships for their own sake and not because they 
help us fulfill personal goals.
Hence, whenever our social relationships break down it is likely to harm our 
well-being. Social relationships are especially vulnerable to MDRO and MDRO 
control measures. Stigmatization and pathologization are social mechanisms by 
which we respond to perceived threats. In this way, the case of MDRO has a lot in 
common with the plight of AIDS carriers in the 1980s. However, stigmatization and 
pathologization are only two ways in which MDRO measures can harm our well- 
being in a social context. More generally, since we derive pleasure from engaging in 
social relationships, MDRO measures that restrict the extent to which we can engage 
in social relations have the potential to lead to a decrease in our well-being.
On the institutional level, we are interested in the carriers’ relationship to and 
standing within institutions, primarily (but not limited to) health care facilities. 
MDRO is primarily an issue when it comes into contact with a healthcare setting. 
That is, MDRO is primarily a risk when it comes into contact with already vulner-
able individuals who depend on effective antimicrobial treatments for their health 
and survival. Such individuals are more often found within care facilities, such as 
hospitals, nursing homes, and rehabilitation centers. Moreover, healthcare settings 
also provide more fertile breeding grounds for the emergence of multidrug-resistant 
organism because of the increased exposure to antimicrobials and, hence, the risk 
that organisms will evolve resistance to these antimicrobials.
Table 13.1 (continued)
Domain Category Specific capability
Environmental Bodily integrity Ability to change locations freely/freedom 
of movement (incl. the ability to live 
where one chooses to)
Other species Ability to live with other animals (i.e., pets 
and livestock), plants (incl. crops), and the 
environment at large
Control over one’s 
environment B
Ability to own property (e.g., livestock)
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Within the environmental domain, we are primarily concerned with carriers’ 
relations with their environments. To what extent, we ask, are carriers able to con-
nect with their environment? Are they able to exercise any control over their envi-
ronment? We can talk about a person’s relationship to their environment in both 
literal and figurative terms. Literally, we talk about the environment as something 
that is there: a physical presence that we can interact with and influence. In this 
sense, our relationship with the environment concerns our ability to interact with 
physical entities such as plants, including flowers, trees, fungi, and so on, as well as 
animals, including both pets and livestock. In a figurative sense, the environment is 
a more abstract and indefinite entity. This is so in two ways. First, we can talk about 
the environment at large, including in the senses of nature and the climate without 
referring to specific plants or animals. This way of understanding the environment 
is of little relevance to the context of MDRO. However, secondly, the environment 
can also be understood as the indefinite but physical space that surrounds us and 
which we can move around within. In other words, in this sense we understand 
one’s environment as something within which she (can) has control over herself and 
her choices. Given that two of the primary MDRO control measures – quarantine 
and isolation – aim to restrict (potential) carriers’ ability to move around, this sec-
ond figurative understanding of the environment is highly relevant to the context 
of MDRO.
Crucially, a category of capabilities can be specified differently within different 
domains. For example, the capability for control over one’s environment in the con-
text of the social domain concerns one’s right and freedom to form social relation-
ships, while in the institutional domain it rather concerns one’s institutional status, 
such as the freedom to participate in political and public life and access to just and 
fair institutions. Thus, although the different categories of capabilities can be rele-
vant within different domains, the more specific capabilities that they contain 
depend on the domain.
It is important to stress that the taxonomy here does not make any claims about 
which capabilities and functionings that cannot be violated by MDRO control mea-
sures. Rather, it provides a structural overview of how MDRO control measures 
may affect the lives and opportunities of individual carriers. We still need to engage 
in a weighing of the relevant capabilities and functionings in individual cases in 
order to determine whether they provide overriding normative reasons not to imple-
ment a particular control measure. Such weighing would take place on a case-by- 
case basis because each case includes contextual circumstances that influence what 
the best course of action would be. Hence, it is not possible to a priori determine 
what control measure (if any) to implement.
However, by offering a taxonomy of relevant domains and capabilities we do 
make a claim about what is normatively important and relevant when addressing 
MDRO. First, as argued in Sect. 13.3, MDRO control measures affect carriers in 
terms of their capability-sets – what they have the real freedom to do or be. Hence, 
it is claimed that we ought to conceptualize and describe the impact that MDRO 
control measures have on individual carriers in terms of capabilities and 
functionings.
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Secondly, however incomplete and underspecified, we make a claim about the 
kinds of capabilities and functionings that are normatively important for (potential) 
carriers of MDRO and which should be taken into account when deciding on the 
best course of action. That is, there are good reasons to claim that these particular 
capabilities have the potential to be normatively relevant when dealing with cases of 
MDRO. There are both normative and empirical reasons for this claim. Normatively 
speaking, Nussbaum’s list of capabilities provides a normative philosophical 
grounding of the capabilities: these are capabilities that can be subject to an overlap-
ping consensus. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that (some or most of) these 
capabilities are of relevance to practitioners and carriers when dealing with cases of 
MDRO in a healthcare setting. The comparison with real-life queries about how to 
ethically address MDRO – as represented by our database and deliberations with 
carriers and practitioners10 – provide empirical basis for the claim that these are the 
kinds of capabilities that are of concern when deciding on control measures.
How can this taxonomy be implemented in practice to analyze particular cases of 
MDRO and decide on appropriate control measures? In the final section, we show 
how our taxonomy can provide an input into ethical decision-making procedures on 
the appropriate measure to address MDRO carriership.
13.6  Applying the Capabilitarian Taxonomy in Practice
We have in the previous section repeatedly argued that the more general categories 
of capabilities that Nussbaum identifies – life, bodily health, mental health, bodily 
integrity, play, affiliation, control over one’s environment, and other species – can 
and should be specified to the particular context of how MDRO control measures 
impact the lives and freedoms of individual carriers. We further argued that we can 
and should specify these categories of capabilities differently according to whether 
they relate to either of four domains of human life, namely the personal, the social, 
the institutional, and the environmental. While the taxonomy that we have presented 
in Table 13.1 provides an overview of how the different categories of capabilities 
can be specified in relation to the different domains, how it contributes to the prac-
tice of implementing appropriate MDRO control measures is still unclear.
The above taxonomy can provide a useful input to ethical decision-making pro-
cedures on the implementation of MDRO control measures, such as the frameworks 
developed by Verweij et al. (2012; Krom 2014) or Grill and Dawson (2015). How 
does the capabilitarian framework help us make decisions about how to address 
MDRO? How can our taxonomy help us make better and more informed decisions 
about what kinds of MDRO control measures that are preferable, acceptable, or 
justifiable? In this section, we briefly consider how the capabilitarian taxonomy can 
be applied in practice to ethical deliberations on MDRO and what issues that are left 
unaddressed.
10 See footnote 7.
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The capabilitarian taxonomy presented in this chapter is especially useful in two 
regards. First, it can help professionals better describe cases of MDRO by making 
explicit what is at stake for the individual carriers and relevant stakeholders. 
Secondly, it can help us to identify and evaluate possible courses of action by show-
ing how various MDRO control measures may impact the capabilities and function-
ings of affected carriers and stakeholders. Let us, by way of a case study, briefly 
show how the taxonomy of normatively relevant capabilities can be put into practice 
in these two ways.
To illustrate how the capabilitarian taxonomy can be applied in practice, con-
sider, for example, the case of a young, 19-year-old mother with no income or 
higher education who shares a household with her own mother. The father of her 
newborn child is unknown or absent and the woman therefore relies on her own 
mother for economic assistance and care help. However, the grandmother of the 
child turns out to be MDRO positive and there are concerns that she is a threat to the 
health of the newborn child. If there is close contact, it is very likely that the grand-
mother would transmit the resistant organism to the newborn. To make matters 
worse, the child in case has a heart valve condition and needs to go to the hospital 
for regular check-ups. Because of the likelihood that the child will become an 
MDRO carrier if the grandmother is involved in the post-partum care of the child, 
the hospital insists that the grandmother cannot provide this care or that she should 
take far-reaching protection measures, such as wearing gowns and masks, that 
would interfere with the bond between child and grandmother.
How can our taxonomy contribute to the understanding and resolution of this 
case? What capabilities are at stake in this case? While this case involves a lot of 
different capabilities within several domains, the primary concern here is the ability 
to live with others, including family (part ‘affiliation A’ within the social domain). 
This capability is restricted not only for the young mother but also for the newborn 
child as well as the grandmother. However, although we can assume that they value 
this relationship intrinsically – and hence contributes to the capability of happiness 
and peace of mind (a part of the capability for ‘mental health’ within the personal 
domain) – in this case there are at least two instrumental reasons why this capability 
is important.
First of all, bonding with relatives may be considered an important part of a 
child’s development (a part of the capability for ‘life’) and restricting the newborn 
child’s relationship to the grandmother risks harming this development. Secondly, 
in this case, the social relationship between the young mother and her own mother 
can also be seen as a proxy for more formal institutional care-relationships. That is, 
not allowing the grandmother to care for the newborn child is mainly problematic 
insofar as the mother does not have alternative opportunities for care assistance. 
Within the taxonomy this is represented by the institutional capabilities for ‘bodily 
health’ (access to timely and effective healthcare) and ‘affiliation A’ (institutions 
help develop and protect forms of affiliation).
In the described case we have multiple courses of action, which can be employed 
either independently or in conjunction. How can the capabilitarian taxonomy help 
us identify and evaluate possible measures? Some of the measures would be directed 
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solely or primarily at the grandmother. First of all, in order to minimize contamina-
tion, we could demand that the grandmother undergoes eradication therapy and sub-
sequently attends regular screenings. Secondly, we could demand that the 
grandmother adhere to a strict hygiene regiment, including the donning of a gown, 
mask, and gloves when tending to the child. Other measures would be directed at 
the other stakeholders, in particular the newborn child. For example, thirdly, we 
could subject the newborn to regular screenings to test for MDRO and, when posi-
tive, to eradication therapy.
However, as the case describes, these measures have potentially negative conse-
quences for not only the mother’s abilities to engage in social relations and to care 
for her child, but also the child’s well-being, especially in relation to her early child-
hood development as well as her capability to form an affiliation with her grand-
mother. From a capability perspective, then, we would do well to look for alternative 
courses of action that provide better protection of these normatively valuable 
capabilities.
The analysis of the case from the capability perspective shows that a major issue 
is that the mother is reliant on informal care for her child. Informal care is – usually 
unpaid – care that is provided by family members or social relations. In contrast, 
formal care is institutionalized and usually performed by trained professionals. By 
applying the taxonomy, our analysis shows that the case extends beyond the per-
sonal and social domains to reveal a lack of normatively relevant capabilities and 
functionings at within institutional domain. In the present case, then, a possible 
solution to the issue could be to increase the access to formal institutional health-
care for the young mother and her infant, so that she does not have to rely so much 
on informal care, thereby avoiding many of the negative consequences that follow 
from limiting the analysis to focus solely on the informal care-relation between the 
child, the mother, and the grandmother.11
While the proposed course of action in this case might be intuitively clear, in 
general, a major issue of applying the capabilitarian taxonomy in practice, espe-
cially when evaluating the various MDRO control measures, concerns the question 
of how to weigh different capabilities against each other. That is, we need to ask, 
when does the reduction of a carrier’s capability-set provide an overriding reason to 
dismiss or provide compensation for a particular control measure? When applying 
the capabilitarian taxonomy in practice to evaluate different control measures, we 
should weigh capabilities on at least three levels, namely the intrapersonal, the 
interpersonal, and the public health level.
The first level at which we need to weight the importance or value of different 
capabilities against each other when evaluating potential MDRO control measures 
is at the intrapersonal level. At the intrapersonal level, we ask whether a person is 
better off within one scenario as compared to other scenarios. That is, we can ask, 
is the person’s capability-set more valuable as a result of a particular control 
11 A possible objection, also based on the capabilitarian taxonomy, to the proposed solution is that 
it would negatively affect the grandmother’s capability for affiliation with her grandchild.
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measure (or combination of control measures) than it would be if we implement 
another (combination of) control measure(s)?
At the interpersonal level, second, we are concerned with comparing the 
capability- sets of different stakeholders within one particular scenario. Here we 
should ask: does a particular control measure diminish the value of the capability 
sets of one or more of the relevant stakeholders to the extent that it outweighs the 
positive impact on the value of the capability sets of other relevant stakeholders?12 
Finally, thirdly, we should weigh the positive or negative impact to the value of the 
capability-sets of individual stakeholders against the estimated benefit to public 
health that the implementation of a particular MDRO control measure has.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider how such a weighing may be 
done. Since this decision must eventually be made on a case-by-case basis, it must 
be a subject for further research to set out normative (or pragmatic) principles for 
the weighing of capabilities. Such principles might include a threshold level of 
capabilities and functionings: do we really need to compensate someone for a lost 
job-opportunity if she already has ample opportunity to find alternative employ-
ment? Other principles are principles of proportionality and acceptable risk, that can 
help us determine when a particular MDRO control measure is (dis)proportionate to 
the harm, conceptualized in terms of capabilities and functionings, that it does to the 
individual carrier. In this regard, possible connections could, for example, be made 
between our capabilitarian taxonomy and the approaches of Viens et al. (2009), who 
set out a principle of reciprocity, Krom (2011), who discusses the shortcomings of 
the harm principle in infectious disease control, and Grill and Dawson (2015) who 
propose a value-based approach.
Moreover, the weighing of capabilities and capability-sets should be done in 
consultation with the relevant stakeholders in order to identify relevant capabilities 
and their normative weight. This leaves quite a bit of space for professional auton-
omy in ethical decision-making. It is simply quite impossible a priori to determine 
the normatively relevant capabilities and their relative, normative weight. In this 
regard, the taxonomy of normatively relevant capabilities and functionings pre-
sented in this chapter should be taken as an open-ended and underspecified basis for 
further deliberation between the various stakeholders (carriers, relatives, profes-
sionals, and possibly policy-makers) on a case-by-case basis. Again, how much 
room to leave for professional autonomy and how exactly to conduct such delibera-
tive exercises must be subject to further research. We have here proposed two prom-
ising frameworks for ethical decision-making, namely Verweij et al. (2012; Krom 
2014) or Grill and Dawson (2015).
Finally, it might be objected that, while intuitively attractive, the capabilitarian 
taxonomy presented in this chapter does not add to professional practice on 
MDRO. That is, it is not clear that the capability perspective would change what 
professionals already do when addressing cases of MDRO. This objection holds 
12 Conversely, this could also be framed as: does a particular control measure increase the value of 
the capability sets of one or more of the relevant stakeholders to the extent that it outweighs the 
negative impact on the value of the capability sets of other relevant stakeholders?
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that one of the supposed advantages of adopting the taxonomy of capabilities, 
namely its intuitive appeal, at the same time makes the contribution of this chapter 
trivial. However, even if the taxonomy largely corresponds to existing practice, 
there are at least four benefits to making the tacit or implicit assumptions of profes-
sional practice explicit through the language of the capability approach and the 
taxonomy that has been presented in this chapter.
First of all, the taxonomy provides a substantive – yet underspecified and open- 
ended – view of carriers’ well-being. Rather than a person’s autonomy, generally 
speaking, we are, on this view, concerned with protecting carriers’ normatively rel-
evant or valuable capabilities and functionings. This allows us, secondly, to provide 
a structured way of discussing how MDRO control measures impact the lives and 
well-being of carriers, namely by influencing their normatively relevant or valuable 
doings and beings. In this sense, the proposed taxonomy could serve as a basis for 
consultation among professionals and with relevant stakeholders. Third, the capa-
bility view presents a multi-dimensional view of the impact that MDRO control 
measures can have. Different individuals might be impacted in different ways by 
similar control measures and one individual might be affected in many different 
ways by a particular control measure. Fourth, by conceptualizing the impact of 
MDRO control measures in terms of people’s capabilities and functionings, it pos-
sible to see how affecting one aspect of an individual’s life may affect other, less 
immediately obvious, capabilities and functionings.
In sum, the capability framework to MDRO and the accompanying taxonomy of 
normatively relevant capabilities does contribute to both the literature on the ethical 
aspects of MDRO as well as, potentially, to real practice of addressing cases 
of MDRO.
13.7  Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have presented and discussed a capabilitarian conceptualization 
of how MDRO control measures can (negatively) impact the lives and well-being of 
individual MDRO carriers. According to the capability approach, we should mea-
sure and evaluate this impact in terms of how MDRO control measures (negatively) 
influence what they are able to do or be. Building on Nussbaum list of central human 
capabilities, we introduced a taxonomy of normatively relevant capabilities and 
functionings in the context of MDRO. This taxonomy proposes that measures to 
contain the spread of MDRO may potentially affect carriers in one or more of four 
domains human life, namely the personal, social, institutional, and environmental 
domains. We identified eight categories of capabilities – life, bodily health, mental 
health, bodily integrity, affiliation, other species, play, and control over one’s envi-
ronment – that can and should be specified differently within the four domains of 
human life when applied to the context of analyzing how MDRO control measures 
impact the lives of individual carriers. An overview of this taxonomy can be found 
in Table 13.1.
M. F. Byskov et al.
223
The taxonomy, we finally argued, should be used as an ethical input to a decision- 
making framework when deciding on the best measures to take when dealing with 
cases of MDRO. As such, the taxonomy is both underspecified and open-ended: it 
still needs to be expanded and adapted when applied to particular, individual cases 
of MDRO. It does not, by itself, determine when the infringement of a particular 
capability or range of capabilities is unjust and should be supplemented with a 
notion of when the reduction of a carrier’s capability-set provides an overriding 
reason to dismiss a particular control measure.
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Chapter 14
A Capability Perspective on Antibiotic 
Resistance, Inequality, and Child 
Development
Michael Millar
Abstract Nussbaum’s capability theory by drawing attention to multiple determi-
nants of wellbeing provides a rich and relevant evaluative space for framing antibi-
otic resistance. I consider the implications of antibiotic resistance for child 
development and adult capabilities. There are common risk factors for childhood 
growth stunting and the spread of infectious diseases in both antibiotic sensitive and 
resistant forms. The interaction between infectious diseases, antibiotic resistance 
and growth stunting illustrates a clustering of disadvantage. The control of antibi-
otic resistance requires wide-ranging cooperative action. Cooperation is predicated 
on an expectation of equitable access to effective antibiotics. This expectation is 
confounded by inequality both in access to antibiotics, and in the risk that available 
antibiotics will be ineffective. Securing child development (and adult capabilities) 
requires that inequalities both in access to antibiotics and in risk factors for the dis-
semination and transmission of antibiotic resistance are addressed. Inequality 
undermines the cooperative activity that is control of infectious diseases and com-
pounds the threat to the securing of capabilities that arises from antibiotic resistance.
Keywords Antibiotics · Capabilities and growth stunting · Social justice · Mother 
and child health · Infectious Disease
14.1  Introduction
Antibiotic resistance has been framed as a problem consequent on the lack of devel-
opment of new antibiotics and overuse of existing antibiotics. How we frame a 
problem is important in determining our responses to the problem (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981). Unsurprisingly solutions to antibiotic resistance have been 
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focused on developing new antibiotics, and constraining the use of existing antibiot-
ics (see for example http://drive-ab.eu, and https://www.bu.edu/law/faculty-scholar-
ship/carb-x). Yet, new antibiotics and constraints on use of existing antibiotics can 
never be a solution to the potentiation of infectious disease transmission (in antibi-
otic sensitive or resistant forms) consequent on poverty, over-crowding, malnutri-
tion, limited educational opportunity, environmental degradation, poor water 
quality, inadequate sanitation or conflict.
14.2  Capability Theory
Capability theory has been influential in defining measures of human development, 
and quality of life, and in the evaluation of the justice of social arrangements. Sen 
(1999) defined a capability as a ‘substantial freedom he or she enjoys to lead the 
kind of life he or she has reason to value’. Nussbaum emphasises the importance of 
capabilities for human dignity, and derives entitlements from reflecting on the 
requirements for equal dignity and respect. She describes necessary conditions for 
a decently just society, in the form of a set of ten fundamental entitlements for all 
citizens (Nussbaum 2006). More recently capability theory has been applied to chil-
dren (Biggeri et  al. 2011) and child development (Peleg 2013). Nussbaum and 
Dixon (2012) have proposed that capability theory can be used to provide theoreti-
cal justification, and to justify a degree of special state priority for children’s rights – 
based on the ‘unique vulnerability of children to the decisions of others’ (Nussbaum 
and Dixon 2012, p. 575).
Antibiotic resistance has implications for child development, basic capabilities, 
and the securing of adult capabilities. There is on-going debate about the elements 
that should be included in a capabilities list that is appropriate for adults (Wolff and 
De-Shalit 2007) or children (Biggeri and Mehrotra 2011). Children develop in to 
adults, moving through different developmental stages and capabilities at different 
ages. Child development both depends on the capabilities of adult carers, and deter-
mines the potential for adult capabilities. For the purposes of this chapter I have 
accepted the list that Nussbaum proposes as appropriate for adults, and that achieve-
ment of thresholds of adult capabilities is substantially dependent on child develop-
ment. The capabilities listed by Nussbaum (2006, p. 154) encompass life expectancy, 
bodily health & integrity, sense, imagination and thought, emotions, practical rea-
son, affiliation, relations with other species, play and control over one’s environment.
14.3  Infectious Disease and Capabilities
The use of antibiotics can be conceptualised as an attempt to try to prevent damage 
caused by infection to established capabilities (adults) or the potential for capabili-
ties (children). One consequence of the use of antibiotics is antibiotic resistance. 
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The rate at which antibiotic resistance develops is a function of usage, time, control 
measures, and the context of use. The availability of effective treatments for infec-
tious disease is a substantial determinant of health. The interactions between health 
and the determinants of health are complex and not unidirectional, so for example 
health both determines and is determined by nutrition, education, and social status. 
The extent of capability fulfilment can be used to define health, while health is 
required for the fulfilment of capabilities (Venkatapuran 2011, 2013). Uncontrolled 
infectious disease subverts the achievement of adult capabilities through multiple 
pathways including through damage to child development. Damage to the capabili-
ties of adult carers also has consequences for child development.
The control of infectious diseases (antibiotic sensitive and resistant) requires ful-
filment of multiple entitlements. An entitlement to bodily health requires that an 
individual is able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be ade-
quately nourished; and to have adequate shelter. The adequacy of shelter is impor-
tant as a risk factor for the spread of infectious disease, and for damage to child 
development (see for example Shelter 2006). Nutrition influences both child devel-
opment and infectious disease susceptibility (Gough et al. 2014). Maternal repro-
ductive health is an important determinant of child development and vulnerability to 
infectious disease. A capability for senses, imagination, and thought requires educa-
tion. To secure child development we must secure the capabilities of those who care 
for them. Nussbaum and Dixon (2012) emphasise that ‘the goal remains the full 
empowerment of all individuals’ (p. 578). Maternal education is a key element in 
assuring healthy child development (see discussion of growth stunting below). 
Maternal education and parental control of their local environment are necessary 
elements in protecting children from infectious disease. The entitlements to be able 
to play and to have relationships with the world of nature can be qualified by adding 
‘safely’. Children in developing countries may not be able to live and play without 
exposure to the risk of infectious diseases (antibiotic sensitive and resistant) trans-
mitted as a result of poor sanitation, close proximity to animals with zoonotic infec-
tion, and vectors for disease (such as malaria mosquitoes). Infectious disease 
contributes to impairment of child development through multiple pathways includ-
ing growth stunting (discussed further below).
The capabilities listed by Nussbaum remind us of important dimensions of the 
individual experience of infectious disease (such as freedom of movement and 
engagement in social interactions). The entitlement to affiliation requires that an 
individual is able to live for and in relation to others, to recognize and show concern 
for other human beings, and to engage in various forms of social interaction. Bodily 
integrity requires that an individual can move freely from place to place. These last 
two entitlements can be breached by restrictions taken to control the spread of infec-
tious disease (antibiotic sensitive or resistant), and by the social consequences of 
infectious disease, particularly when associated with treatment (antibiotic) resis-
tance (see for example Upshur et al. 2009).
Constraints on freedoms to prescribe, to purchase, to manufacture and formulate, 
to dispose, to pollute, and to use antibiotics for economic gain can all contribute to 
the control of antibiotic resistance. Nussbaum’s approach does not preclude 
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limitations on freedoms with respect to the use of antibiotics. Nussbaum gives 
emphasis to the need to limit freedoms when those freedoms adversely impact on 
the central capabilities. She states that ‘no society that pursues equality or even an 
ample social minimum can avoid curtailing freedom in very many ways, and what 
it ought to say is those freedoms are not good, they are not part of a core group of 
entitlements required by the notion of social justice, and in many ways, indeed, they 
may subvert those core entitlements’ (Nussbaum 2011, p. 73). ‘In other words, all 
societies that pursue a reasonably just political conception have to evaluate human 
freedoms, saying that some are central and some trivial, some good and some 
actively bad, some deserving of special protection and others not’ (Nussbaum 2011, 
pp. 74–75). Framing the actions, constraints and precautions from a capability per-
spective also identifies limits to the precautions that we can take and gives priority 
to actions, which do not undermine capability entitlements. A policy that results in 
a substantial loss of a capability for some can be challenged from a capability per-
spective, even if there was an overall benefit. Stigmatisation, isolation, and segrega-
tion of individuals to prevent the spread of treatment resistant infection (such as 
leprosy historically) would not be consistent with a capability perspective while 
there remain feasible alternative courses of action. The non-availability of effective 
treatments resulting from antibiotic resistance restricts alternative courses of action. 
For much of the twentieth century women with leprosy were actively discouraged 
or prevented from having children. New-born babies of mothers with leprosy were 
taken from their parents at birth, because otherwise the child would also develop 
leprosy (see for example International Leprosy Association, History of Leprosy). 
Capabilities related to childbirth including the opportunities to have and to look 
after a child were removed. Leprosy has now been controlled to a large extent by the 
advent and availability of effective antibiotic treatments.
14.4  Human Dignity and Infectious Disease
An emphasis on the importance of human dignity is a substantial element within 
Nussbaum’s capability theory. There is a lack of consensus on how best to define 
and measure human dignity (Ashcroft 2005). Dignity can be defined positively but 
also negatively as freedom from sources of humiliation (see Shultziner and 
Rabinovici 2011). Nussbaum, while acknowledging that dignity is a poorly defined 
concept, uses human dignity as a touchstone for the selection of capabilities. 
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is a list of positive entitlements (capabilities) that are 
necessary for the living of a life with human dignity. Respect for the dignity of oth-
ers is an important social and political value. Conditions must pertain that reflect 
that value and these include conditions that foster a sense of personal worth in 
each person.
There are strong associations between social status, self-esteem and health 
(Mann 1998; Marmot 2003; Chilton 2006). There are many ways in which dignity 
interacts with infectious diseases. There are common risk factors for violations of 
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dignity and infectious diseases, for example lack of access to safe toilets contributes 
to loss of dignity, gender-based violence, and the transmission of infectious disease 
(see WHO factsheet 392). Inadequate shelter threatens dignity and increases infec-
tious disease risks (Shelter 2006). Some infectious diseases, particularly those that 
are difficult to treat, such as antibiotic resistant tuberculosis, increase the risk that 
the dignity of adults will be violated (Upshur et al. 2009). Children with HIV or 
with a parent with HIV can suffer a substantial loss of self-esteem (Chi and Li 
2014). An individual or group with an infectious disease may suffer from stigmati-
sation, social isolation, and a resultant loss of a sense of self-worth. Social conse-
quences of infection for individuals, groups and institutions also include blame and 
shame (Sontag 1989). Acquisition and carriage of antibiotic resistant bacteria by 
individuals while undergoing healthcare can be associated with stigmatisation 
(Rump et al. 2017). Public health policies designed to support the control of antibi-
otic resistant bacteria can also lead to stigmatisation of individuals (Ploug et  al. 
2015). Violations of dignity and damage to self-esteem can increase infectious dis-
ease risk through changes in human behaviour. Low self-esteem is associated with 
sexual risk taking behaviour and sexually transmitted disease (see Byrnes et  al. 
1999; Ethier et al. 2006).
There are common risk factors for violations of dignity and infectious diseases, 
violations of dignity increase infectious disease risk, and infectious disease increases 
the risk that dignity will be violated.
14.5  Clustering of Disadvantage: The Example 
of Growth Stunting
In discussing actions which lead to the destruction of capabilities Nussbaum states 
that ‘We can certainly agree that capability-destruction in children is a particularly 
grave matter and as such should be off-limits’. ‘Usually situations are not so grave, 
and thus in many such cases the approach has little to say, allowing matters to be 
settled through the political process’ (Nussbaum 2011, p.  27). Unfortunately 
capability- destruction is not unusual in many countries. It is estimated that more 
than 40% of children in lower and middle income countries are at risk of impaired 
development (Black et al. 2016). A period of particular risk to development is that 
between conception and 3 years of age. More than 25% of children <5 years of age 
globally have stunted growth (low height-for-age). Stunting is associated with long- 
term cognitive and physical impairment (Hair et al. 2015; Noble et al. 2015) and 
substantial economic consequences for individuals, communities and countries 
(Horton and Steckel 2013). The WHO Conceptual Framework for stunted growth 
(Stewart et al. 2013) identifies a range of community and societal contextual factors 
underlying the causes of stunting of growth of children. These factors include politi-
cal arrangements, poverty, regulatory frameworks, healthcare systems, beliefs and 
norms, the status of women, access to safe foods, sanitation, population density, and 
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natural and manmade disasters. Solutions require intervention in multiple sectors 
with specific emphasis given to the way in which resources are controlled and dis-
tributed through the political and economic system, food security, education (par-
ticularly of females), water quality, sanitation (and hygiene), ameliorating poverty 
and vulnerability, and access to healthcare (Casanovas et  al. 2013). Nussbaum’s 
capability approach specifies a broad range of entitlements and in so doing is well 
placed to explicitly accommodate these multiple and complex requirements.
Infections are thought to contribute to the pathogenesis of growth stunting and 
infections are both more common and more serious in children with stunting. 
Recently it has been suggested that administration of antibiotics to populations of 
children could be used to prevent stunted growth (Gough et al. 2014). The proposal 
to use antibiotics as a population level intervention to mitigate the risk of stunting 
illustrates the tension between sustaining effective antibiotics while assuring access 
for those in pressing need. Population level antibiotic interventions have profound 
implications for present and future generations particularly when the target popula-
tions live under conditions of relative deprivation that facilitate the spread of agents 
of infection in sensitive and resistant forms. Common risk factors for stunting and 
for the spread of infectious diseases include overcrowding, poor education (particu-
larly maternal), poor nutrition, inadequate sanitation, and poor water quality. 
Capability insufficiencies (such as poor shelter, threats to bodily health, lack of 
access to maternal education) contribute both to the transmission of infectious dis-
ease and to host susceptibility to disease, and potentially to the burden of antibiotic 
resistance. There is a clustering of disadvantage in that infectious disease amplifies 
other disadvantages consequent on capability insufficiencies.
The use of antibiotics in many developed economies has extended beyond the 
treatment and prevention of life-threatening human infections to include the mitiga-
tion of symptoms of self-limiting disease(s), animal husbandry, fish farming, and to 
allow us to extend the range of medical and surgical interventions including those 
with limited health benefits such as some forms of cosmetic surgery. In developed 
countries antibiotics have become a means to a variety of ends, with varying degrees 
of relationship with mitigation of harm to human capabilities. Despite this there is 
evidence that the use of antibiotics in developed countries has stabilised or fallen 
this century (van Boeckel et al. 2014). Most of the recent increase in use of antibiot-
ics has been in rapidly developing countries including Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa (BRICS countries). Holland particularly has shown how it is pos-
sible for developed countries to have low levels of human antibiotic usage and low 
levels of antibiotic resistance associated with patients (http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/
en/activities/surveillance/EARS-Net/Pages/Index.aspx). By contrast antibiotic 
resistance is more prevalent now in developing countries with high levels of depri-
vation than in developed countries (WHO Report 2014). This situation probably 
reflects the capacity of countries to expend resources on trying to assure socio- 
economic conditions (and capability entitlements) such as education, health, nutri-
tion, sanitation, and housing which are significant determinants of the epidemiology 
of infectious disease. An oft-quoted example of this relationship is that of tubercu-
losis. The incidence of tuberculosis (TB) and the requirement to treat TB has 
M. Millar
231
declined dramatically over recent decades in developed countries and this decline 
has been attributed to improvements in socio-economic conditions (Comstock 
2000). By contrast with developed countries such as Holland the context of use of 
antibiotics in low to middle income countries frequently involves heightened condi-
tions for the spread of infectious diseases both in antibiotic sensitive and resis-
tant forms.
Antibiotic resistance considered from within a capability perspective draws 
attention to the importance of the social, political and economic context in deter-
mining infectious disease risks. Antibiotic resistance threatens to place an addi-
tional burden on communities where growth stunting and infection are already 
prevalent, because many of the risk factors for growth stunting also determine the 
risk that antibiotic resistance will spread. Capabilities may be incommensurable but 
capabilities still interact with each other in contributing to a state of wellbeing. In 
the real world these interactions may lead to clustering of disadvantage (Wolff and 
De-Shalit 2007). The interaction of infection with growth stunting in children illus-
trates the clustering of disadvantage and the importance of addressing the broad 
range of capability deficiencies. Otherwise preventable childhood stunting has the 
potential to persist alongside burgeoning levels of antibiotic resistance.
14.6  Capability Thresholds and Inequality?
‘The basic claim of my account of social justice is this: respect for human dignity 
requires that citizens be placed above an ample threshold of capability in all ten of 
those areas’ (Nussbaum 2011, p. 36). In this section I ask if capability thresholds 
can be achieved while there remains avoidable and substantial inequality in access 
to effective antibiotics and in the determinants of infectious disease. Inequality can 
be and often is harmful to human wellbeing (Picket and Wilkinson 2010). Our sense 
of self-worth, our social status, our wellbeing and inequalities are intertwined 
(Marmot 2003, 2005). Thresholds of capability may not achievable while substan-
tial inequalities remain. Wolff and De-Shalit (2007, p. 10) define a society of equals 
as one in which ‘disadvantages do not cluster, where there is no clear answer to the 
question of who is the worst off’. Certainly countries are not equal partners and 
neither are individuals within countries, when account is taken of the burdens of 
infectious disease – as exemplified by the contrasting patterns of child development 
and the clustering of disadvantage.
There is inequality in access to effective antibiotics (Laxminarayan et al. 2016). 
Pneumonia is still responsible for 1 in 5 deaths of children less than five years old 
in the world today. Ensuring access of children with pneumonia to antibiotics has 
been a major objective of the WHO and UNICEF over the last decade (WHO 2013). 
There is also inequality in the risk of acquisition of antibiotic resistant bacteria. 
There is increasing evidence of extensive environmental contamination with antibi-
otics and antibiotic resistant bacteria (Lubbert et al. 2017), particularly from antibi-
otic manufacturing plants, from use of antibiotics in meat production, from hospitals 
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and urban conurbations (Berendonk et al. 2015). There is increasing use of antibiot-
ics to support animal meat production even in countries with high levels of child-
hood growth stunting (see Centre for Science and Environment Report 2014). It is 
estimated that by 2030 the use of antibiotics in livestock production in the US and 
China will account for 40% of global antibiotic use (Van Boeckel et  al. 2015). 
Antibiotic resistant bacteria, selected in humans and animals, are shared through 
environmental pollution with both those who can and those who cannot afford to eat 
meat. Often those with less or no access to antibiotics live in conditions, which 
promote the spread of antibiotic resistance. These differences are particularly strong 
in countries where some live in relative affluence in close proximity to slums. Those 
who are better off have access to the best medical advice, diagnostics for antibiotic 
resistance, and the latest treatments including antibiotics. When antibiotic resistant 
bacteria contaminate the environment of people with inadequate sanitation, poor 
education and with a heightened susceptibility to disease then spread is facilitated. 
Contamination of the Ganges provides a specific example. While the rich can afford 
cremation on the Ganges, and pilgrimage to the upper Ganges, the poor cannot. The 
water of the Ganges has become highly polluted with antibiotic resistant bacteria 
including a particularly worrying form of antibiotic resistance called New Delhi 
Metallo-β-lactamase (NDM-1) (Ahammad et al. 2014). Poor people use the water 
of the Ganges for recreation, washing, and drinking. Poor people with limited access 
to medical care or antibiotics are exposed to extreme forms of antibiotic resistance 
through day-to-day activities, with implications for the efficacy of antibiotics, their 
health and for the health of those around them. There is inequality in the risk of 
acquisition of antibiotic resistance as well as inequality in access to effective antibi-
otics (see Note 1).
14.7  International Cooperation, Unequal Partners
Currently the majority of countries collaborate on the control of infectious diseases. 
One hundred and ninety-six countries have signed up to the International Health 
Regulations (2005) (developed after the SARS outbreak in 2003), which are 
designed to control the international spread of infectious disease. The control of 
epidemic diseases is included in the United Nations Rights Document A/6316 
(1996). Over recent years antibiotic resistance has become a focus of international 
concern. The World Health Organisation (2015) has developed an action plan for 
antimicrobial resistance, which recognises the need for international collaboration 
(for example see Section 21 (4), Global Action Plan). There is also broad accep-
tance in the scientific literature (see for example Institute of Medicine 2010) that 
control of antibiotic resistance requires international cooperative action.
Unequal relationships between countries can subvert cooperation. For example 
Indonesia has had outbreaks of avian influenza, which have been associated with 
high mortality, yet withdrew from cooperation with the WHO Global Influenza 
Surveillance Network (GISN) in 2007. The position from the Indonesian 
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perspective is described in a journal article as follows – ‘Indonesia believes that the 
world must work in unity against the H5N1 virus infection…. The work must be 
conducted side by side with mutual trust, transparency and equity as global citizens 
professionals, taking into consideration the elements of human dignity and solidar-
ity.’ ‘The avian influenza case in Indonesia has demonstrated once again the unre-
solved imbalance between the affluent ‘high-tech’ countries and poor 
agriculture- based countries. Countries that are the hardest hit by a disease must also 
bear the burden of the cost of the vaccine, therapeutics and other products, while the 
monetary and non-monetary benefits of these products go to the manufacturers that 
are mostly in the industrialised countries’ (Sedyaningsih et  al. 2008, p.  487). 
Indonesia and other resource poor countries were expected to participate in cooper-
ating in the control of infectious disease, yet there was a belief that the benefits of 
cooperation were unequally distributed. Subsequently an agreement was reached 
which stipulated arrangements for more equitable cooperative arrangements (World 
Health Assembly 2011).
Another example of an unequal international relationship that relates more 
directly to the control of antibiotic resistance arises from the Kumarasamy et al. 
report in 2010 that New Delhi Metallo-β-lactamase-1 was widespread in India. The 
Indian government considered this name to be ‘unfair’ and stigmatising, and poten-
tially undermined the burgeoning health tourist market in India (see Pandey 2010). 
The Editor of the Lancet subsequently described the use of this name as an error and 
apologized stating that the name had ‘unnecessarily stigmatised a single country 
and city’ (Sinhal 2011). This interaction has compromised research on the epidemi-
ology of NDM-1 in India according to the lead author of the Lancet report (Tim 
Walsh), who named this form of resistance NDM-1. He stated that ‘We were banned 
from India and India had a massive clampdown on sending (biological) strains out’ 
(Sugden 2013). Health tourism is developing fast in India and the stigma associated 
with the potential acquisition of antibiotic resistant bacteria was characterised by 
Indian politicians as an international plot to undermine that development. 
Unfortunately NDM1 is now globally distributed (Berrazeg et al. 2014). Conflict 
between the Lancet and the Indian government over health policy has continued 
(Sinhal 2015).
This second story illustrates aspects of the epidemiology of antibiotic resistance. 
When social conditions are poor then antibiotics quickly become ineffective, antibi-
otic resistant bacteria can be rapidly spread around the world, and there is a relation-
ship between the sustaining of the functions of antibiotics and other socio-economic 
‘goods’ such as adequate shelter, and clean water. This example also illustrates a 
relationship between antibiotic resistance, and stigma, which can undermine coop-
eration in the control of antibiotic resistance. There is considerable inequality in the 
international influence of the biomedical press with a bias towards developed coun-
tries with a strong research base. Combinations of economic inequality, antibiotic 
prescribing practice norms, and publication practice have marked out India in a way 
that adds additional disadvantage in a competitive global market for medical 
tourism.
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14.8  A Relational Approach to Capability Inequality
Nussbaum argues that a contractualist account (such as that proposed by Scanlon 
1998) based on individuals as moral equals ‘is a powerful intuitive way of capturing 
the idea that human beings are moral equals despite their widely differing circum-
stances in an unequal world’ (Nussbaum 2006, p.  272). Nussbaum states that ‘I 
employ the notion of reasonable rejection, or something very close to it, in articulat-
ing my account of political justification’ (Nussbaum 2011, p. 89). Her approach ‘is 
a partial account of specifically political entitlements’ (Nussbaum 2011, p. 96).
Scanlon provides an account of why and when we can reject both distributive and 
non-distributive inequalities (see Scanlon 2003, 2013) which can be applied to 
Nussbaum’s evaluative capability framework. Reasonable rejection and justification 
to others provide the substantial focus of Scanlon’s contractualist approach (Scanlon 
1998) (for more discussion of Scanlon’s approach see Note 2). Interactions between 
individuals and groups determine the epidemiology of infectious diseases. Human 
relations directly or indirectly have a substantial role in the spread of infectious 
diseases. In addition many of the transactions that determine the use of antibiotics 
and the consequences of use involve individuals, institutions and nations in dia-
logue. Examples include healthcare workers (such as doctors) agreeing treatment 
plans with patients, or healthcare authorities and institutions agreeing antibiotic 
policies within nations, or nations agreeing approaches to international collabora-
tion on the control of antibiotic resistance. Justification is a key element to these 
relational interactions and it seems intuitively attractive to start from an acknowl-
edgement of the importance of justification in assuring the validity of principles and 
agreements. Another attractive feature of Scanlon’s approach is a concern with 
assuring the conditions for self-worth. This is significant both in relation to the epi-
demiology of infectious disease (as previously discussed) and in relation to a con-
cern with assuring the conditions for a life with human dignity (a substantial concern 
for Nussbaum’s capability theory) (Fitzpatrick 2008).
For Scanlon everyone counts morally, regardless of race, gender, or where they 
live. The different reasons for rejecting inequalities are dependent ‘on the way that 
an inequality affects or arises from the relations between individuals’ (see Scanlon 
lecture – Why does inequality matter?). Reasons for rejecting inequalities ‘presup-
pose some form of relationship or interaction between unequal parties’ and are 
based on comparing the differences in the situations of individuals (Scanlon 
(2004) lecture – When does equality matter?). For Scanlon (2006) reasonable rejec-
tion does not depend on rejection of the distribution of goods, but rather it depends 
on assuring equal respect and fairness. Nussbaum’s capability theory provides an 
evaluative framework for the extent to which equal respect and fairness are achieved, 
without being itself a complete theory of distributive justice.
Scanlon argues that ‘relief of suffering, avoidance of stigmatising differences in 
status, prevention of domination by others, and the preservation of conditions of 
procedural fairness are basic and important moral values’ (Scanlon 2003, p. 218) 
that can give reason to reject inequalities. Inequalities can also be rejected when 
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there are institutional obligations to provide certain benefits in an even-handed way, 
or ‘cases in which individuals, as participants in a cooperative endeavour, have at 
least a prima facie claim to an equal share of the goods which that endeavour pro-
duces’ (Scanlon 2013, p. 463). The control of antibiotic resistance is a cooperative 
exercise. Cooperation is predicated on an expectation of a share in access to effec-
tive antibiotics. Importantly the scope of these reasons for rejection of inequalities 
extends beyond national boundaries (for a fuller discussion see O’Neill 2013).
14.9  Inequalities Subvert Capabilities
Inequalities can lead to substantial disadvantage, furthering inequalities in a com-
petitive world, and cluster to give multiple disadvantages. Inequalities can result in 
stigmatising differences in status, both at the level of the individual and the state as 
shown by the example of NDM-1 antibiotic resistance described above. Inequalities 
in access to antibiotics coexist with inequalities in risk factors for infection, and risk 
factors for antibiotic resistance. These inequalities can and do contribute to social, 
political and economic disadvantage, as exemplified by the interactions between 
childhood growth stunting, infectious diseases and antibiotic access.
Wealth determines access to healthcare, medicines (including antibiotics) and 
healthy living conditions. The less wealthy in many countries have less access to 
high quality medicines, little access to medical advice, or diagnostic facilities, often 
live under conditions that may facilitate the spread of antibiotic resistant bacteria, 
may be exposed to resistant bacteria even before exposure to antibiotics, and are 
more at risk of infection, and of the serious consequences from infection. Securing 
child development requires control of infectious diseases in treatment sensitive and 
resistant forms. There is an unequal distribution of childhood burdens and benefits 
associated with antibiotics and antibiotic resistance both within and between coun-
tries. These inequalities contribute to avoidable suffering (preventable infectious 
disease), differences in status (growth stunting), and potentially domination of vul-
nerable children by others. Inequalities subvert the achievement of capability 
thresholds.
14.10  Addressing Inequalities, Achieving 
Capability Thresholds
Control of antibiotic resistance is a cooperative enterprise with shared objectives 
and shared responsibilities. Countries cooperate in the control of infectious disease 
including antibiotic-resistant agents of infection. If we accept that all of the parties 
engaged in the control of antibiotic resistance should have an equal prima facie 
claim to access to effective antibiotics then when inequalities exist we can ask if 
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those inequalities can be justified – ‘basic structures need to be justified to all who 
are asked to accept them’ (Scanlon lecture – Why Does Inequality Matter?) (see 
Note 3).
Developed countries have used antibiotics for much longer and in much larger 
quantities and for a wider range of reasons than most developing nations. India is 
subject to criticism for insufficient regulation of antibiotic prescribing. Yet, even by 
2010, India used half the number of antibiotic units per person compared with the 
USA (Laxminarayan and Chaudhury 2016). Historically while new antibiotics were 
regularly coming to the market there was no commercial motivation to constrain 
antibiotic use because antibiotic resistance was a major justification for using the 
new antibiotic(s). The profits from antibiotic sales were largely accrued by compa-
nies based in the developed world. Marketing decisions were dominated by consid-
eration of profit maximisation with a relatively low priority given to public health. 
The United Nations has accepted that developed nations should take up a greater 
part of the responsibility for the control of greenhouse gases than developing coun-
tries. ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ (UNFCCC 2015) are justified 
because there are differences in capacity to respond, different priorities, and differ-
ences in the historical contribution to the problem of greenhouse gas emissions 
between developed and developing countries. These differences also apply to anti-
biotic resistance.
In the World Health Assembly Global Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance 
(2015) Section 21. (3) Access states that ‘The aim to preserve the ability to treat 
serious infections requires both equitable access to, and appropriate use of, existing 
and new antimicrobial medicines’. Currently despite the high level of international 
concern there is no international agreement as to what constitutes ‘appropriate’ use 
of antibiotics. Equitable access is a long way away when account is taken of the lack 
of access to antibiotics for the treatment of life-threatening infection in many parts 
of the world while antibiotics are used extensively without human health benefit in 
many other parts of the world. I have previously argued that appropriate use is that 
which prevents some substantial risk of irretrievable harm in patients or their con-
tacts, where a substantial risk is a level of risk which exceeds the range of risks of 
irretrievable harm that we tolerate in our day to day lives (Millar 2012). Use of 
antibiotics to support (non-human) animal growth promotion is inappropriate use. 
Use of antibiotics for animal growth promotion has been reported to be increasing 
in both developed and developing countries (Van Boeckel et al. 2015), including in 
areas where human growth stunting is particularly prevalent such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In developing countries people are more likely to live in close proximity to 
animals, so that the risks that antibiotic resistant bacteria will spread from animals, 
and that people will be exposed to antibiotics present in their environment, is 
increased compared with developed countries where the close proximity of farm 
animals with people is less common. It is strikingly inappropriate for many children 
to have limited access to antibiotics while antibiotics are being used as animal 
growth promoters. Developed countries should take a lead in limiting use of antibi-
otics as animal growth promoters.
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The UN has given a substantial place to human dignity in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (UN 2014). These goals include improvements in education, 
housing, nutrition, water quality, and sanitation. The scope for international action 
on antibiotic resistance includes the amelioration of the conditions that potentiate 
the need for antibiotics and the spread of resistant forms of agents of infection. 
Improving living conditions (including housing), nutrition, education (for example 
with respect to risk factors for disease), and other determinants of human dignity 
such as female empowerment have been shown to reduce the risk of stunting, but 
these are also important factors in the control of infectious disease transmission and 
potentially antibiotic resistance. Achieving UN Development Goals (assuming that 
fairly and honestly set – see Hickel 2017) for 2030 would do much to mitigate the 
risk factors for both stunting and the transmission of agents of infection in both 
antibiotic sensitive and resistant forms.
14.11  Conclusions
Nussbaum’s capability theory (Nussbaum 2006) provides a rich and relevant evalu-
ative space for framing antibiotic resistance. Securing child development and adult 
capabilities requires that we address inequalities in access, regulate ‘appropriate 
prescribing’, and clarify responsibilities for addressing inequalities in risk factors 
for the dissemination and transmission of antibiotic resistance. Historical and cur-
rent patterns of antibiotic use impose a burden of responsibility on developed coun-
tries to ensure that their own use is appropriate, and raise questions with respect to 
the responsibilities of developed countries to address risk factors for antibiotic resis-
tant infection in developing countries. Antibiotics and antibiotic resistant bacteria 
pollute the environment (particularly when sanitation standards are poor) – com-
pounding the inequality and disadvantage of those without equivalent access to 
effective antibiotics. Inequality undermines the cooperative activity that is control 
of infectious diseases and compounds the threat to the securing of child develop-
ment and adult capabilities that comes from antibiotic resistance.
Note 1
There is some empirical evidence that European countries with more income 
inequality have higher levels of antibiotic resistance than those with less inequality 
(Kirby and Herbert 2013). Lack of access to high quality data makes this relation-
ship difficult to study more generally.
Note 2
For Scanlon, reasons are facts (Scanlon 2014, p. 30, note 20), natural (e.g., that you 
will enjoy some activity) or normative (e.g., a law’s being unjust or your having 
reason to go on living; Scanlon 2014, p. 32). These facts are an essential part of a 
relation to an agent: consideration (or fact) p is a reason for x to do a in circum-
stances c. ‘Is a reason for’ is a four-place relation, R(p, x, c, a) (pp. 31, 37). For 
Scanlon there are cases where the relative strength of reasons is derived from the 
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relative amounts of something (such as capabilities), even so he considers it to be a 
mistake to consider that there must inevitably be a quantitative property which 
determines the relative strength of reasons (p. 110). ‘The strength of a reason is an 
essentially comparative notion, understood only in relation to other particular rea-
sons’ (p. 111). When we judge that certain considerations provide conclusive rea-
sons for (or against) certain actions in certain circumstances, justification comes our 
understanding of a relationship with other rational beings that we have reason to 
want, specifically, the relationship of seeing them as beings to whom justification is 
owed (p. 115). Scanlon acknowledges that ‘when we are assessing the justifiability 
of moral principles we must have reason to appeal to things that individuals have 
reason to want, and that many of these are things that contribute to well-being intui-
tively understood.’ However, ‘we cannot delimit the range of considerations that 
figure in justification by defining the boundaries of well-being’ (Scanlon 1998, 
p. 140; see Putnam 2008).
Note 3
Scanlon emphasises the importance of probabilities in determining the degree of 
effort that we make to control risks. ‘The probability that a form of conduct will 
cause harm can be relevant not as a factor diminishing the ‘complaint’ of the affected 
parties (discounting the harm by the likelihood of their suffering it) but rather as an 
indicator of the care that the agent has to take to avoid causing harm’. Scanlon states 
that ‘..the cost of avoiding all behaviour that involves risk of harm would be unac-
ceptable. Our idea of ‘reasonable precautions’ defines the level of care that we think 
can be demanded: a principle that demanded more than this would be too confining, 
and could reasonably be rejected on that ground’ (Scanlon 1998, p. 209 & pp. 235–6; 
see Kumar 2016). Scanlon’s emphasis on reasons allows the inclusion of morally 
salient considerations such as responsibility and fairness (Scanlon 1998, p. 243). 
‘Responsibility of an agent for wrongful conduct, responsibility for creating a situ-
ation that gives reason to break a promise, responsibility for engaging in risky con-
duct that leads to harm and responsibility for misfortune that puts one in need of aid’ 
(Scanlon 1998, p.  244) are all morally salient considerations. The question that 
arises is ‘who has responsibility for ‘reasonable precautions’ when it comes to anti-
biotic resistance in developing countries’, and what is reasonable?
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Chapter 15
Fairness in the Use of Information About 
Carriers of Resistant Infections
John G. Francis and Leslie P. Francis
Abstract One standard menu of approaches to the prevalence of anti-microbial 
resistance diseases is to enhance surveillance, fund research to develop new antimi-
crobials, and educate providers and patients to reduce unnecessary antimicrobial 
use. The primarily utilitarian reasoning behind this menu is unstable, however, if it 
fails to take fairness into account. This chapter develops an account of the fair uses 
of information gained in public health surveillance. We begin by sketching informa-
tion needs and gaps in surveillance. We then demonstrate how analysis of informa-
tion uses is incomplete if viewed from the perspectives of likely vectors of disease 
who may be subjects of fear and stigma and likely victims who may be coerced into 
isolation or quarantine. Next, we consider aspects of fairness in the use of informa-
tion in non-ideal circumstances: inclusive participation in decisions about informa-
tion use, resource plans for those needing services, and assurances of reciprocal 
support. Fairness in information use recognizes the ineluctable twinning of victims 
and vectors in the face of serious pandemic disease.
Keywords Fairness · Data use · Privacy · Surveillance
As many chapters in this volume emphasize, the prevalence of anti-microbial resis-
tant diseases and the comparative paucity of available treatments presents a public 
health crisis. One standard menu of approaches to this crisis is to enhance surveil-
lance to gain information needed to identify potential disease vectors and to ascer-
tain likely modes of transmission; to fund research to develop new treatments and 
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antimicrobials; and to intervene through education, treatment, and careful steward-
ship of the existing antimicrobials that retain some efficacy. This combination of 
approaches is founded primarily in utilitarian reasoning, attempting to achieve the 
best possible mitigation of the current crisis in the hopes that effective new treat-
ment methods may soon become available.
Such utilitarian reasoning is not entirely stable in practice, however. On the one 
hand, when the prospects of exposure to untreatable and potentially fatal disease 
appear imminent, fear may become the overriding reaction to those who are identi-
fied as ill. The result may be forms of coercion against people suspected of being 
vectors of disease that appear prudential in the short term but that are insufficiently 
grounded in science and potentially counter-productive in the longer term. People 
may hide to avoid disclosure and deleterious consequences of over-regulation may 
lead to under-regulation. Recent examples include demands to compel isolation of 
people believed to have been exposed to Ebola or for banning travel from regions 
where outbreaks of conditions such as Ebola or Zika have been identified. On the 
other hand, concerns for victims may generate outpourings of resources for treat-
ment, calls for investment in public health resources in underserved areas, and 
renewed emphasis on privacy protections. These too may be counterproductive if 
they result in confusion and waste of resources or multiple conflicting strategies. 
The upshot may be policies that oscillate between treating people as vectors and 
treating them as victims but without significant or coordinated progress against the 
problem of resistance.
Each of these perspectives—victim-hood and vector-hood—is morally impor-
tant. But in our judgment analysis that is limited to these perspectives is incomplete 
in its failure to take certain considerations of fairness into account. Our specific 
focus here is the use of information, but similar points could be made about other 
types of resources as well. Collection, uses, and access to information, we contend 
in what follows, must be rooted in the effort to make progress against serious public 
health problems in a manner that is reasonably fair under the circumstances. This 
requires not only concern for people as victims and vectors but concerns about how 
the impact of policies are distributed and foster cooperative connections in both the 
shorter and the longer term.
15.1  The Important Roles of Information
Traditional public health surveillance methods are both individual and population 
based. Where particular individuals are concerned, the role of information is pri-
marily to enable strategies to interrupt disease transmission. Case identification, 
case reporting, contact tracing, treatment if possible, and education and intervention 
if needed to prevent transmission come to the fore. At every stage, information is 
critical. If individuals with transmissible disease are unknown or cannot be located, 
efforts to interrupt transmission will fail. Efforts will also fail if information is not 
transmitted to those who are capable of acting, whether they be authorities 
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designated to enforce quarantine or isolation or health care personnel equipped to 
offer treatment or prophylaxis. Education requires information, too, about where to 
direct educational efforts and what these efforts might contain. Importantly, if peo-
ple who might suffer exposures are insufficiently informed about the likelihood and 
seriousness of contagion and the need for precautions, they may unwittingly become 
infected vectors as well as victims themselves. Such was the case for health care 
workers during the SARS epidemic of 2003 and for many during the Ebola epi-
demic of 2014.
Information gleaned in population-level surveillance plays many additional 
important roles in addressing the problem of anti-microbial resistance. A longstand-
ing recommendation of the WHO, codified in the World Health Regulations that 
entered into force in 2007 in article 44, is international cooperation in the develop-
ment of surveillance capacities for the identification of potential global health emer-
gencies of international concern (WHO 2005). Surveillance can help to identify 
rates of incidence and prevalence of resistant disease. Testing samples can yield 
information about histories and patterns of disease spread. Samples also can be used 
to identify biological characteristics of resistant infectious agents that may be help-
ful in developing methods of treatment or identifying new anti-microbial agents.
Population level surveillance can be targeted to identifying the incidence and 
prevalence of resistant disease in particular geographical areas. Gonorrhea is an 
example. There were 78.3 million estimated new cases of gonorrhea worldwide in 
2012; the highest number occurred in low-income areas of the western Pacific. 
Resistant disease has become increasingly prevalent, especially in these areas and 
among groups such as sex workers and truck drivers (Unemo et al. 2017). Extensively 
drug-resistant (XDR) gonorrhea cases also have appeared in Spain and in France, 
although these strains do not appear to have spread, possibly because they are less 
hardy and so less likely to be passed on. However, significant resistance may not be 
detected because of “suboptimal antimicrobial resistance surveillance in many set-
tings” (Unemo et al. 2017). A recent international panel reviewing resistant gonor-
rhea recommends strategies of case management, partner notification, screening 
(especially of sex workers and men having sex with men), and evidence-based treat-
ment (Unemo et al. 2017); these recommendations are based on surveillance data.
Population-level surveillance information may also be useful in identifying risks 
associated with providing humanitarian treatment. Over 30,000 young people 
wounded in the Libyan civil war that began in 2011 were evacuated elsewhere for 
treatment. Concerns arose that many of these patients were recognized to carry with 
them resistant organisms—thus bringing along with their needs for treatment risks 
to other patients being treated in the host facilities (Zorgani and Ziglam 2013). 
Institutions accepting these patients were informed of this risk so that they could 
take appropriate precautions. Libya itself was identified as a region with high preva-
lence of resistant organisms, despite the limited surveillance capacities in that 
conflict- torn nation. Recommendations included improving surveillance in Libya—
which lacks a national surveillance system—and implementation of infection pre-
vention measures in Libyan hospitals.
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Surveillance is also used to identify practices that might contribute to the devel-
opment of resistance. Use of antimicrobials in agriculture is one area of inquiry, 
although its precise contribution to the problem is not easy to quantify (e.g. Hoelzer 
et  al. 2017). There have been many studies of problematic prescribing practices 
among physicians in the US (Wigton et  al. 2008), Europe (e.g. Jørgensen et  al. 
2013), Asia (Lam and Lam 2003), and elsewhere (Trap and Hansen 2002), along 
with efforts to educate physicians about appropriate antimicrobial use.
Ever since the recognition grew that crowds celebrating the return of soldiers 
from World War I had created a ready opportunity for transmission of the Spanish 
influenza, epidemiologists have observed the potential health risks of large gather-
ings that concentrate people together, even for brief periods of time. Examples 
include music festivals, major sporting competitions, other large festivals, and reli-
gious gatherings such as the Hajj or other pilgrimages. The largest estimated gather-
ing is the periodic Kumbh Mela pilgrimage in which Hindus come together to bathe 
in a sacred river such as the Ganges; over 40 million people, drawn largely from the 
Indian subcontinent but increasingly international, attend the event (Gautret and 
Steffen 2016). The largest annual gathering of pilgrims is the Hajj at Mecca which 
draws over two million people; the Fifth Pillar of Islam is the obligation to under-
take the once in a lifetime journey for those who can physically or financially afford 
to do so. With such great numbers of people together for sustained periods of time, 
there is a risk of disease outbreaks and the spread of resistant infections. Such events 
may strain existing sanitation systems or health care facilities if people become ill. 
Crowding and inadequate facilities contribute to the potential for disease outbreaks 
(Gautret and Steffen 2016). These events draw people from around the globe and 
thus may result in the international spread of disease (Gautret and Steffen 2016).
At the same time, many of these events are of great cultural importance and sup-
pression of them is neither a realistic nor a desirable option. There have been exten-
sive discussions of how to address the public health needs of the great numbers of 
people who undertake pilgrimages or who attend other events that draw great num-
bers of people together. Vaccination may create herd immunities that reduce risks of 
disease transmission; for example, for this year’s Hajj the Saudi Arabian govern-
ment is requiring proof of a quadrivalent Meningococcal vaccination in order to 
receive a visa (Ministry of Hajj 2017). Nonetheless, risks may remain significant for 
conditions that cannot currently be addressed by vaccination or that are difficult to 
treat, such as Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) or resis-
tant infections. Information too is critical: such well-attended events require imagi-
native and thoughtful surveillance that informs short-term medical care. Because 
Saudi Arabia has had the largest number of human cases of MERS-CoV—an esti-
mated 80% (WHO 2017b)—travelers for this year’s Hajj are being warned to take 
extra precautions with respect to sanitation and personal hygiene measures such as 
handwashing or avoiding direct contact with non-human animals (New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017).
Still other social factors may contribute to the development of resistant disease 
that can be identified through surveillance. Given the difficulties for women in 
Saudi Arabia to see physicians without being escorted, it is understandable that in 
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Saudi Arabia many community pharmacies will dispense antibiotics without a pre-
scription. Zowasi (2016) recommends addressing these issues by increased educa-
tion especially through social media as to the best approach to respond to the risk of 
anti-microbial resistant organism.
Still other recommendations about information use involve research on the 
development of new forms of antimicrobials. According to the most recent review 
article (Butler et  al. 2017), antibiotics “are dramatically undervalued by society, 
receiving a fraction of the yearly revenue per patient generated by next-generation 
anticancer drugs.” They are in the judgment of these authors an “endangered spe-
cies,”—but there is some faint encouraging news. WHO and a number of national 
governments have recently begun to direct attention to the potential threat of resis-
tance and lack of new drugs. Since 2000, five new-in-class antibiotics have been 
marketed, but these unfortunately only target gram-positive organisms not the 
gram-negative organisms that are likely to be resistant. Other compounds are also in 
various stages of the process of clinical trials, but these too are more likely to be 
active against gram-positive bacteria. In the judgment of the authors of this review 
article, “the acute positive trend of new approvals masks a chronic underlying mal-
aise in antibiotic discovery and development.” Interest in antibiotic development is 
more likely to be present in smaller biotech companies and in biotech companies 
located in Europe. The authors conclude: “The only light on the horizon is the con-
tinued increase in public and political awareness of the issue.” They also observe 
that with the retrenchment in investment, “we potentially face a generational knowl-
edge gap” and drug development “is now more important than ever.”
To address this perilous juncture in antimicrobial research, the Pew Charitable 
Trust convened a scientific expert group in 2016. The premise of the group was that 
regulatory challenges, scientific barriers, and diminishing economic returns have 
led drug companies largely to abandon antibiotic research—yet antimicrobial resis-
tance is accelerating. No entirely new classes of antibiotics useful against resistant 
organisms have been brought to market that are not derivatives of classes developed 
before 1984—over 30 years ago. The Pew report advances many explanations for 
this dismal situation, including importantly the lack of coordinated investment in 
the relevant basic and translational research. One aspect of the report detailed the 
major role played by information gaps. Published research is out of date and out of 
print. Moreover, in today’s world of investment in drug discovery, “creating an envi-
ronment in which data exchange and knowledge sharing are the status quo will be 
difficult given proprietary concerns and the variety of information types and for-
mats, which may range from historical data to new findings produced as part of this 
research effort.” The Pew consensus is that the following forms of information shar-
ing are needed: a review of what is known about compounds that effectively pene-
trate gram-negative bacteria, a searchable catalogue of chemical matter including an 
ongoing list of promising antibacterial compounds, information on screening assays 
and conditions tested, and an informational database of available biological and 
physicochemical data. Mechanisms must also be developed for sharing drug discov-
ery knowledge in the area (Pew, pp. 19–20).
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In line with Pew, a European antimicrobial resistance project suggests that 
research is seriously underfunded (Kelly et al. 2015). This group argues that the 
bulk of the publicly funded research is in therapeutics (63%); among the remainder, 
14% of the research was on transmission and only 3% specifically on surveillance. 
This group also concluded that research is not coordinated and there is little atten-
tion to data sharing or sharing of research results. Funding is fragmented, too, with 
many smaller grants addressing smaller projects independently rather than in a way 
that builds. This group summarizes: “to conclude, investment at present might not 
correspond with the burden of antibacterial resistance and the looming health, 
social, and economic threat it poses on the treatment of infections and on medicine 
in general. Antibacterial resistance clearly warrants increased and new investment 
from a range of sources, but improved coordination and collaboration with more 
informed resource allocation are needed to make a true impact. Hopefully, this anal-
ysis will prompt nations to pay due consideration to the existing research landscape 
when considering future investments.”
Additional recommendations from other groups include novel methods for man-
agement of resistant disease, such as addressing the intestinal microbiome (e.g. 
Bassetti et al. 2017); these methods, too, may be furthered by surveillance informa-
tion as well as information about individual patients.
Analysis of these uses of information from the perspective of vector or victim 
are, we now argue, incomplete.
15.2  The Vector Perspective
When contagious diseases are serious or highly likely to be fatal and treatments for 
them are limited at best, fear is understandable. Fear may be magnified if the disease 
is poorly understood, especially until modes of transmission have been identified. 
Fear may also be magnified if there are no known effective treatments for the dis-
ease, as may be the case for extremely drug resistant infections. It is therefore 
understandable that proposals may come to the fore that emphasize isolation of 
those who are known to be infected, quarantine of those who have been exposed, or 
travel bans from areas of known disease outbreaks. Proposals may even include 
criminalization of those who knowingly or even negligently take risks of infect-
ing others.
All of these possibilities and more were features of the HIV epidemic. Even as 
understanding of the disease grew and effective treatment became increasingly 
available, some of these remain. Criminalization of HIV transmission has not 
waned, despite the many objections raised to it (e.g. Francis and Francis 2013a, b). 
Although the US ended its immigration ban on HIV+ individuals in 2010, concerns 
remain about the risks of undiagnosed infections among immigrant populations in 
the U.S. (Winston and Beckwith 2011) and some countries (for example, Singapore) 
continue to ban entry for HIV+ travelers planning stays over thirty days (The Global 
Database 2017).
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As epidemic fears have waxed and waned over recent decades, so have impera-
tives for identifying vectors and constraining their activities. These patterns have 
been apparent for avian influenza, SARS, Ebola, and Zika, among others. The US 
still bars entry by non-citizens with a list of conditions including active TB, infec-
tious syphilis, gonorrhea, infectious leprosy, and other conditions designated by 
Presidential Executive order such as plague or hemorrhagic fevers (CDC 2017).
Indeed, resistant TB has been a frequent illustration of the vector perspective in 
operation. Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis is transmissible, difficult to treat, and 
poses a significant public health problem. Its presence can be identified by methods 
such as testing of sputum samples. When patients are identified with resistant dis-
ease, public health authorities may seek to compel treatment or isolation, especially 
for patients judged unreliable about compliance with treatment. To avoid transmis-
sion, public health authorities have proposed isolating patients who have been iden-
tified as infected. Because a course of treatment for TB may take many months—and 
failure to complete the full course may increase the likelihood of resistant disease—
isolation may continue for long periods of time. Controversially, during the early 
1990s public health officials in New York isolated over 200 patients identified with 
MDR TB on Roosevelt Island for treatment out of concern that they would be non- 
compliant with treatment even when they were unlikely to infect others (Coker 2001).
Perhaps one of the most highly publicized events involving a single patient was 
the odyssey of Andrew Speaker, a lawyer believed to have extremely resistant TB 
who eluded authorities as he took airplane flights around the globe in the effort to 
return home. Speaker’s journey created an international scare and calls for travel 
restrictions. Speaker’s lawsuit against the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
alleging violations of the federal Privacy Act, he claimed by revealing more infor-
mation than was necessary for public health purposes, was ultimately resolved on 
summary judgment for the government, largely because the challenged disclosures 
had been made by Speaker himself. (Speaker v. U.S.  Department of Health and 
Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 489 Fed. Appx. 425 
(2012); Associated Press 2010) But the saga reveals how individuals perceived as 
threats may be vilified for what were understandable, if unwise, efforts at 
self-protection.
WHO travel guidelines provide that individuals known to be infected with resis-
tant TB should not travel until sputum analysis confirms that they are not at risk of 
disease transmission (WHO 2017). Evidence is limited, however, about the need for 
this policy. The most recent literature review suggests that risks of transmission dur-
ing air travel are very low and that there is need for ongoing international collabora-
tion in contact tracing and risk assessment (Kotila et al. 2016). Blanket travel bans 
encouraging actions that elude detection may reduce, rather than enhance, this 
needed collaboration. More subtle policies tailored to need would be preferable, but 
the fears generated by a focus on fear of vectors may make them unlikely to be 
developed or implemented.
At best, therefore, the vector perspective is incomplete. Focus on it may be 
counter- productive, if people hide or try to avoid education. It may encourage 
expenditures on efforts to identify suspected vectors rather than on evidence based 
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efforts to identify risks of transmission and effective modes of prevention. And, of 
course, it ignores the plight of victims, to which we now turn.
15.3  The Victim Perspective
People with resistant infections are not only vectors, they are also victims of disease 
and have ethical claims to be treated as such (Battin et al. 2007). Indeed, it is likely 
that vectors will themselves be victims, unless they are carriers of the disease in a 
manner that does not affect them symptomatically.
Concern for victims may take the form of seeking to ease the burdens of con-
straints such as isolation. A good illustration of the victim perspective in operation 
is the WHO publication of a pamphlet on “psychological first aid” to those affected 
by Ebola. The pamphlet is designed to provide comfort to and meet the basic needs 
of people infected by Ebola and those who are close to them, while maintained the 
safety of aids workers (WHO 2014). The recommendations rest on the importance 
of respect for the dignity of those who are suffering amidst disease outbreaks. It also 
emphasizes the importance of respect for rights such as confidentiality and non- 
discrimination. The pamphlet is provisional and designed to be updated as knowl-
edge of safety measures improves; this provisional nature is a recognition of the 
importance of ongoing development of information about how victims’ needs can 
be safely met.
Despite the concern for victims, foremost in the pamphlet’s recommendations is 
safety, both of aid workers and of disease victims, so that no one is further harmed 
including victims themselves and others close to them. Overall, the pamphlet 
attempts to counter impulses to come to the aid of victims that may increase trans-
mission risks, such as unprotected contact with those who are ill. But unexplored 
tensions remain in the document’s recommendations. For example: “Respect pri-
vacy and keep personal details of the person’s story confidential, if this is appropri-
ate” (p. 22). Nowhere does the document discuss when confidentiality is appropriate 
or what personal details may be revealed and in what ways. Its manifest and impor-
tant concern for victims is countered by safety but without discussion of how these 
goals might be implemented together or reasonably reconciled in practice.
The WHO’s most recently-adopted strategy for dealing with health emergencies, 
the Health Emergencies Programme, provides another illustration of concern for 
victims that may lie in unexplored tension with other values. The Programme urges 
cooperative methods to meet the immediate health needs of threatened populations 
through humanitarian assistance while also addressing causes of vulnerability and 
recovery (WHO 2016). It is a coordinated strategy for emergency response that will 
move far beyond merely technical help; WHO describes it as a “profound change 
for WHO, adding operational capabilities to our traditional technical and normative 
roles” (WHO 2016). It is aimed to provide crisis help, such as to Hurricane Matthew 
in Haiti or to areas affected by the Zika virus. It requires a major increase in funding 
devoted to core emergency efforts. Core funding will come from assessed contribu-
tions, flexible contributions that the Director-General has discretion to allocate, and 
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earmarked voluntary contributions. But it is clearly under-funded; WHO reported a 
44% funding gap as of October 2016, just to meet the program’s core capabilities. 
Moreover, WHO also reported that it has raised less than a third of the funding 
needed for the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies, a fund deployed for the 
initial 3  months of an emergency before donor funding becomes available 
(WHO 2016).
The Health Emergencies Programme reflects reactions to the humanitarian disas-
ter of the Ebola epidemic and criticisms of the WHO level of response. The WHO 
2016–2017 budget reflects this response as well (WHO 2015). That budget “demon-
strates three strategic shifts” (WHO 2015, p. 2). The first is application of the les-
sons from Ebola especially the need to strengthen core capacities in preparedness, 
surveillance and response. The second strategic shift is a focus on universal health 
coverage, which includes enhancing contributions to maternal and child health, 
speeding progress towards elimination of malaria, and enhancing work on non- 
communicable diseases, among other worthy goals. The final strategic shift is 
towards “emerging threats and priorities”; illustrations of these are “antimicrobial 
resistance, hepatitis, ageing, and dementia.” These are not an obvious group to char-
acterize as “emerging,” to the extent that this suggests a developing threat that has 
not yet become urgent but that may be expected to become so in the near future. Nor 
are they an obvious group to link together in the same category. This mixture of 
budgetary priorities suggests is responsiveness to issues raised through consultation 
with WHO member states, rather than proactive planning.
WHO specific efforts directed to resistance can be characterized as primarily 
coordination. The WHO website devoted to resistance promotes information shar-
ing and lists research questions and potential funding agencies (WHO 2017a). 
WHO expresses no judgment about either funding agencies or which of the nearly 
100 listed research questions—ranging from research on resistance in day care cen-
ters to the biological price that microorganisms pay for resistance—might be fruit-
fully addressed first or how they might be interconnected.
Concern for victims is surely part of a response to a humanitarian emergency. 
Responsiveness to urgent health needs is an important goal. Including antimicrobial 
resistance in a list of “emerging” issues is at least recognition of the problem. But 
the WHO response to Ebola and the WHO budget overall can be characterized as 
less than fully set into context in a reasoned way.
Thus, we contend, neither vector nor victim perspectives are adequate. One risks 
falling prey to fear while the other risks responses that are well-intentioned but that 
may be difficult to meet or compete with other values in ways that remain underex-
plored. These perspectives are inevitable and important, but they are each incomplete.
15.4  Fairness in Information Use
In our judgment, a primary difficulty with both vector and victim perspectives is 
that neither are set into context or seen as interconnected. This section suggests how 
fairness considerations may help in focusing attention to the most pressing 
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questions to ask about antimicrobial resistance and the directions for surveillance 
and information use to take.
Fairness entered the philosophical lexicon in discussions about justice as proce-
dural, most famously in John Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” (Rawls 1958). As Rawls 
initially conceptualized his view, it involved a decision procedure for selecting basic 
principles of justice in which people were unable to gain unfair advantage. As the 
debates about Rawlsian justice unfolded, a fundamental issue was whether people 
with radically different capacities and views of the good life could be expected to 
accept the results of the decision procedure as formulated. Thus critics raised the 
concern that people with disabilities might be left out of the decision procedure as 
“non-contributors” to the practice of justice (Nussbaum 2007; Stark 2007). Critics 
also pressed the argument that people with radically illiberal conceptions of the 
good would ultimately destabilize the practice of justice in a Rawlsian ideal society 
(e.g. Williams 2007a, b). Rawls ultimately accepted the point that proceduralism 
could not yield a universal theory of justice, pulling back his view to the claim that 
it only represented a vision of justice for a certain kind of liberal society (Rawls 1993).
But fairness also entered the debates about justice in a more substantive way, 
especially in bioethics. Norman Daniels (1985), for example, expanded a Rawlsian 
approach to consider justice in health care. The British idea of a “fair innings,” in 
which the opportunities of each to reasonable health over a normal life span are 
prioritized, was raised particularly with respect to the distribution of health care 
resources to the elderly (Bognar 2015; Farrant 2009; Harris 1985; Williams 2007b). 
Like the metaphor of a level playing field, the fair innings argument comes from 
sports (Francis 2017). It reflects the idea of everyone having a chance to participate 
in a game that at least gives them a reasonable opportunity for success. There are 
four aspects of such opportunity: who plays and whether the rules are constructed 
to give each an opportunity to win that is reasonable are two. Also important is the 
balance among opportunities to succeed, so that there aren’t consistent tilts in one 
direction or another, as might be characterized by the further metaphor of leveling 
the playing field. Finally, attention to the interaction between advantages and disad-
vantages matters, so that participants are encouraged to continue playing the game 
rather than dropping out.
Our invocation of fairness as a concept is rooted in the judgment that antimicro-
bial resistance—or other pressing global public health problems, for that matter—
exemplify multiple aspects of non-ideal and partial compliance circumstances. 
Natural circumstances are less than forgiving; new health threats emerge on a regu-
lar basis. Antimicrobial resistance is an ongoing natural challenge to effective ther-
apy for deadly diseases. Social circumstances are imperfect, too: overcrowding, 
poor sanitation, straitened resources for public health and health care, and cultural 
practices that increase potential for disease transmission all play roles in the devel-
opment of resistance. Alexander Fleming, the discoverer of penicillin, warned that 
the development of resistance was likely, but his warning appears not to have been 
well heard. Finally, efforts to address antimicrobial resistance are riven with non- 
compliance: over-prescribing by physicians, over-use of antimicrobials in agricul-
ture, individual failures to take medications as prescribed, and concealment of 
disease out of fear of discovery and persecution. Because the conditions that give 
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rise to these problems of non-compliance may seem urgent—people seeking anti-
microbials are in pain or ill, perhaps gravely; people in hiding from health authori-
ties may fear stigmatization or death—they raise in particularly poignant form 
questions of the extent of obligations under circumstances in which others are not 
doing what arguably is their fair share (e.g. Stemplowska 2016; Murphy 2000).
Fairness as an ethical concept is especially suited to such imperfect circum-
stances. It directs attention to how improvements are distributed. Distributions can 
be more or less fair, if they distribute benefits and burdens in an increasingly inclu-
sive manner (e.g. Francis and Francis 2013a, b). Fairness thus construed is at the 
heart of perhaps the most influential set of recommendations for ethical pandemic 
planning, the Canadian Stand on Guard for Thee (Toronto Joint Centre 2005). 
Although much of the discussion of fairness in this document emphasizes inclusive 
procedures, so that engagement may lead to acceptance of choices as fairly made 
(e.g., p. 1), the recommendations also contain substantive dimensions. These include 
fair resource plans for those who fall ill providing necessary services during a pan-
demic (p. 11) and assurance that people who are affected by choices are reciprocally 
supported in a way that they do not suffer “unfair economic penalties” (p. 13). Here, 
the links between fairness and reciprocity are explicit.
These four aspects of fairness—who is included in the play, what opportunities 
they have, how these opportunities are balanced, and whether there are elements of 
reciprocity—can be used to set vector and victim perspectives into context in 
addressing the gathering and use of information about antimicrobial resistance. 
Over-emphasizing vectors threatens their opportunities and even possible participa-
tion. Overemphasizing victims tilts the field unidirectionally, understandably direct-
ing resources to immediate need but without consideration of longer-term 
consequences. Reciprocity may be the most important of all, creating commitment 
to workable strategies for addressing resistance when there are difficult choices to 
be made.
Fear, understood as a threat personal health, is often an ally in persuading people 
to seek preventive care and to change life styles, or to persuade policy makers to 
create incentives or penalties for decisions that contribute to poor health. But great 
fear can also lead to immobility. The real threat posed by the rise of antimicrobial 
resistance does not seem to be easily addressed by a successful alternative in the 
view of victims or policy makers. Medical personnel are fearful of not responding 
to the demands of patients for immediate reductions in pain or suffering at relatively 
low costs. The scale of the threat posed by rapid rise of antimicrobial resistance may 
be daunting to policy makers especially as funders of research. The cost of develop-
ing ever-new generations of antibiotics seems to suggest a great series of short-term 
solutions especially as pharmaceutical companies respond to incentives to generate 
near-term profits. In this context, it is worth recalling how the development of the 
first antimicrobials contributed to more generally shared benefits: when penicillin 
became known to people as a wonderful drug it actually helped to speed the adop-
tion of the National Health Service in Britain. The popular expectation was health 
care for all facilitated with the rise of a new generation of low cost wonder drugs 
and reinforced by low cost vaccinations (Webster 2002). But some of the advan-
tages were short-lived, as the costs of pharmaceuticals grew exponentially and 
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inadequate attention was paid to the risks of overprescribing—once again a caution-
ary reminder of the importance of emphasizing balance rather than one particular 
perspective such as victimhood. If a promise of sustaining production at lower costs 
of ever-new generations of antimicrobials from how information is used can offer 
benefits more widely, then it becomes easier to impose tougher regulations on anti- 
microbial use that may to some extent stave off the development of resistance.
This approach in terms of fairness directs attention not only to vectors and to 
victims seen as separate entities. It also directs attention to how they are often, and 
unpredictably, twinned—given the epidemiology of resistance spread, it is likely to 
begin within interlaced communities where vectors are also victims. But it also 
directs our attention to these issues set in distributive context, raising questions such 
as these: Who is most likely to be affected by resistance? Who will suffer the most 
severe consequences from resistance? Who is most likely to be disadvantaged by 
information gained to counter resistance? Who will suffer the most severe disadvan-
tage? Who will benefit from efforts to counter resistance? How can these benefits be 
spread more inclusively? And, how are the benefits and burdens of addressing resis-
tance intertwined? Are some primarily beneficiaries, while others are primarily bur-
dened? Are there ways to increase reciprocal linkages in these benefits and burdens, 
so that efforts to counter resistance are accepted and supported more widely? These 
are the kinds of questions that need to guide how surveillance is deployed in the 
effort to counter resistance, not vague generalities about the importance of address-
ing health infrastructure or bromides about the need to increase resources.
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Chapter 16
Antimicrobial Resistance and Social 
Inequalities in Health: Considerations 
of Justice
Lynette Reid
Abstract Within-country social inequalities in health have widened while global 
health inequalities have (with some exceptions) narrowed since the Second World 
War. On commonly accepted prioritarian and sufficientist views of justice and 
health, these two trends together would be acceptable: the wealthiest of the wealthy 
are pulling ahead, but the worst off are catching up and more are achieving suffi-
ciency. Such commitments to priority or sufficiency are compatible with a common 
“development” narrative about economic and social changes that accompany 
changes (“transitions”) in population health. I set out a very simple version of health 
egalitarianism (without commitment to any particular current theory of justice) and 
focus on two common objections to egalitarianism. Priority and sufficiency both 
address the levelling down and formalism objections, but these objections are dis-
tinct: giving content to equality (I argue here) places in question the claimed norma-
tive superiority of priority and sufficiency. Using examples of the role of 
antimicrobials in both these trends – and the future role of AMR – I clarify (first) the 
multiple forms and dimensions of justice at play in health, and (second) the different 
mechanisms at work in generating the two current patterns (seen in life course nar-
ratives and narratives of political economy). The “accelerated transition” that nar-
rowed global health inequalities is fed by anti-microbials (among other technology 
transfers). It did not accelerate but replaced the causal processes by which current 
HICs achieved the transition (growing and shared economic prosperity and widen-
ing political franchise). The impact of AMR on widening social inequalities in 
health in HICs will be complex: inequality has been fed in part by tertiary care 
enabled by antimicrobials; AMR might erode the solidarity underlying universal 
health systems as the well-off seek to maintain current expectations of curative and 
rehabilitative surgery and chemotherapy while AMR mounts. In light of both specu-
lations about the impact of AMR on social and global health inequalities, I close 
with practical and with theoretical reflection. I briefly indicate the practical impor-
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tance of understanding AMR from the perspective of health justice for policy 
response. Then, from a broader perspective, I argue that the content by which I meet 
the formalism objection demonstrates that the two trends (broadening  within- country 
inequality and narrowing global inequality) are selective and biased samples of a 
centuries-long pattern of widening social inequalities in health. We are not in the 
midst of a process of “catching up”. In light of the long-term pattern described here, 
is the pursuit of sufficiency or priority morally superior to the pursuit of equality as 
a response to concrete suffering – or do they rationalize a process more objectively 
described as the best-off continuing to take the largest share of one of the most 
important benefits of economic development?
Keywords Bioethics · Public health ethics · Antimicrobial resistance · Health 
inequality · Health justice
16.1  Introduction
What is the significance of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) for health inequalities? 
This question refers not just to the extent to which AMR might exacerbate or miti-
gate health inequalities, but to the ways that we should think about health inequali-
ties in order to be adequately sensitive to the justice dimensions of AMR and to the 
lessons that AMR might offer about the nature of health inequalities as such and 
their normative status (or the normative plausibility of responses to health 
inequalities).
The development of AMR in bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites detrimental to 
human health is already a substantial public health concern; it is estimated to cause 
700,000 deaths a year globally. The UK government’s O’Neill report paints what it 
calls a worst-case scenario—a post-antimicrobial world in which antimicrobial- 
resistant infections are collectively the second leading cause of death by 2050, caus-
ing 10 million deaths a year and lowering world population by 700 million (O’Neill 
2014, 2016). This “worst case scenario” is based on projecting the consequences of 
AMR for a small selection of conditions and as such may underestimate the poten-
tial consequences of AMR (Jamrozik and Selgelid, Chap. 1, this volume).
It is widely acknowledged that the development of AMR will have different 
effects on high-income, middle-income, and low-income countries. Other chapters 
in this volume propose or evaluate policies to address and mitigate AMR as these 
matter for health equity and for global health.
In this chapter, I situate the use of antimicrobials and the growth of AMR in a 
narrative of population health (Valles 2018), specifically the story of narrowing 
global (between country) and widening local (within country) health inequalities, 
and argue that the development of AMR puts pressure on normative commitments 
to sufficientism and prioritarianism as purportedly more feasible and more norma-
tively satisfying goals for health justice.
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Faced with data showing that people who live in one neighbourhood may have a 
life expectancy 10–20 years lower than people in a nearby neighbourhood, or that 
the difference in life expectancy between countries is in some cases as high as 
35 years, many express a normative worry that social inequality in health and global 
health inequalities are unjust (Marmot 2015). However, among academics who dis-
cuss health justice, few are egalitarians about health. Sufficiency – the attainment of 
a decent minimum – is often argued to be an appropriate goal; priority for the worst- 
off is argued to be adequately action-guiding. The question of sufficiency, priority, 
or equality can be deferred to ideal theory; we need not agree on an ultimate goal in 
order to act. For example, if we can agree that AMR is likely to hit the worst-off the 
hardest, as the O’Neill report projects, then sufficientists, prioritarians, and egalitar-
ians alike can focus their attention on alleviating its effects for the worst-off while 
still remaining faithful to their diverging commitments if they wish.
16.2  Health Inequalities and Health 
Egalitarianism: Definitions
In this chapter, I use the term “social inequality in health” to refer to inequalities in 
some health indicator across socioeconomic status (SES) or other category of inter-
est to justice within countries. I will refer to life expectancy or mortality, but metrics 
of inequality include other key indicators, for example, infant mortality or work-
place mortality. I will use “global health inequality” to refer to inequality in such 
indicators across low-, middle-, and high-income countries (typically referring to 
LMICs on the one hand and HICs on the other).1 Granted that there is normatively 
significant variation in what counts as socioeconomic status and how it is measured, 
I speak broadly of socioeconomic inequalities in health, while not intending any 
specific version of the concept as fundamental. (I motivate/explain this below.)
The core commitment of a health egalitarian is that, all things being equal, a 
society in which persons of different socioeconomic status can lead full lives with 
minimization and mitigation of health-related disruptions to those lives is more just 
than a society in which the possibility of a healthy life is patterned by 
1 The less cumbersome phrase “health equality” refers simply to the distribution of life years across 
a population, not correlated with any other variable of interest to justice. For example, Strømme 
and Norheim recently claim that both global and national health inequalities are shrinking 
(Strømme and Norheim 2017). They base this claim on a univariate measure of the distribution of 
a health indicator alone (age at death) within a population: their empirical claim is that the distribu-
tion of age at death is becoming more closely clustered around a value rather than spread widely 
or polarized while their implicit normative claim is that form of health inequality is what matters 
to justice. Such univariate measures of health inequality, however, capture nothing about who is 
dying early or late within that narrower distribution – for example, the rich or the poor, the racial-
ized or the non-racialized, those of higher or lower educational attainment, or all social classes 
equally (Regidor 2004). Life expectancy could cluster around a given value without any change in 
the gap between the rich and the poor.
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socioeconomic status. That is, a society in which service workers, manual labourers, 
or those excluded from labour market participation live lives as long and healthy as 
executives or professors is more just than a world in which this is not the case. On a 
global scale, a world in which such possibilities of health are not patterned by acci-
dent of global birth is more just than a world in which that is not the case.
Following Temkin (2000, 2003), I explore the health egalitarian commitment 
without assuming a specific view on whether this commitment should dominate 
feasibility considerations or other values that may conflict with the achievement of 
social equality in health or global health equality. For example, a commitment to 
cultural self-determination may outweigh a commitment to health egalitarianism in 
specific cases, granting the moral and political right of a community to pursue eco-
nomic activity and social organization that exposes it to different supports for and 
risks to health, such that life expectancy differs from that obtained in urban settings 
in HICs.
The leveling down objection seems particularly acute for health egalitarians: 
while it may be acceptable to take financial resources from people for redistribution, 
can it ever be acceptable to worsen the health of some people in order to achieve 
some increment of improvement in the health of the less well off? Temkin’s approach 
avoids the common use of this “leveling down” objection (Parfit 1997, 2012) to take 
egalitarianism off the table. We can explore the normative importance of social 
equality in health without ipso facto committing ourselves to the view that it has 
such normative weight that it trumps other considerations and values.
16.2.1  Toward a Multi-dimensional Account of Justice, Health, 
and Equality as a Normative Goal
A health egalitarian faces (at least) three substantial challenges: the leveling down 
objection (discussed in the previous section), the challenge that health inequalities 
qua natural can only be matters of justice insofar as they cause or are caused by 
unjust social inequalities, and the challenge of motivating normatively a concern 
with the abstract and interpersonal measure of inequality. These three challenges – 
the leveling down objection, the natural difference objection, and the formalism 
objection – are closely related. For example, one might focus on concrete normative 
concerns – suffering (and its alleviation) or sufficient health (and its achievement) – 
and, by adopting prioritarianism or sufficientism, avoid both the formalism and the 
leveling down objections (as in Anderson (1999, 2010) and other proponents of 
capabilities (Nussbaum 2006; Venkatapuram and Marmot 2013)). However, these 
objections are conceptually distinct. Filling out the concrete realities that are 
reflected in formal measures of inequalities might bolster rather than undermine the 
case for equality over sufficiency or priority as a normative goal.
In this paper I use examples drawn from antimicrobials and antimicrobial resis-
tance to give content to concerns about social equality in health, showing that the 
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formalist challenge can be met without adopting a sufficientist or prioritarian alter-
native to egalitarianism. I do not offer or adopt a specific comprehensive theory of 
justice or even of justice and health; rather, using examples from antimicrobials and 
antimicrobial resistance, I explore different forms of justice and different relation-
ships between justice and health. These are phenomena that an adequate account of 
health justice should capture, but what account of health justice in what form will 
do that adequately is not a question I attempt to resolve here.2
Certainly, injustices in domains other than health affect health outcomes; health 
states lead to injustices in other domains (e.g. fair opportunity, strict equality, reward 
for merit, reciprocity, respect for privacy or property, etc.). For these reasons, judge-
ments of justice and injustice in other domains inform the normative evaluation of 
the justice or injustice of social inequalities in health and global health inequalities. 
But health needs also constitute specific claims for recognition, in response to which 
we should, as a matter of justice, express respect for equal human worth. That is, 
health inequalities, in addition to causing and being caused by other unjust inequali-
ties, also constitute and express specific relations of equality and inequality that are 
of concern to justice.3
Furthermore, unequal responsiveness to health needs creates social inequalities 
that are sui generis and that are politically significant in sui generis ways. Consider 
that the inability to access medical treatment that could address a serious health 
condition creates desperation which may motivate people to enter into social rela-
tions they would not otherwise contemplate. For example, in moral reasoning tests, 
psychological researchers ask participants to evaluate a scenario in which a person 
needs a medication they cannot afford for their fatally ill spouse. This is the paradig-
matic case in which otherwise socially unacceptable actions become reasonable and 
moral responses to inequality.
My pluralism about forms of justice is not in the first instance motivated by the 
idea that liberal public policy must avoid commitment where individual moral views 
diverge. Any claim to neutrality is dubious. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that 
conceptions of justice and fairness can take different contextually-relevant forms 
(e.g. fair reward for effort; fair opportunity; recognition of achievement; acknowl-
edgement of and response to need), as can oppression (e.g. economic exploitation; 
exclusion from wealth or resource base; denial of voice). Inequality or oppression 
in any of these forms may be produced by other inequalities that themselves raise 
question of justice, and may produce further such inequalities. As Wolff and 
2 This complexity may not be captured by a “spheres of justice” view, where a given domain of 
human endeavour is governed by a single form of justice (Walzer 2008). Consider that educational 
policy must be responsive both to the importance of reward for merit and to the importance of 
equal opportunity for achievement of a reasonable standard of literacy for citizenship and fulfill-
ment. No education system only rewards achievement or only brings the population to whatever 
minimal or reasonable standard can be achieved by all.
3 Sen (2002) makes something like this point about the concept of health equity as a multi-dimen-
sional concept: there are several forms that equity takes in relation to health and in relation to 
matters that have bearing on health and all of these must be taken into account in a treatment of 
health equity.
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da- Shalit have argued, injustices that compound in these ways may be of particular 
concern (Wolff and da Shalit 2007).
Answering the formalist challenge involves contextualization and narrative 
exploration to evaluate the significance of what is portrayed in health statistics. The 
relevant narratives include individual lives (life-course narratives) within the con-
text of social structures and broad changes in those structures – i.e. narratives of 
political economy. Both population level narratives of political economy and indi-
vidual narratives of life courses contribute to understanding the human and norma-
tive significance of broad epidemiological changes in longevity and the social and 
global equality and inequality in these measures.
16.3  Examples
In this section, I show these multiple relations of health and justice by taking two 
examples from microbial disease, antimicrobials, and AMR.
16.3.1  Example: AMR, Sex, and Gender
Women’s health as measured at the population level is strongly influenced by sexual 
and reproductive health, and these are in turn conditioned by reproductive auton-
omy or its absence, as a matter of technology and crucially as a matter of gender 
politics. (The influence of perinatal experiences on population health measures is 
substantial; to be discussed below.) At the level of individual life narratives, child-
bearing is a normative, but of course not a universal, experience for women.
Antibiotics are used prophylactically in childbirth to address the risk of maternal 
and infant morbidity and mortality from infections. I have been unable to locate in 
the medical literature discussion of the implications of AMR for obstetric practice, 
such as discussion of whether prophylactic use constitutes a sustainable form of 
anti-microbial stewardship, under what conditions it might be abandoned by choice 
or triaged by need, or what the implications of its waning efficacy would be for 
women’s health. Neither have I been able to locate discussions of the implications 
of AMR for handling the infections that will be more common if the efficacy of 
prophylactic antibiotics is lost. Presumably this would have a significant impact on 
women’s reproductive health.
Childbirth is normative for women but not universal – many women give birth 
and there are cultural expectations whose negotiation characterizes women’s lives 
whether they themselves give birth or not. There are different pathways by which 
women come through sexual intercourse to childbirth, with greater or lesser degrees 
of autonomy and under different conditions of gender-related and economic justice 
and injustice. Sexual assault is both a concern of justice as a criminal matter and a 
concern of political justice, insofar as it is an expression and a tool of gender-based 
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domination. The sequelae of sexual assault sometimes include health and social 
effects (e.g. sexual transmitted infections, pregnancy, trauma, altered social stand-
ing, and deep effects on current or future intimate relations, exposure to a criminal 
justice system that may be partly or entirely inadequate to victims’ needs, etc.); 
these have further health and social effects (infection in childbirth, to return to the 
original example).
Some of the health-related harms of sexual intercourse are harms that we have 
been able to mitigate with antimicrobials (e.g. gonorrhoea, HIV/AIDS, infections 
arising from termination, infections arising in childbirth) for the last decades. These 
will be affected by AMR. Noting substantial disagreement about the moral and 
political status of sex work, sex workers and/or persons subject to sexual exploita-
tion will be particularly affected by AMR. Some will take this as compounding the 
injustice of sexual exploitation and others will take it as compounding the injustice 
of the stigmatization of sex work. As such, AMR will alter the experience of sexual 
activity and affect concerns of justice in relation to sexual activity.
16.3.2  Example: AMR and Parasitic Infection
Hookworm is a parasitic infection caused by inadequate public health infrastructure 
(Pilkington 2017). It is virtually unknown in HICs; the United States is an exception 
to this, which may not be surprising given that it boasts the highest GINI co- efficient 
(greatest economic inequality) of HICs and captures a low proportion of its national 
income (30%) for state expenditure (Piketty 2014, pp. 475–6). Anthelmintic resis-
tance (resistance to the anti-parasitic agents used in treatment) is a growing concern 
for hookworm (Harhay et al. 2010).
The conditions for hookworm arise directly from the legacy of indentured labour 
on large estates where land was held by a small elite, and so it is strongly condi-
tioned by historical injustices in colonial and slave-holding societies. As a hygienic 
disease it is tied closely to place, and place is tied closely to identity for many 
groups subject to colonialism – whether they were brought as slaves to work in a 
place that is now home or they experienced colonial occupation and seizure of their 
lands, transforming their status as labourers on those lands.
In turn, hookworm has health sequelae detrimental to participation in the labour 
market and fulfillment of care responsibilities in the home (McKenna et al. 2017) 
and so it also has forward-looking intergenerational effects that are of concern for 
justice and the perpetuation of relations of economic inequality in post-colonial 
societies. This compounds the historical colonial relations that gave rise to the risk 
exposure.
These injustices are compounded by the fact that there is little or no investment 
in research to tackle this problem. Instead, anthelmintic drug development serves 
the agricultural industry, with the goal of increasing efficiencies in food production 
for the better-off, rather than serving the medical needs of the worse-off – human 
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beings who live in conditions that make them vulnerable to the parasite (Hu 
et al. 2013).
16.3.3  Summary of Examples
In these examples, justice concerns and health inequalities are intimately and com-
plexly linked. A given health advantage or detriment can reflect justice or injustice 
in gender relations, in criminal justice matters, in labour relations, in global eco-
nomic and colonial relations involving claims to land, resources, and sovereignty – 
in addition to the common justice-related concerns about the fair distribution of 
scarce resources within health care.
The forms of stigmatization to which infectious and hygienic disease are subject 
are paradigmatic and concrete forms of stigmatization. Shame involves the source 
of the infection (in sexual relations, or in place for historically constituted commu-
nities consigned to exposure to hygienic disease) and this extends to shame about 
the resulting health state, in ways closely tied to disease-related identities, to sym-
bolic and quasi-symbolic stigma (denigration, shunning, isolation, social distanc-
ing) and to concrete stigmatization (violation of civil liberties, detention; situating 
waste disposal on “unproductive” land where this is land occupied by indigenous 
and poor communities).
AMR has its effects in these fields. As it renders infectious and hygienic diseases 
less susceptible to treatment, it will exacerbate the ongoing legacies of these histori-
cal harms and their forward-reaching effects, in part by compounding the relevant 
health effects, and in part by the effects of policy responses on marginalized popula-
tions. For example, persons exposed to STIs through sex work or sexual exploita-
tion and persons exposed to hookworm through colonialism and its legacy of land 
marginalization may in turn be subject to increased state surveillance and control, 
even risk of criminalization, insofar as their health state is seen to pose a threat to 
others, or insofar as their health state gives them a claim resources that increasingly 
come to be seen and managed as scarce public or common goods (Smith and Coast, 
Chap. 17, this volume; Giubilini and Savulescu, Chap. 9, this volume).
In describing the examples, I draw on (not very detailed) meso-level narratives in 
which justice considerations abound – narratives that involve local manifestations 
of broader structural relations for specific communities. In these narratives, it is 
relatively clear how justice considerations relate to health and how health differen-
tials can intrinsically constitute the justice or injustice of relevant relationships. But 
what connection can we draw from here to the broadest population metrics of health 
inequalities? What roles have antimicrobials played in these population narratives 
and what role might AMR play?
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16.4  Health Inequalities: The Development Narrative
Recall the 10–20 year within-country differences in life expectancy between high- 
and low-income neighbourhoods and the 30–40 year differences in life expectancy 
between HICs and LMICs. Do the differences among groups captured in the popu-
lation health metrics matter normatively, and are they a concern of justice? What 
role did antimicrobials play in generating these differences and how might AMR 
affect these differences?
Now, these formal measures might matter because those at the low end of the 
distribution are experiencing health deficits which we want to address as a matter of 
beneficence, or as a reciprocal obligation to supply a decent minimum arising from 
our economic inter-dependence – or they might matter because the inequalities of 
which they form one extreme matter. It is easy to elicit some kind of normative 
concern about these inequalities but much more difficult to specify exactly what 
matters about them as inequalities. Two persons might have different life expectan-
cies because of accident or genetic endowment; it’s not obvious why group differ-
ences matter. One possible starting place is the thought that if all else were equal the 
poor would be as healthy as the rich. That is, the poor do not constitute a separate 
natural kind with different potential to be healthy. If they are differentially unhealthy, 
it is because we fail to ensure that everyone has access to their potential to be 
healthy, because incomes are inadequate, housing poor, food of low quality, work 
hazardous, childbirth ill-supported, and access to care and social support for recov-
ery from ill health limited. This line of thought is similar to the view of that health 
inequalities matter to justice when they are caused by or cause other injustices, but 
it maintains at its core the idea that health inequalities matter as such and can con-
stitute injustice.
By analyzing the role of antimicrobials in broad trends for social inequality in 
health and global health inequality, I argue that understanding the causes and the 
narrative constitution of these trends renders sufficientism and prioritarianism less 
attractive as normative stands.
A common account of the broad trends in both global health and economic 
development in recent decades is that within-country inequalities are widening, but 
between-country inequalities are narrowing – a narrowing that is particularly dra-
matic since the 1950s for health and 1980s for economic status. The normative 
claim attached to this account (implicitly or explicitly) is a prioritarian or sufficien-
tist claim that while things may look grim from the perspective of the middle classes 
of HICs, from the perspective of those who are truly the worst off, things have never 
looked better: more and more people in the world are relieved of the worst form of 
poverty (“absolute poverty”) and are achieving a sufficiency of health. In health, the 
worst off are doing even better: life expectancy is advancing faster than it did when 
the current HICs built their prosperous economies over the course of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.
In the examples of the previous section (16.3), I outlined different ways that 
justice questions might reflect, be reflected by, or otherwise enter into health 
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inequalities, by tying life course narratives to narratives that matter to justice – polit-
ical and cultural economy, including gender relations. In the same manner, I will 
approach the significance of population health metrics in relation to justice by 
exploring the meaning of these metrics in terms of the typical and divergent life 
courses of the members of a population and in terms of the political and cultural 
economy of the communities in question (within-country communities and global 
communities).
The common narrative reflecting the sufficientist or prioritarian reading of nar-
rowing health inequalities is the development narrative (political economy) linked 
to life course narratives via “transition” theory (demography and epidemiology).
Demographers long ago observed the tendency of populations to pass succes-
sively through certain stages, tied to their economic development: populations move 
from having a high birth rate along with a high death rate (in foraging or pastoral 
economies), to a more stable and dropping death rate, while the birth rate remains 
high, resulting in a population explosion (from agricultural to early industrial econ-
omies), to a low birth rate-low death rate stage, which we see in the stable or shrink-
ing populations of modern HICs (which depend at this stage on immigration for 
economic growth). Epidemiologists in the mid-twentieth century linked these 
demographic changes to patterns of health and disease: the first stage of “pestilence 
and famine” with its characteristic population swings is followed by a second stage 
of greater stability but low life expectancy conditioned by infectious and hygienic 
diseases, initially from the close co-habitation of animals and humans and then the 
increasingly crowded, eventually urban, living conditions of humans with one 
another. With improvements in living standards and public health infrastructure, we 
enter a third stage where chronic (“man-made and degenerative”) diseases of later 
middle age emerge as common causes of death (Omran 1971). A combination of 
so-called lifestyle changes (e.g. smoking cessation, moderation of red meat con-
sumption) and advanced medical technologies (e.g. cancer treatment) have pushed 
back these diseases of midlife and created the ongoing extension in lifespan that 
HICs are now experiencing, which some describe as a “fourth stage” of epidemio-
logical transition (Olshansky and Ault 1986).
These are the economic and epidemiological narratives behind how a non- 
transparent metric like life expectancy is read in health policy and understood to be 
a normative concern or a concern of justice. A life expectancy in the 40s reflects 
substantial maternal, infant, and child mortality caused by infectious and hygienic 
disease and the lack of empowerment of women to control their sexual and repro-
ductive lives. A life expectancy in the 60s reflects a society in which heart disease 
and cancer are leading causes of death in later middle life, a phenomenon that 
emerged over the course of the twentieth century in HICs. A life expectancy in the 
80s reflects improved prevention and treatment of these major killers and the emer-
gence of new common forms of dying in advanced old age, e.g. frailty and dementia.
The dramatic narrowing of global health inequalities since the 1950s is called, 
within this narrative, the “accelerated transition,” reflecting the success of the inter-
national development agenda in achieving improvements in health status that out-
strip the economic and political development of the countries in question – that is, 
that outstrip both growth in GDP and changes in the franchise and effective political 
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organization of workers to demand the health, education, and safety benefits of 
modern welfare states. By these means, industrialization and urbanization raised 
GDP while political change led to a larger proportion of the GDP being invested in 
the well-being of the population, in a process that involved the empowerment of 
workers and women, improving population health – although (given the dynamics 
of democratic pressure) achieving less success in addressing the needs of so-called 
minorities.4
On this narrative, it seems natural to see the changes in global economic and 
health equalities and inequalities in terms of the idea that some countries got a head 
start and some lag behind. A common economic belief is that open markets and the 
transfer of skills and technology will ensure that LMICs continue to advance 
towards (eventually) “catching up.” The common narrative in health is that some 
(both low and high tech) public health technologies could be transferred in advance 
of economic development, offering LMICs a leg up in the development process.
16.4.1  Is the Development Narrative True?
Is this development narrative true? Does it do the normative work it claims to do?
One important critique of formal measures of equality and inequality is that they 
are not transparently related to the underlying realities they measure (King et al. 
2012; Harper et al. 2010; Mackenbach 2015, Mackenbach et al. 2016). King et al. 
point out that the same underlying reality can be represented as a narrowing of abso-
lute inequalities or a widening of relative inequalities, for example. Similarly, the 
same numeric change may represent different causal pathways or encapsulate dif-
ferent social relations with different significance in terms of justice and injustice 
and different distributions of well being and suffering. This has implications for the 
normative concern that these measurements might inspire (which inequalities 
should we tackle?) and may even raise questions about the reality of abstract inter-
personal measures (are inequalities simply imposed on the individual phenomena 
that, sufficientists and prioritarians argue, should be the object of our moral 
concern?).
16.4.2  Underlying Realities
The narrative that LMICs are “catching up” suggests that they are achieving what 
HICs have achieved, but doing so later. However, this suggestion is false. The accel-
erated narrowing of global health inequalities represents fundamentally different 
epidemiological patterns, causal pathways, and relations of concern to justice.
4 In the current HICs this process led to the state capturing 40–55% of national income for its 
spending (Piketty 2014, pp. 475–6).
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I described above how a population’s life expectancy in a given decade is “read” 
epidemiologically, and I noted that many different underlying patterns of health and 
disease can generate the same measure. Substantial infant and early childhood mor-
tality in a subpopulation might depress life expectancy as much as widespread 
exposure of young adults to interpersonal violence, workplace hazards, tuberculo-
sis, or HIV.  Different narratives of political economy can in turn generate these 
patterns – the sub-population with elevated early childhood mortality may be indig-
enous or migrant; interpersonal violence may be a matter of warfare or the combina-
tion of lack of opportunity, crime, availability of guns, policing, and racialization.
The picture offered by transition theory is simplified (Frenk et al. 1991; Defo 
2014). Researchers now emphasize that the same life expectancy in different popu-
lations may reflect different realities. They describe the transitions of LMICs as 
“incomplete” transitions, highlighting counter-transitions within LMICs and even 
within HICs. For example, LMICs did not leave infectious and hygienic disease 
behind. Rather, they are taking on the so-called diseases of affluence – diseases that 
arise from changes in work, nutrition, energy, and transportation – in addition to 
carrying an on-going burden of infectious and hygienic disease (Santosa et al. 2014; 
Defo 2014). Specific population groups within HICs experience the re-emergence 
of infectious and hygienic disease, while the emergence of so-called “diseases of 
despair” (suicide and substance abuse) may reverse health gains in HICs for some 
groups (Case and Deaton 2015) or for entire countries (some of the former eastern 
bloc). Global migration resulting from instability and lack of opportunity in LMICs 
and the need for low-wage workers particularly in the agricultural sector in HICs 
brings together the AMR diseases of LMIC and the population health profile of 
HICs (Suk et al. 2009).
Furthermore, insofar as LMICs have substantially reduced childhood and young 
adult mortality from infectious and hygienic diseases, these reductions did not come 
from the developments in political economy that led to such improvements in HICs. 
In HICs, rising GDP went along with political changes (universal suffrage extend-
ing beyond male property owners to labourers and women, and various political 
movements organized around these identities) and these brought about improve-
ments in determinants of infectious and hygienic disease. In HICs, antibiotics joined 
and accelerated an existing process of decline in infectious and hygienic disease 
after the Second World War (Mackenbach 1996). In LMICs, on the other hand, 
growth in GDP resulting from urbanization has not been distributed or re- distributed 
and invested to improve living standards and public health infrastructure to the same 
extent. Political empowerment is limited, in part by the actions of the very same 
global corporations that bring (some) growth in income to LMICs. In its place, a 
global network of health philanthropy has delivered effective prevention with vac-
cines and mosquito nets and treatment with antimicrobials for infectious and 
hygienic diseases that remain endemic. Antimicrobials played an important role in 
this so-called “accelerated” transition. The infectious and hygienic diseases that 
result from crowding and exposure to waste are managed medically e.g. by vaccina-
tion for prevention or by antimicrobials for treatment, and not by improved housing 
for primordial prevention. This is not a lag in economic development or in the 
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uptake of health-related technologies; it is a different path of economic and social 
change. Even to describe it as “incomplete” is misleading, insofar as the term 
“incomplete” suggests that LMICs have reached a different point on the same path-
way instead of achieving the partial benefits they have achieved from a different 
trajectory.
This is evident at the level of life course narratives. What a life expectancy of 60 
looks like in a current MIC is not what a life expectancy of 60 looked like when 
HICs reached that stage. Parents in HICs may feel that childhood and adolescence 
are times of risk and danger, but very few children in HICs experience life- 
threatening diarrhea or pneumonia and virtually no adolescents and young adults 
experience TB. (The exceptions to this general picture are in communities within 
HICs that bear a heavy burden of colonialism such as indigenous communities (Orr 
2013 and Møller 2010) and in the globally mobile working class (MacPherson et al. 
2009), where migration is also conditioned by colonial histories in addition to cur-
rent global supply chains.) Parents in LICs with superficially similar mortality fig-
ures continue to experience episodes in which their children’s lives threatened with 
diarrhea in infancy – but they now know how to treat it, as few people would have 
known in the HICs’ pre-transition period, and they have antibiotics available for 
managing severe cases where this is appropriate. Children in MICs do not enjoy a 
trouble-free childhood, but go through the distress of under-5 pneumonia or adoles-
cent TB, while their parents experience the anxiety of trying to secure the antimicro-
bials needed to treat these conditions: for 5 million children with pneumonia in 
LMICs annually, their parents are unable to do this (Laxminarayan et al. 2016). 
The use of antimicrobials along with other readily transferable technologies sustain 
different underlying life course narratives in LMICs compared to those that 
typify HICs.
16.4.3  Underlying Causes
Without a basic understanding of the causal processes that characterize changes in 
population health and health inequalities, it is not possible to evaluate normative 
claims about the co-existence of narrowing global health inequalities and the within 
country widening health inequalities. Sampling changes in a given time period and 
presenting them as trends (or as trends that are causally linked – with the suggestion 
that health benefits are, as it were, transferred from the middle classes of HICs to the 
workers of LMICs) can misrepresent the broad causal picture as it unfolds.
The last 100 years, both globally and within country, constitute one period in a 
long-term process of widening social inequality in health. Broadly speaking, social 
inequality in health has risen ever since the Middle Ages (perhaps surprisingly), 
when nobles and peasants seem to have had similar life expectancies (Antonovsky 
1967; Bengtsson and van Poppel 2011). The late 19th and early 20th century 
period – in which social inequalities in health narrowed within those countries that 
emerged as HICs – was an anomaly.
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To relate the trends to transition theory, roughly speaking, we can say that pesti-
lence and famine affect all social classes; as societies transition to agriculture, the 
wealthy still have surprisingly little protection from the infectious and hygienic 
diseases that characterize this stage of close co-habitation with animals and 
increased human crowding. This “agricultural transition” lowers life expectancy for 
individuals while increasing population size – a qualified form of “improvement” in 
population health. Urbanization and the initially slow but eventually rapid growth in 
economic productivity associated with it, by contrast, both raise the life expectancy 
of the population and increase its size. However, this improvement both for indi-
viduals and for populations benefits those of higher SES more than those of lower 
SES, opening up differences in life expectancy that persist and for the most part 
continue to grow.
The only period in which social inequalities in health narrowed for a time was 
the classic period of hygienic and sanitary reform at the end of the 19th and begin-
ning of the 20th centuries – when initial steps to establish safety of the food supply, 
clean water, and sewage were taken in HICs (Soares 2007). At this point, the happy 
confluence of political change (increasingly wide suffrage), scientific development 
(the germ theory of disease), and growth in GDP contributed strongly to this 
narrowing.
The post-war growth of the welfare state, including systems of universal health 
coverage, by contrast, has at best slowed the growth of social inequality in health: it 
has not moved us in the direction of social equality in health (Sreenivasan 2007; 
Mackenbach 2012; Reid 2016). The better off get more out of the “fourth stage” of 
epidemiological transition by the differential benefit they derive from programs like 
universal health coverage. This is not to say that such programs do not promote 
social equality in health: it is plausible that the poor would have been left yet further 
behind without them (Reid 2016).
This sampling question is significant for the normative work that the develop-
ment narrative is supposed to do. The narrative of local divergence (the almost-best- 
off falling a bit behind) and global convergence (the worst off catching up) relies on 
sampling HICs just after the one period in which inequalities narrowed (thereby 
excluding that narrowing) and sampling LMICs at a moment in history that includes 
the LMIC version of that era in which (in HICs) inequalities narrowed. The underly-
ing dynamic is that as health improves, it improves more for the better off than the 
worse off, absent a period where we acted on the gains that could be made by pro-
viding the basic infrastructure of public health. The broad trend is the same globally 
and within country: it does not reflect a tradeoff in which we forgo goods for the 
already pretty-well-off and give them to the worse-off. On the contrary, as we saw 
in the previous section, we have taken a path to improving life expectancy in LMICs 
that seems likely not to lead to the same gains. The inference from a given period of 
narrowing to a broader pattern of a gap being closed is illicit.
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16.4.4  Implications for Global AMR Policy
The narrative of catching up ignores longer-term trends and obscures differences in 
typical and various life courses that cause the life expectancy gains in LMICs. 
Waning antimicrobial effectiveness will reveal the different underlying causes of 
these gains.
Current approaches to addressing the role of social determinants of health 
(SDOH) in the impact of AMR, consistent with the model of global health that gave 
us the accelerated transition, is medicalized: medical technology transfer again 
takes the place of political development; inappropriate standards of evidence (the 
movement towards implementing evidence-based standards in development) direct 
efforts towards primary prevention and treatment and away from inter-sectoral 
cooperation on health-related primordial prevention. (See King, Chap. 19, this vol-
ume; Silva et al. 2020.) The WHO Global Action Plan (2015a) speaks, for example, 
of “effective prevention of infections transmitted through sex or drug injection as 
well as better sanitation, hand washing, and food and water safety” as “core compo-
nents of infectious disease prevention,” (§36) and “more widespread recognition of 
antimicrobial medicines as a public good … [being] needed in order to strengthen 
regulation of their distribution, quality, and use” (§41) to address inappropriate anti-
microbial use, and the development of awareness and improved veterinary educa-
tion to address the overuse of antimicrobials in agriculture.
Awareness and education are inadequate to address the struggles of LMICs to 
promote appropriate antimicrobial use. These countries often make do with half the 
tax revenues proportionate to GDP or national income that HICs expect: enforce-
ment to tame diversion and over-the-counter sales of antibiotics or the for-profit 
healthcare sector (a substantial source of poor prescribing – Kuo et al. 2017; Haire, 
Chap. 3, this volume; Liverani et al., Chap. 5, this volume; Ho and Lee, Chap. 25, 
this volume) are not free. Neither can LMICs confront the globalized agricultural 
sector that moves agricultural practices that involve the overuse of antibiotics from 
the increasingly intolerant regulatory environments of HICs to their permissive regu-
latory environments. To confront this would in turn require an end to pressure from 
global supply chains serving HIC- consumers against environmental and labour regu-
lation in LMICs (the justice dimensions of such dependencies are explored in the 
social connectionist model of Young 2006). Focusing innovation in anthelmintics, 
for example, on the needs of human beings vulnerable to parasites would change 
treatment possibilities (in accordance with the call of Shawa et al., Chap. 10, this 
volume), while reducing or eliminating agricultural use and improving health-related 
infrastructure – both of which involve political and economic change – would change 
the distribution of health benefits.
In addition, there is another global structural relationship in inequalities related 
to antimicrobial use, insofar as antimicrobials are a common or public good, as 
discussed elsewhere in this volume (Smith and Coast, Chap. 17, this volume; Giubilini 
and Savulescu, Chap. 9, this volume). LMICs cannot “catch up” in antimicrobial use 
because HICs are on track to use them up, for their own needs or in service of HIC-led 
policies that encourage antimicrobial use in LMICs instead of balanced development, 
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high taxation and regulation, and democratic empowerment, the context in which 
conservative antimicrobial use can be implemented as policy.
The problem of effective regulation and orientation of the pharmaceutical indus-
try towards population needs is not isolated to LMICs. Generic drug shortages in 
HICs contribute to AMR by driving inappropriate prescribing (Shoham et al. 2016), 
and every action plan on AMR highlights the failure of industry to invest in new 
antimicrobials, and not the problem that new antimicrobials, when found, continue 
to be marketed and deployed in ways that encourage non-beneficial and marginally 
beneficial use.
16.4.5  AMR and Widening Within-Country Social Inequality 
in Health
Antimicrobials played a role in the so-called “fourth stage” of epidemiological tran-
sition, in which life expectancy has been extended by effective prevention and treat-
ment for cancer and heart disease, among other medical conditions. Insofar as 
progress in addressing these large sources of disease burden for HICs involves 
advanced surgical and other tertiary care techniques (in addition to dietary change 
and tobacco control), this fourth transition relies on antibiotics that make surgical 
and immune-system suppressing chemotherapeutics possible. Even in countries 
with universal, comprehensive health care without financial barriers to access (like 
Canada), innovations in tertiary care provide more benefit to the better-off than the 
worse-off (Starfield 2011; Asada and Kephart 2007)5 – contributing to the return to 
growing social inequality in health despite universal health coverage in contempo-
rary medical care.
At a superficial level, we could speculate that the development of AMR in HICs 
could undo a line of medical progress that has widened social inequalities in health. 
But there would be many opportunities for reassertion of the general pattern of the 
last several centuries, the pattern of the well-off capturing a greater share of benefits 
and experiencing a lower share of burdens. Moderating the use of antimicrobials to 
preserve their effectiveness calls on solidarity as a value (Holm and Ploug, Chap. 21, 
this volume); the implications of waning antimicrobial efficacy will put stress on 
this same value. For example, the tertiary care interventions of the fourth epidemio-
logical stage are becoming increasingly expensive due to AMR (Smith and Coast 
2013; Cosgrove 2006; Teillant et  al. 2015). This will continue for some time as 
those interventions gradually take on an unfavourable intrinsic harm-benefit trad-
eoff for the individual patient directly involved. It is only at this last stage (where the 
5 This is thought to be because the worse-off face barriers to access that are both practical and 
social (e.g. geographical proximity and social capital that generates attention to the expression of 
need and referrals); when they do access care, they have fewer resources that would enable them 
to benefit from it, e.g. the social and income support to enable recovery; furthermore, the care is 
less suited to their needs, given that complex chronic conditions have a social gradient.
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harm-benefit tradeoff shifts) that the loss of this technology would potentially nar-
row health inequalities by de-implementation of “fourth stage” interventions that 
have widened social inequalities in health. The effects of specialty and disease inter-
est group advocacy in the intervening period may well result in even greater capture 
of the resources of the system for the better-off. The increasing cost of supportive 
care to maintain current surgical interventions while responding to AMR may also 
feed a political discourse around system sustainability that contributes to eroding 
the comprehensiveness and depth of universal healthcare coverage. Social inequali-
ties in health could continue to widen as services for those with less voice are eroded 
to enable the higher cost of coping with AMR in the tertiary care sector that has 
served higher income persons well.
This is not just a HIC story. The Millennial Development Goals focused on child 
mortality and mortality of late adolescence/early adulthood (TB; the infectious and 
hygienic diseases), while the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) on which the 
WHO embarked in 2015 focus on developing universal health coverage (UHC) and 
access to tertiary care – important for delivering the care necessary for chronic dis-
eases and causes of midlife mortality that middle income countries are beginning to 
experience (WHO 2015b). The expected health transition from a higher burden of 
infectious and hygienic diseases to a higher burden of chronic, noncommunicable 
disease has informed this policy move. However, as we saw, MICs in particular are 
subject to the double burden of emerging chronic noncommunicable diseases along-
side persistent infectious and hygienic diseases; they also experience a heavy bur-
den from counter-transitions as new infectious and hygienic burdens arise (Cook 
and Dummer 2004; Santosa et  al. 2014; Defo 2014). There is evidence that the 
prevalence of hospital-based resistant microbes is inversely associated with national 
income (Alvarez-Uria et al. 2016), suggesting that LMICs will also bear a heavier 
burden of hospital-based AMR than HICs, at the same time that they face a heavier 
burden of community-based resistant diseases. These new health systems will face 
the same kinds of political struggles about universality, depth, and sustainability 
that are in play in HICs (Norheim et  al. 2014). Given the extent of economic 
inequalities within these countries, they will face these political struggles without 
the social solidarity that is somewhat protective of the breadth and depth of UHC in 
HICs. Indeed, some have speculated that AMR could entirely derail the SDG of 
UHC (Jasovský et al. 2016).
16.5  Conclusion
The debate between sufficientists and prioritarians on the one hand and egalitarians 
on the other turns on deep relationships between concerns about the formalism of 
interpersonal measures and (by contrast) the evident strength of the moral claim of 
the needs of the worse off. It is true that formal interpersonal measures can mask 
different underlying realities that would engage different concerns about justice 
(and other important values). Nonetheless, a fully developed picture of those 
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underlying realities does not necessarily support the case for priority or sufficiency 
as goals – whether on normative grounds or on grounds of practicality. Perhaps put-
ting the breaks on an underlying reality (the long term trend of growing social 
inequality in health) is not ultimately feasible: the role that antimicrobials have 
played in narrowing global health inequalities suggests as much.
The current narrowing of the global gap in life expectancy will not lead to the 
gap closing if there are fundamental barriers to narrowing the gap built into the path 
to the current achievement. What looks like a normatively satisfying narrowing of 
the gap is in reality a period in which a limited version of a familiar (and known to 
be temporary) reversal of a long term trend is playing out.
In the mid to late 20th century, it was thought that there was a limit to the long- 
term trend of growing health inequalities – perhaps a natural limit around 75, at 
which point the better-off would stop gaining life expectancy and then further gains 
would involve the worse-off (within and between countries) catching up. This has 
not come about: life expectancy at the top of the scale continues to advance and 
cautious observers no longer try to predict the upper limit. There is no known end to 
improvements in the upper limit figure, and so no natural limit to the growth of 
social inequality in health.
This growing gap is morally complex: Who can object to saving a life of a fellow 
citizen on the grounds that someone far away does not have access to the same treat-
ment? But our failure to imagine the downside of some having access to lifesaving 
interventions in their 10th and 11th decades and beyond while others have their 
prospects for a long and healthy life compromised by social determinants is just 
that – a failure of imagination.
A century ago, social inequality in health meant that some buried half or more of 
their children before the age of 5 while others experienced this heartache less fre-
quently. The moral concern we feel when learning of a gap in life expectancy 
between 40 and 70 is palpable; we are familiar with these narratives and the death 
of children is a tragedy for which children are not blamed. Social inequality in 
health now looks quite different. It may mean that some will enjoy long and active 
retirements approaching the length of their working lives, helping with grandchil-
dren and greeting great-grandchildren, while others manage multiple morbidities 
related to chronic disease while in their later working lives, juggling this simultane-
ously with responsibilities to others – perhaps the mental health challenges faced by 
their children, the substance use entanglements of their partner, and the caregiving 
needs of their parents who are in turn suffering in their 70s from the cumulative 
effects of their own chronic conditions as the life narrative legacy of their exposure 
to the social determinants of ill health. These caregiving responsibilities lead to loss 
of mobility and skill upgrading, leading to missed work opportunities and, in a 
technology-driven economy, even loss of work – and so (in turn) to late-life poverty 
and death shortly after retirement (if retirement is an option at all).
Through the lens of literature, we can look back sympathetically at the concrete 
social shape that health inequalities took in earlier eras (with Dickens, for example); 
the form they are taking today are often presented in statistical terms and we have 
yet to develop a cultural narrative that explores the relations of domination and 
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subordination and shapes the sense of intrinsic moral concern that might be raised 
by these differences. We are likely to think that individuals bear responsibility for 
these conditions (utilitarian reformers of the nineteenth century likewise thought 
those who were worse off responsible for their poor health). Who fundraises by run-
ning a race for the cure in their 60s and who is crowd-sourcing to raise money for 
their own cancer treatment (for travel and loss of work income if that treatment is 
covered under a universal health system, or for expensive therapeutics not covered 
in that universal system) – and what micro, meso, and macro relations of power are 
embodied here?
The prima facie moral plausibility of a prioritarian or sufficientist commitment 
is placed in question by a long-term trend towards a world in which the well-off 
enjoy a life expectancy – perhaps – double that of the worse-off. Suppose that the 
situation continued such that the person running for the cure in their 60s would 
become the centenarian running for the cure, and so on. How long would one remain 
a sufficientist? At what point would the gap become large enough that an appeal to 
sufficiency would ring hollow, and closing the gap would become a worthy moral 
commitment? If AMR makes the tertiary care that has continued the widening of the 
gap in the fourth stage of epidemiological transition even more expensive, at what 
cost and opportunity cost will we pursue the continuation of that trend or resist its 
reversal?
Globally, the response to AMR must move beyond lip service to the most mini-
mal social determinants of health (sanitation and water) and engage with the politi-
cal and economic process of redistributing resources and power so that governments 
and professional bodies can effectively regulate pharmaceutical production, distri-
bution, and prescribing across the public and private sectors, and so that the global 
working class and those living with the legacy of colonization and resource theft 
(Wenar 2008) – whose housing conditions and social security currently preclude 
them from benefiting from the primordial prevention of infectious and hygienic 
disease that most residents of HICs have at this point enjoyed for most of the past 
century – can survive and even flourish despite the loss of the contribution of anti-
microbials to the so-called accelerated epidemiological transition.
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Chapter 17
The Economics of Resistance Through 
an Ethical Lens
Richard D. Smith and Joanna Coast
Abstract Economics is concerned with the analysis of choice and the efficient use 
of resources. Markets for antibiotics are heavily affected by their ‘public good’ 
nature and the externality that results from their consumption in terms of resistance. 
The non-excludability and non-rivalry associated with knowledge production in 
antibiotic development also has implications for the supply of antibiotics. On the 
demand side there are ethical issues associated with free-riding by consumers, free- 
riding across nations and free-riding across time. On the supply side, the lack of a 
pipeline for new antibiotics for the future causes both ethical and economic issues – 
and from both perspectives, efforts should perhaps focus more on alternatives to 
antibiotics and adjustments to heath care systems to reduce reliance on antibiotics. 
Indeed, unlike many areas of health care, where economics and ethical perspectives 
may differ, antimicrobial resistance is a case where the two perspectives align in 
terms of ensuring efficient and sustainable development and use of this precious 
resources. All strategies for dealing with resistance should share the same goals of 
achieving an optimal balance in the use of antimicrobial agents and explicit consid-
eration of the distributional implications.
Keywords Economics · Externalities · Public-goods · Free-riding · Discounting
17.1  Introduction
Antimicrobial resistance has finally come to the fore on national and international 
agendas, and is now recognised as a critical threat to public health, modern health 
systems, and economies (Smith 2015) [Ref: Chap. 1]. Although the broad potential 
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impacts of resistance are clear – that less effective treatments means greater morbid-
ity and mortality, more expensive treatments or hospital care, and more time off 
work – robust evidence on the extent of likely impacts of resistance on population 
health, health care and economies remains relatively limited and often contentious 
(Coast et al. 1996, 2002; O’Neill 2014; Smith and Coast 2013; Wilton et al. 2002). 
Like climate change, this lack of clarity stems from inherent uncertainty; in the case 
of resistance, relating to uncertainties around the growth path of resistance over 
time, the functional form of the relationship between resistance and antibiotic use, 
and estimates of the direct morbidity and mortality impacts attributable to resistance 
rather than underlying infection or other causes (Cormican and Vellinga 2012; 
Courvalin 2008).
However, apart from such uncertainties, a significant issue is the nature of the 
decision- making around the production and consumption of antibiotics. Although 
an intrinsically biological phenomenon, the conditions promoting, or mitigating 
against, the development and spread of antimicrobial resistance are shaped by 
choices that are made by farmers and vets, doctors and patients, industry and gov-
ernments, amongst others, concerning what antibiotics to produce, purchase and use 
(Smith 2015). Economics, at its foundation, is concerned with analysing and evalu-
ating such choices: what and why certain choices are made over others; the condi-
tions under which such choices are made, and how different conditions affect those 
choices; and, crucially, whether these choices are the ‘best’ ones (that is, whether 
they are ‘efficient’ in the sense that no greater benefit could be gained from another 
choice that was available).
These choices are determined through some sort of ‘market’, broadly defined as 
a place (physical or virtual) where goods are traded. In this case, for example, a 
market is where patients and doctors will determine whether an antibiotic will be 
prescribed, or where a vet and a farmer agree on a course of action for sick animals. 
Regardless of whether money changes hands, this is the point where an antibiotic 
supplier will engage with the consumer. Markets also underpin whether, what and 
how much a producer may invest in production of antibiotics, and the price that the 
payer (the consumer or their agent, often governments or insurers in the case of 
healthcare) will pay.
However, markets for antibiotics are heavily affected by two forces which are 
important when considering the development of antimicrobial resistance and strate-
gies to reduce resistance. First, there are significant ‘public good’ attributes to anti-
biotics that affect use and distribution. This means that markets, left alone, will 
‘fail’; that is, they will not result in a socially optimal level of either production or 
consumption of antibiotics (Smith and Coast 2003). Second, there are ‘externality’ 
effects – effects not included in the decision to consume – that are important, and 
again means that, left alone, the market will ‘fail’ and not result in a social optimum 
of antibiotic consumption (Coast et al. 1998).
Together, these two forces drive the under- and/or over-use of antibiotics com-
pared to what is optimal from a societal perspective. This creates major issues for 
economic efficiency, as different choices would improve overall societal welfare, 
but also for ethics, in the sense that there will be equity impacts that create problems 
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of distributive (in)justice in access to antibiotics and in the impact of antimicrobial 
resistance (Coast and Smith 2015).
This chapter describes the core economic features of antimicrobial resistance – 
the public good and externality forces – through an ethics ‘lens’, focussing espe-
cially on the resultant economic and ethical problems of free-riding in both 
production and consumption. The chapter begins with outlining the core economic 
perspective on antimicrobial resistance – the market, public goods and externali-
ties – in more detail. From this basis, the chapter then turns to consider the specific 
issues related to the demand side and then the supply side, focussing on the ethics 
of the economics, and reflecting on possible strategies to address resistance. In par-
ticular, these sections consider the development of appropriate incentives by gov-
ernments to address free-riding within countries and the development of appropriate 
incentives by international agencies to address free-riding across countries. Such 
incentive mechanisms are evaluated both in terms of their value in addressing the 
economic market- failure and their ethical implications. The chapter concludes with 
a brief reflection on antimicrobial resistance as a specific case where economic and 
ethical concerns converge.
17.2  Antimicrobial Resistance and ‘The Market’
At its most fundamental, the market for antibiotics seeks to equate demand for them 
by patients (and farmers or those with pets, although in this chapter we will focus 
on use in humans only) with supply by providers (doctors, pharmacists or over-the- 
counter stores for example). Patients demand antibiotics because of the impact they 
(are believed to have) on a health issue, such as a sore throat or urinary-tract infec-
tion. There are well-known problems in the market for healthcare goods and ser-
vices, including the lack of information held by the patient upon which to decide on 
whether, or how much, healthcare to demand, the resultant need of the patient to 
rely on an (in economic terminology) ‘agent’ (usually a medical professional) to 
help the patient decide on what to consume, and, often, the separation of the patient 
from payment through the role of a third-party funder – typically government or 
insurer (Guiness and Wiseman 2011). Markets in healthcare are, therefore, far from 
perfect, and thus often subject to government intervention in their provision and/or 
financing. These problems are also, at least partly, responsible for ethical concerns 
for distributive justice, as they can leave many individuals with no, or inadequate, 
access to healthcare. Over time, this has led to increased calls for initiatives to 
ensure ‘universal health coverage’; it is now a major thrust of the World Health 
Organization and World Bank to deal with general market failures in healthcare and 
to increase access (World Health Organization 2015), whilst the specific market 
failures around antimicrobial resistance are dealt with through other agendas, such 
as the Sustainable Development Goals (Hanefeld et al. 2017).
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17.2.1  Externalities
Beyond general issues of failure in healthcare markets, there are two specific fea-
tures of the market for antibiotics that are significant in considering the generation 
of antimicrobial resistance, and in establishing policies to contain it (Coast et al. 
1998). First, there are externality effects from the consumption of antibiotics. An 
externality is an effect that is outside of the immediate producer or consumer, and 
thus does not influence decision-making in the choice about whether to produce or 
consume that antibiotic. So, for the patient, the direct (expected) benefit of the anti-
biotic in treating an infection informs his or her decision, as do possible side-effects 
from taking it, along with any monetary cost associated with its purchase. However, 
a ‘positive externality’ that is not generally expected to be taken into account by this 
patient is the benefit to those individuals who would, in the absence of antibiotics, 
have been infected by them – that is, there is an external benefit associated with 
reduced transmission of pathogens. The existence of this positive externality means 
that, the market will under-provide antibiotics; it might be a good reason for a sub-
sidy or other policy to reduce the private cost to individuals. There is also an ethical 
issue involved here. There is a responsibility for each individual to consider the 
impact of their choice about receiving treatment on the wider community – that part 
of their decision to take treatment should, morally, include consideration of the 
impact of (reduced) infection on the wider population.
More critically for the discussion here is that there is also a major ‘negative’ 
externality from consumption of antibiotics – antimicrobial resistance. It is impor-
tant to note that this externality is not associated with the production of antibiotics 
but with their consumption. The effects of antibiotic use, in terms of the sustained 
effectiveness of that antibiotic for others, or for the same individual in the future, do 
not influence the costs that must be paid by the patient, nor the benefits to them of 
taking the antibiotic now. They are therefore unlikely to be considered in the deci-
sion to purchase and consume that antibiotic (by either the patient or the health 
professional acting as their agent). From a societal perspective there is thus an over- 
consumption of antibiotics. Again, there are distributive issues here around the use 
of a limited resource knowing that it will generate possible greater ill-health in the 
future and/or for others.
On balance, the optimal consumption of antibiotics from a societal perspective is 
a balance of the costs and benefits that accrue directly to the individual concerned, 
plus these external benefits and costs to society (Coast et al. 1998). In recent years, 
consensus has been that on balance there is over-consumption – that the private 
costs and benefits and the positive externality are being severely compromised by 
not accounting for the negative externality of resistance. Focus has therefore been to 
see how these external costs of resistance can be internalised in to the decision to 
consume (in addition to how to increase the supply of effective antibiotics). We look 
at these strategies – affecting the demand and supply sides respectively – later in this 
chapter.
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17.2.2  Public Goods
Second, there are ‘public good’ aspects associated with antibiotics [Ref: Chap. 8]. 
Most goods are what we term as ‘private’ in nature: their consumption can be with-
held until a payment is made in exchange, and once consumed they cannot be con-
sumed again (Woodward and Smith 2003). For example, the consumption of a cake 
can be withheld from the consumer until the consumer pays the baker a price, and 
once the consumer has eaten that cake it cannot be eaten again. A private good is 
therefore considered ‘excludable’ and ‘rival in consumption’. At the other end of the 
spectrum lie public goods, which are defined as having the opposite characteristics. 
That is, the benefits, once the good is provided, cannot be restricted and are there-
fore available to all (i.e. non-excludable), and consumption by one individual does 
not limit consumption of that same good by others (i.e. non-rival in consumption). 
A classic example is the service provided by a lighthouse: the warning it provides is 
available to all who would benefit from it, and one ship’s use of it does not limit the 
ability of other ships to use it. Virtually all public goods are such services or other 
intangibles, with few, if any, ‘commodities’ (in the narrow sense of physical objects) 
meeting these criteria (the exception to this being physical infrastructure, such as 
sewage systems, which once completed are largely non-rival in consumption, and 
difficult to exclude people from using).
However, both excludability and rivalry are relative, not absolute, concepts, and 
there is a scale of both rivalry and excludability. For example, access to public 
goods in particular may be specific to geography (e.g. conventional television 
broadcasts, while they broadly satisfy the criteria for a public good, reach only an 
area defined by the location of transmitters, the strength of signals and topographi-
cal constraints) or can be artificially made excludable (such as by using encryption 
services for satellite broadcasts). These create ‘club goods’, which are non-rival and 
are non-excludable to those who can access the ‘club’, but excludable to those out-
side of the club. Thus, some people could be (and often are) excluded from the 
benefits of most theoretically defined public goods through geographic, monetary or 
administrative prohibition. Similarly, rivalry in consumption may be relative to 
capacity, particularly in the case of physical infrastructure. For example, if a sewage 
system has spare capacity its use is non-rival, but as the capacity constraint is 
approached, its use becomes rivalrous; that person whose use of it causes capacity 
to be reached has effectively prevented the next person wishing to use it from doing 
so. Perhaps more usual is that the consumption of a particular good may not prevent 
others from using it, but simply reduces the benefits available. For example, one 
person’s use of a road does not usually prevent use by others, but the use of the road 
becomes less beneficial as more and more people use it and the road consequently 
becomes more congested. This is sometimes termed the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
(Hardin 1968), Chap. 8.
Of key importance, is that ‘markets’ under-supply public goods. First, non- 
excludability means that a price cannot be enforced, leading to ‘free-riding’ (one 
person can benefit from the actions of another person without reciprocation) and 
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thus there is no incentive for anyone to produce or purchase the good. Second, non- 
rivalry means that the socially optimal level of consumption is far greater than the 
level that occurs at the ‘market price’ (Smith and Coast 2003).
To be clear, antibiotics are not themselves public goods  – they can be made 
excludable, and they are rival in the sense that if I use one dose no one else can use 
that exact same dose.
However, the knowledge they embody in their development, and the resultant 
property of reduced infection (bearing in mind the externality properties above) 
means that they have significant public good attributes associated with them. Once 
developed, the knowledge required to produce the antibiotic can be made (virtually) 
freely available as dissemination of it is quick and cheap, and any one firm using it 
to produce the antibiotic does not prevent another from doing so. We will return to 
this aspect in the section concerning the supply of antibiotics in light of resistance. 
It also means that the benefits resulting from the consumption of the antibiotic, of 
reduced infection, cannot be made excludable – we all benefit from reduced trans-
mission of pathogens – and is non-rival – my benefiting from this reduced risk of 
infection does not diminish you equally benefitting from it. And vice-versa – the 
reduced effectiveness of antibiotics due to resistance is also non-rival and non- 
excludable. It is this consumption side to which we now turn.
17.3  The Ethics and Economics of Demand
The characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry have important implica-
tions for the economics and ethics of the demand/consumption side of the market 
for antibiotics from a number of perspectives.
17.3.1  Free-Riding by Consumers
Consumers have an incentive to engage in free-riding, meaning that they have no 
incentive to reduce their own use of antibiotics, but rather to wait for others to do 
so, Chap. 21. This is perhaps also seen as morally acceptable as each individual 
consumption of each individual course of antibiotics will only add infinitesimally to 
the problem of resistance; an individual’s personal consumption of antibiotics really 
is a ‘drop in the ocean’ relative to the total consumption of antimicrobials (Smith 
and Coast 2013). There are strong parallels here with climate change of course. 
Overall, the antimicrobial resistance problem is the accumulation of many millions 
of decisions by different decision makers for different patients in different health 
systems and facing different personal, financial and organizational incentives. 
Economic policies in general aim to induce consumers to internalize the costs of 
any negative externality, but because of the huge diffusion of the problem in relation 
to resistance, such policies may be very challenging if even possible at all.
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For example, system interventions to address free-riding include taxation (akin 
to Pigovian taxes or pollution charges in the case of climate change), subsidy, per-
mits or regulation (Coast et al. 1998; Laxminarayan et al. 2010; Smith and Coast 
1998) although each of these would have their own distributional implications 
(Coast and Smith 2015), Chap. 8. Examples of clinical interventions that may 
address this issue may include better diagnostics (Kolmos and Little 1999; Oppong 
et  al. 2013; Rice 2011) or educational campaigns providing better information 
(Goossens et al. 2006; Huttner et al. 2010), combined with a gatekeeping role from 
healthcare providers. Other possibilities include focussing more on assessing option 
or existence value (the idea that individuals have some personal utility from know-
ing that the option for them to consume antimicrobials in the future will be retained) 
(Coast et al. 2006). However, it is more likely that benefits may come from encour-
aging a greater moral responsibility to avoid resistance within society, such as has 
been undertaken with climate change and pollution, or as a parallel to stronger regu-
lations, such as with banning smoking in public places, compulsory wearing of 
seatbelts in cars or drink-driving campaigns.
17.3.2  Free-Riding Across Nations
These issues of individual free-riding are also paralleled by free-riding across 
macro-settings. Actions taken by current patients have the potential to transmit 
resistance, through the pathogen this resistance is associated with, across interna-
tional, cultural and ethnic boundaries. Antimicrobial resistance does not respect 
regional or national boundaries, with resistant organisms being able to travel from 
one setting to another just as easily as sensitive ones (Smith and Coast 2002). 
Globalization has increased the rate at which infectious diseases can travel, and 
resistances identified in one area are rapidly found in other countries and on other 
continents. Such spread will be dependent on many epidemiological factors, includ-
ing for example, socio-demographic factors, density of the population, natural 
disasters, hygiene levels and so on. Areas with greater poverty may be particularly 
susceptible to the rapid spread of infection and thus the deleterious effects of 
resistance.
Transmission of resistance may have particularly severe consequences for econ-
omies which already suffer greatly from infectious disease – countries where living 
conditions are poor and where there are high proportions of individuals with 
immune-compromise – but it will also have significant economic and health conse-
quences at a global level (Smith and Coast 2002).
Indeed, transmission of resistance across national boundaries compromises mea-
sures that individual countries may put in place to try to combat resistance; import-
ing resistance from elsewhere may negate national initiatives, rendering them 
effectively pointless. Conversely, countries may do little to address resistance within 
their own borders, relying on the activities of other countries to reduce levels of 
resistance that come in and out of the country; effectively, individual countries may 
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‘free-ride’ on the actions of the wider global community and the containment poli-
cies operated in other settings. The potential for resistance to spread across bound-
aries reduces the incentive for any single country to act against resistance – either 
because it will appear futile in the face of a global rise in resistance, or because the 
optimal approach is to await every other country to act first – which means that 
none will.
The total effort devoted to containing antimicrobial resistance is thus likely to be 
suboptimal because some nations will rely on the efforts of other nations. This 
dilemma facing the creation of collective action against antimicrobial resistance at 
the global level has been highlighted elsewhere (Årdal et al. 2016; Smith and Coast 
2002), although it has recently been suggested that international law may provide a 
means of dealing with the problem of collective action in this context (Hoffman 
et al. 2015a; Walls and Ooms 2017), Chaps. 24 and 25.
Despite the importance of the global issue in this context, economic (and other) 
assessments tend to be conducted on a national basis as if systems are closed to the 
outside world. Opening this up would promote awareness that it is in national self- 
interest to look to address resistance in other countries, and thus contribute to global 
initiatives, as well as be open to moral arguments, such as those that drive consider-
able development funds each year from developed to less developed nations (Molzon 
et al. 2011).
17.3.3  Time Preference and Discounting: Free-Riding 
Across Time
The externality effect is also inter-generational, generating significant issues of 
inter- generational as well as regional equity. Actions taken by current patients will 
impact on the transmission and emergence of resistance for future generations, but 
with similar lack of incentive for either individual consumers or nation states to 
fully account for the impact of their decisions on others.
The relevant economic concept here is that of time-preference and discounting – 
that people place higher weight on benefits that occur now and costs that occur in 
the future, thus biasing decisions and choices against future generations (even 
including themselves in that future generation). The discount rate is the amount at 
which future years are ‘discounted’, where a rate of 0 would give equal weight to 
the current and any future year, and 100% would give total weight to the current 
year and count future years as worthless. Thus, a higher rate places more weight on 
the present. Empirical literature finds huge variance in expressed discount rates, but 
this is overwhelmingly based on personal perspectives (Asenso-Boadi et al. 2008). 
These, typically high, rates are not consistent with the normative arguments that are 
considered when intergenerational equity is discussed, and less weighting explicitly 
given to current generations (Olsen and Richardson 2013; Richardson and McKie 
2007). The authors have also previously noted that discount rates with respect to 
R. D. Smith and J. Coast
287
antimicrobial resistance “should reflect collective value judgements and moral 
issues, rather than just the preference that individuals have for their own consump-
tion over time” (Coast et al. 1996). This is important as high discount rates would 
result in an almost exclusive focus on the current population, and would probably 
also mean that the focus would be on interventions intended to reduce transmission 
of antimicrobial resistance, which has relatively short-term gains, rather than inter-
ventions intended to reduce emergence of new resistances, which may be further 
down the line (but where the total benefits in the absence of discounting may be 
much greater). This issue is examined in greater detail elsewhere (Coast et al. 2002).
17.3.4  The Importance of Context
On the consumption side, therefore, the focus of policy is on incentives and systems 
to influence demand through education of patients, restriction of availability through 
regulation, or greater guidance to providers (Dar et al. 2016). There are huge chal-
lenges in this respect, not only of construction, enforcement and evaluation of any 
single policy, but also across contexts. Policy in most developed countries is con-
cerned with reducing the over-use of antibiotics – their use where there is little or no 
clinical indication, such as for the common cold, their use where there is marginal 
clinical benefit (e.g. many minor infections in otherwise healthy people, which may 
hasten their cure by a few days only) and even use where there may be greater mor-
bidity but the disease is not fatal. In contrast in many low- and middle-income coun-
tries the challenges are to increase use, where appropriate, to reduce pools of 
infection, and to reduce practices of dose splitting, use of sub-standard, out-of-date 
or counterfeit medicines, and cross use of antibiotics for humans and animals 
(Review on antimicrobial resistance 2015a).
17.4  The Ethics and Economics of Supply
Externality and public good aspects are not only relevant to consumers, but also to 
the producers of antibiotics. The supply-chain of antibiotics is long – from original 
discovery, research and development, which may be in universities, through testing 
and eventual production by a pharmaceutical company, through wholesalers, health 
systems or private pharmacy and retailers (with prospects for counterfeit or sub- 
standard antibiotics being introduced along the way), Chap. 5 However, critical to 
this discussion is the core discovery, development and production of the antibiotics; 
especially that undertaken in the private sector.
It has been noted many times that there has been a distinctly dry pipeline for new 
antibiotics over recent decades, with no new class of antibiotic being discovered for 
many years and declining investment by the pharmaceutical industry in the area of 
anti-infectives (Cormican and Vellinga 2012). What underlies this is the current 
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business model for the development of pharmaceuticals, which is based on a market 
response to ‘free-riding’ (Smith et al. 2009).
17.4.1  Free-Riding and Intellectual Property
Basic research and development of new drugs is hugely expensive, but the informa-
tion that is produced from this research and development activity  – such as the 
chemical formulation of a new antibiotic – is almost costless to disseminate, is very 
hard (especially in the internet age) to exclude other companies having access to, 
and is non-rival in the sense that me using this information to produce the drug does 
not prevent you also using the information to produce the drug. Thus, given the non- 
excludability of this information, it is socially optimal to encourage wide dissemi-
nation and use of it, which can be achieved at almost zero cost once produced. But, 
the inability to exclude means that a high-price cannot be charged for it to recoup 
the original investment in its production, and so other producers can ‘free-ride’ on 
the back of the one who first produced the information. Since the original producers 
cannot recoup their costs, let alone gain a profit, then there is no incentive for that 
information to be produced. Hence, left to this pure market system, there would be 
no medicines developed (Smith and Coast 2003).
The ‘solution’ to this situation has been to develop an artificial exclusion system 
to enable the original producer who discovers and develops the information to 
charge a higher price to compensate for the research and development costs incurred. 
This is the ‘Intellectual Property Right’ system, which in the case of pharmaceuti-
cals is operationalised through a patent (Smith et al. 2009). This system confers a 
legal exclusion to be placed on others using material that is patented for a specified 
number of years – usually 20–30. During this time whoever filed the patent, such as 
the pharmaceutical company, has exclusive rights to use it and can therefore charge 
a sufficiently high price for the medicine it develops from it to allow it to recoup the 
costs invested, and to make a profit (Yamabhai and Smith 2015).
This ‘solution’, however, creates a critical problem for both efficiency and ethics. 
Due to the non-rival nature of the information  – and the non-rival nature of the 
resultant reduction in infectious disease risk from taking the antibiotic that is based 
on the information – it is most socially efficient if it is widely disseminated and 
used. The patent system creates a restriction on that use, since only those who can 
afford to pay the price now charged can access it, which will be at a level lower than 
is socially optimal. Ethically, it also means that the information – and resultant anti-
biotics – are only available at a much higher price than the production cost, with the 
known consequence that there will be people who can benefit who are being denied 
that treatment (Mendelson et al. 2016). The ‘patent wedge’ between cost price and 
the price charged by the patent holder can typically by seen when the patent period 
expires and ‘generic’ versions of branded pharmaceuticals are made available, 
which are often hundreds of times cheaper (Smith et al. 2009). During the patent 
period there are clearly therefore poorer people, and countries, that are not able to 
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afford to access these drugs and where ill-health is suffered as a result. For example, 
the most infamous case is that relating to anti-retroviral therapies for HIV/AIDS 
which were priced at over US$10,000 per person per year by those producing 
branded products, but could be produced by generic manufacturers for US$365 per 
patient per year (Keppler 2013). This is both inefficient and unethical (Laxminarayan 
et al. 2016). Inequality in access due to price – especially for those in low-income 
settings – has been the cause of considerable debate more widely with respect to 
medicines (Trouiller et al. 2002).
There is added complexity in the case of antibiotics, compared to other medi-
cines, in part due to the nature of antibiotics, which are relatively inexpensive com-
pared to other drugs that could be developed and are used for short periods of time 
(thus reducing the potential profit), and in part due to the development of resistance, 
as polices elsewhere seek to reduce and restrict use. This is especially the case in 
high-income countries, which is where the major markets for new antibiotics are 
based and where companies expect to be able to charge the higher-prices required 
to support research and development. The combination then of the high develop-
ment cost, with reduced market volume, has discouraged investment in this area.
17.4.2  Alternative Systems
Over the years there have been growing calls for changes to the patent system as 
underpinning research and development in pharmaceutical in general, largely from 
those concerned about the bias towards health needs of high-income countries who 
are the major markets, resulting in concerns around ‘neglected diseases’ (Trouiller 
et  al. 2002), Chap. 10. More recently, especially following the report from the 
Independent Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, chaired by Lord Jim O’Neill, 
there has been a renewed push for the development of new systems for incentivising 
investment in new antibiotics, where high-income countries too have considerable 
need that is not being met (Review on antimicrobial resistance 2015a).
One popular alternative is the de-linking of profitability from sales volumes 
(Brogan and Mossialos 2016; Review on antimicrobial resistance 2015b; Wise 
2015). For example, pre- purchase agreements could be made by governments to 
guarantee the pharmaceutical company a minimum ‘market’ in terms of sales, but 
then the government can choose whether and how those drugs would be dissemi-
nated. This builds on other recent work, such as by Chatham House, a think-tank on 
international affairs, which has outlined alternative business models to similarly 
change the current financial models for encouraging and supporting research and 
development in new antibiotics (Kesselheim and Outterson 2010; Outterson 2014; 
Outterson et  al. 2015). There is a lot of work and funding also now going in to 
research and development by governments themselves to directly develop new anti-
biotics. For example, The U.S. granted GlaxoSmithKline US$200 million for 
investment in new antibiotic research and development (GlaxoSmithKline 2013). 
There are also other initiatives. In the United States for instance there has been an 
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extension to marketing exclusivity, accelerated review, and a relaxation of require-
ments for approval by the Food and Drug Administration (Hatch 2015). Although 
this leniency may have increased the development and launch of new antibiotics, 
there is worrying evidence that such ‘fast tracking’ may generate considerable 
adverse effects (Doshi 2015).
Critical, of course, is the basic fact that because resistance to an antibiotic begins 
as soon as it is developed, new agents can never be the sole solution—and are 
unlikely to be the most cost-effective or sustainable, Chap. 19. Thus, in addition to 
looking at encouragement of new drug discovery, another focus has been on initia-
tives to support the sustainable use of current antibiotics through the development 
of rapid diagnostic tests to support the more ‘appropriate’ use of antibiotics (Review 
on antimicrobial resistance 2015a). In the UK there have been specific funds made 
available to support diagnostics research and development through the UK Research 
Councils (Medical Research Council 2014), and the Longitude Prize, where £1 m is 
to be awarded to whoever first develops a specific rapid – and affordable – diagnos-
tic tool (Nesta 2014). The critical issue here is the last one – affordability. Diagnostic 
tests face a challenge of affordability in relation to the option to simply take the – 
currently cheaper – antibiotic. The cost of the test relative to the cost of the antibi-
otic is critical – if the test costs more than, or even approximates, the antibiotic cost 
then it is likely to be rational for individuals to simply take the antibiotic and risk it 
not working – if it does work they save the cost of the test, if it does not work then 
they may need another drug but have still saved the cost of the test, whereas if they 
have the test and don’t need an antibiotic they may have incurred a cost greater than 
that of simply taking the antibiotic, and if the test suggests they do need that antibi-
otic all they have done is add a cost of the test on to what they would have paid in 
any case. There are challenges especially for this in community settings, rather than 
hospitals, and in low- and middle-income countries.
Given that a critical feature of antimicrobial resistance is that it occurs naturally 
for all antibiotics, developing new drugs may win successive battles but not the war. 
It is possible that genomic developments may produce antibiotics where resistance 
is not seen, or new ways to tackle pathogens. However, in the absence of those, the 
most serious issue is not, perhaps, systems for encouraging development in new 
technologies, but rather how to design health systems that are less reliant on antibi-
otics. Modern healthcare especially, has been built on the basis that infections can 
be prevented or treated easily and cheaply. Healthcare has become increasingly 
technological and invasive, and antibiotics have become integrated in many aspects 
of care, from prevention of iatrogenic infection in surgery, to women delivering by 
caesarean section to those having cancer treatment (Smith 2015). From both eco-
nomic and ethical perspectives efforts should perhaps focus more on alternatives to 
antibiotics and on adjustments to health systems and care pathways to reduce reli-
ance upon antibiotics.
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17.5  Discussion: The Convergence of Ethics and Economics
Far from the ‘dismal science’, or the often perceived amoral (if not immoral) nature 
of economics being in conflict with ethics, antimicrobial resistance is a case where 
the two perspectives are frequently aligned. Many of the economic imperatives for 
ensuring the efficient and sustainable development and use of antibiotics are in-line 
with major ethical principles to secure benefits that are equitably available and dis-
tributed. In this sense, from an economic and ethical perspective, we are seeking to:
• Develop alternative systems to support the discovery, development and produc-
tion of new antibiotics that are effective for all major infectious diseases globally
• Ensure that these antibiotics are available to those populations that would benefit 
from them, wherever they are in the world
• Look for alternatives to reduce reliance on antibiotics – alternatives for the same 
treatment or prevention of infection, and alternatives to avoid infection and risk 
of infection and hence requirement for antibiotics or their substitutes
It is also important to note that, at least from an economics perspective, the ‘erad-
ication’ of resistance is not necessarily a desirable goal. To eradicate resistance 
entirely – or even to maintain resistance at current levels – would require significant, 
if not total, reduction in the use of antibiotics, as the use of any antibiotic will lead 
to the development of some resistance.
Such a goal would imply allowing significant mortality and morbidity to be 
incurred – far in excess of that caused by the resistance itself. The aim must there-
fore be to use the available strategies to optimise the balance between the current 
use of effective antibiotics to treat infection, and thus reduce morbidity and mortal-
ity today, and minimising the emergence and spread of resistance to these antibiot-
ics and the consequent increased future morbidity and mortality. This balance 
depends upon the relative costs and benefits of the positive and negative effects 
involved. It is determining this balance that is critical, and requires consideration 
from both an economics and an ethical perspective, as it encompasses significant 
inter-generational and inter-regional distributional aspects.
Given the diverse contexts of the developed and developing nations, it is likely 
that optimal strategies will vary considerably across these them, but all strategies 
should share the same goals of achieving an optimal balance in the use of antimicro-
bial agents (Hoffman et al. 2015b; Woolhouse and Farrar 2014) and explicit consid-
eration of the distributional implications.
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Antibiotics and Animal Agriculture: 
The Need for Global Collective Action
Jonathan Anomaly
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Economics
The use of antibiotics in animal agriculture is steadily increasing, especially in 
developing countries. The European Union and a handful of developed countries 
have implemented policies to scale back the use of antibiotics, recognizing its role 
in the global rise of antibiotic resistance. But many farmers who raise animals live 
in poor countries without public health regulations, or work for large corporate enti-
ties that can move their operations to places with weak regulations. To minimize the 
careless use of antibiotics around the world, we need multi-lateral coordination 
between states on some common standards for the use of antibiotics in animals.
18.1  Introduction
Imagine a world in which every time you tied your shoes, you contributed to a pro-
cess that resulted in the unintended suffering and death of thousands of people 
you’ll never know.1 In this world, like ours, shoelaces are useful: they save time, are 
a little cheaper than using Velcro ties, and more convenient than wearing slip-on 
shoes. But when everyone ties their shoes, lots of people die, and many more suffer.
This is a strange world to imagine, but it is a lot like the world we live in. The 
culprit isn’t tying shoelaces, of course, but consuming factory farmed meat. Factory 
farms are wicked places  – one of the last bastions of legally sanctioned cruelty 
toward animals. But more than this, they are bad for human health.
1 Parts of the introduction are reprinted from an article that first appeared in Compass, the annual 
magazine of the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University (2017).
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Some antibiotics are given to cattle and pigs to marginally speed up their growth. 
The biological mechanisms through which antibiotics promote growth aren’t well 
understood, but the use of antibiotics to promote growth does seem to work. More 
importantly, raising animals in densely packed conditions requires a steady dose of 
antibiotics to prevent infections that would otherwise run rampant.
Like many practices, there are benefits as well as costs: meat from factory farms 
is cheaper than meat from farms with free-range animals, often about half the price. 
This is partly because factory farms allow animals to occupy less space, which 
makes their production cheaper, and this savings is passed on to consumers.
Apart from its obvious benefits, factory farming produces many costs (Anomaly 
2015). In this essay, I will focus on the threat that our use of antibiotics in animal 
agriculture poses for human health. Contrary to popular opinion, the problem is not 
that antibiotics are passed along from animals to people who eat them, and that this 
is bad for our health. Instead, the problem is that the more antibiotics we give to 
livestock, the more we encourage the emergence and spread of antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria in a microbial environment shared by animals and people (Marshall and 
Levy 2011; Spellberg et al. 2016).
Like all eukaryotic organisms, people pay a high price for sex: each child only 
shares half of her genes with each parent. But sexual reproduction seems to confer 
benefits by increasing variation in the immune system children inherit, thus making 
it more likely that some of them will survive the onslaught of parasites that continu-
ally evolve novel ways of exploiting their hosts (Hamilton et al. 1990). As strange 
as sex is – each of two independent organisms swapping their genes to create a 
hybrid – the bacterial equivalent is even kinkier than a San Francisco night club. 
Bacteria reproduce by cloning themselves, but they evolve throughout their lives by 
promiscuously swapping genes with other bacteria and by extracting genes from the 
viruses that parasitize them. This allows them to adapt to new environments quickly: 
in a lethal environment, a small number of bacteria are likely to have some advan-
tage over the trillions that die. And this advantage comes either from a random 
genetic mutation, or from the lateral transfer of genes from one bacterium to another.
Some genes allow bacteria to fend off the antibiotics that plants, animals, and 
other bacteria use to destroy them. Many of these naturally occurring antibiotics 
have existed for billions of years, as part of an unending evolutionary arms race 
between host and parasite. Like their naturally occurring cousins, synthetic antibiot-
ics made in a lab usually involve penetrating a bacterial cell wall and disrupting 
DNA synthesis, or otherwise slowing or stopping bacterial reproduction.
All a bacterium needs to survive an antibiotic is some way to either block the 
penetration of the chemical with a thick cell wall, degrade it with enzymes, or pump 
it out if it penetrates its body. Once that happens, it’s off to the races. The lucky 
bacterium multiplies rapidly and spreads its resistance to other bacteria. When new 
resistant strains of bacteria emerge in animal agriculture, they are passed along to 
farmers who work with animals, workers who slaughter animals, consumers who 
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eat meat, and people in our more general microbial environment (Laxminarayan 
et al. 2016).
The average person hosts about 40  trillion bacteria at any given time, and we 
constantly swap bacteria with each other and with the environment around us 
(Sender et al. 2016). So even though the overuse of antibiotics tends to affect those 
closest to the source of resistant bacteria – whether animals or people – over time, 
strains of bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics can spread through trade and travel 
among people, and through soil and streams around factory farms. And while reduc-
ing the use of antibiotics does tend to reduce resistance, the decline of resistance 
does not happen immediately, since reservoirs of antibiotic-resistant genes tend to 
persist in bacterial plasmids for a long time (Andersson and Hughes 2010).
For more than a decade the European Union has banned antibiotics for growth 
promotion in farm animals, and tried to impose standards that increase animal wel-
fare and reduce the need to use antibiotics. The US has begun to follow suit, driven 
by consumer demand for antibiotic-free meat, and FDA threats of regulation. But 
most developing countries are moving in the opposite direction, with explosive 
growth of antibiotic use in both people and animals in China, India, Pakistan, Egypt, 
and many sub-Saharan African countries (Van Boeckel et al. 2015).
18.2  Economic Models
The problem of antibiotic resistance is often framed by well-known economic mod-
els like the prisoner’s dilemma, the tragedy of the commons, or the provision of 
public goods. All three models are useful in some contexts, but when they are not 
adequately qualified they can cast shade rather than light on the problem of resistance.
18.2.1  Prisoner’s Dilemma
Consider first the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). In the original example, we are pre-
sented with two prisoners who are suspected of armed robbery, but a District 
Attorney (DA) who only has enough evidence to prosecute them for the illegal pos-
session of firearms. The prisoners are in separate jail cells, and the DA offers each 
of them a deal: if you snitch on your accomplice and he stays silent, you’ll get off 
scot free and he’ll be executed. If you both stay silent, you’ll each get one year in 
prison. If you both snitch, you’ll each get a decade in prison. The payoffs are as 
follows:






If the accomplices lack friendly feelings for one another, and if neither fears 
reprisals outside of prison, the rational move for each is to snitch, even if the socially 
optimal move is for both to stay silent. The PD is interesting because each player 
acting rationally produces an outcome that is worse for everyone.
The PD is a simple model that is frequently invoked to explain why rational 
agents act in ways that contribute to air pollution or species extinction even when 
each person would prefer to breath clean air or preserve biodiversity. Although most 
of the real-world games the PD is used to illustrate are complicated by the fact that 
there are more than two players, that players have asymmetric information or poorly 
formed preferences, and that they face uncertainty about whether (or how many 
times) the game will be repeated, the simplistic two player model is still of some use 
in visualizing problems like antibiotic resistance.
Consider the following case. Each carnivore faces the choice to consume meat 
from factory farmed animals or humanely raised animals free from antibiotics.
Odin Loki
Humanely raised Factory farmed
Humanely raised 2nd/2nd 4th/1st
Factory farmed 1st/4th 3rd/3rd
The payoff matrix indicates that each person does best by consuming factory 
farmed meat, that each does worst by consuming humanely raised meat (if the other 
does not), but that they both do better if they both consume meat from humanely 
raised rather than factory farmed animals. In the real world, if there were only two 
consumers and two producers, the effects of Loki’s consumption choices would not 
be big enough to adversely affect Odin’s welfare. But when we generalize to hun-
dreds of millions of people, we get a case in which each person marginally increases 
the probability of antibiotic-resistant bacteria emerging and spreading, but each also 
saves a bit of money by consuming meat from factory farmed animals. As long as 
the benefit to each from buying factory farmed meat exceeds the costs associated 
with the alternative, the model predicts they will continue their socially suboptimal 
behavior.
There are several limitations of extending a two-person model to a many-person 
case. First, in the large number case we can treat other people’s actions as given, 
whereas in the small number case we might change their behavior by reasoning with 
them (Bowles and Gintis 2013). Second, in the large number case we may have to 
resort to using state power to incentivize socially optimal behavior, whereas in the 
small number case people are in a better position to create local solutions that 
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exploit social norms and informal punishments to move from the Nash equilibrium 
to the Pareto optimum (Ostrom 2000).
Similar considerations apply to farmers choosing whether to raise their animals 
with or without antibiotics, which is a many-person prisoner’s dilemma in which 
most people reason parametrically (taking other’s actions as more-or-less given). 
While there is a growing market for antibiotic-free meat, so that some farmers find 
it profitable to reject factory farming, most consumers around the world either don’t 
know enough or care enough about the problem to entice farmers to reject antibiot-
ics and raise their animals humanely.
18.2.2  Tragedy of the Commons
Many have argued that our aggregate use of antibiotics – in hospital settings and 
animal agriculture – is analogous to the misuse of commonly owned resources. In 
the classic example of a commons tragedy, farmers lack private property rights and 
are forced to raise animals on a common plot of land. The farmers internalize the 
benefits from raising animals and selling their meat, but share the costs of grass and 
soil depletion. Consequently, in the absence of sufficient altruistic restraint, each 
farmer continues to add animals to the commons up to the point at which the per-
sonal benefits equal the personal costs. To the extent that they ignore social costs, 
farmers add animals even if it makes everyone worse off than they would be if they 
agreed to a set of enforceable constraints.
Assume, for example, that above some number for each animal added to a com-
mon pasture, each farmer will get 10 utility points but the community will lose 20 
utility points as the grass becomes overgrazed. If there are 10 farmers, each nets 8 
utility points from adding another animal (+10 from selling the meat and − 2 from 
depleting grass and soil), and so they add animals until the commons is ruined. The 
typical solution to commons tragedies is to privatize plots of land, or (less effi-
ciently) to set up enforceable limits with penalties for exceeding the limits. In small 
settings, these standards can be enforced by the court of public opinion, assuming 
farmers care about their reputation in the community. In large settings, standards are 
usually set by the state, and enforced with penalties for violating laws, or taxes and 
subsidies that attempt to bring about a socially optimal use of common resources.
Is the use of antibiotics on factory farms a commons tragedy? Some suggest that 
it is (Hollis and Maybarduk 2015). Others are more cautious, arguing that it depends 
on assumptions that include how quickly alternative antibiotics and vaccines will be 
developed, and how accurately we can diagnose infections (McAdams 2017a). Just 
as there is no such thing as a precise carrying capacity for land (since we can develop 
chemical fertilizers to increase soil productivity, or genetically engineer animals to 
more efficiently turn grass into meat), so too there is no specific point at which using 
more antibiotics necessarily imposes net costs on people.
As with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the commons tragedy model can help us con-
ceptualize the incentives that generate the problem of antibiotic resistance. But it 
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can also be misleading. For example, suppose we develop better diagnostics. Rapid 
diagnostic tests can make broad-spectrum antibiotics last longer by helping us iden-
tify the specific kind of infection plaguing a person or animal so that we can treat it 
with a narrow-spectrum antibiotic agent (McAdams 2017a). When better diagnos-
tics are available to guide treatment in conjunction with extremely narrow-spectrum 
agents, David McAdams argues that “greater antibiotic use can in some cases 
decrease the selective pressure favoring resistant bacteria” (2017a, p.  6). Better 
diagnostics may also make it more profitable for companies to manufacture and 
conserve antibiotics if it leads physicians and farmers to more carefully use antibiot-
ics to target specific infections (2017b). Using the wrong antibiotic often fails to 
treat the relevant infection, and it encourages resistance among all bacteria that the 
antibiotic affects. Using broad-spectrum antibiotics without a specific diagnosis is 
like carpet-bombing an entire city in order to kill a few soldiers. To the extent that 
we can target our enemies with precision strikes, there is less opportunity for col-
lateral damage in the form of resistant strains of bacteria that grow in number as 
their susceptible compatriots are killed.
In addition to rapid diagnostic tests, the invention of “adjuvants” (supplements 
that make antibiotics more effective by priming our immune system, or by blocking 
bacterial resistance) can extend the life of antibiotics (Wright 2016). Rapid diagnos-
tics and effective adjuvants show that the collective consumption of antibiotics does 
not automatically create a commons tragedy. It all depends on how we use antibiot-
ics, and this is in part a function of technology, and the incentives that physicians 
and farmers face as a result of public policies.
Nevertheless, the careless way in which antibiotics are currently used in animal 
agriculture outside of Europe probably is a commons tragedy. This is because farm-
ers in most countries today simply ignore the social cost of using antibiotics in 
livestock, and many farmers fail to understand how using antibiotics in agriculture 
can lead to the rise of bacterial infections in people that are increasingly expensive, 
difficult, or impossible to treat.
18.2.3  Public Goods
A final model frequently used to describe problems associated with our use of anti-
biotics requires us to make a distinction. In economics, private goods are those that 
are consumed by individuals in ways that don’t involve significant externalities 
(costs or benefits borne by people external to an economic transaction). For exam-
ple, when I buy a private good like a cup of coffee or a pair of eyeglasses, the costs 
or benefits imposed on other people are trivial. Public goods, by contrast, are con-
sumed in common, so that we share the benefits of consumption. Public goods can 
be thought of as non-excludable positive externalities (Cowen 2008), though this is 
misleading in cases where the public good is experienced as a cost rather than a 
benefit to those who consume it.
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Antibiotics themselves are not public goods, but to some extent the efficacy of 
antibiotics, and efforts made to move us toward the socially optimal use of antibiot-
ics, are public goods. Similarly, efforts to eliminate infectious diseases are public 
goods (Selgelid 2007), since the reduction or eradication of a disease is shared by 
all people in a region, and potentially all people on the planet. By extension, reduc-
ing the reckless use of antibiotics in agriculture is a public good. Although alterna-
tive agricultural methods are more expensive, the enormous external costs of 
drug-resistant diseases that emerge from factory farming almost certainly exceed 
the benefits of cheaper meat (O’Neill et al. 2015).2
Many people, including some economists, equate public goods problems with 
commons tragedies and prisoner’s dilemmas. This is a mistake, although it is under-
standable since many commons tragedies and public goods problems can be use-
fully modeled by the prisoner’s dilemma. But often public goods are better described 
as assurance games or coordination games (Hampton 1987), and this is good news 
for lawmakers and farming associations who are aware of the problem and want to 
converge on common standards that allow them to make a profit and minimize the 
risk of antibiotic resistance. One problem with preserving global public goods like 
the efficacy of antibiotics is that most people are unaware of the problem, since each 
plays a very small role in producing it. In other words, many people who might help 
preserve or produce public goods are rationally ignorant about the nature of the 
problem.
18.3  Moral Principles
Ignorance of how the use of antibiotics in agriculture harms human health is ratio-
nal in the economic sense, but it is not necessarily morally excusable (Anomaly 
2015). Since the problem of AMR is difficult to understand, and since each act of 
consuming factory-farmed products contributes only imperceptibly to the problem, 
it makes perfect sense that consumers would ignore the problem and purchase cheap 
factory-farmed meat, rather than more expensive meat from farms that don’t use 
antibiotics.
But the fact that we can explain consumer ignorance does not absolve consumers 
of responsibility for contributing to the problem. As information about the private 
benefits and social costs of using antibiotics in farm animals becomes more widely 
available, consumers have an increasing responsibility to act on it by changing their 
purchasing habits and trying to persuade governments to make it harder to purchase 
meat from animals unnecessarily dosed with antibiotics. Alexander Fleming 
2 It may be that some use of antibiotics in agriculture is both individually beneficial for animals 
(who contract infections despite humane and prudent farming practices), and socially beneficial 
for people (who may be less likely to contract a bacterial infection an animal has). But the growing 
quantity of antibiotics used in farming today is likely to produce harms that far exceed these 
benefits.
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famously warned that “the thoughtless person playing with penicillin is morally 
responsible for the death of the man who finally succumbs to infection with the 
penicillin-resistant organism.”3 One form of “playing with penicillin” is the use of it 
as a growth promoter on factory farms, or the more common use of it to prevent 
infections in the cramped and cruel conditions that characterize factory farms.
A more nuanced version of Fleming’s admonition requires us to distinguish 
actual harms to discrete people from probabilistic harms to actual or potential peo-
ple. Another way to put the point is to say that the harms of antibiotic resistance are 
“identity-independent” in the sense that the victims of AMR cannot be known ahead 
of time and, in some cases, are not yet born. While a single farmer (or consumer) 
misusing antibiotics can create or encourage a resistant strain that spreads to other 
people, generally the prevalence of resistant bacteria in the environment depends on 
how all of us act. By acting in ways that create genetic pollution in our microbial 
environment, we make it a little more likely that someone will suffer or die of a 
previously treatable infection.
Many other pollution problems are structurally similar to antibiotic resistance. 
For example, each of us drives to work and produces the social costs of pollution 
and traffic congestion as a byproduct, while experiencing the private benefit of an 
enjoyable ride in our own car. There are also social benefits when each person 
drives, if driving contributes to a more efficient workforce that creates better goods 
at lower cost. Suppose the social costs of air pollution and traffic congestion exceed 
the individual benefits of driving. A common response is to impose a price on driv-
ing by taxing fuel or charging user fees to encourage the efficient use of roads and 
the atmosphere. The underlying moral principles are that we should pay in propor-
tion to the amount we contribute to the problem, and that if anyone’s liberties to 
pollute are restricted, then all us should face the same restrictions (Gaus 1999, 
p. 197).
Similar arguments have been made for taxing antibiotics in medicine and agri-
culture to discourage low-value use (Kades 2005; Anomaly 2013). But antibiotic 
resistance is much more complicated than air pollution or traffic congestion: in 
some cases we may want to subsidize rather than tax the use of antibiotics when 
people who can’t afford them are likely to spread infectious diseases to others 
(Selgelid 2007). Apart from taxes and subsidies, there is a vast literature on how to 
harness intellectual property rights, prescription requirements, basic science 
research funding, and shared surveillance to control the problem (O’Neill et al. 2016).
What I now want to argue is that without more coordination between states, the 
problem of antibiotic resistance in agriculture will likely get worse, with dire con-




18.4  Global Coordination
The provision of global public goods like conserving antibiotics and reducing infec-
tious disease raises two problems: the free rider problem occurs when individual 
consumers, farmers, or states seek the gains of limited antibiotic use without paying 
the costs; the assurance problem occurs when each is willing to pay the cost of 
reducing unnecessary use, but lacks the assurance that others will abide by policies 
that constrain our collective use of antibiotics.
The first problem is difficult to overcome to the extent that self-interest domi-
nates the actions of farmers in a market or of politicians in a government. But there 
is some evidence that most consumers who understand the problem are willing to 
pay higher prices for meat from animals not given antibiotics (Spellberg et al. 2016). 
Moreover, if people really understood the problems factory farms create they would 
likely be willing to pay significantly more for meat, since most people support taxes 
(or costly regulations) when they are reasonably sure the tax will be used to discour-
age the problems associated with pollution (Kallbekken et al. 2011).
Agricultural producers are also likely to be willing to comply with standards that 
limit antibiotic use provided other firms are also forced to internalize the cost of 
similar regulations or taxes. The fact that the assurance problem is often more seri-
ous than the free rider problem in trying to elicit cooperation in many public goods 
games (Bowles and Gintis 2013) is good news for those who worry about the feasi-
bility of states setting mutually beneficial standards.
Part of the problem with antibiotics in agriculture is that as transportation costs 
decline, the market for animal meat becomes increasingly global: animal feed is 
produced in one country, animals are raised in another, and then meat is exported to 
a third country. Since producers in many countries are now in a position to operate 
industrial animal farms, unless all states set standards that limit antibiotic use, pro-
ducers will tend to migrate to countries with the weakest regulations. There is 
already some evidence that this “race to the bottom” is happening as Chinese farms 
are producing meat in factory farms that use more confinement and antibiotics than 
farms in other countries. In fact, just as the US is beginning to move away from fac-
tory farming due to consumer demand and threats of regulation by the US Food and 
Drug Administration, many of the most populous developing countries – including 
China, India, and Brazil – are embracing factory farming (O’Neill et al. 2015).
A well-designed trade treaty between major exporters and importers of meat 
should recognize the problem of “leakage,” which occurs when one country sets 
relatively high environmental standards, and allows other countries with weaker 
standards to increase the production of similar goods in ways that simply changes 
where the pollution is emitted (Barrett 1999). In other words, any treaty worth 
implementing cannot reward free-riding countries whose firms are permitted to 
externalize the costs of their production, while firms in other countries internalize 
the costs of complying with policies that would make everyone better off if coun-
tries complied with them.
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A second feature of an effective treaty to limit antibiotics in agriculture is a mini-
mum participation clause to assure prospective signatories that unless a sufficient 
number of nations sign on, they will not be forced to pay additional production costs 
(Barrett 1999). This feature solves the assurance problem for firms and nations that 
are willing to comply with stricter production practices provided enough others do 
to produce the global benefits associated with restricting antibiotic use.
A third feature of any multi-lateral agreement to restrict antibiotic use is that it 
would need to be flexible enough to allow countries to achieve collective goals in 
different ways. For example, some experts advocate setting targets for the per capita 
quantity of antibiotics that can be administered to animals. According to the British 
Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, pork producers in Denmark (the first country 
to ban antibiotics as growth promoters) use about 50 mg of antibiotics per kg of 
livestock in the country (O’Neill et al. 2015, p. 2).
A flexible treaty would take something like this number as a benchmark that all 
countries must meet, but it would allow countries to achieve the relevant goal in 
different ways: by taxing antibiotics, placing a cap on total use, restricting antibiot-
ics by requiring veterinary oversight, or some combination of these policies. 
Antibiotics deemed especially important for human use should probably be banned 
for use in agriculture by all countries. But what often matters is the quantity of anti-
biotics used, not just the kind. This is especially true because plasmids that confer 
antibiotic resistance can be transferred between bacteria of different species, and 
can reduce the efficacy of different drugs than those administered by farmers 
(Marshall and Levy 2011).
One advantage of imposing “pollution taxes” or user fees on antibiotics in agri-
culture is that, unlike regulations, governments have strong incentives to enforce 
them. Governments can use the revenue raised from taxes to finance vaccination 
programs that minimize the need to administer antibiotics. They might also fund 
basic science research that aims to develop new vaccines and diagnostics for infec-
tious diseases, and to develop entirely new treatments like genetically engineered 
bacteriophage viruses (Bikard et al. 2014).
Taxing socially costly activities like using antibiotics in agriculture also incentiv-
izes farmers to find alternative ways to produce meat that minimize antibiotic resis-
tance. These alternatives may include increasing the roaming space animals have, 
and decreasing the stress they face when forced to live in extreme confinement. A 
more promising alternative is to create “in vitro meat” made in a lab from embry-
onic stem cells. This would avoid the need to raise animals at all, thus reducing 
untold amounts of suffering and potential public health problems.
Finally, any agreement to restrict antibiotic use should be attractive enough for 
each participating country to be willing to enforce it. It is likely that offering bene-
fits for compliance will be more effective than simply threats of sanctions for non- 
compliance. For example, it is in the interest of all nations that each nation monitors 
the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases, as well as novel patterns of antibiotic 
resistance. But sometimes only wealthier states have the budgets and technology to 
accomplish this. By sharing information and technology with developing countries, 
wealthier countries can both signal goodwill and deliver tangible benefits to other 
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countries they wish to comply with stricter controls on antibiotic use. This may act 
as a positive incentive for poor countries to do their part, even if the threat of sanc-
tions for non-compliance with collectively beneficial restrictions is also important.
Each nation faces its own challenges, including an electorate that is unlikely to 
fully understand the social benefits and costs of antibiotics, and factory farmers who 
are unlikely to welcome regulations that impose new costs on them. Governments 
can justify spending some money to ease the transition from factory farming tech-
niques to alternatives that produce better consequences for the same reason they can 
justify compensating taxi cab drivers who were required to buy a costly permit from 
the state to drive a taxi, but who are now forced to compete with companies like 
Uber, whose drivers did not have to pay for the right to operate as a taxi service. In 
fact, if relatively wealthy governments offer temporary assistance to domestic firms 
to transition away from factory farming, and to relatively poor governments to com-
ply with new restrictions, the move away from the reckless use of antibiotics may 
be easier to induce, and more fair from the standpoint of global distributive justice.
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Chapter 19
Technological Fixes and Antimicrobial 
Resistance
Nicholas B. King
Abstract A ‘technological fix’ reduces the negative impact of a problem without 
addressing its underlying political, economic, or social causes. This chapter exam-
ines antimicrobials’ central role in both the modern faith in technological fixes in 
medicine, and critiques of over-reliance on technological interventions that produce 
unintended consequences. The enduring appeal of technological fixes is rooted in 
their promise to provide simple, efficient, measurable, and effective solutions to 
complex problems; but this practically is purchased at the price of eliding important 
distributive concerns.
Keywords Ethics · Public health · Infectious diseases · Social policy · History 
of science
19.1  Introduction
In October, 2003, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) announced the 
first 14 ‘Grand Challenges in Global Health,’ as part of an initiative to stimulate 
scientific research on diseases affecting less-developed nations. Grand Challenge 
#10 asked for applications that would help “discover drugs and delivery systems 
that minimize the likelihood of drug resistant microorganisms.” In the intervening 
years, combatting antimicrobial resistance has continued to be a priority for the 
BMGF, with at least 50 grants funded through initiatives aimed at ‘Creating Drugs 
and Delivery Systems to Limit Drug Resistance,’ and identifying ‘Novel Approaches 
to Characterizing and Tracking the Global Burden of Antimicrobial Resistance.’ 
Funded projects include efforts to crowdsource surveillance of antimicrobial resis-
tance (AMR), investigating the role of metabolic pathways in M. tuberculosis 
N. B. King (*) 
McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
310
bacteria as a target for drug therapy, and identifying chemical entities that would act 
as ‘selection inverters’ to limit or reverse the development of AMR.
Given the problem’s scale and complexity, the importance of developing techno-
logical solutions to improve surveillance and response to AMR might seem unas-
sailable. However, soon after the initial announcement of the BMGF Grand 
Challenges, historian Anne-Emanuelle Birn published a sharp critique in The 
Lancet. Birn argued that, “in calling on the world’s researchers to develop innova-
tive solutions targeted to ‘the most critical scientific challenges in global health’, the 
Gates Foundation has turned to a narrowly conceived understanding of health as the 
product of technical interventions divorced from economic, social, and political 
contexts”(Birn 2005, p. 515). In the area of AMR, Birn argued that:
Three more Grand Challenges addressing drug resistance and the development of cures for 
latent and chronic infections are also short-sighted. While access to effective immunothera-
pies for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and other ailments has been appropriately termed a 
human right, integration of treatment with the well- established social and economic com-
ponents of prevention surely merits at least one Grand Challenge. Here what deserves care-
ful consideration are the factors associated with both HIV and multiple drug resistant 
tuberculosis: typically a combination of deprived social conditions—poor nutrition, over-
crowded and unsanitary housing, economic insecurity, and inadequate health-care ser-
vices—which lead to disease and can inhibit the taking of a complete course of medication 
(Birn 2005, p. 516).
Noting that “it is easy to be seduced by technical solutions”(Birn 2005, p. 516), 
Birn questioned the BMGF’s assumption that the most pressing global health prob-
lems can be solved through the application of innovative scientific and technologi-
cal solutions that target proximate causes of disease, while ignoring more distal 
political, economic, or social determinants of health. She concluded with a call for 
integrating both narrow technological and wider social interventions, and cautioned 
that “the longer we isolate public health’s technical aspects from its political and 
social aspects, the longer technical interventions will squeeze out one side of the 
mortality balloon only to find it inflated elsewhere”(Birn 2005, p. 518).
Birn’s general argument is commonplace in contemporary public health. These 
arguments frequently employ a critique of ‘technological fixes’ (or in Birn’s lan-
guage, ‘technical solutions’) – attempts to solve problems through technological 
innovations or interventions, without attending to the social, economic, or political 
factors that may have contributed to the development of the problem in the first 
place. Over-reliance on the promise of technological fixes has long been controver-
sial in public health, particularly since the widespread recognition of the importance 
of the social determinants of health. Critics contend that too much emphasis is 
placed on ‘downstream’ technical solutions to health problems whose root 
‘upstream’ causes are not amenable to technological intervention.
In this chapter, I will use the idea of a ‘technological fix’ as a window into the 
moral economy of responses to AMR, paying special attention to questions of dis-
tributive justice. Responding to antimicrobial resistance – which results from both a 
lack of appropriate medical technology and a complex web of behavioral, social, 
political, and economic factors – invites but also troubles the easy distinctions at the 
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heart of the technological fix idea, and confronts us with difficult decisions regard-
ing how best to distribute social and economic resources.
19.2  Technological Fixes
The idea of a technological fix arose within a context of postwar optimism that 
advances in science and technology could provide cheap and effective solutions to 
seemingly intractable social problems. While there were important precursors, one 
of the most important early popularizers of this view was Alvin Weinberg, a physi-
cist and longtime director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Weinberg had long 
advocated philosophical reflection and social awareness among scientists, particu-
larly about the implications of ‘Big Science.’ During the 1960s, in a series of con-
versations with colleagues, he developed the idea that at least some pressing 
problems that were largely seen as intrinsically social might be amenable to simple 
technological interventions (Johnston 2018), culminating in an influential 1966 
speech, “Can Technology Replace Social Engineering?” which was printed in a 
number of periodicals, including the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
Weinberg argued that the causes of many pressing social problems of the day 
were intractably complex, and interventions targeting those causes are infeasible or 
impossible. He thus advocated remedies that can reduce or eliminate the harms 
generated by these problems, without addressing those causes:
There is a more basic sense in which social problems are much more difficult than are tech-
nological problems. A social problem exists because many people behave, individually, in 
a socially unacceptable way. To solve a social problem one must induce social change – one 
must persuade many people to behave differently than they behaved in the past. One must 
persuade many people to have fewer babies, or to drive more carefully, or to refrain from 
disliking blacks. By contrast, resolution of a technological problem involves many fewer 
individual decisions (Weinberg 1991, p. 42).
Weinberg identified technologies that had already ‘fixed’ social problems, 
including the intra-uterine device (a ‘one-shot’ form of birth control which requires 
a minimum of individual motivation), development of safer cars (which reduces 
traffic deaths without having to improve driver competence), and even the hydrogen 
bomb (a strong disincentive to war that does not require greater tolerance or under-
standing). He proposed additional fixes, such as providing air conditioning to low-
income households (to improve immediate personal comfort and potentially reduce 
rioting during hot summer months, without having to address the underlying social 
or economic causes of riots), and employing nuclear-powered desalination (which 
would eliminate water shortages without changing water consumer behavior).
While Weinberg was an admitted optimist and a tireless promoter of technologi-
cal fixes, in his 1966 speech he struck a conciliatory note with potential critics: 
Noting that “technological solutions to social problems tend to be incomplete and 
metastable, to replace one social problem with another,” he conceded that “we tech-
nologists shall not satisfy our social engineers, who tell us that our Technological 
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Fixes do not get to the heart of the problem; they are at best temporary expedients; 
they create new problems as they solve old ones” (Weinberg  1991, pp.  47–8). 
Answering the question posed in his title, Weinberg concluded that “technology will 
never replace social engineering…It is only by cooperation between technologist 
and social engineer that we can hope to achieve what is the aim of all technologists 
and social engineers  – a better society, and thereby, a better life” (Weinberg 
1991, p. 48).
Weinberg’s hedging notwithstanding, his ideas about technological fixes met 
with immediate and sustained criticism; as early as 1970 the Oxford English 
Dictionary included wholly negative or ironic definitions of the term (Rosner 2004). 
Critics have mounted both practical and ideological objections. On the practical 
side, technological fixes provide at best short-term relief from the deleterious symp-
toms of social problems, but fail to address their root causes; at worst, they oversim-
plify intrinsically complex problems which they then fail to solve, and may introduce 
side effects that are worse than the problems they intend to solve. In a larger sense, 
the search for technological fixes is fundamentally reactionary in nature, encourag-
ing society to seek cheap, quick, and partial solutions to holistic problems, while 
turning a blind eye to fundamental social and distributive injustices.
The transparent pursuit of technological fixes has had few defenders as vocal as 
Weinberg, and many detractors. This does not mean that the idea has fallen out of 
favor. Indeed, continued criticism is a sign of the enduring appeal of the idea of a 
technological fix, even if the term itself is not commonly used. For example, Evgeny 
Morozov’s 2013 book, To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological 
Solutionism, criticizes the ‘there’s an app for that’ mentality of technological ‘solu-
tionism’ in the internet age. Echoing earlier criticisms, Morozov argues that efforts 
to use internet-based technology to solve complex social problems – such as com-
batting obesity through exercise-tracking apps rather than food regulation – encour-
age us to define problems in terms of the technologies that might solve them, and 
discourage broader consideration of macro-level interventions (Winograd 2013).
19.3  Technological Fixes and Health
Technological fixes have been the subject of intense and sustained debate in the 
areas of public health and medicine. Advances in medical technology (e.g. vaccines, 
therapeutic drugs, surgical techniques, medical devices such as x-rays) play an 
undeniable role in diagnosing and curing disease, relieving suffering, increasing life 
expectancy, and improving population health. This fact alone would seem to justify 
continued investment of the BMGF Grand Challenges variety. Yet, beginning 
around the same time that Weinberg began evangelizing for technological fixes, crit-
ics began to question a similar logic underlying increasing investment in medical 
technology.
First, critics questioned whether medical advances played as great a role in health 
improvements as commonly believed. The classic statement of this critique is 
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Thomas McKeown’s 1976 book, The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage, or Nemesis? 
McKeown argued that changes in political economy – including rising standards of 
living and better sanitation and nutrition – rather than specific therapeutic or preven-
tive efforts, were responsible for the massive mortality declines of the ninteenth and 
early twentieth centuries (McKeown 1979). While the McKweown thesis has been 
hotly contested (Szreter 1988; Fairchild 1998; Colgrove 2002), it is now widely 
accepted that the contribution of technological innovation to historical improve-
ments in health and longevity has been greatly overstated.
Critics also pointed to the unintended consequences of medical technology. The 
classic statement (and the ‘Nemesis’ of McKeown’s title) is Ivan Illich’s 1975 book, 
Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health. Illich criticized medicine’s role in 
the production of ‘iatrogenic’ illness, side effects of medical interventions that 
might often be worse than the original pathology they were intended to treat. He 
lamented the progressive “medicalization of life,” which left individuals and societ-
ies ill-equipped to contend with normal aspects of human life including birth, pain, 
and death, as anything other than technologically-mediated pathology. And he 
objected to modern medicine’s “radical monopoly” on all aspects of health and 
disease, diverting economic and intellectual resources from other attempts to 
improve the human condition.
Finally, critics contended that the pursuit of medical technology promoted a nar-
row approach to health and illness, rather than the environmentally and socially 
holistic approach that is actually necessary. In his 1959 book, Mirage of Health: 
Utopias, Progress, and Biological Change, René Dubos – a microbiologist who as 
early as 1942 had predicted the emergence of bacterial resistance (Moberg 1996) – 
argued that attempts to create a world free of disease are bound to fail, “because 
paradise is a static concept while human life is a dynamic process” (Dubos 1996, 
p. 281). Modern medical technology is ill-equipped to address the evolutionarily 
dynamic biological and social worlds, and single-minded pursuit of technological 
innovation is a fool’s errand.
In the years since, the arguments mounted by McKeown, Illich, and Dubos have 
resonated with a wide variety of critics of technological fixes in clinical care, mod-
ern medicine, and public health. They have found most purchase among proponents 
of the social determinants of health, who contend that the majority of the world’s 
inequalities in health result from political, economic, environmental, and social 
injustices, rather than lack of technological innovation. As the World Health 
Organization’s 2008 report, Closing the Gap in a Generation, argues:
Traditionally, society has looked to the health sector to deal with its concerns about health 
and disease. Certainly, maldistribution of health care – not delivering care to those who 
most need it – is one of the social determinants of health. But the high burden of illness 
responsible for appalling premature loss of life arises in large part because of the conditions 
in which people are born, grow, live, work, and age. In their turn, poor and unequal living 
conditions are the consequence of poor social policies and programmes, unfair economic 
arrangements, and bad politics. Action on the social determinants of health must involve the 
whole of government, civil society and local communities, business, global fora, and inter-
national agencies. Policies and programmes must embrace all the key sectors of society not 
just the health sector (WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008, p. 1).
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19.4  Technological Fixes in the Context 
of Antimicrobial Resistance
It is no accident that Dubos developed his theories of microbial ecology, and his 
broader critique of the ‘mirage’ of modern medicine, within the context of his early 
work on bacterial resistance (Moberg 1996). Antimicrobials appear at first glance to 
be a technological fix par excellence, in the sense that they are a simple and effective 
technical solution to a complex problem with biological, social, political, and eco-
nomic determinants. Indeed, a recent article critiquing the pursuit of technological 
fixes in dementia cited antibiotics as the classic case of a technological fix with 
unintended consequences (Jongsma 2017).
One could in fact argue that the apparent success of antibiotics is in large part 
responsible for a broader faith in technological fixes in medicine in the developed 
world. In 1967, during an oft-cited speech before American public health officials at 
the White House, U.S. Surgeon General William H. Stewart declared that it was 
time to close the book on infectious diseases and turn attention towards chronic 
health problems (Garrett 1994, p. 33). Stewart’s optimistic claim reflects a perennial 
American faith in the power of biomedical science to conquer disease, but it is also 
evidence of a significant transformation in the burden of disease during the past 
century. In what is often referred to as the “epidemiologic transition,” the proportion 
of deaths caused by infectious disease in the United States (and other industrialized 
nations) declined precipitously (Omran 1983). In 1900, infectious disease was 
responsible for 797 deaths per 100,000 population; by 1980, this figure had dropped 
to 36 deaths per 100,000 population. As mortality from infectious disease climbed, 
death rates for heart disease, various cancers, stroke, and accidents held steady or 
increased. In a dramatic reversal, chronic diseases replaced infectious ones as the 
leading killers in the United States. In 1900, 40% of deaths in the U.S. were caused 
by the eleven major infectious diseases (pneumonia, influenza, and tuberculosis 
alone accounting for more than 25% of all deaths), 16% by the three major chronic 
diseases (heart disease, cancer, and stroke), and 4% by accidents; by 1973, only 6% 
of deaths were caused by infectious diseases, 58% by chronic diseases, and 9% by 
accidents (Armstrong 1999).
The social and institutional ramifications of the epidemiologic transition were 
profound. Deluged with dramatic stories of patients snatched from the brink of 
death by antibiotics such as streptomycin and penicillin (dubbed “yellow magic” by 
Reader’s Digest in 1943), Americans increasingly credited biomedical science for 
reducing the threat of infectious disease. This accelerated the transformation (or 
“narrowing”), underway since the early part of the century, of the focus of public 
health, from broad preventive measures towards clinical medicine, screening and 
the early detection of disease (Rosenkrantz 1974; Tomes 1998). This transformation 
was accompanied by changes in federal health expenditures as well: between 1950 
and 1959, federal grants-in-aid declined from $45  million to $33  million, while 
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funding for clinical and laboratory research jumped from $28 million in 1947 to 
$186 in 1957 (Fee 1994). The redirection of public and private funding from public 
health towards biomedical research would continue to accelerate into the 1980s, 
when it would be exacerbated by the dismantling of public health infrastructures in 
general under the pressure of Reagan-era budgetary constraints.
Even as much of the institutional apparatus for addressing infectious disease was 
being dismantled, the public and the medical profession increasingly mirrored 
Stewart’s optimism regarding the threat of infectious disease. As historian Nancy 
Tomes notes, “With the array of drugs and vaccines available by 1965, the need to 
guard against contact infection understandably relaxed. Americans quickly came to 
believe that with a few soon-to-be-cured exceptions, modern medicine and public 
health had ‘conquered’ epidemic disease. Young physicians in the 1960s were 
advised, ‘Don’t bother going into infectious diseases,’ and to concentrate on cancer 
or heart disease instead” (Tomes 1998, p. 254) Americans increasingly came to see 
infectious disease as a thing of the past, and they were bolstered in this confidence 
by the lack of significant epidemics of communicable disease – a confidence only 
briefly shaken by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, at least until the discovery of antiretro-
viral drugs.
Yet one can argue whether antibiotics truly ‘fixed’ the problem of infectious 
disease. As already noted, while they are often given full credit for the decline of 
infectious disease in Europe and North America, antibiotics were introduced after 
the majority of mortality declines that are more correctly attributed to rising stan-
dards of living, better nutrition, and basic public health preventive measures such as 
sanitation, vaccination, vector control, and provision of clean water (Szreter 1988; 
Cutler and Miller 2005). Moreover, social and economic factors continue to be 
major determinants of infectious disease (Semenza 2016). Even in high-income 
countries with well-functioning health care systems and access to a full range of 
antibiotics, poverty, social marginalization, and food and water quality continue to 
play a significant role in the incidence of infectious disease (King 2003; Semenza 
2010). It remains to be seen whether, from a population perspective, investment in 
additional antimicrobials is the most effective or efficient way to reduce the burden 
of infectious disease.
Whether or not antibiotics ‘fixed’ infectious disease, their introduction generated 
the unintended consequence of antimicrobial resistance. While it might seem logi-
cal that a ‘technological’ problem (antimicrobials) demands a ‘technological’ solu-
tion (more antimicrobials), as the other chapters in this volume illustrate, the causes 
of and solutions to antimicrobial resistance are more complicated. As with infec-
tious disease, the proximate cause of antimicrobial resistance is biological – patho-
gens develop resistance under the selective pressure exerted by use of 
antimicrobials – but underlying this proximate cause is a range of more distal deter-
minants. These include, among others:
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• Physician behavior – e.g., prescribing antibiotics for conditions caused by viruses 
(Sprenger 2015); engage in suboptimal practices such as use of monotherapy 
rather than combination therapy; and incorrect drug administration routes 
(Struelens 1998).
• Patient behavior – e.g., failure to complete full course of treatment; and self- 
medication, particularly in countries where antimicrobials are available over the 
counter.
• Poor hygiene, sanitation, and infection control in hospitals and other healthcare 
facilities, leading to cross-infection with multiple strains of bacteria (Aiello 
2006; Struelens 1998).
• Widespread use – including misuse and overuse – of antimicrobials in agricul-
ture (Levy 2014; Ventola 2015).
• Lack of development of new antimicrobials, which are less profitable than drugs 
for chronic conditions that are generally more expensive and used for much lon-
ger periods of time (Brown and Wright 2016).
Novel antibiotics will be introduced into the same social, political, and economic 
contexts that have contributed to the development of antibiotic resistance in the first 
place. Addressing these contexts would require, among other interventions: chang-
ing the behavior of physicians and patients to encourage appropriate stewardship of 
antimicrobials; instituting and enforcing new sanitation and infection control proto-
cols at healthcare facilities across the globe; reforming an agricultural system 
dependent upon cheap antibiotics; and changing the incentive structure of the phar-
maceutical industry to ensure that need rather than profit drives drug research.
Faced with a wide and seemingly insurmountable range of determinants, focus-
ing on the development of new lines of antimicrobials through targeted research 
grants and incentive programs is attractive. Yet such a narrow pursuit would, ulti-
mately, amount to little more than layering technological fixes on prior technologi-
cal fixes. As Dubos noted a half-century ago, “Granted the obvious usefulness of 
sanitary practices, immunological procedures, and antimicrobial drugs, it does not 
necessarily follow that destruction of microbes constitutes the only possible 
approach to the problem of infectious disease, nor necessarily the best”(Dubos 
1996, p. 53).
19.5  Technological Fixes and Distributive Justice
Technological fixes have an enduring appeal. Part of this is practical: they appear to 
provide simple, efficient, measurable, and effective solutions to complex problems. 
However, the presumed practicality of these fixes conceals underlying moral and 
political assumptions, with important ramifications for distributive justice.
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One of Weinberg’s precursors was Richard L. Meier, a chemist and technological 
optimist who advocated the use of technological systems as a means of eliminating 
poverty and other social ills (Johnston 2018). It is worth noting an important distinc-
tion between the little-known precursor and the widely-known successor: while 
Meier saw technology as a means of remedying distributive injustices, Weinberg 
saw it as a means for minimizing the harms of those injustices without addressing 
them. Indeed, in his influential 1966 essay, Weinberg’s primary example of a suc-
cessful technological fix is the advances in mass production of goods that “enable[d] 
our capitalistic society to achieve many of the aims of the Marxist social engineer 
without going through the social revolution Marx viewed as inevitable” (Weinberg 
1991, p. 43).
The distinction between Meier and Weinberg illustrates an often-hidden ethical 
component of the technological fix approach. Technological fixes generally 
reward the rich. This is partially by design: fixes are appealing precisely because 
they avoid social engineering that might upset the status quo, including extant 
inequalities. They require no hard questions about the justness of current distribu-
tional procedures or outcomes, and they often expressly promise to reduce the 
negative consequences of extant inequalities without addressing the inequalities 
themselves.
The concentration of benefits among the rich is also a consequence of the global 
economy of health research. Health-related technological innovations are most 
likely to occur in wealthy institutions  – top research universities, multinational 
pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers, highly-capitalized 
biotechnology startup companies  – concentrated in high-income countries. 
Initiatives that target technological innovation, from BMGF research grants to tar-
geted incentives for pharmaceutical development, thus overwhelming benefit 
wealthy individuals and institutions in wealthy countries. While it is true that these 
investments may eventually benefit others, in the short-term they simply circulate 
resources from rich donors to rich institutions in the global north, often in the name 
of benefitting the least advantaged.
Technological fixes may thus be ‘practical’ insofar as they provide an easily 
identifiable, targeted, and efficient strategy for distributing resources; but this prac-
tically is purchased at the price of eliding important distributive concerns. In the 
context of antimicrobial resistance, we would do well to resist the urge to unthink-
ingly pursue technological fixes, lest they contribute to precisely the inequalities 
that underlie the spread of infectious disease and the continued generation of anti-
microbial resistance.
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Chapter 20
Tackling Anti-microbial Resistance: 
An Ethical Framework for Rational 
Antibiotic Use
Jasper Littmann, Annette Rid, and Alena Buyx
Abstract To reduce the effect of antimicrobial resistance and preserve antibiotic 
effectiveness, clinical practice guidelines and health policy documents call for the 
“rational use” of antibiotics that aims to avoid unnecessary or minimally effective 
antibiotic prescriptions. In this paper, we show that rational use programmes can 
lead to ethical conflicts because they place some patients at risk of harm – for exam-
ple, a delayed switch to second-line antibiotics for community-acquired pneumonia 
is associated with increased fatality rates. Implementing the rational use of antibiot-
ics can therefore lead to conflicts between promoting patients’ clinical interests and 
preserving antibiotic effectiveness for future use. The resulting ethical dilemma for 
clinicians, patients and policy makers has so far not been adequately addressed. We 
argue that existing guidance for acceptable risks in clinical research can help to 
define risk thresholds for the rational use of antibiotics. We develop an ethical 
framework that allows clinicians and policy-makers to evaluate policies for rational 
antibiotic use in six practical steps.
This paper is an extended version of: Littmann J, Rid A, Buyx A: Tackling anti-microbial resis-
tance: ethical framework for rational antibiotic use. European Journal of Public Health 2018; 
28(2): 359–363. A fuller defense of our framework is provided in: Rid A, Littmann J, Buyx A: 
Evaluating the risks of public health programs: rational antibiotic use and antimicrobial resistance. 
Bioethics 2019; 33(7): 734-748.
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20.1  Introduction
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has been described as one of the major threats to 
public health in the twenty-first century and sparked concerns about the possibility 
of a post-antibiotic era, in which many infections are no longer treatable (WHO 
2014; General Assembly of the United Nations 2016; Davies et al. 2013). Such a 
development would not only have detrimental effects on patient care, but is also 
likely to significantly affect public health, agriculture, as well as economic and 
national security (PCAST 2014; O’Neill 2014; Adeyi et al. 2017; OECD 2018).
Over the past few years, the challenge of AMR has increasingly been recognised 
by policy makers. The World Health Organization (WHO) developed a global action 
plan on AMR (WHO 2011, 2015), the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
declaration on the issue (General Assembly of the United Nations 2016) and the 
G20—a forum of the world’s major economies—has placed AMR on its agenda 
(Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2011). In addition, considerable investments 
have been made to strengthen and incentivise the development of new antibiotics 
(Boucher et al. 2013; Drive-AB-12 2018; Rex 2014; Outterson et al. 2016a, b).
Since one of the major causes of AMR is the overprescription and overconsump-
tion of antibiotics, comprehensive response plans to preserve antibiotic effective-
ness do not focus solely on the development of new drugs. They also include a wide 
range of measures, including surveillance, infection control and, crucially, the pro-
motion of the “rational” use of antibiotics (WHO 2014). Rational use programmes 
primarily focus on avoiding unnecessary prescriptions of antibiotic treatments, for 
example in the context of viral respiratory infections. However, they also include 
practices that involve delaying or withholding access to antibiotics that are known 
to be beneficial. These practices can place some patients at risk of harm and thereby 
lead to conflicts between two important ethical goals: promoting patients’ clinical 
interests and preserving antibiotic effectiveness for future use.
The ethical conflict between these goals has so far not been adequately addressed. 
In this paper, we describe programmes for rational antibiotic use and show when 
they require placing some patients at risk of harm for the benefit of managing the 
existing pool of effective antibiotics. We argue that ethical guidance on acceptable 
risks in clinical research can help to develop acceptable programmes for rational 
antibiotic use. Based on a recognized ethical framework for risk and risk-benefit 
evaluations in clinical research, we propose a novel framework that allows clini-
cians and policy-makers to evaluate when rational antibiotic use is (or is not) ethi-
cally justified.
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20.2  Rational Use of Antibiotics
The promotion of “rational” antibiotic use – sometimes referred to as “prudent” or 
“appropriate” use  – is a key component of many response plans to AMR 
(Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2011; UK Department of Health 2013; Public 
Health Agency of Canada 2014; The White House 2014; Australian Department for 
Health 2015). The WHO provided the most widely cited definition of the rational 
use of medicines in general, which includes the rational use of antibiotics. According 
to WHO, this requires that “patients receive medications appropriate to their clinical 
need, in doses that meet their own individual requirements, for an adequate period 
of time, and at the lowest cost to them and their community” (WHO 1985). 
Elsewhere, the WHO defined appropriate antibiotic use as the “cost-effective use of 
antimicrobials which maximizes clinical therapeutic effect while minimizing drug- 
related toxicity and the development of antimicrobial resistance” (WHO 2011). 
Most concise is the definition provided by the Alliance for the Prudent Use of 
Antibiotics (APUA), which defines prudent use as “the right drug for the right con-
dition for the right amount of time” (Wilson and Tan 2010).
Notwithstanding some differences in meaning, these definitions all delineate 
types of antibiotic use that are clearly “irrational”—that is, obvious instances of 
overuse or misuse where antibiotics are prescribed or taken even though they are not 
the appropriate treatment. For example, antibiotics are an appropriate treatment for 
“strep throat”, which is caused by a bacterium susceptible to certain antibiotics. 
However, they are not an appropriate treatment for most sore throats, which are 
caused by viruses against which antibiotics are not effective.
There is a wide array of interventions designed to reduce antibiotic prescribing, 
and evidence suggests that restrictive measures, which limit the availability of anti-
biotics, have a higher chance of success than information campaigns or educational 
interventions that teach prescribing clinicians about AMR (Charani et  al. 2011; 
Davey et al. 2013). In many instances, such restrictions appear to be a promising 
and effective way of reducing antibiotic use. For instance, recent research has shown 
that antibiotic prescribing in primary care can be restricted substantially, without a 
negative effect on clinical outcomes, through a practice called delayed prescribing 
(Schuetz et al. 2009; Spurling et al. 2013; Little et al. 2014). Here patients for whom 
antibiotics are unlikely to be an appropriate treatment—say most patients with sore 
throats—receive a prescription that they can use at the pharmacy if their symptoms 
do not improve on their own within a few days. Receiving such a prescription gives 
patients reassurance, even though only few end up filling it. A Cochrane review 
concluded that delayed prescribing offers no additional risks to the patient, while 
offering similar patient satisfaction when compared to immediate prescribing 
(Spurling et al. 2013).
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So understood, rational use of antibiotics is ethically justified because it pro-
motes patients’ clinical interests while also preserving antibiotic effectiveness for 
future use. Not only are present patients spared the side effects of unnecessary treat-
ment, avoiding such treatment also curbs the spread of antibiotic resistance and 
thereby helps to ensure that existing antibiotics remain effective to treat future 
patients. Indeed, because rational use so understood promotes the interests of pres-
ent as well as future patients, clinicians and policy-makers are ethically required to 
ensure that patients use “the right drug for the right condition for the right amount 
of time” (Wilson and Tan 2010).
20.3  Ethically Challenging Instances of Rational Use
In addition to avoiding unnecessary antibiotic use, rational use programmes embrace 
practices that restrict access to antibiotics even when treatment would reduce a 
given patient’s health risk (Millar 2012). One example for this are programmes that 
ask clinicians to factor resistance thresholds in the community when they suggest 
antibiotic treatment to their patients. For example, clinical practice guidelines for 
treating community-acquired pneumonia recommend the use of macrolides—a par-
ticular class of antibiotics—unless 25% or more of the relevant pathogens are resis-
tant to macrolides in the given local community (Mandell et al. 2007). Only then 
should clinicians switch to more effective second-line drugs (Mandell et al. 2007).1 
When considering the entire patient population, this is a sensible recommendation, 
since it is to be expected that macrolides—the first line of treatment—remains 
effective in most patients if resistance is below 25%. However, a delayed switch to 
second-line drugs negatively affects clinical outcomes in some patients, notably 
those with severe pneumonia. Some authors estimate that a similar guideline has 
carried a mortality risk of more than 1% for all patients in the past (Daneman et al. 
2008). Rational use practices of this type effectively delay or withhold a proven 
beneficial antibiotic in order to curb the spread of antimicrobial resistance. This 
places some present patients at risk for the sake of future patients.
In these and comparable cases, the rational use of antibiotics confronts clinicians 
with a trade-off between promoting their present patients’ best clinical interests and 
helping to maintain effective antibiotic treatments for future patients (Kollef and 
Micek 2014). This trade-off seems particularly stark for several reasons (Littmann 
et al. 2015; Littmann and Buyx 2018). First, it is difficult to measure the contribu-
tion of any individual course of antibiotics to the emergence of AMR in a popula-
tion, so that estimates about the benefits of rational use programmes are relatively 
uncertain. It seems likely, however, that delaying or withholding any given antibi-
otic treatment makes no more than a very small contribution to curbing AMR and, 
in some cases, no contribution at all. For example, a patient might develop resistant 
1 Since the time of writing, an updated version of the consensus guidelines has superseded the cited 
work (Metlay et al. 2019).
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bacteria but die before transmitting these to other people or the environment. As a 
result, rational use programmes that involve delaying or withholding antibiotic 
treatment are neither necessary nor sufficient for addressing AMR. Moreover, the 
benefits of preserving antibiotics may accrue to unknown people in the potentially 
distant future. By contrast, the benefits of antibiotic treatment for the present patient 
are much easier to measure and can therefore be predicted with greater certainty. 
Antibiotic treatment also has immediate benefits that accrue to known or “identi-
fied” persons. These differences readily explain why a typical clinician who is 
tasked with delaying or withholding antibiotics from her present patients with the 
goal of tackling AMR would feel an acute ethical conflict (Cohen et al. 2015).
Bioethicists have started to discuss this ethical conflict (Selgelid 2007; Battin 
et al. 2009; Millar 2012; Oczkowski 2017; Littmann and Buyx 2014; Littmann et al. 
2015). However, at both the clinical and policy level, there is no ethical guidance on 
when rational use programmes that involve delaying or withholding antibiotics and 
hence compromise the best clinical interests of present patients are acceptable. 
Moreover, many policy documents lack explicit discussion of any ethical chal-
lenges, and those that include ethical considerations are narrowly disease- and 
pathogen-specific (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2011; WHO 2011; Davies 
et al. 2013; Andreasen 2014). What is therefore needed is a more specific analysis 
of whether and when it is acceptable to restrict antibiotics use with the goal of curb-
ing AMR, even when doing so poses risks to present patients and thereby compro-
mises their best clinical interests.
20.4  The Analogy to Clinical Research
To address this question, it is helpful to consider more generally whether and when 
it is justified for clinicians not to promote the best clinical interests of their present 
patient. Standard professional guidance takes a relatively restrictive stance on this 
issue. For example, the World Medical Association states that clinicians owe their 
patients “complete loyalty”, and that they may place the interests of others above 
those of the patient only in “exceptional situations” (Williams 2015). However, 
closer analysis reveals many clinical practices that place the interests of other 
patients, individuals or society above the interests of a given present patient (Wendler 
2010). Consider, for example, that clinicians routinely give vaccinations not to pro-
tect the present patient, but to maintain herd immunity; that clinicians transplant 
kidneys from healthy individuals to patients with renal failure in order to enable 
these patients to live a better and longer life; and that clinicians allow younger col-
leagues to gain experience and perform procedures for the first time, even though 
they know that this will result in higher complication rates for the present patient. 
Importantly, these practices are not only frequent, but ethically justified provided 
that a number of conditions are met (Wendler 2010). This finding raises the possibil-
ity of evaluating the ethical acceptability of rational use programmes for antibiotics 
in comparison to other practices that involve compromising the interests of 
individual patients for the benefit of others.
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For such comparisons to be both sound and useful, it is essential to identify com-
parator practices that are relevantly similar to rational use programmes for  antibiotics 
and widely considered to be acceptable (Sunstein 1993). Moreover, detailed ethical 
guidance on how to evaluate the given comparator practice should ideally exist. 
Clinical research fulfils all three desiderata, as the following paragraphs 
demonstrate.
Clinical research is a subset of research with human participants that focuses on 
evaluating methods to prevent, treat or cure illness and disease, or on generating the 
knowledge necessary to develop such methods. One of the key characteristics of 
clinical research is that investigators expose participants to some risks for the poten-
tial benefits of unknown patients in the potentially distant future. Clinician- 
investigators routinely perform research procedures that do not promote the best 
clinical interests of the present patient-participant, but serve solely to address 
research questions. In fact, the majority of clinical trials involve procedures that 
have no prospect of clinical benefit for participants but help to answer important 
research questions. For example, most clinical trials involve additional blood draws, 
biopsies or imaging procedures that would not be performed as part of routine clini-
cal care, but serve to test the safety and efficacy of an investigational drug. Moreover, 
phase 1 trials with healthy individuals by definition have no prospect of clinical 
benefit. It is widely considered acceptable for clinician-investigators to perform 
these “net risk” procedures and trials—and thereby deviate from the general clinical 
norm of promoting the present patient’s best clinical interests—because clinical 
research generates knowledge with the potential to improve the health or care of 
future patients (WMA 2013; CIOMS 2016). That is, the potential benefits of clinical 
research for future populations are widely considered to justify that investigators 
expose patient-participants to some level of net research risk.
Importantly, the potential benefits for future patients—or the so-called “social 
value” of the research—is generally seen as the fundamental justification for expos-
ing participants to net research risks, not the participants’ informed consent. 
Participants’ consent is, of course, relevant for determining what levels of net 
research risk are acceptable in socially valuable research. Only small levels of net 
risk are acceptable when participants cannot give their own informed consent, for 
example in research involving children, or when obtaining participants’ consent is 
not feasible, for example in research on large datasets that were originally collected 
for clinical (and not for research) purposes. By contrast, greater net risks are accept-
able when participants give their voluntary and informed consent. However, it is 
generally accepted—and for good reason in our view—that research without social 
value is not justified even when the research poses low net risks and participants 
consent (Wendler and Rid 2017). This underscores that the fundamental justifica-
tion for exposing participants to net research risks lies in the potential benefits of 
clinical research for future patients.
Restricting antibiotic use with the goal of curbing AMR is relevantly similar to 
clinical research in this important respect. Just like in research, clinicians expose the 
present patient to some risks of harm for the potential benefits of unknown patients 
in the potentially distant future. Moreover, what level of risk is acceptable arguably 
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depends on whether the present patient consents to delaying or foregoing antibiotic 
treatment that would be in her best clinical interests. In clinical research, it is not 
certain that any given clinical trial generates findings that make a significant contri-
bution to improving the health or care of future patients and populations. Moreover, 
the enrolment of any single patient-participant is uncertain to make a significant 
difference to the value of any given trial. Yet without sufficient overall participation, 
trials—and clinical research more generally—would fail. Rational use programmes 
that involve delaying or withholding antibiotics are similar in this respect. It is not 
only uncertain that such programmes will make a significant contribution to address-
ing AMR, but restricting a single patient’s access to antibiotics may not lead to a 
measurable effect on the overall level of AMR. Yet reducing antibiotic prescriptions 
overall is a key component of strategies for curbing AMR and ensuring that bacte-
rial infections can still be treated effectively in the future (Costelloe et al. 2010; 
Davies et  al. 2013). Given this relevant similarity between clinical research and 
rational use programmes that delay or withhold antibiotics, and considering that it 
is widely accepted for clinician-investigators to impose some level of net risk on 
patient-participants for the potential benefit of future patients (Selgelid 2007; Kollef 
and Micek 2014), it should also be acceptable to impose comparable levels of risks 
on patients in order to preserve antibiotic effectiveness for future patients.2
Moreover, there is a long-standing and nuanced debate about acceptable risk in 
clinical research. This does not only mean that our judgments about acceptable risks 
are relatively considered in the research context, but also that detailed ethical guid-
ance in this area exists (WMA 2013; CIOMS 2016; Emanuel et al. 2008). Clinical 
research therefore fulfils the three desiderata for sound and helpful comparisons 
formulated above: it is relevantly similar to rational use programmes that delay or 
withhold antibiotics for the sake of curbing AMR; it is widely considered an accept-
able exception from the general principle that clinicians should act in the best inter-
ests of the present patient; and detailed ethical guidance on how to evaluate research 
risks, including net research risks, exists. This suggests that judgments about accept-
able risk in clinical research can inform the ethical evaluation of rational use pro-
grammes that impose risks on present patients with the goal of curbing AMR and 
safeguarding antibiotic effectiveness for future patients (Rid et al. 2019).
20.5  An Ethical Framework for Evaluating Rational 
Antibiotic Use
For clinician-researchers to justifiably impose risks on patient-participants in clini-
cal research, a number of conditions must be met. Specifically, the research must be 
scientifically valid and socially valuable; the risks to participants have to be 
2 There are, of course,  relevant dissimilarities between clinical research and rational use pro-
grammes that involve delaying or withholding antibiotics. However, as we argue elsewhere in 
more detail, the similarities between the two clearly dominate the dissimilarities (Rid et al. 2019).
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minimised and reasonable in relation to the potential clinical benefits for them and/
or the social value of the research; and, when participants cannot or do not consent, 
any net risks to them should be no greater than minimal or, in cases of compelling 
social value, no greater than a minor increase over minimal risk (WMA 2013; 
CIOMS 2016).
To operationalise these conditions, one of the authors of this paper (AR) has 
developed a systematic framework for evaluating research risks and potential ben-
efits based on prominent research ethics guidelines and literature (Rid and Wendler 
2011). This framework can be usefully adapted to evaluate the risks of rational use 
programmes that involve delaying or withholding antibiotics from patients who 
could clinically benefit (Appendix). The framework is most useful for evaluating 
rational use programmes that do not require clinicians to obtain the patient’s 
informed consent for restricting antibiotics. In particular, the minimal risk threshold 
for research without informed consent (Rid 2014) provides much needed orienta-
tion regarding  acceptable levels of unconsented to net risks in the public health 
context. However, the framework could also help to evaluate rational use pro-
grammes that would require the patient’s informed consent. Here, the debate about 
upper net risk limits in research with competent consenting adults is particularly 
informative (London 2006; Miller and Joffe 2009).
The framework sets out six steps for evaluating rational use programmes that 
involve delaying or withholding antibiotics. A hypothetical programme to restrict 
antibiotic use for lower respiratory tract infections (LRTIs) helps to illustrate how 
these steps would work in practice (Table 20.1, Ethical framework for rational anti-
biotic use).
The first step—ensure and enhance the programme’s social value—requires 
decision-makers to develop rational use programmes based on sound evidence and 
policy methods. This is to ensure that all programmes are rigorously developed and 
judged to be both feasible and effective. For example, the available data should sug-
gest that delaying or withholding the given antibiotics for LRTIs has the potential to 
help curb AMR. Data should also be sufficient to estimate the risks of restricting the 
antibiotics for patients; if there is too much uncertainty regarding how likely patients 
will suffer harm, relevant data should first be gathered in a research study. For pro-
grammes that meet these conditions, step one also requires conducting (and/or 
reviewing) observational research on their implementation. For example, how does 
restricted antibiotics use for LRTIs affect prescription rates, clinical outcomes, and 
antimicrobial resistance in the community? Such research serves to confirm that the 
given programme is indeed effective, while also expanding the existing knowledge 
of AMR. Evidence from accompanying observational research should inform regu-
lar re-evaluations of the programme.
The second step—identify the programme interventions—requires considering 
how the care of patients under the given rational use programme would differ from 
recommended standard care. Of course, the key difference would be that antibiotics 
are delayed or withheld under clearly specified circumstances. However, pro-
grammes might also include supplementary, non-routine interventions that aim to 
reduce the risks of restricting antibiotic use. Importantly, these non-routine 
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(continued)
Table 20.1 Ethical framework for rational antibiotic use
Step Elements Example




1. Ensure that restricting 
antibiotics use for the given 
condition is based on sound 
evidence and policy methods
Available data allow estimating the clinical 
and public health impact of restricted 
antibiotics use for lower respiratory tract 
infections
Policy to restrict antibiotics use for lower 
respiratory tract infections is rigorously 
developed (policy analysis, stakeholder 
consultation, etc.) and judged to be feasible 
and effective
2. Ensure that restricting 
antibiotics use for the given 
condition passes a minimum 
threshold of social value
Restricted antibiotics use for lower 
respiratory tract infections has the potential 
to address antimicrobial resistance, a major 
public health problem
3. Enhance the knowledge to 
be gained from the policy 
and use it to refine the policy
Initiate researcha to evaluate how restricted 
antibiotics use for lower respiratory tract 
infections affects prescription rates,  
clinical outcomes, antimicrobial  
resistance etc. and update policy as new 
evidence comes in
Evaluate how the experience with restricting 
antibiotics use for lower respiratory tract 
infections can inform the management  
of antibiotics use for other conditions  
(e.g. urinary tract infection)
2. Identify the 
policy 
interventions
1. Identify the policy 
intervention and any 
supplementary (non-routine) 
interventions to protect 
patients
Policy intervention: restricted antibiotics use 
for lower respiratory tract infections
Supplementary interventions: provide 
relevant information to patients in writing 
(e.g. signs of worsening condition, next 
steps in this situation), provide 1-time 
respiratory therapy session to manage 
symptoms
Exclude routine clinical interventions from 
analysis: provide relevant information 
verbally, provide supportive measures  
for lower respiratory tract infections  
(e.g. mucolytics, inhalation,  
pain medication)
2. Ensure that each 
supplementary intervention 
is essential for protecting 
patients
Could consider whether written patient 
information is essential





3. Evaluate and 
reduce the risks to 
patients
1. Evaluate the risks of the 
policy intervention and each 
supplementary intervention
Restricting antibiotics use for lower 
respiratory tract infections poses risks 
(e.g. of increased complications such as 
pneumonia or empyema), which may 
require antibiotics and/or hospitalisation)
Providing relevant information to patients  
in writing (rather than verbally) can cause 
mild anxiety
2. Reasonably reduce the 
risks
Ensure that routine clinical interventions to 
treat lower respiratory tract infections are 
implemented (e.g. supportive measures)
Ensure that serious harms, should they 
occur, are adequately managed at no 
financial cost to the patient (e.g. antibiotics  
and/or hospitalisation) and patients receive 
compensation for any lasting serious harms
Actively monitor or exclude patient groups 
from policy who are at increased risk of 
complications or other serious harms 
(e.g. immunodeficiency)
Instruct clinicians to exercise judgment in 
individual cases
Reassure patients about written  
information sheet




1. Evaluate the potential 
clinical benefits of the policy 
intervention and each 
supplementary intervention
Restricting antibiotics use for lower 
respiratory tract infections spares patients 
the risks of treatment (e.g. diarrhea)
1-time respiratory therapy session helps to 
manage symptoms
2. Enhance the potential 
clinical benefits
Consider complementing 1-time respiratory 





1. Determine whether the 
risks of each individual 
intervention exceed the 
intervention’s potential 
clinical benefits (implies net 
risks): Would an informed 
clinician who is committed 
solely to promoting the 
patient’s clinical interests 
recommend the intervention?
Informed clinician would not recommend 
withholding antibiotic treatment for lower 
respiratory tract infections or measures to 
manage the resulting risks (e.g. written 
information, active monitoring): net risks
Informed clinician would recommend 
respiratory therapy session: no net risks
2. Determine whether the 
unit of policy and 
supplementary interventions 
pose net risks: would an 
informed clinician 
recommend the unit of 
interventions?
Informed clinician would not recommend 
unit of interventions: potential clinical 
benefits of respiratory therapy session do not 
outweigh the risks of withholding antibiotic 
treatment and measures to manage the 
resulting risks
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interventions can carry their own risks. For example, if antibiotics for LRTIs were 
delayed or withheld, patients might be informed about signs of pneumonia or 
 empyema (i.e. potential more serious complications of an initial infection) in writ-
ing, rather than verbally as in standard practice, so as to ensure that they know when 
to seek expert advice and thereby reduce risks to them. However, receiving written 
information can itself cause concern among patients. It is therefore essential to iden-
tify all programme interventions in order to comprehensively evaluate the risks that 
the given rational use programme poses to patients. As part of this step, the need for 
any supplementary interventions should also be scrutinized with a view to avoiding 




whether the net 
risks are justified 
by the policy’s 
social value
1. Determine the level of 
cumulative net risk posed to 
patients
Relatively small level of net risk from 
withholding antibiotic treatment and 
measures to manage the resulting risks
2. Determine whether the 
policy’s cumulative net risks 
fall within the general range 
of acceptable net risk: could 
judge in light of net risk 
limits in biomedical 
research, notably the 
“minimal risk”” threshold in 
research without informed 
consent for rational use 
programmes that do not 
require clinicians to obtain 
the patient’s informed 
consent and upper net risk 
limits in research for rational 
use programmes that require 
informed consent
Net risks from withholding antibiotic 
treatment for lower respiratory tract 
infections arguably falls within the range  
of acceptable net risk in clinical research 
(i.e. the net risks arguably fall below the 
minimal risk threshold)
3. Evaluate whether the 
given level of cumulative net 
risk is proportionate to the 
social value of implementing 
the policy: would an ideal 
social arbiter recommend 
the policy?
Ideal social arbiter may recommend the 
policy, given the importance of curbing 
antimicrobial resistance and the arguably 
minimal net risks to patients
The framework is adapted from an existing framework for risk-benefit evaluations in biomedical 
research (Rid and Wendler 2011; see Appendix for additional details). Example: hypothetical pol-
icy to restrict antibiotics use (delayed or no prescription) for lower respiratory tract infections 
without obtaining the patients’ informed consent
aResearch to evaluate the impact of restricted antibiotics use for a given condition has to be judged 
based on standard ethical criteria for research (CIOMS 2016; WMA 2013)
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Step three—evaluate and reduce the risks to patients—requires evaluating the 
risks of all programme interventions, including those of any supplementary inter-
ventions, based on the available evidence. Moreover, all reasonable measures must 
be taken to reduce the risks to patients. For example, if written information about 
pneumonia and/or empyema is considered necessary, how can this information be 
conveyed in ways that reduce anxiety and stress for patients? Similarly, rational use 
programmes that involve delaying or withholding antibiotics need to ensure that 
patients who suffer serious harms are adequately treated at no financial cost. In the 
case of restricting antibiotics for LRTIs, for instance, it must be guaranteed that any 
collections of pus in the pleural cavity (i.e. empyemas) are promptly treated for free. 
Patients with any lasting serious harms should also receive compensation. 
Furthermore, patient groups at increased risk of experiencing serious harm—for 
example, patients with immune deficiency—should either be actively monitored or 
excluded from the programme. Guidelines should also instruct clinicians to exercise 
their judgment in individual cases.
Step four—evaluate and enhance the potential benefits for patients—requires 
evaluating based on the available evidence to what extent patients could benefit 
clinically from the given rational use programme. For example, not receiving anti-
biotics for LRTIs means avoiding their side effects and reducing the risk of infection 
with Clostridium difficile—which is associated with antibiotic use and sometimes 
leads to a life-threatening infection of the colon—or resistant infection in future. 
Moreover, non-routine supplementary interventions can have potential clinical ben-
efits for patients. For instance, if a one-time respiratory therapy session is intro-
duced to help manage patients’ symptoms, this should be considered when 
evaluating the risks of the overall programme. Any supplementary interventions 
with potential clinical benefits for patients should also be targeted at groups who 
would benefit most, especially when they cannot be provided to all patients. For 
example, the one-time respiratory therapy session might be focused on patients who 
suffer from chronic pulmonary problems (provided they are not excluded from the 
programme for being at increased risk).
Step five—evaluate whether the interventions pose net risks to patients—
requires judging, again based on the available evidence, whether the risks of each 
individual intervention exceed the intervention’s potential clinical benefits. If the 
answer to this question is yes, then the given intervention is said to pose “net risks” 
to the patient. One way of making this determination is to ask whether an “informed 
clinician” who is committed solely to the promoting the patients’ best clinical inter-
ests would recommend that they undergo the intervention in question (Rid and 
Wendler 2011). If the clinician would recommend the intervention, it promotes the 
patients’ clinical interests and thus does not pose net risks. This implies that the 
intervention’s risk-benefit profile is acceptable and—assuming the requirements of 
the previous steps are satisfied—needs no further evaluation. If the clinician would 
be indifferent, then undergoing the intervention neither undermines nor promotes 
the patients’ clinical interests. Provided that including the intervention in the 
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rational use programme is necessary to ensure its safety (step 2), this suggests that 
it has an acceptable risk-benefit profile. If the clinician would advise against the 
intervention, then it poses net risks that require further evaluation (step 6). For 
example, an informed clinician who is committed solely to promoting the patients’ 
best clinical interests would not recommend delaying or withholding antibiotics for 
LRTIs (at least where the expected benefit of antibiotic treatment outweighs the 
expected harms of adverse effects of antibiotics outlined above). This means that 
this intervention poses net risks whose acceptability needs to be considered further.
Finally, step six—evaluate whether the net risks to patients are justified by the 
programme’s social value—serves precisely this purpose. It first requires determin-
ing the cumulative level of net risk of the given rational use programme by adding 
the net risks of all its interventions. For example, restricting antibiotics for LRTIs 
likely poses a relatively small level of cumulative net risk from delaying or with-
holding antibiotic treatment and providing patients with written information in 
order to manage the resulting risks. Evaluators must then judge whether the pro-
gramme’s cumulative net risks fall within the general range of acceptable net risk to 
patients and, if the answer is yes, whether the risks are proportionate to the social 
value of implementing the programme.
With regard to the general range of acceptable net risk, there is a long-standing 
debate about this issue in clinical research that can inform judgements about the 
acceptability of rational use programmes. Debate has been most intense in the con-
text of research involving participants who cannot give their own informed consent, 
such as children or patients with dementia. Many ethical guidelines and regulations, 
as well as many research ethicists, endorse a “minimal risk” threshold for such 
research in order to protect participants from excessive net research risks (Emanuel 
et al. 2008; WMA 2013; CIOMS 2016). The precise interpretation of this threshold 
remains contested. However, a recent analysis of the existing literature identifies 
several “lessons learned” that are equally pertinent for the evaluation of rational use 
programmes (Rid 2014). Specifically, the most convincing definitions of minimal 
risk refer to the two basic components of research risk, likelihood and magnitude of 
research harm. Further, these definitions distinguish different magnitudes of harm 
(e.g. small, moderate, serious) and set approximate likelihood thresholds for each 
magnitude of harm, where the likelihood thresholds are anchored with numeric 
information (e.g. 1 per 100,000) derived from risk comparisons. For example, if the 
risks of participating in a charity soccer game are considered acceptable, and this 
activity is thought to be relevantly similar to clinical research, data on the risks of 
playing soccer can be used to anchor likelihood thresholds for different magnitudes 
of research harm. At present, comparator risks are best specified as the risks that 
average, healthy, normal individuals in different age groups face in riskier but still 
acceptable activities that are directed at benefiting others, such as playing soccer for 
charitable purposes in children. In practice, this implies that the most convincing 
definitions of the minimal risk threshold equate minimal net research risks with 
very low likelihoods of serious and moderate harm and modest likelihoods of small 
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harm (Rid 2014). Using this threshold as a preliminary guide for evaluating the 
acceptability of rational use programmes, net risks such as those reported for delay-
ing antibiotics for LRTIs would seem to qualify as minimal. Specifically, if the two 
main complications—empyema and pneumonia—are classified as moderate harms, 
the up to 10% likelihood that they will occur (Schuetz et al. 2009) is broadly con-
sistent with the likelihood of moderate harms observed in appropriate comparator 
risks (Rid et al. 2010).
Similar arguments have been advanced in the debate about upper risk limits in 
research with competent consenting adults. Specifically, several authors suggest 
that these upper risk limits should be delineated in comparison to appropriate com-
parators risks for competent adults, such as emergency medical assistance (London 
2006; Miller and Joffe 2009). In rational use programmes that require clinicians to 
obtain informed consent for delaying or withholding antibiotics, the range of accept-
able net risks could be evaluated based on what levels of risk are considered accept-
able in research involving competent consenting adults. However, all current rational 
use programmes that we are aware of proceed without the patients’ informed con-
sent (though individual doctors may discuss prescribing decisions with their patients 
and seek to understand patients’ preferences), so that the minimal net risk threshold 
is more pertinent. Moreover, although some ethical guidelines allow a “minor 
increase” above minimal risk in research without consent when it is not possible to 
gather the necessary data in a less risky manner and the social and scientific value 
of the research is compelling (CIOMS 2016), the minor increase over minimal risk 
threshold remains underspecified in the research ethics literature. We therefore 
would not recommend applying it systematically in the context of rational use 
programmes.
With regard to judging whether the net risks of a given rational use programme 
are proportionate to the social value of implementing it, one way of making this 
judgment is to ask whether an “informed and impartial social arbiter” would recom-
mend the programme in question after carefully considering the risks and potential 
benefits for all affected parties and giving everyone’s claims fair consideration, 
while treating like cases alike in similar areas of policy (Rid and Wendler 2011). 
This test provides no more than a heuristic to guide evaluators’ judgment; however, 
the idea of a social arbiter helps to ensure that rational use programmes are evalu-
ated just like other programmes or policies that impose some level of risk on indi-
viduals for the sake of realising an important social good—within clinical medicine, 
but also beyond. In the case of delaying or withholding antibiotics for LRTIs, the 
(arguably) minimal net risks that this programme involves for patients would seem 
proportionate to the importance of preserving antibiotic effectiveness and the 
potential of this programme to help curb AMR.  Moreover, given that net risks 
are minimal, the programme could proceed without obtaining the patients’ informed 
consent.
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20.6  Potential Objections
Critics might argue that there are less invasive strategies for curbing the spread of 
AMR that we should exhaust before delaying or withholding antibiotics in clinical 
medicine, such as eliminating unnecessary antibiotic treatments, reducing antibiotic 
use in farming, and investing more, and more effectively, into research on new anti-
biotics. These other strategies should indeed be pursued with urgency, and there is 
little reason to believe that adopting rational use programmes would undermine 
them. However, given that AMR is now recognized as one of the major public health 
threats of the twenty-first century, it is essential to consider all approaches that 
could delay or prevent AMR in an ethically justifiable way. As this paper argues, 
rational use programmes that involve delaying or withholding antibiotics should 
become part of the conversation.
It might also be objected that few such programmes would satisfy the minimal 
risk threshold known from the context of clinical research. At this point, it is diffi-
cult to respond to this objection because few reliable data exist on patient outcomes 
when antibiotics are delayed or withdrawn. However, we have identified at least one 
case—restricting antibiotic use for LTRIs—where reasonable estimates suggest that 
the minimal risk threshold would be respected. As more data become available, 
more cases could follow. Moreover, our proposed ethical framework would also be 
helpful for evaluating rational use programmes that pose more than minimal risks to 
patients and therefore require obtaining their informed consent to participate. 
However, as mentioned, all current rational use programmes we are aware of pro-
ceed without obtaining the patients’ informed consent, and we suspect this will stay 
the same in future. To be effective, rational use programmes need to be implemented 
as widely as possible—and in practice this is likely to be feasible only when patients 
are not asked to give their informed consent to having antibiotic treatment withheld 
or delayed. Given the considerable uncertainty about the social value of rational use 
programmes in terms of curbing AMR, and considering that such programmes are 
generally rolled out without requiring that clinicians obtain patients’ informed con-
sent, we would argue that rational use programmes should pose no more than lim-
ited net risks to patients until more evidence supports their social value.
Finally, some might argue that the present argument rests on an ethical frame-
work for risk-benefit evaluations in clinical research that is not universally accepted. 
In particular, prominent research ethicists hold that clinician-investigators should 
generally not delay or withhold established effective treatments from patient- 
participants in clinical trials (Weijer and Miller 2004). This argument is based on 
the idea that clinician-investigators continue to have clinical obligations in the 
research context, which make it unacceptable for them to act against the best clini-
cal interests of patient-participants by depriving them of proven effective interven-
tions. And, it might be argued, if it is not acceptable to delay or withhold proven 
interventions in the research context, then it is not acceptable to do the same in 
rational use programmes. However, it is important to see that this latter position is 
not universally accepted in research ethics. This is because it cannot explain why it 
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is justified for clinician-investigators to pose any net research risks to patient- 
participants—for example, by performing research-specific blood draws or biopsies 
that have no prospect of clinical benefit. After all, these interventions by definition 
do not promote the best clinical interests of patient-participants (Miller and Brody 
2003). The ethical framework for risk-benefit evaluations that forms the basis of the 
present paper avoids this problem. It justifies why some level of carefully evaluated 
net risk can be imposed to patient-participants, namely because clinical research has 
important social value. Moreover, the framework applies the same standards for 
acceptable net risk to all research interventions, whether or not net risks result from 
delaying or withholding effective treatments or from performing research proce-
dures without a prospect of clinical benefit (Rid and Wendler 2011). Thus, the ethi-
cal framework for risk-benefit evaluations in clinical research used here, while not 
universally accepted, is arguably more defensible than the existing alternatives.
20.7  Conclusion
For clinicians, rational use programmes can pose ethical conflicts when they involve 
delaying or withholding antibiotics and thereby compromise the clinical interests of 
their present patients for the sake of preserving antibiotic effectiveness for future 
patient populations. Such exceptions from the general norm that clinicians should 
always act in the best interests of the present patient need to be carefully developed 
and managed. In this paper, based on a comparison to clinical research, we pre-
sented an ethical framework that enables an explicit and transparent evaluation of 
the net risks that rational use programmes can pose to patients in order to address 
AMR. Because these evaluations require judgments about complex empirical facts 
and normative questions, it is essential that rational use programmes be developed 
transparently and with the involvement of patients, clinicians and other relevant 
stakeholders. This involvement would not only improve the quality of deliberations, 
but also help to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of the resulting policies and their 
successful implementation.
Finally, the rational use of antibiotics can only be one part of a comprehensive 
strategy to address the danger of AMR; other measures have to be pursued with 
equal urgency, including better infection control, comprehensive strategies to reduce 
antibiotics use in animals, and the development of new antibiotics.
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Abstract The concept of solidarity has received increasing attention in discussions 
about public health interventions, both as a possible justification for such interven-
tions and as a possible motivating factors for individual action. This chapter pro-
vides an analysis of whether thinking through a lens of solidarity is likely to be 
helpful in devising strategies and policies to combat antimicrobial resistance. It first 
provides a critical overview of recent accounts of solidarity and argues that solidar-
ity must be understood as a group based concept. It then applies this conception of 
solidarity to individual use of antibiotics through a case study of the antibiotic treat-
ment of moderate and severe acne where it is argued that solidarity based thinking 
is valuable within a context of shared decision-making. Issues of policy making are 
then discussed and it is argued that basing a policy on solidarity on the one hand 
constrains the methods chosen to pursue public health goals, but that on the other 
hand solidarity may provide a strong and durable motivation to comply with such a 
policy. The limits of solidarity are explored in the final section and it is concluded 
that 1) the concept of solidarity does have an important role to play in thinking 
about public health, 2) considerations of solidarity can help us shape the goals and 
methods of public health policies in the area of antibiotics, and 3) that it is likely that 
solidarity may also be helpful in thinking through other contentious issues in pub-
lic health.
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Antibiotic resistance in bacteria, viruses and other pathogenic microorganisms is an 
increasing public health problem. The treatment of infectious diseases depends on 
the availability of effective antibiotics and modern surgery is only possible because 
post-operative infections can be effectively treated. It is therefore of the utmost 
importance to devise policies that can minimise and delay the emergence of resis-
tance, as well as policies that promote the development of new classes of antibiotics.
But developing such policies and ensuring compliance with them is a compli-
cated problem. It is complicated by (1) the fact that the development of resistance is 
not only caused by misuse or overuse of antibiotics, (2) the possibility of resistant 
strains and resistance genes to spread rapidly in our globalised and interconnected 
world, and (3) the close connection between health system deficiencies in resource 
poor environments and the development of resistance (Daulaire et al. 2015).
Any use of antibiotics can lead to the selection of genetic variants that confer 
resistance to that antibiotic or class of antibiotics in microorganisms. Although 
proper use of antibiotics can minimise the emergence of such genetic variants it 
cannot completely prevent it, and there is some evidence that genes conferring resis-
tance can be present even before the antibiotic is developed and used (Rolo et al. 
2017a, b). Patients shed microorganisms during their treatment (e.g. approximately 
1 × 1011 bacteria per gram of faeces), and the antibiotics themselves are also excreted 
in urine and faeces leading to selection for antibiotic resistance in bacteria in the 
sewer systems of health care institutions (Hansen et al. 2016).
This means that antibiotic resistance cannot be prevented merely by preventing 
misuse and overuse of antibiotics. In some circumstances we will also need to 
restrict proper use. We may, for instance have to restrict the use of an effective anti-
biotic against a known microorganism which is sensitive to that antibiotic in con-
texts where most of the cases of the illness in question are self-limiting. The cost of 
this will be that many patients will experience illness for longer than if they had 
been treated, and that some whose illness turn out not to be self-limiting may suffer 
more significant effects.
In this paper we will analyse to what extent the concept of ‘solidarity’ can help 
in (1) guiding personal and professional decision-making about the use of antibiot-
ics, (2) designing and deciding on proper policies for minimising and delaying the 
emergence of resistance, and (3) maintaining support for and promoting compliance 
with anti-resistance policies. Solidarity is an old concept, but has recently experi-
enced a resurgence in public health ethics.
The focus of the paper is on the use of antibiotics in human health care, and pri-
marily on policies that aim to control the use of antibiotics in health care. There are 
significant issues concerning how to properly incentivise the development of new 
antibiotics and how to control the marketing of antibiotics, but these issues of 
‘industrial policy’ are better analysed through the concepts of justice and injustice. 
Antibiotic use in veterinary medicine and in agriculture more generally, e.g. as 
growth promoters in animal husbandry is also outside the scope of this paper. These 
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practices contribute very significantly to the development and maintenance of anti-
biotic resistance, but we simply do not have space to analyse them in depth within 
the solidarity framework.1
21.2  Solidarity and Public Health
Solidarity is an old concept with roots in both moral theology and socialist/social 
democratic political philosophy. Both the authors of this paper are from Denmark 
and up until the mid-1990s ‘solidarity talk’ was common in Danish political dis-
course and it is still common within the organised labour movement.
The concept of solidarity has recently been revived in public health ethics by 
Prainsack & Buyx and by Jennings & Dawson (Dawson and Jennings 2012, 
Jennings 2015, Jennings and Dawson 2015, Prainsack and Buyx 2011, 2016; see 
also Baylis et al. 2008).
Prainsack & Buyx develop their conception of solidarity from the bottom up in 
their important book-length exploration of the concept, building on the concept of 
the solidaristic act defined in the following way:
Solidarity is an enacted commitment to carry ‘costs’ (financial, social, emotional or other-
wise) to assist others with whom a person or persons recognise similarity in a relevant 
aspect. (Prainsack and Buyx 2016, p. 52)
Based on this definition they then distinguish three ‘tiers’ of solidarity:
 1. Interpersonal solidarity
 2. Group solidarity
 3. Contractual, Legal or Administrative Norms (or perhaps better ‘institutionalised 
solidarity’)
And they define group solidarity as:
… solidarity comprises manifestations of a shared commitment to carry costs to assist oth-
ers with whom people consider themselves bound together through at least one similarity in 
a relevant respect (e.g. a shared situation, characteristic, or cause). (Prainsack and Buyx 
2016, p. 55, emphasis in original)
Other important features of their account are that they see solidarity as an inher-
ently symmetrical relation, and thus distinct from asymmetrical relations like char-
ity (p.  67); and that they claim that solidarity is a hybrid descriptive-normative 
concepts and that it is therefore “… suited neither to be framed nor applied in the 
way clearly deontic concepts such as human rights, or justice, can be.” (p. 93)
We agree with their analysis in many respects. It is very useful because it shows 
that although the concept of solidarity has a history which links it historically to 
socialist and social democratic political philosophy, it can be developed and used 
1 We do not even have space to consider whether or not human networks of solidarity can and 
should be extended to also encompass some or all animals.
21 Solidarity and Antimicrobial Resistance
348
for bioethical purposes without relying on any explicit or implicit socialist premis-
es.2 However, the commitment to develop the conception from the bottom up, from 
the individual, isolated solidaristic act leads to some problematic conclusions.
The first problem is that it may not make sense to define a specific class of soli-
daristic acts without reference to a motive grounded in group solidarity. Acts of 
beneficence or charity are often based on a recognition of ‘similarity in a relevant 
aspect’ between the agent and the beneficiary of the act, e.g. the ability to suffer or 
the ability to experience a certain kind of welfare benefit or the simple fact that the 
beneficiary is recognised as being a fellow human being; and beneficial acts based 
in justice are often built on the recognition that the agent and the recipient are simi-
lar in the relevant sense of being moral agents subject to obligations of justice.
The second problem is that it is far from obvious that relations of solidarity are, 
or have to be inherently symmetrical. Agents may perform solidaristic acts for other 
persons in the full knowledge that they can perform these acts because they have 
more power or more resources than those they assist, and that it is unlikely that they 
will need reciprocation. But, if the acts are motivated by solidarity and not by, for 
instance pity or a desire to do good works, then they should count as within the 
scope of solidarity. And even if the acts are performed with the expectation that they 
will be reciprocated if and when needed, that does not entail that the acts or the 
relationship is symmetrical at the time when the act is performed. If I, based on a 
motive of solidarity donate money to the striking workers during a long term strike, 
I may have an expectation that if ever I was participating in a long term strike some-
one would, based on solidarity donate money to me and my fellow strikers, but that 
would not necessarily be an expectation that the money would come from the very 
same workers who are now on strike, and it could still involve the realisation that I 
am currently much better off than they are. A strict symmetry requirement would 
also entail that solidarity with future generations beyond the lifetime of the moral 
agent would be ruled out, simply because whereas I can do something for future 
generations, they cannot do anything for me.3
It also cannot be definitional for acts of solidarity that they must involve net 
costs. Walking in the 1st of May parade with the other members of the blacksmiths’ 
labour union was, at least in years when the weather was good, a great source of joy 
for one of our grandfathers, but it was also an act of solidarity and identification 
with the union, its members and its causes, as well as with the larger network of 
labour unions.
Jennings & Dawson has a more traditional understanding of solidarity as a group 
concept and identify three relational dimensions of solidarity:
The fundamental gesture or posture of solidarity is standing up beside. This posture has 
three relational dimensions: standing up for, standing up with, and standing up as. (p.32, 
emphasis in original)
2 Whether that is sufficient to ensure that those socialist historical connotations will not be activated 
in the minds of readers or listeners when the term ‘solidarity’ is used is a different question.
3 Except, perhaps keeping my good reputation alive.
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We stand up for when we “assist or advocate for the other” (p 36). We stand up 
with when our solidarity requires us to enter “into the lifeworld of the other”; and 
we stand up as when there is “a yet stronger degree of identification between the 
agents of solidaristic support and the recipients of such support.” (p.  37). These 
three dimensions are not fundamentally different types of solidarity and they all 
draw their justification from the same conception of solidarity, but they point to dif-
ferent levels of engagement and action. It is, for instance uncontroversial that health 
care professionals should in many circumstances stand up for the patient groups 
they serve, but their obligation to stand up with these patient groups only get acti-
vated in certain contexts, and it is perhaps even rarer that they are required to stand 
up as with a patient group. But, the obligation to stand up as may be activated in 
more circumstances for health care professionals if the issue that requires solidaris-
tic action is an issue affecting other health care professionals. In our analyses below 
of the implications of solidarity for individual and group actions and societal poli-
cies in relation to antimicrobial resistance we use Jennings & Dawson’s three 
dimensions to indicate the level of engagement and commitment necessary for a 
particular kind of solidarity based action or policy to be likely to be effective.
21.3  Solidarity and Antimicrobial Resistance
Antimicrobial resistance is a problem that may potentially affect each and every one 
of us. It may currently be a more significant problem in some areas of the world, but 
it is not geographically containable. In order to reduce the rate at which antimicro-
bial resistance develops and spreads we also all have to be involved, since there is 
no use of antibiotics which does not promote resistance to some small degree.
We thus have a coordination problem. Each of us will in each instance where 
antibiotics can be prescribed personally benefit or potentially benefit by using anti-
biotics more than is optimal seen from the point of an optimal, overall balance 
between use and development of resistance. Or to put it the other way around, slow-
ing down the development of resistance will require each of us sometimes to suffer 
when that suffering could have been potentially reduced by the prescription of 
antibiotics.
Coordination problems can, as discussed in other chapters of this book be solved 
in a variety of different ways, e.g. by changing the choice architecture and/or incen-
tive structure. But some of these more structural solutions may either be illiberal in 
the sense that they reduce the option space available to individuals, even if none of 
the individual choices have any harmful consequences as individual choices, or they 
may create perverse incentives to try to circumvent restrictions in the choice archi-
tecture. It is therefore worth considering whether there are alternative options.
Can considerations of solidarity help to solve these coordination problems in a 
more constructive way, and what is required for solidarity to be activated?
If we look at Jennings & Dawson’s three relational dimensions of solidarity it 
seems to be the case that even persons who have not realised that antimicrobial 
21 Solidarity and Antimicrobial Resistance
350
resistance is a problem for themselves can come to see that they ought to stand up 
for others in relation to antimicrobial resistance. They might, for instance decide to 
stand up for victims of extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) in sub- 
Saharan Africa, because they recognise some connection between themselves and 
the victims, even though they do not see themselves in any way threatened 
by XDR-TB.
However, once persons have realised that they share in the problem of antimicro-
bial resistance the two more intensely relational dimensions of solidarity can be 
activated, i.e. they can come to the realisation that they have to stand up with or as 
those who are threatened by antimicrobial resistance.
This does, potentially have different implications for ordinary persons /patients 
and for health care professionals. Ordinary persons can stand up with others in a 
number of ways in this context, they can advocate for policy changes, for research 
investment and for increased health care; and they can stand up as and take respon-
sibility for their own use of antibiotics and encouraging others to do the same.
Health care professionals have a wider range of actions available to them because 
of their roles as gatekeepers to antibiotics, experts in public debates, and trusted 
advisors to individual patients. But this also means that they have to bring two dif-
ferent perspectives to bear, their personal perspective and their professional per-
spective; and that they can be part of potentially different networks of solidarity 
(e.g. solidarity with other health care professionals in areas of the world where 
resistance is very prevalent).
It is important to note that activating solidarity in the context of antimicrobial 
resistance does not necessarily have to be based solely on the realisation that I and 
others share this particular similarity or vulnerability. Groups within which we feel 
and enact solidarity are often sustained by multiple, complexly intertwined per-
ceived similarities (e.g. a national, regional or professional identity that engenders 
group solidarity is not just about one shared feature), and it may well be that the 
chance of successfully engendering ‘antimicrobial solidarity’ is much larger if it 
takes place within already existing networks of solidarity. Single similarity solidar-
ity may in some instances be strong, but multi-similarity solidarity is often stronger, 
partly because it receives support from a multiplicity of motivating factors.
It is likely that the most important and effective kind of solidaristic identification 
and action in relation to antimicrobial resistance is if enough people stand up as and 
take responsibility for their own use of antibiotics. What are the necessary condi-
tions for this kind of solidarity to be engendered and for it to spread within already 
existing networks of solidarity? The first necessary precondition is, as mentioned 
above the realisation that antimicrobial resistance is not only a problem for others, 
it is also a problem for me and for others like me. However, for this to result in more 
than a sentiment of solidarity or a solidarity based call or activism for others to do 
something, I also need to know that there is something I can do personally in rela-
tion to the use of antibiotics. Many people in the industrialised world have probably 
internalised three key messages about antibiotics during their own upbringing, and 
later as parents:
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 1. Don’t ask for antibiotics unnecessarily, e.g. when there is no bacterial infection
 2. Take the antibiotics if they are offered by the doctor
 3. Take the full course of antibiotics that is prescribed
1. and 3. were traditionally backed up by the claim that this will help prevent the 
development of resistance, and 2. by the general idea that if a doctor offers a treat-
ment option it must be good for you. However, 3. which has been a mainstay of 
antibiotic folk-knowledge for generations has now been repudiated by a group of 
scientist in a recent high profile paper where they claim that taking the full course 
actually promotes the development of resistance (Llewelyn et al. 2017).
So, what knowledge do people now need to have in order to be able to act effec-
tively in this context? They should still not ask for antibiotics when they are not 
necessary, but the concept of ‘not necessary’ may have to be further explicated so 
that we all understand that many bacterial infections are self-limiting and therefore 
not in need of antibiotic treatment, and also that pursuing treatment even when it is 
technically effective may bring about bad consequences for others to which we 
stand in a relation of solidarity.
Let us briefly analyse a specific case study of antibiotic use through the lens of 
solidarity, i.e. the use of antibiotics in the treatment of acne (Acne vulgaris) in teen-
agers and adolescents. Acne is a common disease and moderate and severe acne can 
lead to permanent scarring of the skin, as well as social and psychological problems 
in those affected by the condition (Hassan et  al. 2009; Kellett and Gawkrodger 
1999; Murray and Rhodes 2005). Oral antibiotics have for decades been used when 
topical treatments have been tried but turn out not to be effective and before the 
prescription of systemic isotretinoin or other retinoic acid analogues, since the reti-
noic acid analogues have many and potentially severe side-effects (Nagler et  al. 
2016). There has, however been an increasing realisation that whilst this use of oral 
antibiotics is effective in many cases, it also leads to increasing antimicrobial resis-
tance (Dreno et al. 2014; Sinnott et al. 2016). What implications do solidarity in 
terms of standing up with and as have for patients and doctors in this scenario? We 
will first focus on the patient-doctor encounter and then move on to the question 
of policy.
In the patient-doctor encounter the enactment of solidarity is a matter for per-
sonal and potentially shared decision-making. The doctor can and should advise the 
patient on the benefits and drawbacks of antibiotics and of other available treat-
ments and the patient should make a decision based on an evaluation of how the 
different treatment options will affect his or her life and life plans. What solidarity 
brings to the table are two things, it provides the doctor with a license (and potential 
obligation) to appeal to the patients solidaristic motivations and it creates an obliga-
tion for the patient to consider the choice through the lens of solidarity and not 
merely as an individual decision. This does not mean that the patient has to refuse 
antibiotics, or that the doctor has not to mention them as one of the treatment 
options. Acne is not a trivial disease, the side-effects of other available treatments 
are significant, and it is only the patient who can judge whether the sacrifice of for-
going antibiotics is outweighed by the solidaristic public health benefits in terms of 
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reducing the development of antibiotic resistance. It is also important to note that 
the doctor’s license to appeal to solidaristic motivations is not generated by the doc-
tor’s professional role but by the fact that he or she stands with the patient in a 
mutual relation of solidarity and that they both recognise this.
Things are more complicated at the policy level. The ‘spontaneous’ enactment of 
solidarity that we would wish to crystallise in policy arise in a situation where the 
doctor interpellates the patient as a person within a network of solidarity and encour-
ages the patient to consider and enact solidarity in his or her decision-making, and 
where the patient enacts solidarity in a nuanced way by giving proper weight to the 
public health consequences of using antibiotics in his or her specific circumstances. 
This is tricky to implement as a policy and the main risks are that the doctor will be 
seen not as someone who stands with the patient and interpellates him or her in a 
network of solidarity, but as an agent of the state or the public health system, and 
that the patient will therefore not engage in solidaristic decision-making but per-
ceive the situation as one where he or she is simply being asked or forced to sacrifice 
personal interests for some abstract conception of the public good. To avoid this 
problem the justification given for a policy, the way it is communicated to doctors 
and patients, and the way in which it is being implemented in health care will have 
to foreground solidarity considerations as the driving force behind the policy. A 
policy of simply banning the use of oral antibiotics for the treatment of acne is, for 
instance unlikely to sustain a solidarity based motivation for compliance.
Consideration of the implications of solidarity can also guide the choice of meth-
ods used to pursue public health goals in other areas. It has for instance been sug-
gested in the literature that the active stigmatisation of the overweight and obese is 
an acceptable public health intervention, if there is evidence that it is effective 
(Callahan 2013); and there have been suggestions that targeted stigmatisation of 
farmers whose pigs carry multi-resistant bacteria is acceptable or perhaps even 
appropriate.4 But, if there are some obese people or some pig farmers within my 
circles of solidarity a choice of pursuing active stigmatisation to further public 
health goals becomes potentially problematic seen from the perspective of solidar-
ity. These are people with whom I share important things and with whom I work on 
common projects and not people who should be harmed or ridiculed. And, given 
that standing up with or as them requires me to understand their lifeworld I may 
well come to understand why they act as they do. More generally considerations of 
solidarity enjoin us to choose supportive methods in our public health policies, and 
only resort to proscription when absolutely necessary.
4 For a rejection of this view on other grounds than solidarity see Ploug et al. 2015.
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21.4  Solidarity as a Motivational Factor
We have argued above that considerations of solidarity can be useful in the design 
of policies to minimise and delay antibiotic resistance. But, building on the case 
study we need to consider solidarity as a motivating factor for action in more detail. 
We do not want to become embroiled in the interminable discussion about whether 
moral considerations necessarily motivate, or whether they only motivate when 
combined with a suitable desire. And, working with a concept like solidarity we do 
not need to become embroiled in that debate because realising that one has an obli-
gation derived from or in solidarity straddles the cognitive/affective divide. Being in 
a relation of solidarity with a group is not a purely cognitive matter, but also a matter 
of felt identification. You don’t walk in the parade on the eighth of March, or partici-
pate in a ‘Reclaim the Streets’ action purely on the basis of a dispassionate, rational 
assessment of your ethical obligations. You do it because you identify with the cause 
and with the group pursuing the cause.
This motivating force of solidarity lead to and support individual solidaristic 
action, but it can also be an important factor in engendering support for policy 
change and maintaining support for policies once they are implemented. However, 
the mere fact that a policy builds on or crystallises an already existing, or a develop-
ing solidarity based practice does not automatically mean that the support will 
transfer from the practice to the new context where what was previously a freely 
chosen action is now prescribed and must be performed (or proscribed and no lon-
ger available).
In the design of policies we therefore need to be careful not to lose the connec-
tion to solidarity as a motivating factor. The policy in a sense has to continue to 
speak to people and call them out in the language of solidarity and interpellate them 
as active participants in networks of solidarity.
This has implication both for how policies should be designed and how they 
should be communicated. We need to understand which networks of solidarity the 
relevant groups of citizens are embedded within, and design policies that appeal to 
those already existing networks.
21.5  The Extent and Limitations of Solidarity
There are a number of possible criticisms of the line of argument which has been 
pursued above. Here we want to look at two of them which are especially relevant 
in the context of antibiotic resistance since it is a global problem that needs global 
solutions.
The first possible criticism is that because we develop solidarity as a group con-
cept, there will be some individuals and groups that are outside the solidarity group, 
that are Other than the ones included in our solidarity and who will be disadvan-
taged by solidarity in the in-group. The second criticism is that it is implausible to 
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think that the solidarity of ordinary people could ever have a global scope (Holm 
1993). Saints may aspire to global solidarity, but most of us restrict our solidarity to 
smaller and more local groups. Taken together these two criticisms imply that soli-
darity is an unsuitable, and perhaps even pernicious concept on which to base a 
solution to a global public health problem.
We take the second criticism to be empirically true. Few people manage to 
engender a state of ‘solidarity with the people of the world’5 in themselves (pace 
West-Oram and Buyx 2017). But perhaps that is not what is needed for solidarity to 
have global reach and be useful in supporting public health policies and initiatives. 
A global reach of local solidarity can come about in two ways. The simplest way is 
if local networks of solidarity are exhaustive in the sense that everyone is a member 
of at least one local network of solidarity, and if the results of solidarity in all, or 
perhaps just most of these networks contribute to a similar aim, i.e. in the present 
context the conservation of effective antibiotics through a reduction in the develop-
ment of resistance. In this scenario a positive global outcome can be achieved by 
purely local action. Each local network of solidarity does not have to pursue an aim 
which is precisely identical to that of other networks. The second way in which 
local solidarity can have global reach is when we have local, but overlapping circles 
of solidarity that reach in an unbroken chain from people in the affluent north to 
people in the impoverished south. This may be sufficient to sustain the public health 
policies globally. In such a situation, persons may for instance accept policies 
restricting the use of antibiotics based on their solidarity with their fellow citizens 
in a particular country or region, but most of the people in that circle of solidarity 
which is defined by local citizenship will also be in other overlapping circles of soli-
darity based on other identifications like language, gender, profession etc. etc. Some 
of these overlapping circles may reach directly from the north to the south, there 
may for instance be solidarity among nurses or teachers or solidarity based on 
shared history. Others may be longer and involve more linking circles of solidarity 
but may never the less still be effective.
The first criticism also contains an element of truth, but it is perhaps not as dam-
aging to the use of solidarity as it initially seems. It is undoubtedly true that there 
are some circles of solidarity that are partly constituted by identifying a particular 
group of others as ‘the enemy’, or as the radical Other. Communist solidarity among 
workers for instance posits the violent struggle between the working class and the 
capitalist class as an inevitable historical fact. However, not all forms of solidarity 
have to work in that way, and most do not. Danish identity and solidarity among 
Danes, for instance originally relied on distinguishing Danes from Swedes and 
Germans and seeing those two groups as enemies. But, although Swedes and 
Germans are still the Other and instantiate all of the traits that are non-Danish and 
therefore not-ours, they are no longer the enemy. So whereas solidarity almost inev-
itably expresses a form of partiality, which is partly what distinguishes it from thin 
5 ‘Solidaritet med verdens folk’ is a common slogan in left wing politics in the Nordic countries
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conceptualisations of justice or utility maximisation, it may be a perfectly benign 
type of partiality.6
21.6  Conclusion
In this paper we have argued for three main conclusions. First, that the concept of 
solidarity has an important role to play in analysing how individuals and groups can 
and should act in relation to the threat of antimicrobial resistances and that it is an 
important counterweight to pure self-interest. Second, that considerations of soli-
darity can help us to shape both the goals and the methods of public health policies 
in order to make them long-term socially sustainable. And, third by implication that 
given that solidarity is helpful when thinking through one thorny issue in public 
health ethics and policy, it is likely to be helpful in other areas of public health ethics 
as well and that it therefore warrants continued attention from the public health (eth-
ics) community.
We have also analysed the problems in moving from a voluntary practice sus-
tained by solidarity to an official policy crystallising that practice as prescriptions 
and proscriptions and shown that careful design and communication is necessary 
not to lose the motivating force of solidarity when formulating policy.
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Abstract This chapter charts and critically analyses the ethical challenge of assess-
ing how much (and what kind of) evidence is required for the justification of inter-
ventions in response antibiotic resistance (ABR), as well as other major public 
health threats. Our ambition here is to identify and briefly discuss main issues, and 
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point to ways in which these need to be further advanced in future research. This 
will result in a tentative map of complications, underlying problems and possible 
challenges. This map illustrates that the ethical challenges in this area are much 
more complex and profound than is usually acknowledged, leaving no tentatively 
plausible intervention package free of downsides. This creates potentially over-
whelming theoretical conundrums when trying to justify what to do. We therefore 
end by pointing out two general features of the complexity we find to be of particu-
lar importance, and a tentative suggestion for how to create a theoretical basis for 
further analysis.
Keywords Antibiotic resistance · Public health ethics · Precautionary principle · 
Complexity
22.1  Antibiotic Resistance
Antibiotic resistance is emerging as one of our largest global challenges: more and 
more bacterial infections1 are becoming increasingly impervious to antibiotics, 
which increases morbidity, mortality and societal costs around the world.
The evolutionary principle that drives ABR is relatively simple: when popula-
tions of bacteria are exposed to an antibiotic, strains that have acquired resistance to 
the drug (through mutations or through uptake of genetic material) are favoured 
over the sensitive ones. The emergence of ABR on a macro-scale is, however, noto-
riously complex.2 One reason is that ABR is a global phenomenon with a variety of 
causes on different levels and in different contexts, some of which are poorly 
understood.
The most obvious cause of ABR is the use of antibiotics in humans, especially 
when antibiotics are used inappropriately (e.g. when overly broad antibiotics are 
used, or when a patient has no benefit from antibiotic treatment). The use of antibi-
otics in animals, both for treatment and prevention of disease and for growth promo-
tion, also contributes to the problem.3 Some bacteria have the ability to colonize 
both humans and domestic animals, and mobile genetic elements, such as resistance 
plasmids, often move across bacterial species. Hence, there are no firm barriers that 
1 We will limit ourselves here to antibiotic resistance. Antibiotic resistance is a sub-category of 
antimicrobial resistance, which also includes drug resistance in viruses, fungi and other microor-
ganisms than bacteria.
2 World Health Organization (2014). The evolving threat of antimicrobial resistance: options for 
action. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization.
3 Anomaly, J. (2020). Antibiotics and Animal Agriculture; The Need for Global Collective Action. 
In Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health. Springer, Cham.
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separate the microflora of animals from that of humans. The external environment 
is another source of resistance, both as a transmission route for certain pathogens, 
for example through faecal contamination of water, and as a source for resistance 
genes that over time are recruited from harmless bacteria into pathogens, assisted by 
a selection pressure from antibiotics.4 The need to take into account the interconnec-
tion between humans, animals and the external environment is often referred to as a 
“One Health perspective”.5
Clearly, there is an urgent need to address all of these causes of ABR and imple-
ment interventions at different sites and different levels of organization. However, 
as we will see, securing the evidence required to establish both the effectiveness and 
the risks of such interventions, comes at a moral price. This raises in a straightfor-
ward manner the question of what the criteria of evidence should be for the various 
interventions that aim to fight ABR. This question links the ethical justification of 
ABR interventions to debates around the ethics of risk and precaution. In other 
words, all ABR interventions pose the challenge of what quality of evidence for 
what balance of risks and possible benefits is required for such an intervention to be 
justified.
22.2  Precaution
The notion of precaution is central to much public health and environmental think-
ing. Specifically, when faced with complex and potentially extremely threatening 
phenomena such as a pandemic, global warming or pollution, it makes sense both to 
act in response to them even if there is a lack of evidence, but also to proceed with 
caution when enacting precautionary measures to mitigate or prevent damage.
Scholars of the Precautionary Principle (PP) have worked to express this intu-
ition more clearly, resulting in a generic criterion of justified decision-making and 
policy arrangements that can be expressed in the following way:
... in the face of an activity that may produce great harm, we (or society) have reason to 
ensure that the activity is not undertaken, unless it has been shown not to impose too seri-
ous risks.6
This criterion expresses three basic things: First, the idea that uncertain major 
threats may provide reason for action.7 Second, the contention that whatever such 
4 Bengtsson-Palme, Johan, and DG Joakim Larsson (2015). Antibiotic resistance genes in the envi-
ronment: prioritizing risks. Nature Reviews Microbiology 13.6: 396–396.
5 Boden, L. & D. Mellor. (2020). Epidemiology and ethics of antimicrobial resistance in animals. 
In Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health. Springer, Cham.
6 Munthe, Christian (2016). Precautionary principle. In: Ten Have (ed.) Encyclopedia of global 
bioethics. Dordrecht: Springer International Publishing.
7 Compare also: “uncertainty should not be a reason for inaction in the face of serious environmen-
tal threats”. Daniel Steel calls this idea the ´meta-precautionary principle´. Note that the vagueness 
of this procedural meta-criterion allows PP to be applied in a large number of different contexts 
22 Justifying Antibiotic Resistance Interventions: Uncertainty, Precaution and Ethics
360
actions are taken must not themselves impose too serious risks or new uncertain 
major threats, and, third, that we are required to demonstrate reasons both why 
responses to threats are motivated and why apparent threats may be accepted. The 
criterion expresses a generic formula, within which more specific PP versions, or 
specific precautionary policy suggestions, must fit in order to be justified. There are 
thus various ways to flesh out the idea that we have reason to take precautions in the 
face of major, but uncertain threats. As a version of PP is specified, it further delin-
eates what can properly be considered responsible decision-making in such con-
texts, not least regarding what is required more precisely to satisfy the requirement 
of demonstrating reasons for whatever precautionary action is suggested.8
One basic assumption underlying PP is that there is a moral price to exposing 
people to risk, as well as to proceed with activities in the face of uncertain risks. 
However, there is also always a price to any precautionary intervention that aims to 
clarify uncertainties and to prevent or mitigate risks: these will always claim 
resources that could have been used for other worthwhile purposes, create risks of 
their own, and delay or stop possibly valuable activities. For that reason, sugges-
tions for precautionary action need to be subjected to precautionary scrutiny too, 
and to be justified it needs to be demonstrated that they incur an acceptable price 
and level of precaution. Particularly in systemically complex situations, the emer-
gence of risks and uncertainties on various levels raises complications concerning 
how to balance the type and severity of the various harms and uncertainties involved.
A version of PP has to set standards concerning when precautionary action is 
required, and what is required of it in order to be responsible. Daniel Steel has 
recently explained this in terms of a ‘tripod’, consisting of a knowledge condition, 
a harm condition, and a suggested precautionary action.9 Variations of how this tri-
pod is construed will affect the price of precaution, as well as the level of precaution 
enacted. A PP version thus needs to specify for (1) any suggested precautionary 
action, (2) what threat is sufficiently serious for such action to be defensible, and (3) 
what degree of uncertainty is acceptable for it. For example, in order to, say, justify 
taking expensive precautionary measures to curb ABR (1), there needs to be a sci-
entifically plausible model (3) in which failure to introduce these measures leads to 
significant economic or health damage (2). Whether or not in a specific case the 
model leading to harm is ´plausible´ and the damage is ´significant´ of course 
requires further elaboration. In any justifiable specification of the ‘tripod’, it is nec-
essary to balance in a responsible way the need for precautionary action against the 
price of precaution.
Although details vary among authors, critical debate on what it takes to justify a 
PP version has led to a reasonably broad consensus on some minimal desiderata. 
These regard that a sound PP must not balance its required level and price of 
and on different levels of organization. See Steel, Daniel (2014). Philosophy and the precautionary 
principle. Cambridge University Press.
8 Munthe, Christian (2011). The price of precaution and the ethics of risk. Dordrecht: Springer.
9 Steel (2014).
N. Nijsingh et al.
361
precaution arbitrarily (but according to a general principle that applies equally to all 
cases), that it needs to avoid so-called precautionary paradox, and that principle for 
responsible balancing of precautionary level and price must be proportional.10
PP is arbitrary when it offers no good, generalizable reasons why a specific 
course of action is acceptable or not. If an appeal to PP is used to recommend inter-
vention 1, but to prohibit intervention 2, it should be able to meaningfully distin-
guish between the two measures and show how these are relevantly different. Note 
that the requirement to avoid arbitrariness also excludes treating the status quo with 
special regard: the fact that things are currently done in certain way is not in itself 
an argument for doing it that way.11 It also means that whatever requirements are set 
by the specification of the tripod in a PP, these apply both to uncertain threats in 
order to justify precautionary action, and to the uncertainties of these actions 
themselves.
This links to the need to avoid ‘precautionary paradox’. PP can lead to paradox 
in two related ways: Either its requirements are so strong that it tends to ban all 
options in most situations, thereby undermining any capacity to guide decision- 
making.12 Or it issues inconsistent prescriptions by requiring and banning one and 
the same option.13 It has been a theme among critics to point out how simplistic 
versions of PP may easily become paradoxical in any or both of these ways.14
The desideratum of proportionality follows from both of these requirements. In 
order to avoid paradox and arbitrariness, a justified version of PP must present a 
principle of responsible balancing of what level of precaution is required and what 
price of precaution is acceptable to pay that applies equally to all situations, as well 
as to all options in such situations. Any plausible version of PP will thus offer prin-
cipled grounds for comparing suggested precautionary interventions, or the accep-
tance of an uncertainty or a threat, to alternative options in a unified manner. Such a 
version will express an allegedly morally responsible way of balancing the required 
level and price of precaution. To justify a specific precautionary action in a situa-
tion, it is therefore necessary to point how such a PP version supports it. As different 
situations vary with regard to what options are available, what stakes in terms of 
threats and prospects these actualise, and what knowledge is available with regard 
to these factors, one and the same precautionary intervention may therefore be 
10 Munthe, 2011, 2016; Munthe, C. (2017). Precaution and Ethics: Handling risks, uncertainties 
and knowledge gaps in the regulation of new biotechnologies. Berne: Swiss Federal Office for 
Buildings and Publications and Logistics (FOBL); Steel, (2014).
11 However, there may be good instrumental reasons to be cautious when implementing change in 
a situation of great uncertainty. We will return to that point later.
12 What Munthe (2011, ch. 2) has called decisional paralysis.
13 What Steel (2014) terms inconsistency.
14 Holm, Søren, and John Harris (1999). “Precautionary principle stifles discovery.” Nature 
400.6743: 398–398. Sunstein, Cass R (2005). Laws of fear: Beyond the precautionary principle. 
Cambridge University Press. McKinney, WJ, & Hill, HH (2000). Of sustainability and precaution: 
The logical, epistemological, and moral problems of the precautionary principle and their 
implications for sustainable development. Ethics and the Environment, 5: 77–87.
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justifiable in some situations, but not in others. This regards also what quality and 
type of information about risks and effectiveness we require, and how much of fur-
ther investigation to mitigate uncertainties is needed in the light of that. Precautionary 
requirements will therefore be gradual rather than absolute, and context-dependent 
rather than rigid. Different situations will justify different levels of precaution, and 
different prices of precaution to attain such levels.15
This regards not least the option of postponing a specific intervention in order to 
gather more evidence to ensure its effectiveness and responsibility. Possibly, this is 
the most common type of precautionary measure, familiar from standard regulation 
of drugs and the introduction of novel biotechnology.16 It is also easy to see how this 
type of precautionary action may often be justified on the basis of a defensible ver-
sion of PP. However, knowledge is never perfect, and the option to further update 
the basis of information for assessing the effectiveness and riskiness of an interven-
tion is ever present. So, when do we know enough? How much time and resources 
should we spend on making sure that what we do in order to invoke responsible 
precautionary response to dangers and uncertainties will not in fact worsen the situ-
ation from a precautionary standpoint by invoking an unjustifiable price of precau-
tion? This is a distinct ethical issue that becomes a particular challenge in the face 
of complex and drastic public health threats, such as ABR, where the price of delay-
ing interventions is obvious, and costs and new risks of conducting research are 
salient. If we wait, the ABR problem continues to grow and increasingly threatens 
to overwhelm us, and if we experiment with interventions this will usually create 
new uncertainties and risks of harm. At the same time, unproven interventions may 
both escalate the ABR problem, and expand it to include severe policy failures. This 
takes us to the question of how these stakes, and options of collecting (or not col-
lecting) evidence, should be assessed and evaluated.
22.3  Evidence
Traditionally, guidelines for evidence basing and research in the area of medicine 
confine themselves to clinical trials of biomedical interventions, focusing mostly on 
the immediate somatic effects on individual patients.17 At the same time, as men-
tioned, ABR (and most other public health) interventions greatly surpass that area, 
and mostly occur outside of immediate therapeutic action (although sometimes 
intended to affect it, e.g., those interventions that regard antibiotic prescription prac-
tices). However, the recently revised guidelines by the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) allow for a broader conception of 
15 Munthe, (2017).
16 Munthe (2011), p. 97. See also Munthe, (2017).
17 World Medical Association (2014). “World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: ethical 
principles for medical research involving human subjects.” The Journal of the American College of 
Dentists 81.3: 14
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‘health research’, including the study of any intervention that aims to change health- 
related behaviour on both individual and institutional levels.18 This more inclusive 
conception clearly and significantly leaves room for the gauging of the proper 
amount of evidence for public health interventions.
A starting point for this type of assessment is the recognition of the fact that all 
health research – not only on biomedical interventions – imposes risks on research 
subjects, while the projected aim is to gather more knowledge in the interest of sci-
ence or society.19 A central tenet of research ethics therefore is that health research 
either has to plausibly benefit the research subject, or the societal benefit needs to be 
very large. In the new CIOMS guidelines, the latter is explicitly recognized in terms 
of the “social value” that may be attained by an intervention.20 Furthermore, consid-
erations of promoting trust towards health professionals and the complexity of the 
ethical issues involved provide arguments to treat health research with a certain 
amount of caution.21 To this, we may add the precautionary considerations related in 
the preceding section: while a public health threat may be major and acute, any 
intervention meant to mitigate or prevent it may instead make it worse, or produce 
structural side effects that undermine other types of social goods. Therefore, the 
CIOMS frame is helpful to understand the question of evidence in public health 
interventions, such as the interventions aimed at fighting ABR.22 To establish 
whether the evidence is sufficient, we have to chart the types of harm and uncer-
tainty for various interventions in order to determine whether the expected (social) 
value of the intervention outweighs the value of postponing the use of a new inter-
vention to collect more solid information about it.
This challenge is well illustrated by debates over suggested interventions in pub-
lic health emergencies, such as Ebola.23 When, in 2014, the West African Ebola 
epidemic was finally recognized as a global threat, it was suggested to prevent 
18 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) (2016). International 
Ethical Guidelines for Health-Related Research Involving Humans. Geneva, Switzerland: Council 
for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. http://www.cioms.ch (accessed July 28, 
2017). Munthe, C., Nijsingh, N., de Fine Licht, K., & Joakim Larsson, D. G. (2019). Health-related 
Research Ethics and Social Value: Antibiotic Resistance Intervention Research and Pragmatic 
Risks. Bioethics, 33(3), 335–342.
19 Wilson, James, and David Hunter (2010). “Research exceptionalism.” American Journal of 
Bioethics 10.8: 45–54.
20 CIOMS (2016).
21 Wilson and Hunter (2010).
22 Attena, Francesco (2014). “Complexity and indeterminism of evidence-based public health: an 
analytical framework.” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17.3: 459–465.
23 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017). Integrating Clinical 
Research into Epidemic Response: The Ebola Experience. National Academies Press. An even 
more recent example is the Zika epidemic. See Edwards, Sarah JL (2016). “The precautionary 
paradox and Zika.” Research Ethics: 178–181.
and Glenza, J. “Zika virus: Floridians fear ‘Pandora’s box’ of genetically altered mosquitos.” 
The Guardian, August 14, 2016: https://www.theguardian.com/us- news/2016/aug/14/florida-
keys-zika-virus-genetically-modified-mosquitoes (accessed July 25, 2017).
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further harm by ‘fast tracking’ new vaccines and experimental drugs, thus relaxing 
the demands of evidence required to introduce new medication.24 This suggestion 
was countered by public health officials, who argued that the epidemic should rather 
be controlled by means of proven public health policies, such as proper hygiene, 
surveillance and quarantine.25 Another issue that was debated was whether random-
ized clinical trials could be justified in the context of an epidemic and the extent to 
which genuine equipoise could be presumed. In part, the answers to these questions 
depend on the relative risk to which the affected communities were exposed, in 
another part it depends on how we assess the gravity of uncertainties underlying the 
assessment of these risks and how we value the importance of acting on good evi-
dence in view of those uncertainties. While the question on the evidence of interven-
tions to counter ABR is similar to such debates, the issue of ABR also raises a new 
set of worries and topics for discussion. Specifically, whereas the Ebola crisis was 
unexpected and presented an acute emergency, ABR is – for now – slowly emerg-
ing, albeit foreseen, but nevertheless posing a major and growing public health 
threat. Already a substantial amount of morbidity and mortality is attributed to 
ABR, but this number is likely to keep growing in a way well known to us.
22.4  Justifying Interventions
Since the causes are varied, the fight against ABR takes place in different arenas. In 
this section, we distinguish between various groups of interventions. The first set 
concerns the development of new types of (or alternatives for) antibiotics. Second, 
we consider interventions that target the access to antibiotics by individuals. Third, 
various interventions aim to establish a larger degree of surveillance. Last, we bring 
together various institutional measures to attack the environmental health side of the 
ABR problem, such as the use of antibiotics in animals, as well as emissions of 
antibiotics. In accordance with the broad notion of ‘health research’ introduced in 
the former section, these interventions span a wide array of different actions and 
policies. As a consequence, we will consider many different levels and types of 
intervention; both on the scale of an individual patient–doctor interaction, as well as 
on the level of macro-economic interventions, institutional regulation and global 
health treaties. Varied though these interventions may be, they all share the charac-
teristic of aiming to help curbing – or otherwise fighting – ABR. To what extent it 
can be demonstrated that they are effective in that regard, and to what extent they 
pose risks of their own, determines whether they can be responsibly introduced.
Not all interventions in the fight against ABR are new. In fact, a number of 
important interventions intended to counter ABR belong to the classic public health 
24 Geisbert, Thomas W. (2015). “Emergency treatment for exposure to Ebola virus: the need to fast-
track promising vaccines.” Jama 313.12: 1221–1222.
25 Rid, Annette, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel. (2014). “Ethical considerations of experimental interven-
tions in the Ebola outbreak.” The Lancet 384.9957: 1896–1899.
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repertoire: screening, surveillance, quarantine, hygiene, and so on. Although they 
are not always uncontroversial, these interventions have been thoroughly tested and 
proven effective. Unfortunately, however, they will not suffice in addressing the 
problem of ABR.26 New methods will need to be explored, which raises the question 
how to determine which intervention is preferable; which offers greater relative 
benefit, and which poses fewer relative risks? The answer to that question depends 
on the evidence available to assess the various interventions. We have no ambition 
here to be complete in listing the possible, but aim to illustrate and map some major 
complexities that arise when balancing the level of precaution against the price of 
precaution.
22.4.1  Biomedical Interventions
A fundamental problem in managing and fighting ABR is the lack of appropriate 
biomedical interventions. One aspect of this is the lack of truly new antibiotics. 
Although there is some progress in the development of novel antibiotics that affect 
Gram-positive bacteria (bacteria with a single outer cell wall),27 innovation for 
Gram-negative bacteria that has reached the market has for decades consisted only 
in variations of the same.28 In part, this can be attributed to the fact that developing 
new antibiotics is relatively unappealing from a business point of view. Therefore 
there is a widely recognized and urgent need to encourage academia and pharma-
ceutical companies to develop new antibiotics, and to facilitate their introduction.29
So-called expedited programs to this effect have been launched, for example by 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).30 Interventions included in such pro-
grams are priority review, accelerated approval, and fast track (which can be 
combined).31 By promising a swifter, simplified and/or more relaxed process for 
licencing new therapies, such options both offer incentives to industry to invest in 
26 O’Neill, Jim (2014). Antimicrobial resistance: tackling a crisis for the health and wealth of 
nations. Review on antimicrobial resistance.
27 Wright, Gerard. (2015). “Antibiotics: An irresistible newcomer.” Nature 517.7535: 442–444.
28 See, e.g., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. “Antibiotic breakthrough: How to over-
come gram-negative bacterial defenses.” ScienceDaily. www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2017/05/170510132012.htm (accessed July 6, 2017); WHO 2015.
29 World Health Organization, WHO. Global priority list of antibiotic-resistant bacteria to guide 
research, discovery, and development of new antibiotics. Geneva: World Health Organization, 
2017. Online access: http://www.who.int/medicines/publications/global-priority-list-antibiotic-
resistant-bacteria/en (accessed July 28, 2017)
30 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Guidance for Industry. Expedited Programs for 
Serious Conditions – Drugs and Biologics. Washington: USDHHS, 2014. Online access: https://
www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/.../ucm358301.pdf (accessed July 7, 2017). See for a more elabo-
rate discussion: Munthe, C., & Nijsingh, N. (2019). Cutting red tape to manage public health 
threats: An ethical dilemma of expediting antibiotic drug innovation. Bioethics, 33(7), 785–791.
31 https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/fast/ucm20041766.htm (accessed July 28, 2017)
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the development of new antibiotics, and speed up the introduction of successful 
fruits of such endeavours. Interventions of this sort appear attractive, considering 
the potential damage that lack of development and delay could cause, motivating a 
lower acceptable price of precaution than in the case a “normal” drug development 
context. At the same time, entirely new classes of antibiotics imply elevated uncer-
tainties regarding effect and side effects, pointing to a need for more caution, and 
motivating a higher price of precaution. In addition, problems with regards to the 
control of prescription, use and transmission imply further uncertainties regarding 
the benefits of “expediting” new antibiotics. In particular, it creates a stark tension 
between the overall aim of ABR research and the needs of patients burdened by 
resistant infections. If a new compound is introduced in a setting where the men-
tioned problems have not been mastered, resistance, though inevitable, can be 
expected to develop faster. As a result, there is a relative public health benefit to 
delay the discovery and introduction of new antibiotics while addressing the prob-
lems of ensuring responsible use, and mitigating transmission of resistance. Still, 
earlier introduction may save lives and reduce morbidity of individuals. Therefore, 
it is less clear whether expedited programs for the introduction of new antibiotics 
should be at the top of the priority list. Unless they are combined with effective 
measures to control usage and transmission, they introduce graver uncertainties of 
both negative side effects for patients, and of having the overall aim of managing the 
ABR problem undermined. Below, we will comment on interventions to manage 
this complexity of the ABR challenge.
Another aspect of this challenge is that, if resources are concentrated to this 
effect, it may be possible to develop drugs to take in order to mitigate plasmid- 
mediated transmission of resistant bacteria from one patient to others. These could 
be taken by patients with resistant infections, but also patients who take antibiotics 
where this treatment may otherwise give rise to local resistance. This is a possible 
intervention that is still in a very early stage of exploration,32 which means there will 
be a long and expensive path to any possible actual treatment. At the same time, 
there is an obvious risk that no such success awaits at the other end – creating a 
severe uncertainty with regard to the actual worth of incentive schemes aimed at 
effecting such focused research and development endeavours. In addition, any suc-
cessful treatment of this sort will create an ethical challenge in terms of exposing 
patients to the risk of side effects of the treatment without any sort of potential 
somatic benefit for these same patients. If it is successful, it will have an important 
general primary preventive effect of great public health value in the face of the ABR 
problem. If the introduction of such a drug would be “expedited”, this will at the 
same time increase the risk and uncertainty regarding negative side effects concen-
trated only to those people taking the drug. Weighing these stakes has to be a part of 
striking the balance between what the acceptable price of precaution is to be when 
comparing incentive schemes.
32 See, e.g., Buckner, Michelle, Maria Laura Ciusa, and Laura JV Piddock. (2018). “Strategies to 
combat antimicrobial resistance: anti-plasmid and plasmid curing.” FEMS microbiology reviews.
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Controlling use and transmission is less essential regarding therapeutic interven-
tions where resistance development is not an apparent threat. Phage therapy (the 
therapeutic use of viral strains to attack bacteria) might fall into that category.33 The 
efficacy and safety of phage therapy has not been proven to the stage where it would 
fulfil current guidelines in Europe and the USA. However, it might be that these 
guidelines do not quite suffice in assessing the responsible introduction of phage 
therapy, e.g. since individually designed cocktails may be required for each patient, 
creating an impediment for designing controlled trials. Thus, phage therapy, or 
other innovative solutions that do not (as new antibiotic compounds) feed immedi-
ately into the ABR development problem, may be a better target for “expedited 
programs” from an ABR standpoint  – at least while we lack effective means to 
control use and transmission. On the other hand, accepting the higher degree of 
uncertainty, means lowering the level of required precaution, which may harm 
patients severely if experimental treatments turn out to be unsuccessful.
A more general challenge posed by all types of expediting program interven-
tions, is that they may inadvertently create incentives that give rise to negative 
dynamics regarding drug development. The basic problem is that any expedited 
program creates an incentive for industry to re-direct their research efforts in a way 
that shapes studies to be less stringent and clinically relevant than what they would 
otherwise have been. A well-known example of this is the acceptance of surrogate 
outcome variables (an essential part of accelerated approval interventions), which 
makes it economically attractive for companies to run studies measuring only these, 
meaning that there will be a structural dynamic change of clinical research efforts 
into paths with less potential or without demonstrating actual clinical value. 
Similarly, so-called compassionate use programs have recently come under fire for 
creating a structural incentive for industry to move more and more drug develop-
ment out of the default review process, thus creating a generally decreasing level of 
safety and elevated uncertainty regarding effect. To be sure, expediting programs 
partly aim at having industry thus allocate their efforts and resources, however, if 
there is a structural negative dynamic on the general effectiveness of new drugs, this 
must be viewed as a relevant downside. For that reason, policy makers may want to 
consider other solutions to the issue of drug development, such as rewarding phar-
maceutical companies for developing new antibiotics, for example with exclusivity 
extensions, buyouts and entry prizes.34 Each of these interventions has the potential 
to offer incentives to the pharmaceutical companies, but also to pose risks to society 
33 De Vos, Daniel & Pirnay, Jean-Paul (2015). “Could viruses help resolve the worldwide antibiotic 
crisis?” AMR Control, 110.
34 Seth Seabury Neeraj Sood (2017, May 18). Toward A New Model For Promoting The 
Development Of Antimicrobial Drugs. Health Affairs Blog: http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2017/05/18/toward-a-new-model-for-promoting-the-development-of-antimicrobial-
drugs/(accessed July 28, 2017); Morel, Chantal M., and Elias Mossialos. “Stoking the antibiotic 
pipeline.” BMJ: British Medical Journal (Online) 340. Jim O’Neill (2014) has also suggested a 
´pay or play´ principle, where pharmaceutical companies are required to either contribute or 
pay a fine.
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and individuals, for instance a risk of social backlash.35 There are, of course, also 
large uncertainties regarding whether or not such actions would be money well spent.
Returning to our main question concerning the evidence required for justifying 
various interventions that aim to offer incentives to develop new medicine, we see 
that a trade-off has to be made not just between individual and public interest, but 
also between various levels of uncertainty, and risks of structural negative dynamic 
effects. If faster development of antibiotics comes at the price of faster emergence 
of ABR for those same drugs, this raises the question on how to appreciate the 
urgency of the matter. In particular, it demands that we weigh current ABR against 
possible future ABR and the likelihood of developing alternatives for which ABR 
development is not an issue. There is both a danger of being retrospectively overly 
restrictive in the use of antibiotics when an alternative to the current drugs is found, 
as well as a danger of complacency based on the false reliance on such an alterna-
tive. At the same time, we need to weigh into the balance the apparent but uncertain 
risk of incentive schemes being structurally counterproductive.
22.4.2  Prescription Practices
Since the individual use of antibiotics is an important driver of ABR, interventions 
aiming to control the distribution of antibiotic drugs to individual patients are an 
important part of ABR policy. The proposed interventions include mandating pre-
scription policies (in those countries where this is not already the case), various 
limitations to the type of antibiotics that are made available and improved access 
where antibiotics are currently lacking.
It is a received wisdom that the prescription system is an effective way of con-
trolling the use of drugs. At the same time, the effectiveness on the system may vary, 
depending on numerous factors. For instance, antibiotic prescription practices 
across European regions vary considerably, linked to varying levels of institutional 
corruption.36 Such structural challenges can be assumed to multiply in countries 
where there is no system or culture of effective prescription for antibiotics. Given 
the widespread acceptance of the over-the-counter availability of antibiotics in such 
societies, not only among citizens, but also medical professionals, and sometimes 
policy makers, there is a recognised uncertainty as to the real impact of trying to 
create or toughen up such regulation.37
35 Munthe et al. (2019).
36 Rönnerstrand, Björn, and Victor Lapuente. (2017). “Corruption and use of antibiotics in regions 
of Europe.” Health Policy 121.3: 250–256.
37 Radyowijati, Aryanti, and Hilbrand Haak (2003). “Improving antibiotic use in low-income coun-
tries: an overview of evidence on determinants.” Social science & medicine 57.4 (2003): 733–744. 
Dreser, Anahí, et al. (2012). “Regulation of antibiotic sales in Mexico: an analysis of printed media 
coverage and stakeholder participation.” BMC public health 12.1: 1051.
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We meet here with a type of uncertainty that is entirely about how societies may 
react to attempted institutional change.38 Weighing into the mix economic, cultural 
and institutional factors of relevance, a more incremental change seems preferable. 
It provides opportunity to attend to the interests of various stakeholders, as well as 
taking the time for a society to adjust, in order to ease both the passing of regulation, 
and its effective implementation. However, that requires quite a bit of knowledge of 
such mechanics of overarching social change, and also uses time itself as a factor. 
This raises the question of how long is long enough to attempt establishing social 
change, and how much effort should be spent on securing the understanding of how 
to make such attempts work. Facing the ABR challenge, how high should the price 
of precaution due to delaying prescription regulative action be allowed to rise while 
attending to such uncertainties?
For countries where a reasonably effective prescription practice is in place, 
unless a patient is critically ill, the first choice of antibiotics is often not the latest, 
most potent formula (with still limited resistance problems). Therefore, antibiotics 
prescribed usually bring a greater risk that the treatment will not cure the infection 
due to resistance. At the same time, this practice serves to protect the future integrity 
of “last line antibiotics” by minimising their use and thereby inhibiting the evolu-
tionary drive towards resistance to them. Most commentators describe the payoff of 
these interventions in terms of public good, whereas risks of implementing them are 
considered to be carried by single individuals.39 However, matters are slightly more 
complex than that. First, although there is agreement that this intervention does 
delay resistance for broad-spectrum compounds, the magnitude of the effect is still 
uncertain. Second, since broad-spectrum antibiotics are more likely to drive resis-
tance in the individual patient’s own gut flora,40 there is also a chance of individual 
benefit linked to prescription practice.
We thus face a complex trade-off situation, where individual risks of suffering 
untreated infections must be balanced against the uncertain prospect that patients 
are protected against being infected by resistant bacteria, at the same time as the 
question remains whether this mix of risk and uncertain benefit for some individuals 
can be justified by a social benefit of uncertain magnitude. This also raises the ques-
tion how much effort should be spent on making sure that the right balance is struck, 
for example by straightening out some of the important uncertainties.
In any case, agreeing that such a practice is indeed justified does not end the 
problem. We must also ask what intervention would actually effectively address it. 
38 The risk of incentive schemes for drug creation to produce unintended negative dynamics via 
their effect on industry in the former section also belongs to this type.
39 Littmann, Jasper, and A. M. Viens. (2015). “The ethical significance of antimicrobial resistance.” 
Public health ethics 8.3: 209–224.
40 This is phenomenon can be observed in urinary tract infections, for example. As the normal non-
resistant invading bacteria of this flora are exterminated by the treatment, a very fertile living space 
is created for bacteria that are resistant against the drug used. Costelloe, Ceire, et al. (2010). “Effect 
of antibiotic prescribing in primary care on antimicrobial resistance in individual patients: system-
atic review and meta-analysis.” Bmj 340: c2096.
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One idea, of course, is to make professional prescription guidelines for doctors to 
use. However, this introduces the uncertainty that doctors may fail to apply them, 
e.g., due to patient pressure, economic counter-incentives, or the mere inertness of 
habit. To address that, there is the option of allowing professionals less choice, for 
example by requiring application to a higher instance and proof of due cause for 
having a prescription green lighted. Such an intervention could consist of several 
levels of requirements, and for some antibiotics regular doctors may be stripped of 
all prescription rights. At the same time, being able to leave professional discretion 
to doctors in individual cases also has its value, and the more of rigid restriction is 
built into an intervention, the bigger the risk that individuals are harmed due to lack 
of (timely) access to treatment. However, rigid regulatory interventions clearly 
avoid the uncertainty with regard to the overall aims of delaying resistance develop-
ment, as well as avoiding harmful individual prescriptions. To make this trade-off, 
it would be of great value to know more about the social dynamics creating the 
uncertainty around the effectiveness of prescription interventions, as well as how 
these might be complemented by additional institutional changes to mitigate the 
pressure on doctors from patients, and to remove economic counter-incentives.41 On 
the other hand, as we delay action, or apply overly cautious interventions with 
uncertain effectiveness while making sure what more exact variant would be best, 
the price of precaution is allowed to go up in terms present prescription practices 
being allowed to continue.
This precautionary challenge is further complicated by the fact that there is an 
instrumental value to fine-tune prescription interventions so that treatment of infec-
tion is optimized also under a restrictive prescription practice. The reason for this is 
that increased persistent infection can be expected to increase the future demand 
and consumption of antibiotics, thereby accelerating rather than mitigating resis-
tance development in the long run.42 Depending on what current prescription prac-
tices look like in specific societies, this may mean that an optimal prescription 
intervention should not only decrease prescription, but in some cases leave it as it is, 
and in yet other even improve the access to antibiotics. Considerations of fairness 
may add further reasons to a similar effect, and also the need of securing the legiti-
macy of any policy in this area. After all, of what interest is the issue of ABR to 
anyone who is barred from accessing appropriate antibiotics in the first place? This 
further complicates the uncertainty about what exact intervention would be most 
effective. But it also adds a basic source of uncertainty with regard to how the 
moral stakes should be balanced in a measure of effectiveness. A sound precaution-
ary solution therefore needs to acknowledge the latter point when striking the bal-
ance between ensuring a desired level of precaution at an acceptable price of 
precaution, and allow both considerations of health promotion and fair distribution 
of the population health.
41 As such changes may involve drastic reform to entire health care and health insurance systems, 
the knowledge required is quite advanced and complicated to collect.
42 Daulaire, N., et al. (2015). “Universal access to effective antimicrobials: an essential feature of 
global collective action against antimicrobial resistance.” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 43.2.
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22.4.3  Surveillance
The fight against ABR also requires enhanced possibilities of diagnosis and surveil-
lance of resistant bacteria. Better diagnostic methods are in themselves unobjection-
able as increased speed, precision and readiness in determining the cause of an 
infection limits the danger of squandering antibiotics. However, there will be trade- 
offs between increasing speed, increasing precision and financial costs and possibly 
the intrusiveness of the sample taking. Because of this, as well as the general uncer-
tainties befalling any new measurement tool, there is once again a challenge to 
decide how much support for the reliability and validity of a new diagnostic tool has 
to be secured in order to start implementing it. The balance here, as before, includes 
assessing the value of more firm knowledge against the price of precaution in terms 
of delaying tools that may also offer opportunities for better surveillance in the face 
of the ABR threat. But it also includes the complications as more speedy introduc-
tion will tend to increase one or the other of well-known downsides to such 
interventions.
These complications become especially challenging as resistant infections or 
even carriership may often actualise restrictive communicable disease management 
measures, such as compulsory isolation, quarantine or mandatory life-style restric-
tions. The implied tension between individual interest and collective good is par-
ticularly salient when this involves asymptomatic carriers, who have nothing to 
benefit from being institutionalized.43 The issue is further complicated when we 
consider the possibility of false positives, where patients are wrongly identified as 
carrying resistant bacteria. As in the former section, this also links to a risk of 
undermining the legitimacy of ABR policies. Thus, while speedy introduction of 
diagnostic methods certainly has its potential upsides, it will increase uncertainties 
of a sort that in other areas are often taken to undermine health surveillance 
programs.
Attempting to strike these several balances, we face the general problem of hav-
ing the right idea concerning the moral stakes involved and a sound notion of what 
price of precaution to allow. In addition, increased complexities of how to assess the 
quality of available and attainable evidence for ambitious and complex public health 
interventions add another layer of uncertainty.44
43 Weinstein, Robert A., Daniel J. Diekema, and Michael B. Edmond. (2007). “Look before you 
leap: active surveillance for multidrug-resistant organisms.” Clinical Infectious Diseases 44.8: 
1101–1107. Nijsingh, N., Juth, N., Munthe, C., “The Ethics of Screening”, in: Quah, Stella 
R. International encyclopedia of public health. Academic Press, 2016. Nijsingh, N., Munthe, C., 
Lindblom, A., & Åhrén, C. (2020). Screening for multi-drug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria: 
what is effective and justifiable?. Monash bioethics review.
44 Attena, (2014).
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22.4.4  Environment and Animals
A wide variety of ABR interventions relate to attempts to curb the emission of anti-
biotics in the environment45 and their use in animals. We have grouped these together 
because of the potential risks of the interventions, which seem mostly economical. 
For example, attempts to enhance transparency of pharmaceutical companies46or 
banning of the use of antibiotics as a growth enhancer,47 or taxing consumer prod-
ucts emanating from ABR driving practices, such as meat production,48 do not have 
direct health risks for humans. Compared to the possible economic damage of such 
interventions, the health risks of ABR may seem to clearly win out. However, there 
is still much uncertainty concerning the role of non-human use and pollution in the 
establishing of ABR and economic cost of interventions carry their own set of sec-
ondary risks and uncertainties, which might be substantial indeed as the incurred 
costs become more significant.
One obvious uncertainty regards the effectiveness of systems of surveillance and 
control of emission rates in production or compound use in farming. These will 
include uncertainties and imprecisions of technical methods, but even more institu-
tional uncertainties of the sort we have already discussed related to prescription and 
surveillance interventions. As already observed, straightening these uncertainties 
out includes coming to grips with very complex social circumstances, and may 
require quite a lot of time and resources.
On top of this, macro-economic ABR interventions targeting environmental 
emission may have adverse effects in themselves, both socially and economically, 
for instance, by discouraging pharmaceutical business and thereby restricting access 
to drugs generally. Consequently, we may legitimately ask which interventions are 
necessary, or reasonable, and which are disproportional, given the uncertain effects 
of current practices. Should, for instance, pharmaceutical companies be required to 
monitor and make sure antibiotics emission from manufacturing are very low?49 Or 
should regulation rather target the pricing of products, adding tax or extra cost in the 
procurement of drugs by public national health services? Or should some other 
45 Pruden, Amy, et al. “Management options for reducing the release of antibiotics and antibiotic 
resistance genes to the environment.” Environmental health perspectives 121.8 (2013): 878.
46 Larsson, DG Joakim, and Jerker Fick. “Transparency throughout the production chain—a way to 
reduce pollution from the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals?.” Regulatory Toxicology and 
Pharmacology 53.3 (2009): 161–163. Nijsingh, N., Munthe, C., & Larsson, D. J. (2019). Managing 
pollution from antibiotics manufacturing: charting actors, incentives and disincentives. 
Environmental Health, 18(1), 95.
47 Laxminarayan, Ramanan, Thomas Van Boeckel, and Aude Teillant. (2015). “The economic costs 
of withdrawing antimicrobial growth promoters from the livestock sector.”.
48 Giubilini, Alberto, et al. (2017). “Taxing Meat: Taking Responsibility for One’s Contribution to 
Antibiotic Resistance.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 30.2: 179–198.
49 Bengtsson-Palme, Johan, and DG Joakim Larsson. (2016). “Concentrations of antibiotics pre-
dicted to select for resistant bacteria: Proposed limits for environmental regulation.” Environment 
International 86: 140–149.
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institutional intervention to similar effect be chosen, for example having high emis-
sions in production reduce the calculated health benefit in the context of health 
technology assessment? In all these cases, should the link between detected emis-
sion rates and such incentives be proportionally or more rigidly designed? If the 
former, according to what formula or proportionality, if the latter, on what grounds 
should thresholds be set? And what institutional arrangement would be effective to 
have whatever intervention is chosen to be effectively implemented? Similar ques-
tions appear with regard to interventions aimed at creating incentives to reduce the 
use of antibiotics in farming.50
All of this makes for a considerable difficulty in assessing the proper balancing 
of the level of precaution and its acceptable price. Surely, the urgency of mitigating 
major environmental practices that fuel antibiotic resistance development is a prior-
ity. However, to find the right way of doing this requires quite a bit of very complex 
knowledge, and behind this need lurks the very real risk that a more speedy intro-
duction of interventions is not only sub-optimal, but actually makes the problem 
worse. For instance, implementing any of the regulative interventions mentioned 
may mainly have the effect of having pharmaceutical and food production relocat-
ing to areas where the regulative situation is even worse. Or secondary effects, e.g., 
in the form of drastically increased food prices may both undermine the legitimacy 
of ABR policies and create a public health threat of its own. On the other hand, it is 
well known that it takes considerable time to have large-scale operations such as 
drug production and farming change their longstanding ways, and in the light of 
that, applying interventions to address the environmental side of the ABR challenge 
is paramount.
22.5  Discussion
We have assessed interventions with regard to how much and what kind of evidence 
is needed when evaluating and implementing interventions in response to antibiotic 
resistance, a public health threat of immense proportions. The notion of responsible 
precautionary decision-making provides a basic and strong reason to act in response 
to this threat. However, determining what response to go for introduces complex 
problems of balancing what level of precaution to aim for and what price of precau-
tion to pay, actualising much more difficult ethical challenges than what is often 
acknowledged.
We end this exploration by briefly addressing two issues that emerge when we 
consider the evidence for interventions that aim to fight antibiotic resistance, lead-
ing into a final broad suggestion for future analyses to build on.
50 Silley, Peter, and Bernd Stephan. (2017). “Prudent use and regulatory guidelines for veterinary 
antibiotics—politics or science?.” Journal of applied microbiology 123.6: 1373–1380.
22 Justifying Antibiotic Resistance Interventions: Uncertainty, Precaution and Ethics
374
First, there is the sheer size of the possible consequences of increased ABR. For 
example, there is a real question whether standards of treatment and diagnosis in 
research ethics and clinical ethics may need revision in light of a public health threat 
as significant to global wellbeing as ABR. Although one should be wary to discard 
too easily the frameworks that have proven to be of value throughout the years, the 
possible disruptive effects of ABR raise the issue to what extent these standards can 
be maintained, given the range of difficult choices we might face. At the same time, 
we have seen that many of the uncertainties posed by ABR interventions are not so 
much about having risks of undesirable side effects as such are typically conceived 
of when evaluating pharmaceuticals. Rather, the important uncertainties are about 
risks of outright counterproductivity due to social psychological and institutional 
dynamics, where apparently promising attempts to counter ABR may instead lure 
us into political, economic or psychological dead ends from which we are unable to 
get out. Social processes are typically slow, variably inert and intractable, which 
means also that they may be very difficult to reverse, and that doing so may require 
a lot of time. Given that interventions on all of the mentioned levels are probably 
necessary to reduce the risk of emerging resistance and that they are to a large extent 
interrelated, the standards of evidence should be set from an integrated, One Health 
perspective.
This connects to the general observation that methods in response to ABR have 
to intervene on a variety of different levels, from the everyday practice of physicians 
to those affecting global structures. Interventions worthy of consideration therefore 
involve a myriad of different types and degrees of uncertainty and risks, which are 
also unevenly distributed across people, societies and time. Assessment of the evi-
dence thus needs to consider a multi-layered mosaic of uncertainties and ethical 
dilemmas regarding the short- and long-term trade-off between individual interests 
and public health aims. This regards especially the issue of how much and what 
evidence to collect regarding the effectiveness of interventions, and their potential 
long-term legitimacy.
These considerations may drive one to despair whether a responsible, measured 
approach to the issues at play here is at all feasible. One way of moving forward in 
the light of these considerations is to acknowledge that there are good – moral and 
precautionary – reasons to cut the Gordian knot: just as there is a question of how 
much to amass and ponder evidence and the proper resolution of ethical dilemmas, 
we must not get stuck forever in the precautionary conundrum. Moving along such 
a path, one primary consideration is then to assess the relative importance of avoid-
ing harm and risk of harm that result from otherwise apparently effective interven-
tion packages, while avoiding the pull of the enormity of the ABR challenge to lure 
us into policy deadlocks. In doing so, the complexity and close connections of the 
various risks offer strong grounds for putting the reversibility of potential adverse 
consequences at centre stage. Related to debates on the ethics of precaution, this 
links to different proposals on how to limit the scope of a precautionary principle, 
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e.g., in terms of de minimis risk, and, more specifically, to the importance of avoid-
ing irreversible negative outcomes. This is not to say that this is a generally plausi-
ble solution for all precautionary decision-making, but the peculiar complex 
challenges of assessing evidence for ABR interventions seem to add reasons for the 
fittingness of an approach that prioritises reversibility.51
51 This research was supported by the UGOT Challenges Initiative at the University of Gothenburg; 
and by the Swedish Research Coucil, VR, contract no. 2014–40, for the Lund-Gothenburg 
Responsibility Project.
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Chapter 23
Antimicrobial Footprints, Fairness, 
and Collective Harm
Anne Schwenkenbecher
Abstract This chapter explores the question of whether or not individual agents 
are under a moral obligation to reduce their ‘antimicrobial footprint’. An agent’s 
antimicrobial footprint measures the extent to which her actions are causally linked 
to the use of antibiotics. As such, it is not necessarily a measure of her contribution 
to antimicrobial resistance. Talking about people’s antimicrobial footprint in a way 
we talk about our carbon footprint may be helpful for drawing attention to the global 
effects of individual behaviour and for highlighting that our choices can collectively 
make a real difference. But can we be morally obligated to make a contribution to 
resolving a collective action problem when our individual contributions by them-
selves make no discernible difference? I will focus on two lines of argument in 
favour of such obligations: whether a failure to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint 
is unfair and whether it constitutes wrongdoing because it is harmful. I conclude by 
suggesting that the argument from collective harm is ultimately more successful.
Keywords Political philosophy · Ethics · Public health · Antimicrobial resistance · 
Collective action problems
23.1  Introduction
Anti-microbial resistance and a decline in anti-microbial efficacy are urgent collec-
tive action problems. Who should act on this problem? According to the World 
Health Organisation’s recommendations, concerted action on this issue requires 
efforts from a diverse array of actors: patients, drug prescribers and dispensers, 
hospitals, policy makers, and food producers (WHO 2001: 68–70, see also Littmann 
and Viens 2015).
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In this chapter I explore the idea of an ‘antimicrobial footprint’ and discuss 
whether or not individual agents are under a moral obligation to reduce theirs. 
Importantly, I am not suggesting that reducing our antimicrobial footprints by way 
of individual behavioural change is the best or most efficient way of decelerating 
antimicrobial resistance, since that is an empirical question. However, given that the 
WHO identified individual agents such as patients and prescribers as agents of 
change, it seems that individuals’ moral obligations deserve some discussion, which 
is why I will focus on those in this chapter. But before I do so, let me briefly point 
to another way in which individual agents are implicated in anti-microbial resis-
tance: as consumers of products from animal industries. Notably, the aforemen-
tioned WHO report treats the implications of our aggregate meat consumption as an 
issue for regulation, but not one for individual behavioural change. In contrast, my 
argument includes individual consumer choices amongst the options individuals 
have for addressing antimicrobial resistance.
I will focus on two lines of argument for moral obligations to reduce one’s anti-
microbial footprint: whether a failure to reduce it is unfair and whether it constitutes 
wrongdoing because it is harmful. I conclude by suggesting that the argument from 
collective harm is ultimately more successful.
23.2  Antimicrobial Resistance as a Collective Moral 
Action Problem
Antimicrobial resistance is a collective action problem in that it is the result of many 
different agents’ activities, it can only be solved by the concerted efforts of many 
different agents, and it seems rational for individual actors to free-ride because indi-
vidual behavioural change (if taken in isolation) is neither responsible for the prob-
lem’s occurrence nor could it ever remedy the problem.
Crucially, too, antimicrobial resistance is the inevitable result of using antimicro-
bials and thereby selecting microorganisms that are resistant to our drugs. Resistance 
will eventually emerge to any antimicrobial agent we use. This means that resis-
tance as such is an effect that has to be factored into the ‘good’ that specific antimi-
crobials provide. To put it differently, it is only a matter of time for any antimicrobial 
drug to lose its efficacy. To undermine the public good of antimicrobial efficacy is 
to reduce overall efficacy and to produce resistance at a faster-than-necessary rate. 
Some have warned that we might be in danger of losing this public good altogether 
one day – a worst-case scenario, which we are currently capable of preventing. In 
order to do that, we need to slow down the process of emerging resistance through 
a more limited and more considerate use of such drugs.
But who is meant by ‘we’? Unsurprisingly, many call for global regulation or 
even the socialization of the use of antibiotics in order to delay the erosion of this 
good (Smith and Coast 2002; Anomaly 2010). And no doubt, regulators, policy- 
makers and industry leaders must be at the forefront of restricting the use of antimi-
crobials in a way that secures their continued efficacy.
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But what about ordinary people  – individual agents who consume antibiotics 
either directly (as patients) or indirectly (as consumers of animal products) or who 
prescribe them (as medical doctors)? The ‘general community’ was identified by 
the WHO as a target of intervention (WHO 2001). The assumption behind that 
seems to be that individual members of the general community can jointly reduce 
resistance. If that is the case, does it follow that we ought to do something about 
reducing resistance?
One of the starting points for answering this question is to establish what causal 
relationship obtains between our use of antibiotics and emerging resistance. 
According to WHO authors, “the relationship between use and resistance is not a 
simple correlation” when it comes to antimicrobials. “Paradoxically, underuse 
through lack of access, inadequate dosing, poor adherence and sub-standard antimi-
crobials may play as important a role as overuse” (WHO 2001: 15).
Further, it is not simply the case that those who are causally responsible for anti- 
microbial resistance are automatically morally responsible. That is, knowing how a 
problem came about, or which agent(s) caused it, does not necessarily tell us which 
agent(s) can be blamed for its occurrence or even who should fix it. Retrospective 
moral responsibility is often used synonymously with moral blameworthiness. The 
focus in this chapter will be on prospective – or forward-looking – moral responsi-
bility in the sense of having a moral obligation to act or to bring about a certain 
outcome.
Clearly, any answer to the question of prospective moral obligations must be 
based on empirical data concerning which actions will really make a difference to 
antibiotic resistance. One of the great difficulties for making the case for moral 
obligations to change individuals’ behaviour lies in the fact that no individual 
(human) agent’s actions will make a measurable or perceptible difference to solving 
the problem. It is an issue on which only the aggregation and combination of count-
less individual actions and enduring behavioural change will have a real impact.
Both common-sense morality and traditional moral theory often struggle in deal-
ing with collective moral action problems – cases where what is wrong or right 
cannot be determined by looking at individuals and their actions in isolation, but 
where instead these must be considered in conjunction or in aggregation. 
Increasingly, scholars are making an effort to rethink traditional ethical approaches 
with a view to better account for collective agents, actions and effects (May and 
Hoffman 1991; French and Wettstein 2006; French and Wettstein 2014; Hess et al. 
2018). One of the early attempts to do so will be discussed further down: Derek 
Parfit proposed that we re-think our ‘moral mathematics’. According to Parfit, we 
need to revise our notions of wrong and right, harm and benefit regarding aggregate 
effects, where individual actions only make a significant difference in conjunction 
with countless actions of others (Parfit 1984). It is easy to see that such collective 
moral action problems abound: Apart from anti-microbial resistance, climate 
change, and overfishing are cases that come to mind.
So who should act on these problems? The most obvious response would be to 
point to states and state agents and the need for new policies and regulation. And 
there is no doubt that such agents are in principle best suited for dealing with such 
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complex large-scale problems. But there is a role for ‘ordinary citizens’ where gov-
ernments fall short of doing what is required. Where climate change mitigation is 
concerned, for instance, the combined actions of individual agents can make a sig-
nificant contribution to closing the so-called emissions gap, that is, the gap between 
the emission reductions countries have currently committed to and the reductions 
required for limiting global warming to a maximum of 2  °C (Dietz et  al. 2009; 
Ostrom 2010; Wynes and Nicholas 2017).
Whether or not anti-microbial resistance is a problem that can be fixed or 
improved through the aggregate effect of individual behavioural change by patients 
and doctors, consumers and producers is ultimately an empirical question. But, in 
line with the WHO Global Strategy for Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance, I 
will proceed on the assumption that collectively individual actors can make a sig-
nificant difference. Can this ground an obligation for patients, doctors, consumers 
and producers to make a joint effort towards reducing the use of antibiotics? In the 
following, I will re-assess some of the philosophical arguments defending ascrip-
tions of individual obligations in combating collective action problems. I will intro-
duce the idea of an ‘antimicrobial footprint’ and discuss whether not contributing to 
the public good of antimicrobial efficacy is unfair and whether or not it constitutes 
harmful behaviour. I will conclude by suggesting that not reducing your antimicro-
bial footprint (where it is possible for you to do so at an acceptable cost) is poten-
tially wrong because it is harmful (even if your individual actions as such make no 
difference to antimicrobial resistance).
23.3  Antimicrobial Footprints
Let me start by introducing a new concept: that of an antimicrobial footprint. An 
individual agent’s antimicrobial footprint would result from the extent to which her 
actions are causally linked to the use of antibiotics. The idea mirrors that of a carbon 
footprint, a measure which – however imperfect (Wright et al. 2011) – reflects the 
amount of greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere as a result of individuals’ 
actions. Importantly, it links global effects to individual behaviour and highlights 
that our choices can collectively make a real difference. It may be a helpful tool, 
then, to start talking about our antimicrobial footprint in a way we talk about our 
carbon footprint.
With regard to antibiotics, a person’s antimicrobial footprint would not necessar-
ily be a measure of her contribution to resistance, but merely of her overall direct 
and indirect use. Direct use would involve using such drugs as a patient, prescriber 
or agricultural producer. Indirect use would involve the consumption of goods from 
animal industries that were produced by overusing antimicrobials. Our diet, then, 
plays a major role in accelerating resistance (Giubilini et  al. 2017) (see also the 
chapter by Anomaly “Antibiotics and Animal Agriculture). It is important to note, 




To reiterate, the anti-microbial footprint is – just like one’s carbon footprint – an 
imperfect measure. As mentioned above, the causal links between our use of antimi-
crobials and resistance are not always straightforward. But the concept as such 
draws attention to an important fact – that every single one of us is causally and 
morally implicated in the problem of antimicrobial resistance.
Note further that – just like with our carbon footprint – our antimicrobial foot-
print will differ depending on our needs and circumstances. If we live in a climate 
which forces us to heat or cool our dwellings during major parts of the year in order 
to be healthy and safe then our carbon footprint will necessarily be greater than that 
of a person living in a milder climate. Likewise, if we suffer from health conditions 
that require the use of antibiotics we will necessarily have a greater antimicrobial 
footprint. Reducing our carbon footprint as well as reducing our antimicrobial foot-
print must not involve unacceptable cost.
But just like in the case of greenhouse gas emissions, there are many instances 
where we can reduce our antimicrobial footprint at an acceptable cost. First, research 
shows that patients often ask for such drugs (and are prescribed such drugs) when it 
would not have been necessary (WHO 2001, see also chapter by Oakley). If doctors 
can avoid prescribing such drugs and patients stop insisting on them where they are 
not needed this can make a significant difference for the better.
Another way to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint at an acceptable cost (and 
with numerous co-benefits such as improved health) is to become vegetarian (or 
vegan) or at least to have a meat-reduced diet (or else to resort to game and fish 
caught in the wild). This is a factor that is missing from many public debates con-
cerning antimicrobial resistance and also missing from the WHO report (2001) 
mentioned earlier.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that a reasonable way of promoting the 
idea of antimicrobial footprint reductions can be found – one which does not unduly 
jeopardize individuals’ health and which promotes reductions that are truly effec-
tive. Do we have moral obligations to reduce our antimicrobial footprint? Why 
would anyone have such an obligation? The question is a serious one: by them-
selves, none of our individual antimicrobial footprint reductions would make a dif-
ference to local, or regional, let alone global antimicrobial efficacy. I call this the 
impotence objection, or the no-effect-view. The issue is a familiar one: can we be 
morally obligated to make a contribution to resolving a collective action problem 
when our individual contributions make no discernible difference? The view that we 
cannot be obligated to perform an action if it makes no discernible positive differ-
ence to a morally desirable outcome seems to be entailed by standard individualist 
act-consequentialism. The discussion of obligations to contribute to collective 
endeavours even where our individual actions make no perceptible difference is 
ongoing (Parfit 1984; Cullity 1995; Kagan 2011; Nefsky 2011; Schwenkenbecher 
2014; Spiekermann 2014; Pinkert 2015).
I will not rehearse all positions here, nor even the main ones, but instead focus on 
two solutions that appear particularly interesting and suitable to the kind of problem 
we are faced with and which move outside the standard act-consequentialist frame-
work: the argument from unfairness and the argument from collective harm (for a 
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different argument based on solidarity, see chapter by Holm and Ploug “Solidarity 
and Antimicrobial Resistance”). Most importantly, these solutions avoid the prob-
lem of impotence or imperceptible effects by locating the wrongness of failing to 
contribute somewhere other than in the effects of one’s individual actions.
23.4  The Argument from Unfairness
The first of these arguments is about fairness: Under certain conditions, it is unfair 
not to contribute to schemes that we benefit from, regardless of the immediate effect 
of our free-riding, that is, regardless of whether or not we undermine the scheme or 
make people worse off by defecting. According to Garrett Cullity’s Principle of 
Fairness (Cullity 1995), if a person receives benefits from a scheme that satisfies the 
following conditions, it is unfair of her not to meet the requirements the scheme 
makes on those enjoying its benefits:
 (i) The practice of participation in the scheme represents a net benefit for her;
 (ii) Similarly, this practice does not make most others worse off either;
 (iii) She is not raising a legitimate moral objection to the scheme. (p.  18f, 
paraphrased)
According to Cullity, the free-rider’s unfairness lies in giving herself objection-
ably preferential treatment in such cases. The benefits she seeks to gain from free-
riding “only exist because others who seek them take it upon themselves to 
contribute toward their production”. In other words, her choice to free-ride is moti-
vated by the benefits that others provide, while she grants herself the privilege of 
enjoying those benefits without providing them (1995: 22–23).
In a later paper, Cullity specifies that unfair actions are failures of appropriate 
impartiality (Cullity 2008). Judgments about fairness and unfairness concern 
actions for which one particular way of being impartial is morally required (2008: 
3). “Unfairness requires not just that the impartiality you fail to display would have 
been appropriate, but that it is the appropriate way of doing what ought to be done, 
as it ought to be done.” (2008: 5). Cullity gives the following general description of 
what is common to unfair actions:
“Not Φ-ing is unfair when:
 (i) something ought, all things considered, to be done;
 (ii) doing it as it ought to be done requires a form of impartiality;
 (iii) Φ-ing is the appropriate form for that impartiality to take; and
 (iv) the failure of appropriate impartiality can contribute to a non-instrumental 
explanation of the failure to do what ought to be done.” (ibid.)
According to Cullity, then, what matters for assessing the wrongness of free- 
riding is not only whether there is an action that ought to be performed (or an out-
come to be produced or a scheme to be implemented) but that there is a specific way 
in which this ought to be done, which requires people to apply some kind of impar-
tial rule, rather than look to their own advantage. Doing “what ought to be done as 
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it ought to be done” (ibid.) requires that individuals do not exempt themselves from 
contributing. That is, out of the two imperatives that bind agents in such cases – the 
imperative to produce the collective good and the imperative of distributive (or pro-
cedural) justice – the free-rider violates the latter even where she cannot be said to 
clearly violate the former (because she does not jeopardize the collective outcome 
with her defection alone).
How does this relate to our specific problem of antimicrobial footprint reduc-
tions? Let us assume that Cullity is correct in claiming that the above features char-
acterise unfair actions. Is failing to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint unfair? In 
order for that to be true, it would have to be the case that reducing or limiting anti- 
microbial resistance is something that all-things-considered ought to be done. Such 
a claim implies that it can be done at an acceptable overall cost. I think we can 
safely assume that both are the case.
But what about doing it as it ought to be done? Is reducing our individual anti- 
microbial footprint the method by which we ought to combat anti-microbial resis-
tance? Cullity rejects the idea that whenever a group ought to collectively act or 
produce a good, individual group members ought to be doing something to produce 
that good: “That would have odd implications for collective actions to which no one 
is contributing” (2008: 11). He thinks that it is not unfair if I do not unilaterally 
pursue a goal if there is no collectively agreed method for pursuing it (ibid.). 
Defecting (or exempting yourself from contributing to a collective good) is only 
unfair if there is such a method.
According to Cullity, a collectively agreed method for addressing a collective 
action problem is in place where the required course of action was decided in a fair 
procedure. He makes two qualifications though: first, that sometimes decisions pro-
duced by fair procedures can be bad and therefore need not to be respected. Second, 
that we may sometimes be obligated to respect the outcomes of procedures that 
though not perfectly fair are good enough. Unfortunately, Cullity does not specify 
what it means for a procedure to be good enough.
It is not possible here to have a detailed discussion on fair (or good enough) pro-
cedures for deciding on the production of collective goods. Regulation and legisla-
tion – where they result from legitimate democratic procedures – should arguably 
count as such. What is crucial for Cullity’s procedural condition is the underlying 
rationale: that in order for a collective scheme to have legitimacy, in the sense that 
it gives individual agents binding reasons for playing their role therein, such a 
scheme must have been produced in the right way. If that is the case, then we as 
individual agents can be bound by rules (including laws) that are not of our own 
making and that we would in fact not have chosen ourselves. But these clarifications 
do not help with our current enquiry, since our focus is precisely on actions that are 
not called for by regulation and legislation, but on voluntary individual behavioural 
change that might be necessary while regulation and legislation fall short of reining 
in the problem.
This is the point where the fairness argument in favour of reducing our antimi-
crobial footprint crumbles, I believe. It is quite unclear what kind of method or 
procedure would count as fair where aggregate individual behavioural changes to 
reduce our use of antimicrobials are concerned. Would it be enough for such changes 
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to have been recommended by an authoritative, politically neutral global body such 
as the WHO or other expert panels? According to WHO, its Global Strategy for 
Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance report is the result of expert consultation, 
workshops and consensus meetings. It is doubtful that this is the kind of procedure 
Cullity had in mind. Moreover, even though the panel has made recommendations 
for individual behaviour change, it has not in fact proposed an outright ‘scheme’ for 
individual participation with clearly defined roles and contributory actions. For both 
of these reasons, it does not constitute the kind of collective agreement that gives 
potentially binding reasons to individual agents. In sum, the argument put forward 
by Cullity cannot support the idea that individuals ought to take on a share in reduc-
ing antimicrobial resistance as a matter of fairness.
A different and more promising approach might be built on an argument that 
antibiotic overuse or misuse is a way of wronging others in that it harms those who 
suffer its consequences. This argument relies on a notion of ‘collective’ harm – a 
relatively new concept that is increasingly gaining traction.
23.5  The Collective Harm Argument
According to Elizabeth Cripps (2011), individual agents can be collectively respon-
sible for harm brought about by their aggregate individual actions in some cases:
a person becomes one of a group collectively responsible for harm once her contribution 
exceeds the amount such that, were everyone contributing only to that level, there would be 
no harm (p. 181)
In order for a person to be thus responsible for harm, certain conditions have 
to be met:
 1. “individuals acted in ways which, in aggregate, caused harm, and which they 
were aware (or could reasonably be expected to have foreseen) would, in aggre-
gate, cause harm (although each only intentionally performed his own act);
 2. they were all aware (or could reasonably expected to have foreseen) that there 
were enough others similarly placed (and so similarly motivated to act) for the 
combined actions to bring about the harm; and
 3. the harm was collectively avoidable: by acting otherwise (which they could rea-
sonably have done), the individuals making up the putative group could between 
them have avoided the harm.” (pp. 174f)
The crucial point to be noted is that in order to be weakly collective responsible 
(as Cripps puts it) for harm, individuals need to know (or be in a position to foresee) 
two things: (i) that if enough other people did what they do it will cause harm, and 
(ii) that there are enough other people doing what they do.
Whether or not a large enough number of people are in this position vis-à-vis 
antimicrobial resistance is an empirical question. However, I suspect that these epis-
temic conditions are not met when it comes to our antimicrobial footprint. The 
problem of antimicrobial resistance has much less presence in the media and public 
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discourse than the problem of climate change and carbon footprint reductions, for 
instance.
Cripps’ criteria are clearly modelled on Derek Parfit’s (1984) conditions for col-
lectively doing wrong or harming others. He, too, relies on an epistemic condition 
that is – currently – unlikely to be met where antimicrobial resistance is concerned:
(C12) When (1) the outcome would be worse if people suffered more, and (2) each of the 
members of some group could act in a certain way, and (3) they would cause other people 
to suffer if enough of them act in this way, and (4) they would cause these people to suffer 
most if they all act in this way, and (5) each of them both knows these facts and believes 
that enough of them will act in this way, then (6) each of them would be acting wrongly if 
he acted in this way. (p. 81, my emphasis in bold)
According to both Cripps and Parfit, then, we only act wrongly if we know about 
the effects of our own antimicrobial overuse or misuse and we are aware that enough 
others are engaged in this practice. Consequently, public awareness campaigns 
would make it the case that Cripps’ and Parfit’s conditions are met. Public knowl-
edge – which obtains where most people know some proposition to be true and most 
people know that most people know – would turn harmless actions into harm. But 
still, on their accounts there is – currently – no harm or wrongdoing committed by 
many if not most of those who contribute to antimicrobial resistance. Also, for 
Cripps, weakly collective responsibility does not imply that any individual has 
direct duties to avert the (aggregate) harm. Instead such duties fall to the group, first 
and foremost. That is, even if we were collectively responsible for antimicrobial 
resistance we would not be required to individually reduce our antimicrobial foot-
print on her account.
Let me now turn to Judith Lichtenberg, who combines the unfairness argument 
and the argument from aggregate harm (2010): If we knowingly contribute to harms 
that “depend on the joint effects of many people’s actions” (p. 568) we accept that 
if a sufficient number of other persons act in the same way, these harms will occur. 
She thinks that to do so is wrong because it means to act unfairly: “In the case of 
aggregate harms, doing the right thing involves an appeal to the unfairness of acting 
inconsistently with how one thinks others ought to act.” (2010: 569). As I under-
stand Lichtenberg, contributing to aggregate harms is not intrinsically wrong, but is 
wrong because it cannot be justified in rule-consequentialist terms or by way of 
universalizing. Similar to Cullity, she argues that the wrongness lies in exempting 
oneself from a rule that one should accept as morally optimal.
Note that Lichtenberg’s account is more demanding than Cripps’ and Parfit’s 
because it does not have as strong a knowledge condition. For the wrongness of 
contributing it does not matter whether or not an individual agent knows that enough 
others will perform the same action and harm will be thus caused in aggregation. It 
suffices for the individual to know that collectively we should adopt a rule prohibit-
ing such actions. This is a more demanding account because it seems to require us 
(pro tanto, at least) to individually refrain from doing what is collectively subopti-
mal. As I understand it, Lichtenberg’s rule, if applied to antimicrobial footprint 
reductions, would imply that avoidable antimicrobial overuse and misuse are 
instances of harming, from which we (pro tanto) ought to abstain.
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In response, one might argue that to demand – as Lichtenberg appears to do – 
that we individually do our part in a pattern that is collectively optimal is too strong 
a requirement. After all, sometimes it may be right to do what is collectively subop-
timal if no one else does what is collectively optimal and our individual ‘sacrifice’ 
would be pointless. However, note that if Lichtenberg’s proposal is safe from this 
objection as long as it is understood as generating pro tanto obligations to avoid 
contributing to collective harm, that is, obligations that can be overridden by other, 
more important obligations. If the collective defection rate is too high, my pro tanto 
obligations may simply fail to become all-out obligations. That is, if not enough 
others contribute, I may not have an all-things-considered obligation to avoid col-
lective harm.
23.6  Conclusion
In this chapter I discussed arguments in favour of a moral obligation to reduce one’s 
individual antimicrobial footprint. Despite the intuitive appeal of this idea, there 
exists no simple, straightforward defence of an obligation to change our individual 
behaviour. High levels of collective awareness and a genuine collective willingness 
to address the problem of anti-microbial resistance appear to be important precondi-
tions for motivating (all-out) obligations for individuals to reduce their antimicro-
bial footprint. It is one of the most frustrating aspects of collective action problems 
that it is precisely the publicly known lack of commitment to resolving them which 
seems to sustain and justify a (further) lack of commitment for all those who could 
potentially resolve it.
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Chapter 24
Global Health Governance 
and Antimicrobial Resistance
Belinda Bennett and Jon Iredell
Abstract This chapter analyses the challenges and the adequacy of existing frame-
works to provide a strong foundation to support global responses to antimicrobial 
resistance. Calls for global responses are indicative of a growing global commit-
ment to seeking practical means of tackling the growing problem of antimicrobial 
resistance. While antimicrobial resistance is often conceptualised as an emergency, 
the application of the International Health Regulations, designed to govern responses 
to public health emergencies of international concern, remains unclear. Furthermore, 
there may be challenges for countries in developing and resourcing national 
approaches to address antimicrobial resistance. Clarity and agreement around defi-
nitions of key concepts related to antimicrobial resistance will also be essential to 
antibiotic stewardship and development of policy in this area. Finally, improve-
ments to health systems as a result of the Sustainable Development Goals may help 
to support improvements in public health and may play a role in global strategies to 
address antimicrobial resistance.
Keywords Antimicrobial resistance · International Health Regulations · Sustainable 
Development Goals
24.1  Introduction
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has been described as ‘a global health crisis,’ 
(Review on Antimicrobial Resistance 2015) ‘a slowly emerging disaster’ (Viens and 
Littman 2015), and ‘a complex global public health challenge’ (World Health 
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Organization 2014: xix). With AMR raising the possibility that we could soon be 
living in a ‘post-antibiotic era’ (World Health Organization 2014: ix) and with rec-
ognition that AMR ‘threatens the sustainability of the public health response to 
many communicable diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS’ 
(World Health Assembly 2014), there is increased international dialogue around the 
need to find practical global solutions for the looming crisis (Laxminarayan et al. 
2013). Others have argued for the need for AMR strategies to address equitable 
access to medicines; conservation through stewardship and appropriate use of anti-
microbials; and innovation to ensure the development of the new antimicrobials, as 
well as the importance of a binding legal framework addressing these issues 
(Hoffman, Outterson, Røttingen et al. 2015; Hoffman, Røttingen and Frenk 2015). 
Proposals have included a new international treaty (Hoffman, Outterson, Røttingen 
et  al. 2015; Anomaly 2010), the establishment of an intergovernmental panel 
(Woolhouse and Farrar 2014), a range of policy options to support action on AMR 
(Hoffman, Caleo, Daulaire et  al. 2015), and the use of the International Health 
Regulations as an existing framework for managing global health risks (Wernli et al. 
2011). Such is the complexity of the challenge posed by AMR that national and 
regional approaches alone are unlikely to be effective solutions (Littman et  al. 
2020). Yet the complex nature of AMR presents considerable challenges for global 
health governance, and with recent global health crises revealing shortcomings in 
global health governance, there are clearly significant challenges associated with 
utilising existing frameworks to address the growing problem of AMR. This chapter 
analyses these challenges and the adequacy of existing frameworks to provide a 
strong foundation to support global action on AMR.
24.2  The Rise of Drug Resistance
Severe infection long ago overtook heart attacks in terms of likelihood of hospital 
admission in developed countries (Seymour et al. 2012). The ability to manage it is 
essential for intensive care, major surgery and transplantation services that are 
increasingly routine. Up to 20 million people each year are treated with mechanical 
ventilation in intensive care (Adhikari et al. 2010). Infection complicates about half 
of ICU admissions and is an important cause of death in the critically ill (Vincent 
et al. 2009). 
Antibiotics are a cornerstone of treatment of severe infection, with the risk of 
death increasing in the presence of antibiotic resistance (Review on Antimicrobial 
Resistance 2016a). In response to the steady rise in antibiotic resistance that began 
soon after the first introduction of antibiotics and has been quickly accelerating 
(Davies et al. 2013; Laxminarayan et al. 2013; Review on Antimicrobial Resistance 
2016a: 10), experts call for international co-ordination of public policy solutions 
that include (i) better antibiotic controls in industry, agriculture and medicine (anti-
microbial stewardship), and (ii) better surveillance and containment (infection con-
trol) (Howard et  al. 2013; Laxminarayan et  al. 2013; Piddock 2012; Spellberg 
et al. 2008).
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24.3  A Global Approach to AMR?
With the recognition of the problems posed by growing AMR have come calls for a 
global approach to limiting the spread of AMR and its associated risks. In 2015 the 
World Health Assembly adopted a global action plan on antimicrobial resistance 
(World Health Organization 2015a; Ho and Lee 2020) and called on Member States 
to develop national actions plans on AMR and to ‘mobilize human and financial 
resources through domestic, bilateral and multilateral channels in order to imple-
ment plans and strategies in line with the global action plan’ (World Health 
Assembly 2015). The global action plan included five strategic objectives:
(1) to improve awareness and understanding of antimicrobial resistance; (2) to strengthen 
knowledge through surveillance and research; (3) to reduce the incidence of infection; (4) 
to optimize the use of antimicrobial agents; and (5) to ensure sustainable investment in 
countering antimicrobial resistance (World Health Organization 2015a: 1)
The World Health Assembly resolution was followed in 2016 by a declaration by 
the high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on antimicrobial 
resistance. The declaration of the high-level meeting included committing to work 
nationally, regionally and globally to address AMR, and to mobilize funding and 
resources to support the development and implementation of national plans (United 
Nations General Assembly 2016). 
These calls for global action on antimicrobial resistance indicate a growing 
global commitment to seeking practical means of tackling the growing problem of 
antimicrobial resistance. As Wernli et al. have pointed out, this growing focus on 
AMR ‘also indicates that AMR has transformed into a global governance priority, 
which requires international co-operation’ (Wernli et al. 2017: 1). The policy dis-
courses around AMR are also complex however, with Wernli et al. identifying five 
key policy frames that are evident in the debates around AMR, with each of these 
frames providing insights into AMR and the interdependencies between these pol-
icy frames: (i) ‘AMR as a healthcare issue’; (ii) ‘AMR as a development issue,’ 
reflecting the burden of infectious diseases  in low- and middle-income countries; 
(iii) the relationship between AMR and innovation, which recognises the impor-
tance of research and development for new antibiotics; (iv) AMR as a global health 
security issue; and (v) AMR and the role of a One-Health approach to addressing 
AMR (Wernli et al. 2017).
International cooperation will clearly play a key role in responding to AMR 
(Årdal et al. 2016). However, recent global health crises have revealed difficulties in 
ensuring effective responses to emerging public health crises, leaving the role of 
global health governance in leading responses to AMR unclear. The remainder of 
this chapter identifies four key areas that will present challenges for a global 
response to AMR: (i) the challenge of fitting responses to AMR within other global 
health governance frameworks that support urgent responses to health crises; (ii) the 
challenge of developing national and regional capacities to identify and respond to 
AMR; (iii) the challenge of developing common understandings and definitions of 
AMR; and finally (iv) the challenge of fitting AMR within the global priorities iden-
tified by the Sustainable Development Goals.
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24.4  The International Health Regulations, Global Health 
Governance and AMR
Adopted to manage the international spread of infectious diseases, the International 
Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) (World Health Organization 2016a) could possi-
bly provide a framework for improved surveillance and reporting of AMR. However, 
there has been debate over whether the scope of the IHR could include evolving 
events such as AMR or whether the IHR are more properly focused on emergency 
situations (Wernli et al. 2011; Kamradt-Scott 2011). It has been argued that AMR 
may, at least in some instances, fulfil two of the four IHR criteria for a ‘public health 
emergency of international concern’ (PHEIC) i.e. those relating to the seriousness 
of the public health impact of an event, and the potential for international spread of 
disease (Wernli et al. 2011: 3), with the remaining two IHR criteria being that the 
event is ‘unusual or unexpected,’ and that there is ‘a significant risk of international 
travel or trade restrictions’ (World Health Organization 2016a: Annex 2). It is cer-
tainly the case that the IHR provide a strong normative scaffold for the shared 
expectations about how both states and the international community should respond 
to the international spread of disease (Davies et al. 2015), as well as clear processes 
for reporting progress.
While patterns of AMR vary between countries (Review on Antimicrobial 
Resistance 2014), AMR certainly poses major risks to public health globally (World 
Health Organization 2015a). The focus of the IHR on managing global risks to 
public health, and the inclusion of consideration of whether there is ‘a significant 
risk of international spread’ as one of the criteria for determining whether events 
that may constitute a PHEIC should be notified to WHO (World Health Organization 
2016a: Annex 2), provide a global perspective to the risks posed by spread of 
AMR. As it is now more than a decade since the revised IHR took effect in 2007, the 
IHR provide a familiar and well-established framework for the global community 
and, it has been argued that it may be possible to build on existing frameworks 
rather than building new ones (Wernli et al. 2011: 5). Yet these factors do not neces-
sarily make the IHR an ideal mechanism for addressing AMR (Kamradt-Scott 
2011), even though, with the global initiatives referred to above, global health gov-
ernance seems set to play a key role in addressing AMR.
Despite the promise that initially heralded the adoption of the revised IHR in 
2005 (Fidler and Gostin 2006), recent global health crises have revealed significant 
shortcomings in contemporary global health governance including, inadequate 
capacity building of national health systems, a failure by countries to comply with 
the IHR 2005 through the imposition of trade and travel restrictions contrary to 
WHO recommendations, and a lack of funding to support an effective global 
response to global public health emergencies (Gostin et al. 2015, 2016; Moon et al. 
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2015; Ottersen et al. 2016). Furthermore, the suitability of the IHR as a mechanism 
for addressing AMR remains unclear, with the primary focus of the IHR being on 
the global capacity to deal with global public health emergencies (Kamradt-Scott 
2011).  With the IHR’s focus being on acute emergencies, rather than issues requir-
ing sustained response over a prolonged period, their utility as a framework for 
coordinating global responses to AMR appears less certain (Wernli et al. 2017: 5; 
Kamradt-Scott 2011).
While a new treaty may provide a clear mechanism for addressing the challenges 
posed by AMR (Anomaly 2010; Hoffman, Outterson, Røttingen et al. 2015), as has 
been noted, ‘Reaching such an ambitious legal agreement will take leadership, skill, 
and perseverance from a wide range of actors’ (Rochford et al. 2018: 1977). A treaty 
would also need to balance stewardship of antibiotics and innovation with recogni-
tion of lack of access to antibiotics for many people, particularly in low and middle 
income countries (Padiyara et al. 2018: 3). Furthermore, as discussed below, the 
issue of capacity building remains an enduring challenge, particularly in low 
resource countries.
24.5  Building Capacity
A further difficulty associated with using the IHR as a mechanism for addressing 
AMR is in the challenges faced by many countries to meet their IHR core capacity 
requirements (Davies et al. 2015: 126-132; World Health Organization 2015b). The 
IHR require Member States to develop core capacities within their national health 
systems to ‘detect, assess, notify and report events’ that are within the scope of the 
IHR (Article 5). These national capacities required by the IHR will provide an 
important step in building surveillance capacities for AMR (Wernli et  al. 2011). 
Countries were required to achieve the core capacity requirements of the IHR by 
2012 i.e. within 5 years of the IHR coming into force, with some extensions possi-
ble, but many countries still had not achieved their core capacity requirements 
(World Health Organization 2016b). Although global collaboration (Goff et  al. 
2017) and regional networks may provide an additional mechanism for capacity 
building, particularly in developing regions (Bennett and Carney 2017), the chal-
lenge of building strong public health systems remains a key one for global health 
(Gostin et al. 2016; Moon et al. 2015).
In addition, although the World Health Assembly has urged its Member States to 
develop national action plans for antimicrobial resistance (World Health Assembly 
2015), the results of 2013–2014 WHO survey showing that few countries reported 
having comprehensive national AMR plans (World Health Organization 2015c: 1), 
suggests that there may be considerable work to be done in many countries. 
More recently, a self-assessment survey of countries and their progress in 
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developing and implementing national AMR plans also shows that considerable 
work remains, with only 60% of countries having a national multisectoral action 
plan on AMR, although a further 33% had plans in development (World Health 
Organization et al. 2018: 7). In addition, although 125 countries reported having 
awareness raising activities about AMR risks and human health, only 36 had cam-
paigns in animal health (World Health Organization et  al. 2018: 12). While 103 
countries reported having a national surveillance system in humans, only 41 coun-
ties had systematic data collection in animals, and most countries have no surveil-
lance system in place in the plant and environment sectors (World Health 
Organization et al. 2018: 15).
One key difficulty is that although the IHR require countries to develop their 
national capacities to deal with potential global public health emergencies that arise 
within their borders, poorer countries may have difficulty in finding the resources to 
support such capacity building (Gostin and Katz 2016: 276-277; Davies et al. 2015: 
126-132), leaving many countries unable to achieve the capacities required by the 
IHR. There is renewed interest in developing sustainable mechanisms for global 
health financing, including financing of global public goods such as addressing anti-
microbial resistance (Ottersen et al. 2017; Mendelson et al. 2016; Moon et al. 2017). 
Clearly there is a need for investment to address shared vulnerabilities in global 
health (Gostin 2017). Global commitments and the development of effective financ-
ing mechanisms will be key to the development of effective responses to 
AMR. Without them we may see a repeat of the difficulties in building IHR core 
capacities, with poorer countries lacking the resources to develop their national 
capacities.
24.6  Understandings and Definitions
Understandings of the mechanisms of development of AMR as well as definitions 
of key terms relating to infection and antimicrobial use are critical to effective pol-
icy response for AMR. Even the term ‘antimicrobial resistance’ may be poorly 
understood (Mendelson et al. 2017). The two pillars of the health policy response to 
antimicrobial resistance relate to control of its spread (‘infection control’) and to 
reduction of inappropriate antibiotic use that promotes it (antimicrobial steward-
ship) (Davies et al. 2013; Laxminarayan et al. 2013). 
Measures of success and failure of public health policy are heavily contingent on 
definitions. The definition of ‘inappropriate prescribing’ remains poorly informed 
by research into antibiotic effects and is therefore regarded as a public policy 
research priority in the area of antibiotic resistance (Spellberg et al. 2011). Similarly, 
the definition of ‘severe infection’ or ‘sepsis’ is subject to major revision (Fullerton 
et  al. 2017) and new definitions may alter the cohort included in this definition, 
especially at initial point of care where health policy must drive effective immediate 
responses (Fullerton et al. 2017).
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These definitional questions are of key importance to policy initiatives such as 
antibiotic stewardship. AMR is an example of the tragedy of the commons in which 
overconsumption of a common resource harms the common good (Hollis and 
Maybarduk 2015; Giubilini and Savulescu 2020). For this reason, stewardship and 
the preservation of key antimicrobials is an important strategy in addressing AMR 
(Laxminarayan et al. 2013). Yet the development of policy responses for AMR is a 
particular challenge as there is a need to limit inappropriate use of antibiotics, 
(which assumes well-developed understandings of ‘inappropriate prescribing’), 
while simultaneously ensuring equitable access to medicines (Laxminarayan et al. 
2013, 2016; Padiyara et al. 2018; Selgelid 2007). An antibiotic that is harmful to the 
public health in terms of driving resistance in the longer term may be thought to 
have specific benefit to the individual for whom it is prescribed. This may lead to 
direct conflict between public health policy needs and the needs of an individual and 
means in turn that antimicrobial stewardship may be cast in a policing role.
These challenges may be described as ones of ‘understandings’ and of ‘defini-
tions.’ To address these challenges additional funding is required to support research 
on the mechanisms for acquiring resistance to further our understandings of this 
important area. Agreed international standards for data collection on AMR (World 
Health Organization 2014) are also vital if surveillance is to be comprehensive and 
effective, making definitional issues ones of critical importance.
24.7  AMR and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
When the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations 2015) were 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015, AMR was not 
listed amongst the 17 goals, although it is mentioned in the SDG declaration (World 
Health Organization 2015d: 103). Nor was there the inclusion of a broader SDG goal 
on global health security, which might have also provided a focus for action on AMR 
(Kickbusch et al. 2015). However, this is not to suggest that the SDGs will be irrel-
evant for global responses to AMR. For example, addressing antimicrobial resistance 
will clearly be important to achieving SDG3 (‘Ensure healthy lives and promote 
well-being for all at all ages’), while the goal of universal health coverage in SDG3.8 
will help to ensure the existence of strong health systems (Gostin 2017: 194). 
International trade of animals or products, the complexity of addressing both over-
consumption and lack of access to medicines, and the relevance of trade agreements 
and intellectual property arrangements to research and development for new antimi-
crobials, all highlight the importance of considering the relevance of trade to the 
development of solutions to antimicrobial resistance (Hanefeld et al. 2017). Access 
to water and sanitation were also included as SDG6 (United Nations 2015). As the 
UK’s Review on Antimicrobial Resistance has noted, improved water and sanitation 
can help to reduce antibiotic consumption by helping to prevent infections that may 
then be treated with antibiotics (Review on Antimicrobial Resistance 2016a: 21-23; 
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2016b). The association between poor sanitation, infections and antibiotic use 
shows that broader public health goals and improvements can play an important 
role in global strategies to prevent AMR (Review on Antimicrobial Resistance 
2016a; 2016b).
24.8  Conclusion
Developing effective mechanisms to address the growing threat of AMR will be 
essential to safeguarding public health into the future. To achieve this will require, 
amongst other things, strong mechanisms for global health governance to support 
coordinated programs and building of capacity at the national, regional and global 
levels. The commitments to the development of national plans for AMR along with 
suggestions for new financing mechanisms to support capacity building and the 
funding of global public goods reflect a promising prioritisation of AMR. Whether 
we can develop practical and effective means of addressing AMR remains to be seen.
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Chapter 25
Global Governance of Anti-microbial 
Resistance: A Legal and Regulatory 
Toolkit
Calvin W. L. Ho  and Tsung-Ling Lee
Abstract Recognizing that antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a serious threat 
to global public health, the World Health Organization (WHO) has adopted a Global 
Action Plan (GAP) at the May 2015 World Health Assembly. Underscoring that 
systematic misuse and overuse of drugs in human medicine and food production is 
a global public health concern, the GAP-AMR urges concerted efforts across gov-
ernments and private sectors, including pharmaceutical industry, medical profes-
sionals, agricultural industry, among others. The GAP has a threefold aim: (1) to 
ensure a continuous use of effective and safe medicines for treatment and preven-
tion of infectious diseases; (2) to encourage a responsible use of medicines; and (3) 
to engage countries to develop their national actions on AMR in keeping with the 
recommendations. While the GAP is a necessary step to enable multilateral actions, 
it must be supported by effective governance in order to realize the proposed aims.
This chapter has a threefold purpose: (1) To identify regulatory principles embed-
ded in key WHO documents relating to AMR and the GAP-AMR; (2) To consider 
the legal and regulatory actions or interventions that countries could use to strengthen 
their regulatory lever for AMR containment; and (3) To highlight the crucial role of 
the regulatory lever in enabling other levers under a whole-of-system approach. 
Effective AMR containment requires a clearer understanding of how the regulatory 
lever could be implemented or enabled within health systems, as well as how it 
underscores and interacts with other levers within a whole-of-system approach.
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25.1  Introduction
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is widely recognized as a public health threat, 
responsible for 700,000 deaths worldwide. If the spread of antimicrobial resistance 
is left unaddressed, it could lead to 10 million additional annual deaths by 2050, 
according to an estimation by the World Bank. Facilitated by inappropriate uses of 
medicines to control the spread of infection for human and animal health, antimi-
crobial resistance also poses long term threat to human development. The United 
Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon describes AMR as a “fundamental 
threat” to human development at a high-level UN meeting on drug-resistant bacteria 
(United Nations News Centre 2016). Likewise, recognizing the gravity of antimi-
crobial resistance on global health, the then Director-General for the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Margaret Chan characterizes the rise of AMR as a “slow- 
motion tsunami” (Leatherby 2017). Without an effective global containment strat-
egy, the World Bank warns, the economic impact of AMR makes it unlikely for the 
world to reach the sustainable development goals set for 2030 (World Bank 2017).
Scientists have long known that microbes can become resistant to medicine. 
Alexander Fleming, the Nobel laureate for the discovery of penicillin, cautioned the 
world in his 1945 Nobel acceptance speech of the impending public health crisis 
(Fleming 1945, at p. 93): “… there is the danger that the ignorant man may easily 
under dose himself and by exposing his microbes to non-lethal quantities of the 
drug make them resistant.” Since the 1950s the WHO has identified AMR as a 
global threat, but little progress has been made in improving access to antimicrobi-
als and maintaining their appropriate consumption and effectiveness. Likewise, lim-
ited innovation in antimicrobials further compounds the challenge. For these 
reasons, a broad range of microorganisms have become more resistant to antimicro-
bials in all parts of the world. An emerging concern is AMR for diseases which 
affect low and middle income countries (LMICs) disproportionately, such as tuber-
culosis (TB), malaria and HIV (See Chaps. 2–4). Furthermore, with extensively 
drug-resistant to tuberculosis now identified in 105 countries, it further raises con-
cerns of a future TB epidemic where limited treatment options are available.
Even though the direct consequences of AMR on human health were beginning 
to be scientifically well-understood several decades ago, international efforts to 
address this problem did not begin till the late 1990s and 2000s. The WHO played 
a key role in catalysing international actions on the issue. It convened a series of 
consultative groups and expert workshop to assess, evaluate, and develop a series of 
recommendation for effective containment interventions to garner international 
attention. This work culminated in the report WHO Global Strategy for Containment 
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of Antimicrobial Resistance (World Health Organization 2001). Since this strategy 
was published, AMR has been discussed at several World Health Assembly meet-
ings, resulting in the adoption of several resolutions such as WHA60.16 concerning 
the rational use of medicine and WHA62.15 on prevention and control of multidrug- 
resistant tuberculosis and extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis. At the 2015 World 
Health Assembly, member states endorsed a Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial 
Resistance (GAP-AMR; World Health Organization 2015a) – which calls for an 
effective One Health approach – and which was later endorsed through resolutions 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). In the same year, AMR was recognized as a 
threat to the world’s sustainability and human development at the UN level. In a 
landmark UN resolution guiding the global development plan for the next 15 years 
entitled Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(United Nations 2015), AMR is mentioned but not explicitly set out as a Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) target. Most recently, the G20 summit reaffirmed the 
commitment to combat antimicrobial resistance (G20 Leaders’ Declaration 2017).
These commitments, both within and outside of the high-level political setting of 
UN organs, underscore the growing political interest in AMR. Two distinct but 
interrelated factors explain the recent high-level political attention. First, national 
governments have a strong self-interest in mitigating the negative impacts of AMR 
on public health: the estimated economic cost for failing to address the issue would 
be £66 trillion in lost productivity to the global economy (Public Health England 
2015). Second, AMR transcends national borders and exposes a global vulnerability 
which necessitates collective action at the international level. The shared vulnerabil-
ity underpinning AMR was recently acknowledged by Tedros Adhanom, the WHO 
Director-General, in his address to the G20 summit. Urging the world to act, he 
underscored the interdependence of the world, noting “… vulnerability for one is 
vulnerability for all of us” (World Health Organization 2017a). German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel echoed this concern, depicting AMR as akin to a global health secu-
rity issue of global collective responsibility (Scheuber 2017).
This chapter has a threefold purpose: (1) To identify regulatory principles embed-
ded in key WHO documents relating to AMR and the GAP-AMR; (2) To consider 
the legal and regulatory actions or interventions that countries could use to strengthen 
their regulatory lever for AMR containment; and (3) To highlight the crucial role of 
the regulatory lever in enabling other levers under a whole-of-system approach. In 
the section that follows, we consider how the WHO and other international bodies 
have systematically framed this global health issue as a collective action problem; 
initially by setting out the WHO GAP-AMR. But subsequently, it was quickly rec-
ognised that a global plan would not be self-enabling and therefore a global frame-
work has since been proposed by the UN to facilitate implementation by all member 
states. We set out what we consider to be the core principles that are embedded in 
the GAP-AMR and the global framework built around it. We then consider the regu-
latory lever that member states need to establish and apply in order for these prin-
ciples to effect change at the national level.
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25.2  The WHO and AMR
25.2.1  Collective Action Problem
Ilona Kickbusch and David Gleicher (World Health Organization 2012a, b) define 
global health as health issues which transcend national boundaries and governments 
and call for actions on the global forces and global flows that determine the health 
of people. As microbes are capable of penetrating national borders, national efforts 
are contingent upon, and vulnerable to external actions and forces. It is widely rec-
ognised that a collective response is necessary to mitigate the negative consequences 
of AMR. As no country is capable of addressing the issue without some degree of 
mutual reliance on others to mount an effective response against AMR, the interde-
pendency makes AMR containment a collective action problem.
Some scholars go further and argue that the containment of AMR is a public 
good: the benefits from effective containment are enjoyed by all and there is no 
rivalry in consumption (Smith and Coast 2002). If this is correct, it could present a 
free rider problem: individual states lack incentive to take the necessary actions and 
instead, rely on others to act. Arguably, the free rider problem can be addressed 
through international law (Wernli et al. 2011; Review on Antimicrobial Resistance 
2014). Steven Hoffman and Asha Behdinan (2016), Reinl (2016), Susan Rogers Van 
Katwyk et al. (2016), Christine Årdal et al. (2016), and Asha Behdinan et al. (2015), 
for instance, argue that countries can be encouraged to act if international law 
embeds incentives. While many international institutions are involved in addressing 
the threat posed by AMR, as a starting point, we focus the discussion on the WHO, 
particularly for its instrumental role in developing the GAP-AMR.
25.2.2  Global Action Plan
Recognizing that systematic misuse and overuse of antimicrobial drugs in human 
medicine and food production puts every nation at risk, the overarching goal of the 
GAP-AMR is thus to ensure that the world is able to “treat and prevent infectious 
diseases with effective and safe medicines that are quality-assured, used in a respon-
sible way, and accessible to all who need them” (World Health Organization 2015a, 
b, at p. 8). To achieve this goal, the GAP-AMR requires concurrent actions at the 
national and international levels. While the GAP-AMR is not technically binding, it 
seeks to harmonise practices across countries while affording regulatory flexibility. 
To assure policy coherence at the national and international levels, the GAP-AMR 
provides five objectives to guide and align national and international policy actions: 
(1) to improve awareness and understanding of AMR through effective communica-
tion, education and training; (2) to strengthen the knowledge and evidence base 
through surveillance and research; (3) to reduce the incidence of infection through 
effective sanitation, hygiene and infection prevention measures; (4) to optimize the 
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use of antimicrobial medicines in human and animal health; and (5) to develop the 
economic case for sustainable investment that takes account of the needs of all 
countries, and increases investment in new medicines, diagnostic tools, vaccines 
and other interventions. Member states are urged to have national action plans that 
are aligned with the GAP-AMR within 2 years of the endorsement of the action plan 
by the World Health Assembly.
Moreover, because excessive human and animal use of antibiotics in multiple 
settings will have health, economic and security implications beyond national bor-
ders, the GAP-AMR embraces a One Health approach towards AMR. Defined as a 
collaborative, multi-sectoral and trans-disciplinary, the One Health approach recog-
nizes interconnection between people, animals, plants and the shared environment. 
This approach calls for sectorial coordination involving human and veterinary med-
icine, agriculture, finance, environment, and consumers to optimal health outcomes. 
At the level of international health, horizontal coordination of different UN agencies 
occurs through the WHO. As the specialized public health agency within the UN 
agency, the WHO is charged with organizing international responses to shared 
health challenges, and this responsibility includes acting as “the directing and coor-
dinating authority on international health work” (World Health Organization n. d.). 
The WHO works with the Strategic and Technical Advisory Group on AMR at the 
FAO and OIE to develop a framework for monitoring and evaluation of member 
states’ national action plans. Likewise, the FAO, OIE and World Bank are encour-
aged to put in place and implement action plans in their respective fields. Notably, 
the regulatory functions bestowed on the WHO are broader in scope than any other 
international agency in the UN orbit.
As of 2017, more than one third of WHO member states have completed their 
national action plans on AMR, and a further 62 are in the process of doing so. These 
national action plans provide a basis for an assessment of the resource needs at 
national and international levels. The WHO is tasked with publishing biennial prog-
ress report on countries’ progress in implementing their national action plans. The 
progress report will also include an assessment of progress made by the FAO, OIE 
and WHO.
25.2.3  Limitations of the Global Action Plan
To be sure, the GAP-AMR provides a good starting point, but the plan lacks con-
crete goals to compel action. Moreover, the WHO alone cannot be expected to solve 
the global AMR crisis. For instance, preserving antimicrobial medicines will require 
a global agreement as to what constitutes ‘appropriate use’. Likewise, new financ-
ing mechanisms will be needed to incentivise global innovation in antimicrobial 
medicines. Thus, in the same resolution that endorsed the global action plan, the 
World Health Assembly (2015a, b) requested the Director-General to develop a 
global development and stewardship framework to support GAP-AMR in combat-
ing AMR. Specifically, the Health Assembly requires the Director-General to 
(World Health Assembly 2015a, b, Request 7):
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develop, in consultation with Member States and relevant partners, options for establishing 
a global development and stewardship framework to support the development, control, dis-
tribution and appropriate use of new antimicrobial medicines, diagnostic tools, vaccines 
and other interventions, while preserving existing antimicrobial medicines, and promoting 
affordable access to existing and new antimicrobial medicines and diagnostic tools, taking 
into account the needs of all countries, and in line with the global action plan on antimicro-
bial resistance.
The global framework will build on the GAP-AMR, but with specific focuses on 
preservation of antimicrobial medicines and development of new antimicrobial 
medicines, diagnostic tools, vaccines and other interventions. According to a report 
issued by the FAO, OIE and WHO (Food and Agriculture Organization 2017, at 
p. 4), a global development and stewardship framework would have a threefold goal:
 1. Stewardship: Preserving antimicrobial medicines through a stewardship frame-
work covering control, distribution and appropriate use;
 2. Research & Development: Developing of new health technologies for preventing 
and controlling antimicrobial resistance; and
 3. Access: Promoting affordable access to existing and new antimicrobial medi-
cines and diagnostic tools.
This framework further encapsulates key principles that have been expounded in 
earlier initiatives of the WHO. For the purposes of this chapter, we highlight three 
principles that are of especial pertinence to laws and regulations on pharmaceuti-
cals, which are discussed in the section that follows (for a broader ethical discussion 
on AMR, see Haire, Chap. 3, this volume; Cheah et al., Chap. 4, this volume). Not 
necessarily in order of priority, these principles are:
 1. Rational and responsible use of antimicrobials
At a practical level, the WHO defines rational use of medicines as patients receiv-
ing medications appropriate to their clinical needs, in doses that meet their own 
individual requirements, for an adequate period of time, and at the lowest cost to 
them and their community (World Health Organization 1985). This definition 
extends to the use of antimicrobials, where for instance, irrational use occurs when 
patients are prescribed and/or take antibiotics (intended to treat bacterial infection) 
when in fact they have a viral infection. As a matter of public policy, responsible use 
of antimicrobials is set out as a governing principle that should underpin national 
governments’ efforts to curb AMR. This principle requires governments to ensure 
that existing activities, capabilities and resources of health system are aligned to 
ensure patients receive the right dosage of antimicrobials at the right time, use them 
appropriately and benefit from the usage (World Health Organization 2012a, b).
 2. Equitable access to, and appropriate use of, existing and new antimicrobial 
medicines.
The GAP-AMR recognizes that all countries should have a national action plan 
on antimicrobial resistance that includes an assessment of resource needs. Moreover, 
recognizing the need to optimise the use of antimicrobial medicines in human and 
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animal health, the WHO has updated its model list of essential medicine which 
categories antibiotics into three groups: access, watch and reserve. The access group 
include antibiotics (considered to have low resistance potential) recommended as 
first or second choice treatment options for common infections. This group of anti-
biotics should be widely available at an affordable cost and of assured quality. The 
watch group of antibiotics are those generally considered as to have higher resis-
tance potential but are recommended as for first or second choice treatment for 
limited number of indicators. The reserve group consists of ‘last-resort’ options, or 
tailored to highly specific patients and setting, and when other alternatives have 
already failed. International efforts are required in monitoring, reporting the uses of 
reserve antibiotics to preserve their effectiveness (World Health Organization 
2017b, c).
 3. Transparency: Data Sharing, Collection and Evaluation
Data sharing, collection and evaluation have been emphasised in order to pro-
mote transparency and collaboration. A report by the WHO Secretariat on antimi-
crobial resistance sets these responsibilities out concisely as (World Health 
Organization 2015a, at p. 11): “Publishing biennial progress reports, including an 
assessment of countries and organizations that have plans in place, their progress in 
implementation, and the effectiveness of action at regional and global levels; and 
including an assessment of progress made by the FAO, OIE and WHO in imple-
menting actions undertaken within the organizations’ tripartite collaboration will 
also be included in these reports.”
Significantly, the call for a global development and stewardship framework was 
later reiterated at a high-level meeting on antimicrobial resistance at the UN level in 
2016 (United Nations 2016). It was the only fourth time that the UN General 
Assembly convened a high-level meeting on a health issue. Previous meetings – 
HIV/AIDS, Ebola and non-communicable diseases – catalysed and mobilized polit-
ical actions at the international level. The UN Political Declaration on antimicrobial 
resistance was adopted by all 193 member states, signalling a global commitment to 
combat antimicrobial resistance.
In the discussion so far, we have considered the framing of AMR as a collective 
action problem the WHO and other international organisations. We have also briefly 
set out how the GAP-AMR and an enabling global framework have been con-
structed in response to this problem. More importantly, we have attempted to iden-
tify key principles that are embedded in the GAP-AMR, and in respect of which the 
global framework seeks to give expression to. For ease of reference, we refer to 
them generally as regulatory principles, because member states need to incorporate 
them – through laws and regulations – within their health systems. These laws and 
regulations collectively constitute a regulatory lever that will, at a basic level, enable 
member states to design, implement and manage policies (particularly pharmaceuti-
cal oriented ones) toward responsible use and good stewardship of antimicrobials. 
These laws and regulations are considered in the next section of the chapter. We 
then explain why a sound regulatory lever within a whole-of-system approach is 
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critical to enable other levers (financial and information ones in particular) to oper-
ate effectively in meeting global AMR objectives.
25.3  Regulatory Leverage for Responsible Use and Good 
Stewardship of Antimicrobials
The prevalence of AMR is heavily influenced by the way that antimicrobials are 
consumed. It is now well established that overuse and underuse of antibiotics can 
lead to resistance (Jamrozik and Selgelid, Chap. 1, this volume). Even so, improper 
or imprudent use of antibiotics is deeply entrenched within health systems. In order 
for all member states of the WHO to meet their moral and political commitments set 
out under the GAP-AMR, it is critical for health systems to be strengthened on all 
fronts. Clearly the challenge of AMR is a complex one because it is influenced by 
many different factors and conditions. At the level of health systems, the relational 
dynamics between prescribers (or suppliers) of antibiotics and patients (or consum-
ers), financial incentives, systemic commitments and characteristics, and the regula-
tory environment, are arguably the key contributors to AMR. For the purposes of 
this chapter, we focus on the role of regulation (broadly applied to refer to both 
legislative and regulatory actions) and examine how it could be used to support the 
containment of AMR. Many countries do not have a substantially clear and system-
atic legal and regulatory framework that is specifically directed at AMR (for exam-
ple, Singh 2017). At a fundamental level, a clear regulatory position on responsible 
antimicrobial use that simultaneously prioritises effective antimicrobial stewardship 
is a pre-requisite to a coordinated response in policy decisions and actions across 
different domains within a health system. In addition, a variety of regulatory inter-
ventions should be considered to enable, as well as promote, the use of structural 
(delivery arrangement), information and financial levers to encourage appropriate 
use and stewardship of antimicrobials. It is further important for the regulatory envi-
ronment to be sufficiently open in allowing a combination of top-down and bottom-
 up actions within a whole-of-system approach.
Policy discussions on effective stewardship of pharmaceuticals in health systems 
as a response to the problem of AMR predate the GAP-AMR. In a WHO report 
(Bigdeli et al. 2014) published ahead of the 2015 World Health Assembly, four main 
policy objectives with respect to medicines (and antimicrobials) in health systems 
have been identified as: (1) widely available high-quality medicinal products; (2) 
equitable access; (3) appropriate and safe use; and (4) affordability. Different policy 
actions and conditions are matched to each of the four policy objectives in the fol-
lowing manner (Bigdeli et al. 2014, at p. 45):
 1. Ensuring availability of quality generic and innovative products:
• Monitoring product quality;
• Prequalifying supplies and products;
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• Negotiating prices, quality, volume, and supply-chain security;
• Promoting fair competition;
• Engaging in risk sharing agreements;
• Establishing patient access programmes;
 2. Improving Equitable Access:
• Understanding utilization profiles;
• Assessing of care seeking behaviour and barriers to care;
• Expanding provider networks;
• Targeting policies and programmes to improve access for vulnerable 
populations;
 3. Encouraging Appropriate Use:
• Implementing and updating standard treatment guidelines;
• Matching essential medicines and reimbursement lists to standard treatment 
guidelines;
• Assessing provider performance;
• Managing care comprehensively;
• Implementing and monitoring policies to encourage clinically appropriate 
and cost-effective use;
 4. Keeping cost affordable:
• Monitoring routine medicines expenditures by therapeutic area;
• Evaluating health technologies and budget impact;
• Assessing household medicines expenditure;
• Implementing and monitoring policies and programmes to reduce waste and 
inappropriate use.
Not surprisingly, these policy objectives are closely aligned with what we have 
identified to be regulatory principles that underscore the GAP-AMR. For instance, 
rational and responsible use, equitable access and transparency are all necessary 
conditions to ensure the availability of quality antimicrobials within a health sys-
tem. However, these policy objectives and their attending actions and conditions 
inevitably compete in many ways. Price pressures could limit investment in gover-
nance infrastructure, where such limitations are typically manifested in weak regu-
latory capacity, information imbalance, lack of coordination among different 
stakeholders and perverse incentives whereby irresponsible use is directly supported 
by direct financial gain. Over time, these practices not only strain health systems by 
increasing needless consumption, cost and inefficiencies, but also accentuate the 
global threat of AMR. Within the paradigm of value-based practice, the problem of 
AMR highlights the urgent need to shift current low-value practices to high-value 
ones (Porter 2010; Elshaug et  al. 2017). A low-value practice is an intervention 
where evidence suggests that it confers no or very little benefit (to a patient for 
instance). It also depicts any practice where risk of harm exceeds probable benefit, 
or where added costs of the intervention do not provide proportional added benefits. 
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In contrast, a high-value practice is one where evidence suggests it confers benefit 
on the intervention subject, or probability of benefit exceeds probable harm, or 
where the added costs of the intervention provide proportional added benefits rela-
tive to alternatives. For instance, overprescribing that is incentivised, among other 
factors, by increased revenue for healthcare providers through greater pharmaceuti-
cal sales is a low-value practice that continues to be sustained in many health 
systems.
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to address comprehensively the value 
implications of inappropriate use and poor stewardship of antimicrobials, our intent 
is to make explicit an implicit understanding that responding to the AMR challenge 
could be closely linked to addressing many on-going concerns relating to quality of 
care (World Health Organization 2016). The role and impact of regulation on qual-
ity of care have been a longstanding concern among a variety of scholars in different 
quarters. With limited exception however (notably in the work on refining the work-
ing definitions for substandard and falsified medical products (World Health 
Organization 2017c)), there has not been as much focus on the regulatory lever 
within health systems on containment of AMR as compared to the financial lever, 
for example. We hope to address this deficiency by proposing different tools and 
conditions that could make-up or compose the regulatory lever in relation to each of 
the four policy objectives identified by the WHO, as well as propose what we con-
sider to be a sufficient open and responsive regulatory environment that could con-
structively resolve tensions by focusing on higher-value practice when these 
objectives come into conflict.
25.3.1  Ensuring Quality
A sufficiently robust and up-to-date legal and regulatory framework is necessary to 
control the quality, safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, including antimicrobials. 
Substandard or degraded antimicrobials, where dosage may be lower or less effec-
tive, contribute to therapeutic failure and could thereby encourage the development 
of drug-resistant strain of pathogens. Similarly, counterfeit antimicrobials could 
have an adverse effect if the active ingredients include other types of antibiotics 
(and/or other drugs). In order for such a legal and regulatory framework to be robust, 
regulatory actions must include accreditation, audit and inspection for the purposes 
of controlling quality and assessing the safety and efficacy of antimicrobials. For 
instance, health systems that manufacture antimicrobials must have a legal and reg-
ulatory framework to ensure that good manufacturing standards and practices are 
adhered to. It is not enough to only specify these requirements, but it is just as 
important for regulatory mechanisms to be in place that can effectively detect defi-
ciencies or deviations from prescribed standards and practices.
Appropriate laws and regulations are also needed to legitimise, implement and 
sustain policies and programmes that are directed at rational and appropriate antimi-
crobial use. These policies and programmes generally relate to disease surveillance 
C. W. L. Ho and T.-L. Lee
411
and management, and standard treatment guidelines. More recently, various mea-
sures have been introduced to incentivise the use of high value care through pay-for- 
performance programmes. These programmes reward healthcare providers for 
achieving quality, efficiency and “value” by increasing accessibility and appropriate 
use of drugs that are of proven efficacy. However, evidence of the effectiveness of 
such programmes are mixed in high-income countries and extremely limited in 
LMICs. From a regulatory standpoint, pay-for-performance programmes are not 
self-enabling everywhere but are likewise dependent on a supportive regulatory 
environment. Broadly speaking, appropriate legal or regulatory principles should be 
in place to ensure fair bargain, safety and (where appropriate) fair compensation, 
monitoring and data sharing.
In summary, the following legal and regulatory interventions should be consid-
ered in advancing the policy goal of ensuring availability of quality (generic and 
innovative) antimicrobials:
• Laws and regulations on standards and practices that ensure quality level is 
achieved (e.g. good manufacturing standards and practices);
• Legally sanctioned practices for monitoring product quality and prequalifying 
supplies and products (e.g. through licensing, accreditation, audit and inspection);
• Law and regulations that promote fair competition or that enable regulatory 
action to be taken against anti-competitive practices;
• Legally entrenching disease surveillance and management programmes; and
• Set out legal and regulatory baseline and principles for risk sharing agreements 
and patient access programmes.
25.3.2  Improving Prescribing and Dispensing
In many LMICs, antimicrobials are sold over-the-counter without a prescription or 
otherwise dispensed by individuals who lack professional training or authority. 
Even where there may be laws or regulations that proscribe such practices, they may 
be poorly or inadequately enforced (Singh 2017; World Health Organization 2015b). 
For instance, accreditation and professional licensing may not specifically target 
adherence to standard treatment guidelines. Consequently, the failure to adhere to 
guidance on responsible antimicrobial prescription would not render the healthcare 
provider professionally accountable or otherwise legally empower a professional 
body to take remedial action. Responsible prescribing and dispensing practices 
could also be hampered by weak healthcare infrastructure, expectations of patients 
and perverse financial incentives. Access to rapid or reliable diagnostic tests may be 
limited in a low resource health system. This could in turn encourage healthcare 
providers to veer towards prescribing an antibiotic in order to ensure that the pros-
pect of a bacterial infection is addressed even if there is no reliable diagnosis to that 
effect. Such a conservative approach could even be a cost effective response (in the 
short term) if the cost of the antibiotic is lower than to order a laboratory test to 
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validate a diagnosis (World Health Organization 2015b). For this and other reasons, 
providers may feel obligated to prescribe – while patients may feel entitled to use – 
antimicrobials, as a quick treatment option. Patients may not be aware of what 
appropriate use of antimicrobials means, particularly where duration of medical 
consultation is limited, and could consider themselves to have received substandard 
care if they have not been prescribed an antibiotic. At a systemic level, financial 
incentives may encourage overprescribing of antimicrobials. Where pharmaceutical 
sales generate revenue for healthcare providers and institutions, there would be a 
perverse financial incentive to overprescribe. Such a practice may be exacerbated 
where pharmaceutical companies themselves enter into profit-sharing arrangements 
with these providers or institutions. Additionally, it is currently impossible to deter-
mine the extent that antimicrobials are appropriately prescribed and consumed as 
there is a lack of reliable data across all health systems.
Laws and regulations are necessary to prohibit over-the-counter sale of antimi-
crobials while ensuring that patients continue to have access through appropriately 
trained and qualified healthcare professionals. In addition, requiring an appropriate 
amount of information to be indicated on packaging and to be shared as part of 
responsible prescribing practice could be given regulatory force. On the former, 
such a requirement could be taken up as a regulatory measure to ensure high-value 
or quality use of antimicrobials, particularly where full treatment courses are to be 
dispensed. Healthcare providers, institutions and professional associations have a 
crucial role to play in robust guideline development and implementation processes, 
filling evidence gaps with research, developing high-value practices, and leading or 
participating in efforts to shift from low-value to high-value practices. In many 
health systems, these stakeholders do not have sufficient or appropriate legal stand-
ing to contribute constructively to policy measure that are directed at improving 
prescribing and dispensing practices (Singh 2017; World Health Organization 
2015b). As noted earlier, professional associations that have an interest in ensuring 
that standard treatment guidelines are observed by their members may not have any 
regulatory authority to monitor and improve such practices. Where professional 
organisations have the capability and motivation to improve professional practices, 
appropriate laws and regulations could be facilitative of this in a manner that is 
transparent and accountable. The challenge of perverse financial incentives is per-
haps more difficult to surmount, particularly if the health system concerned is com-
mitted to particular structural arrangements or values. Legal or regulatory 
intervention could then be a platform for evaluation, discussion and change. For 
instance, legal and regulatory changes introduced by South Korea in 2000 to pro-
hibit doctors from dispensing drugs have reduced inappropriate antibiotic prescrib-
ing (Kwon 2003; Park et al. 2005).
In summary, the following legal and regulatory interventions could be consid-
ered to improve prescribing and dispensing of antimicrobials:
• Prohibit over-the-counter sale of antimicrobials;
• Lend regulatory weight to standard treatment guidelines;
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• Empower healthcare institutions and professional associations to improve pre-
scribing and (where applicable) dispensing practices through means that include 
assessing provider performance;
• Introduce regulation to ensure that care is managed comprehensively;
• Laws and regulations that support implementing and monitoring policies to 
encourage clinically appropriate and cost-effective use of antimicrobials; and
• Evaluate, remove or manage perverse financial incentives through appropriate 
laws and regulations.
25.3.3  Ensuring Appropriate, Affordable and Equitable Access
The policy goals of ensuring appropriate, affordable and equitable access to phar-
maceuticals (including antimicrobials) are aligned with the WHO’s global health 
initiative on universal health coverage (UHC), broadly directed at promoting access 
for all to appropriate health services at affordable cost (World Health Assembly 
Resolution 2005; World Health Organization 2010a, b). Much discussion on UHC 
has focused on expanding populations covered by national payment systems, 
although comparatively little information exists on what pharmaceutical are pro-
vided, whether they meet the healthcare needs of the population, and how health 
systems manage pharmaceuticals so that patients receive high-value services at 
costs that households and systems can afford. When the types of pharmaceuticals 
provided do not meet population needs, risk protection is inadequate and this does 
not prevent household impoverishment (Yip and Hsiao 2009; Parry 2012; Wagner 
et al. 2008).
The economic burden of pharmaceuticals on households is high: they account for 
nearly half of household healthcare expenditures in 12 Asia-Pacific countries 
(Wagner and Ross-Degnan 2009) and for all healthcare expenses in four out of 10 
households in 22 low- and 17 middle-income countries (Wagner et  al. 2011). 
Pharmaceuticals also constitute a major source of inefficiencies in health systems. 
Of the ten leading sources of inefficiency in health systems identified in the 2010 
World Health Report, pharmaceuticals account for the top three (World Health 
Organization 2010a). Underuse of generic products, use of substandard and coun-
terfeit medicines, and inappropriate use of medicines waste scarce resources in sys-
tems. The World Health Organization estimates that more than half of all medicines 
globally are prescribed, dispensed, or sold inappropriately (World Health 
Organization 2009). For instance, overuse of antibiotics to treat acute respiratory 
tract infections wastes resources and leads to use of higher cost second and third 
line antibiotics for drug resistant infections. In many LMICs, access to a qualified 
healthcare professional may cost patients more time and money when compared 
with inappropriately or illegally obtaining antibiotics over-the-counter or from an 
unauthorised vendor. To promote appropriate and affordable access, national antibi-
otics policies and standard treatment guidelines must be supported by essential 
medicines lists or formularies that encourage rational and responsible use of 
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antimicrobials. In addition, appropriate laws and regulations must be in place to 
ensure that the antimicrobial supply chain is secure in terms of their procurement, 
storage and sale (World Health Organization 2015b). These requirements extend to 
importation requirements and quality inspections for health systems that do not 
manufacture antimicrobials.
The use of antimicrobials in animals for food production or other purposes will 
also need to be carefully monitored and regulated. Whereas laws and regulations 
have conventionally been domain specific particularly in keeping regulations relat-
ing to humans distinct from nonhuman animals, the One Health approach endorsed 
in the GAP-AMR highlights the need for a more comprehensive and coordinated 
approach across the food, veterinary and health sectors. Many countries have yet to 
establish a regulatory mechanism to enforce requirements for appropriate use of 
antimicrobials in animals. In addition, there is inadequate infrastructure for moni-
toring and controlling the development of resistant pathogens in animals, their verti-
cal transmission from one animal species to another, as well as zoonotic transmissions 
to humans.
Above all, WHO policy documents and guidance (2010a, 2014, 2016, 2017a) 
have consistently emphasised the importance of promoting equity through greater 
stakeholder engagement and prioritising the worst off (or otherwise the most vul-
nerable) in a given society. This could be especially important for decentralised 
health systems, where inequalities across regions may be great (see also Reid, 
Chap. 16, this volume). A related concern is that public awareness of appropriate 
antimicrobial use remains low in most, if not all, health systems. Even within 
healthcare institutions, infrastructure and human resources may not be adequately 
equipped to implement and manage infection prevention and control programmes. 
Equitable access as devised through paradigms such as “accountability for reason-
ableness” (Daniels and Sabin 2002) is arguably more likely to enable and encourage 
relevant stakeholders – particularly the broader community – to be interested and 
proactively involved in national antibiotics policies and related infection prevention 
and control programmes. As we shall elaborate on below, an equitable regulatory 
lever is crucial in support bottom-up approaches to promoting high-value use of 
antimicrobials (Tang et al. 2016).
In summary, the following legal and regulatory interventions could be consid-
ered to ensure appropriate, affordable and equitable access to antimicrobials:
• Introducing laws and regulations that implement and sustain infection prevention 
and control programmes, including appropriate surveillance mechanisms, to 
understand utilisation profiles, assess care seeking behaviour and barriers to 
care, and improve access for vulnerable populations;
• Regulation could be the basis of public awareness campaigns and continuing 
education for stakeholders;
• Laws and regulations may be needed to support monitoring routine medicines 
expenditures by therapeutic area, evaluating health technologies and budget 
impact, and assessing household medicines expenditure;
• Implementing and monitoring policies and programmes to reduce waste and 
inappropriate use through appropriate regulations;
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• Requiring appropriate stakeholders’ involvement or contribution through regula-
tion; and
• Reduce the use of antibiotics as growth promoters in animals through laws and 
regulations.
25.4  Regulatory Lever Within a Whole-of-System Approach
In our discussion above, we have considered the different types of legal and regula-
tory actions or tools that could constitute the regulatory lever, taking into account 
pharmaceutical policy goals and the GAP-AMR regulatory principles. We have also 
noted that the regulatory lever is but one of other levers that are available to policy- 
makers, two of such levers being financial and information. In this section, we 
broadly explain why the regulatory lever underscores the effectiveness of these two 
other levers within a “whole-of-system” approach that is directed at AMR contain-
ment. By this approach, we adopt the WHO’s emphasis that focus should not be 
limited to a particular component of a health system – broadly defined to mean “all 
organizations, people and actions whose primary intent is to promote, restore and 
maintain health”- but to recognise that different systemic components are interre-
lated and interact in ways that may be anticipated or unanticipated (World Health 
Organization 2010a; b, at p. 19).
25.4.1  Financial Lever
The financial lever could be thought of as being constituted by financial schemes 
that include budget controls, tax and incentive arrangements, and also the policies 
and actions of healthcare purchasers or payers, particularly social insurers (Bigdeli 
et  al. 2014). Ideally, financing schemes should be designed to support decision- 
making through provision of information on demographic characteristics, health-
care needs and utilisation patterns of its users, and also of healthcare 
providers  – particularly prescribing patterns and related costs. Implementers of 
financial schemes exert a degree of financial control over patients and healthcare 
providers in terms of what they pay for, and could shape patient demand through 
both financial and educational means. Additionally, financial incentives should 
encourage cost-effective prevention and care, while financial commitments should 
be directed at meeting infrastructural requirement, such as surveillance mechanisms 
that allow the use of international and local data on disease burden and utilisation 
patterns to signal potential inappropriate use patterns. In reality, financial interven-
tions, like expenditure-focused policy instruments, tend to lack specificity and often 
have unintended effects. For instance, a cap on funding does not necessarily encour-
age clinically appropriate use or otherwise reduce wasteful spending as a result of 
over-treatment.
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Within a whole-of-system approach, the financial lever should be applied 
together with the regulatory lever to support the establishment of a sound informa-
tion environment, by making available evidence-based clinical guidelines and eco-
nomic assessments that include health technology assessment and budget impact. 
As we have noted above, this is crucial in overcoming the current challenge that too 
little information on monitoring and evaluation activities is available, primarily due 
to lack of mechanisms in many health systems to monitor antimicrobial prescription 
and use. While some information is available on how medicines are financed in 
these health systems, there is little information to reliably determine equitable 
access and appropriate use.
25.4.2  Information Lever
The information lever of many health systems is disproportionately focused on 
price rather than on appropriate use and good stewardship. There is a need to review, 
revise and develop information systems to collect information that will enable 
policy- makers to target policies that improve prescribing practices, carry out audits 
and conduct education programmes. Such a system should also be able combine 
information from different parts of the healthcare system. Regular samples of paper- 
based facility prescribing and dispensing records can provide information on utili-
zation to inform policy decisions (World Health Organization 2015b).
Policies that ensure appropriate use of antibiotics in a manner that is effective, 
safe, equitable and efficient depend on the availability of information including 
population demographics, disease epidemiology, treatment approaches, and politi-
cal and economic environments. Health systems will need to be capable of generat-
ing routine, up-to-date information about the type of antibiotics that are needed by 
patients, which antibiotics are being used and how they are used across different 
patient populations within the health system, who prescribed them, whether they are 
clinically appropriate (such as in addressing the disease burden faced by the popula-
tion) and the cost spent. Without such information, it will be difficult to determine 
if quality of care is provided. Ideally, information systems should capture details on 
the antibiotics use and expenditure, along with quality of care (such as the percent-
age of primary care patients receiving antibiotics), and details of misuse. However, 
these details are usually not captured by data collection systems. For instance, 
where providers are paid through bundled-payment arrangements (whether case or 
episode-based), the information system may not be designed to capture data on the 
type and amount of antibiotics prescribed, since payment does not depend on such 
information. As we have noted above, appropriate laws and regulations could help 
bring about changes to information systems that prioritises AMR containment.
Constant monitoring, feedback and evaluation are important to ensure that levers 
continue to achieve desired goals. Crucially, member states will need to ensure that 
the whole-of-system approach to AMR containment could be implemented bottom-
 up and top-down (Elshaug et al. 2017). Bottom-up actions require stakeholders who 
are not in any formal positions of authority to change practices that are within their 
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sphere of influence. Such stakeholders could be patients, clinicians, cooperatives 
and agricultural producers (see Schwenkenbecher, Chap. 23, this volume and 
Oakley, Chap.8 in this volume). In contrast, top-down actions have wider impact 
and the drivers of change typically include governments, professional bodies and 
third party payers. The use of the regulatory lever, along with other levers, should 
enable as well as facilitate a combination of both bottom-up and top-down actions 
to improve policies and practices relating to antibiotics access, use and stewardship.
25.5  Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered how AMR containment has become a collective 
action problem, perhaps most comprehensively mapped out in the GAP-AMR. While 
the GAP-AMR itself lacks legal or regulatory force, there are at least three regula-
tory principles that could be drawn from it. These regulatory principles in turn 
require countries to adopt a variety of legal and regulatory actions or interventions 
that may be necessary to strengthen their regulatory lever for AMR containment. We 
have attempted to explicate these legal and regulatory actions in terms of four phar-
maceutical policy objectives that have been articulated in a number of WHO docu-
ments and initiatives. Finally, we highlighted the crucial role of the regulatory lever 
in implementing the GAP-AMR, and also in enabling other levers under a whole- 
of- system approach.
Policies on AMR in health systems need to be responsive to shifting contexts and 
goals. Such adaptations must be informed by the best available evidence of what 
works, for whom, how and why in a given situation. In addition, routine monitoring 
and periodic evaluations of the impacts are necessary, and they are further crucial to 
ensuring quality, appropriate use and good stewardship of antimicrobials. The regu-
latory lever could and arguably should be applied to introduce, guide, scale-up, 
adapt, adjust or terminate policies on AMR containment. While it is not disputed 
that the regulatory lever is generally recognised to be important, there has been rela-
tively little attention as to what it means in terms of laws and regulations that could 
be directed at AMR containment. If the GAP-AMR is to be effectively enabled, this 
lacuna that we have highlighted will require greater attention.
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Chapter 26
The Super-Wicked Problem 
of Antimicrobial Resistance
Jasper Littmann, A. M. Viens, and Diego S. Silva
Keywords Complex systems · Social policy · Bioethics · Political philosophy
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) – the progressive process by which microbes, such 
as bacteria, through evolutionary, environmental and social factors develop the abil-
ity to become resistant to drugs that were once effective at treating them – is a threat 
from which no one can escape. It is one of the largest threats to clinical and global 
health in the twenty-first century  – inflicting monumental health, economic and 
social consequences.1 All persons locally and globally, and even all future persons 
yet to come into existence, all suffer the shared, interdependent vulnerability to this 
threat that will have a substantial impact on all aspects of our lives. For example, 
1 J O’Neill, et al., Infection Prevention, Control and Surveillance: Limiting the Development and 
Spread of Drug Resistance (London: Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, 2016) https://amr-
review.org/sites/default/files/Health%20infrastructure%20and%20surveillance%20final%20ver-
sion_LR_NO%20CROPS.pdf (accessed September 29, 2017); President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology, Report To The President On Combating Antimicrobial Resistance 
(Washington: PCAST, 2014); World Health Organization, The Evolving Threat of Antimicrobial 
Resistance: Options for Action (Geneva: WHO Press, 2012); World Economic Forum, Global 
Risks 2013 – Insight Report, Eighth Edition (Geneva, 2013); S.C. Davies, J. Grant and M. Catchpole, 
The Drugs Don’t Work: A Global Threat (London: Penguin, 2013); O.O.  Adeyi, et  al., Drug-
Resistant Infections: A Threat to Our Economic Future (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017).
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while reliable data are hard to find, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) has conservatively estimated that, in Europe alone, AMR causes 
additional annual cost to health care systems of at least €1.5 billion, and is respon-
sible for around 25,000 deaths per year. Furthermore, AMR significantly increases 
the cost of treating bacterial infections with an increase in length of hospital stays 
and average number of re-consultations, as well as the resultant lost productivity 
from increased morbidity.2 With a combined cost of up to $100 trillion to the global 
economy – pushing a further 28 million people into extreme poverty – this is one of 
the most pressing challenges facing the world.3 Most troublingly, if we do not suc-
ceed in diminishing the progression of AMR, there is the very real potential for it to 
threaten common procedures and treatments of modern medicine, including the 
safety and efficacy of surgical procedures and immunosuppressing chemotherapy.4 
Some experts are warning that we may soon be ushering in a post-antibiotic area.5
26.1  Challenges in Responding to AMR
There exists a multitude of policy responses to AMR at the local, national and inter-
national levels.6 Unfortunately, their success to date has only been limited.7 This 
may partly be due to the fact that many microorganisms are highly adaptable and 
constantly evolving, thereby presenting a perpetual challenge to clinicians, research-
ers, public health professionals and policy-makers.8 However, the formulation and 
2 L.L.  Maragakis, E.N.  Perencevich and S.E.  Cosgrove, ‘Clinical and Economic Burden of 
Antimicrobial Resistance,’ Expert Review of Anti-infective Therapy 6(2008): 751–63; F. Alam, 
et al. ‘The additional costs of antibiotics and re-consultations for antibiotic-resistant Escherichia 
coli urinary tract infections managed in general practice,’ International Journal of Antimicrobial 
Agents 33(2009): 255–57; R. Smith and J. Coast, ‘The true cost of antimicrobial resistance,’ BMJ 
2013; 346: f1493; Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the 
United States, 2013 (Atlanta: Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, 2013)
3 J. O’Neill et al., Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally: Final Report and Recommendations 
(London: Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, 2016), available at https://amr-review.org/sites/
default/files/160518_Final%20paper_with%20cover.pdf (accessed September 29, 2017).
4 A. Teillant, S. Gandra, D. Barter, D.J. Morgan, and R. Laxminarayan, ‘Potential burden of antibi-
otic resistance on surgery and cancer chemotherapy antibiotic prophylaxis in the USA: a literature 
review and modelling study,’ Lancet Infectious Diseases 15(2015): 1429–37.
5 S.C.  Davies, J.  Grant and M.  Catchpole, The Drugs Don’t Work: A Global Threat (London: 
Penguin, 2013).
6 World Health Organization, Global Strategy for Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance 
(Geneva: WHO, 2001); Infectious Diseases Society of America, ‘The 10 × ‘20 Initiative: Pursuing 
a Global Commitment to Develop 10 New Antibacterial Drugs by 2020,’ Clinical Infectious 
Diseases 8(2010): 1081–83; Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, Deutsche Antibiotikaresistenz-
Strategie (Berlin, 2011); Department of Health, UK Five Year Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy 
2013 to 2018 (London, 2013)
7 World Health Organization, Antimicrobial Resistance – Global Report on Surveillance (Geneva: 
WHO Press, 2014)
8 A.S. Fauci and D.M. Morens, ‘The Perpetual Challenge of Infectious Diseases,’ New England 
Journal of Medicine 366(2012): 454–61.
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implementation of effective polices are also compounded by the complexity of the 
challenge. This complexity pertains to the number of local, national and interna-
tional stakeholders involved, the difficulty in establishing successful collaboration 
and coordination mechanisms across different policy areas, and the numerous inter-
related drivers that make this a problem at the global scale.9
The number of stakeholders who contribute to the emergence of AMR is extraor-
dinarily large.10 Misuse and over-prescription of antibiotics, for example, are driven 
not only by health care professionals but also consumers – many of whom will not 
use antibiotics as instructed, often without being aware of the potential conse-
quences of their actions.11 Other patient groups entirely lack access to appropriate 
antimicrobial treatment, especially in poorer or less developed settings.12 Where 
treatment is either unaffordable for many or infrastructure is lacking, people are 
more likely to self-medicate or buy counterfeit drugs through unofficial channels, 
increasing the chance that their drugs are less effective or unsuitable for treating the 
infection.13 Beyond human usage, the pervasive use of antibiotics outside of medical 
settings also remains a key source of resistance. Indeed, it is estimated that more 
antibiotics are given to animals than consumed by humans – and, in many instances, 
for non-therapeutic use.14 The wide use of antibiotics within agricultural, aquacul-
ture, horticultural and animal farming industries all provide multiple opportunities 
for the increase incidence and prevalence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria.15
AMR does not, therefore, squarely fall into a single policy domain and any effec-
tive policy will require collaboration among a wide range of experts, such as clini-
cians, veterinarians, microbiologists, pharmacologists, epidemiologists, lawyers, 
9 R. Laximinarayan, et al., ‘Antibiotic resistance - the need for global solutions,’ Lancet Infectious 
Diseases 13(2013): 1057–98.
10 W.  Albrich, D.  Monnet, S.  Harbarth, ‘Antibiotic Selection Pressure and Resistance in 
Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus pyogenes,’ Emerging Infectious Diseases 
10(2004): 514–17.
11 C.C. Butler, et al., ‘Understanding the culture of prescribing: qualitative study of general practi-
tioners’ and patients’ perceptions of antibiotics for sore throat,’ BMJ 317(1998): 637–42; 
I. Björkman, et al., ‘Infectious disease management in primary care: perceptions of GPs.’ BMC 
Fam Pract, 12:1 (2011); N.  Britten, ‘Patients’ expectations of consultations’, BMJ, 328 
(2004):416–17
12 M. Mendelson, et al. ‘Maximising access to achieve appropriate human antimicrobial use in low-
income and middle-income countries,’ Lancet 387(2015):188–98; R. Laxminarayan, et al., ‘Access 
to effective antimicrobials: a worldwide challenge,’ Lancet 387(2016): 168–175.
13 N. Gualde, Resistance: The human struggle against infection (New York: Dana Press, 2006); 
R. Laxminarayan and D.L. Heymann, ‘Challenges of drug resistance in the developing world,’ 
BMJ 344(2012): e1567.
14 J. O’Neill, et al., Antimicrobials in agriculture and the environment: reducing unnecessary use 
and waste (London: Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, 2016) https://amr-review.org/sites/
default/files/Antimicrobials%20in%20agriculture%20and%20the%20environment%20-%20
Reducing%20unnecessary%20use%20and%20waste.pdf (accessed September 12, 2017).
15 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Drivers, Dynamics and Epidemiology 
of Antimicrobial Resistance in Animal Production (Geneva: WHO, 2016); R.W. Meek RW, H. Vyas 
and L.J.V. Piddock, ‘Nonmedical Uses of Antibiotics: Time to Restrict Their Use?’ PLoS Biology 
13(2015): e1002266. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002266.
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philosophers, economists and public health professionals.16 This requires high 
degrees of multi-sectorial integration, coordination and accountability mechanisms, 
for which existing policy-making structures are inappropriate or insufficient.17 This 
is further compounded by the fact that AMR has numerous interdependent biologi-
cal and social drivers that make it a problem on the global scale. Expanding interna-
tional travel, tourism and trade will continue to perpetuate resistance beyond current 
levels.18 As such, while national and regional policies can certainly impact on the 
prevalence of drug-resistant infections,19 the global dissemination of resistant bac-
teria demonstrate why such localised efforts alone cannot be ultimately effective.20
As a result of all of these considerations, AMR also raises distinctive ethical 
issues, which must not only be accounted for in our policy and response activities, 
but will play an important role in supporting the numerous difficult choices involved 
in balancing the benefits and burdens associated with protecting antibiotic effective-
ness and reducing the spread of drug-resistant infections.21 Our traditional norma-
tive theories and principles, as developed in other infection prevention and control 
contexts, will be insufficient if mechanically applied as if it were just another prob-
lem of infectious disease ethics. It will require careful attention to the morally- 
relevant features of what makes AMR a distinctive problem, and due care and 
context-specificity in the application of moral guidance and regulation. The ethical 
analysis required to shape and guide our policy response to the problem of AMR 
16 S.B. Levy, The Antibiotic Paradox (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2002).
17 R.D. Smith and J. Coast, ‘Antimicrobial resistance: a global response,’ Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 80(2002): 126–133; R. Laxminarayan, et al., ‘Antibiotic resistance-the need 
for global solutions,’ Lancet Infectious Diseases 13(2013): 1057–98; C. Årdal, et al., ‘International 
cooperation to improve access to and sustain effectiveness of antimicrobials,’ Lancet 387(2015): 
296–307; S.  J. Hoffman and T.  Ottersen, ‘Addressing Antibiotic Resistance Requires Robust 
International Accountability Mechanisms,’ The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 
43(2015): 53–64.
18 D.W. MacPherson, B.D. Gushulak and W.B. Baine, ‘Population Mobility, Globalization, and 
Antimicrobial Drug Resistance,’ Emerging Infectious Diseases 17(2009): 1727–1732; 
Z. S. Ahammad, et al., ‘Increased Waterborne blaNDM-1 Resistance Gene Abundances Associated 
with Seasonal Human Pilgrimages to the Upper Ganges River,’ Environmental Science & 
Technology 48(2014): 3014–3020; A.H. Holmes, L.S. Moore and A. Sundsfjord, ‘Understanding 
the mechanisms and drivers of antimicrobial resistance,’ Lancet 387(2016): 176–87.
19 For instance, as illustrated by the significant variation in the proportion of methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections across European hospitals. See, e.g., European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control, Annual epidemiological report on communicable diseases in 
Europe (Stockholm: ECDC, 2011).
20 I.N. Okeke and R. Edelman, ‘Dissemination of Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria across Geographic 
Borders,’ Clinical Infectious Diseases 33(2001): 364–369; S.E.  Majowicz, et  al., ‘The Global 
Burden of Nontyphoidal Salmonella Gastroenteritis,’ Clin Infect Dis 50(2010): 882–89; 
L.S. Tzouvelekis, et al., ‘Carbapenemases in Klebsiella pneumoniae and Other Enterobacteriaceae: 
an Evolving Crisis of Global Dimensions,’ Clinical Microbiology Reviews. 25(2012): 682–707; 
Nicola K. Petty, et al. ‘Global dissemination of a multidrug resistant Escherichia coli clone,’ PNAS 
111(2014): 5694–5699.
21 J.  Littmann and A.M.  Viens, ‘The Ethical Significance of Antimicrobial Resistance,’ Public 
Health Ethics 8(2015): 209–224.
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also necessitates thinking and theorizing that is able to incorporate and reflect the 
various biological, social, political and legal factors involved in the spread and con-
trol of drug-resistant infections.
In this paper, we will argue that the concept of super-wicked problems can pro-
vide an apt description of the current situation regarding AMR, and that it will help 
us better understand some of the complex ethical challenges associated with 
AMR. Furthermore, framing AMR as a super-wicked problem will help to explain 
why at first glance, AMR appears to be so similar to other large policy challenges, 
such as climate change. However, we will argue that the structural similarity should 
not lead us to conclude that attempts to mitigate one super-wicked problem can 
simply be transferred to another. Instead, we suggest that the crucial feature of 
super-wicked problems is the need to change path dependency – a term we will 
explain more fully below – and that this change will likely require unique approaches, 
methods and tools for each super-wicked problem. To develop this argument, we 
will first introduce the ideas of super-wicked problems as a way to frame 
AMR. Second, we will argue that conceptualizing AMR as a super-wicked problem 
can help inform policy making by highlighting how our efforts should be focused. 
Finally, in sections four and five, we provide a potential way to move forward, and 
highlight key ethical issues that arise in this context.
26.2  Framing AMR as a Super-Wicked Problem
The concept of wicked problems, which has its origins in Rittel and Webber’s paper 
about planning theory, describes certain policy problems as complex challenges that 
do not respond to standard problem-solving mechanisms.22 Rittel and Webber sug-
gest that the success of social policy in the 19th and early twentieth century was 
essentially the picking of low-hanging fruits, and that the policy challenges that 
societies are now facing are much more difficult to address.23 Inherent complexity 
(i.e., the overlapping and varied sources of influence or causes to a social problem 
that resist simple linear solutions),24 inter-relatedness with other policy fields, and 
several conflicting goals that might each be reasonably pursued, make some policy 
problems “wicked”. According to Rittel and Webber, these problems are not solv-
able by traditional instruments of policy making, especially not by cost-benefit or 
22 H.W.J. Rittel and M.M. Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,’ Policy Sciences 
4:2 (1973): 155–69.
23 H.W.J. Rittel and M.M. Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,’ Policy Sciences 
4:2 (1973): 155–69.
24 M.C. Jackson, Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Managers (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley 
and Sons, Ltd., 2003).
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system analysis, as these approaches cannot make sense of all dimensions of wicked 
problems.25
Wicked problems are characterized by the fact that proposed solutions cannot be 
judged as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ but merely as more or less suitable, and they do not 
allow for a trial-and-error approach to policy-making. Instead, Rittel and Webber 
argue, wicked problems only allow policy-makers a single shot at solving the prob-
lem – if this fails, the unsuccessful policy will have changed the original problem to 
such an extent its initial alternatives may no longer be viable contenders.26
The concept of wicked problems has been applied to a number of areas as diverse 
as coastal governance,27 liberal arts and design28 and, more recently, climate change. 
It has been argued, however, that the latter no longer presents a wicked, but a ‘super- 
wicked’ problem.29 Super-wicked problems provide an even greater challenge due 
to four additional complications that policy makers have to engage with. These cri-
teria are:
 (i) Time for finding a solution to a policy challenge is running out;
 (ii) Those seeking to solve the problem are part of the cause;
 (iii) Central authorities to address the problem are either weak or non-existent; and
 (iv) Policy responses discount the future irrationally.30
The following section illustrates how these criteria can be applied to the case of 
AMR, why it should be viewed as a super-wicked problem and how each aspect of 
the problem raises important ethical concerns that must be factored into how we 
will be justified in responding to AMR as a super-wicked problem.
26.2.1  Criterion 1: Time Is Running Out
Super-wicked problems require drastic and urgent responses if they are not to 
become unsolvable policy dilemmas. In the case of AMR, it is evident that increas-
ing drug resistance will exacerbate the existing challenge, which has led to concerns 
25 H.W.J. Rittel and M.M. Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,’ Policy Sciences 
4:2 (1973): 155–69.
26 H.W.J. Rittel and M.M. Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,’ Policy Sciences 
4:2 (1973): 155–69.
27 S. Jentoft and R. Chuenpagdee, ‘Fisheries and coastal governance as a wicked problem,’ Marine 
Policy 33(2009): 553–60.
28 R. Buchanan, ‘Wicked Problems in Design Thinking,’ Design Issues 8(1992): 5–21.
29 R. Lazarus, ‘Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to liberate the 
future,’ Cornell Law Review 94(2009): 1153–234; K. Levin, et al., ‘Overcoming the tragedy of 
super wicked problems: constraining our future selves to ameliorate global climate change,’ Policy 
Sciences 45:2 (2012): 123–52.
30 K. Levin, et  al., ‘Overcoming the tragedy of super wicked problems: constraining our future 
selves to ameliorate global climate change,’ Policy Sciences 45:2 (2012): 123–52.
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about a “post-antibiotic era”.31 There is thus, in short, an observable trend towards 
more complex cases of AMR, which will either be very difficult to treat or no longer 
respond to antibiotics at all.32 Indeed, for some infections, such as tuberculosis or 
gonorrhea, resistance to all common treatments can already be observed.33 As multi- 
and extensively drug resistant infections are being registered more and more fre-
quently and with a lack of new antibiotics under development, the prospect of total 
antimicrobial resistance is no longer an abstract worst-case scenario.34 This not only 
signals the need to make exigent decisions about a large and serious risk of harm for 
individuals and populations, but also factoring in the ethics of acting under condi-
tions of necessity, urgency and uncertainty – and how this may differ from policy 
responses taken under conditions of normalcy.35
26.2.2  Criterion 2: Those Seeking a Solution Are Part 
of the Problem
AMR is a multi-factorial problem and often those involved in combating it also 
contribute to, or exacerbate it, in some important way:
• Health care professionals, who in many countries act as gatekeepers for access 
to antibiotics, often prescribe more antibiotics than necessary, which can lead to 
higher prevalence of drug-resistant infections.36 There in an increasing number 
of studies, which indicate that a high proportion of prescriptions of antibiotics do 
not comply with scientific guidelines.37 Furthermore, appropriate infection 
31 N. Brown, ‘Dawn of the post-antibiotic age?’ BMJ 309(1994): 615; A.J. Alanis, ‘Resistance to 
Antibiotics: Are We in the Post-Antibiotic Era?’ Arch Med Res 36(2005): 687–705.
32 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Antimicrobial resistance surveillance in 
Europe: Annual report of the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network (EARS-
Net) 2011 (Stockholm, 2012).
33 E. Alirol, et al., ‘Multidrug-resistant gonorrhea: A research and development roadmap to dis-
cover new medicines,’ PLoS Med 14(2017): e1002366; World Health Organization, Treatment 
guidelines for drug-resistant tuberculosis, 2016 update (Geneva: WHO, October 2016 revision) 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/250125/1/9789241549639-eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1 
(Accessed September 25, 2017).
34 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, The bacterial challenge: time to react 
(Stockholm, 2009).
35 See, e.g., A.M. Viens, ‘Normative Uncertainty and the Ethics of Risk Regulation in Emergency,’ 
in A.  Alemanno (ed.), Governing Disasters: The Challenges of Emergency Risk Regulation 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), pp.  137–46; A.M.  Viens, In Extremis: Morality in Times of 
Emergency (London: University of London PhD, 2012).
36 R.G. Finch, ‘Antibiotic resistance: a view from the prescriber,’ Nature Reviews Microbiology 
2(2004): 989–94; V.I. Enne, ‘Reducing antimicrobial resistance in the community by restricting 
prescribing: can it be done?’ Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 65(2010): 179–82.
37 K.E.  Fleming-Dutra, A.L.  Hersh and D.J.  Shapiro, ‘Prevalence of Inappropriate Antibiotic 
Prescriptions Among US Ambulatory Care Visits, 2010–2011,’ JAMA 315(2016): 1864–1873. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2016.4151.
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prevention and control can reduce the need for antibiotics in the first place – 
which is an area where improvements can be made too.38
• Pharmaceutical companies have steadily decreased research efforts into new 
antimicrobial drugs, despite mounting pressures on health care systems to intro-
duce new and effective drugs. The lack of investment is, at least, partly caused by 
concerns over limited returns on investment due to advancing AMR.39 Margaret 
Chan, former World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General, recently 
alluded to this problem, when she rhetorically asked: “[f]rom an industry per-
spective, why invest considerable sums of money to develop a new antimicrobial 
when irrational use will accelerate its ineffectiveness before the R&D investment 
can be recouped?”40 Recent advances in clinical research show that it may be 
possible to develop entirely new classes of antibiotics.41 However, the time frame 
for their development remains unclear and unless novel ways of financing are 
introduced, their prices are likely to be prohibitive for most patients in low and 
middle-income countries (LMICs). The industry perspective is that the invest-
ment into new antibiotics is only financially feasible, if considerable lump sum 
payments, so-called market entry rewards, are paid out. These are usually esti-
mated to have to be greater than $ 1 billion.42 Moreover, the antibiotic production 
process and discarded antibiotic-laced waste can also have a considerably nega-
tive environmental impact that further perpetuates resistance.43
38 J. O’Neill et al., Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally: Final Report and Recommendations 
(London: Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, 2016), available at https://amr-review.org/sites/
default/files/160518_Final%20paper_with%20cover.pdf (accessed September 29, 2017).
39 C. Morel and E. Mossialos, ‘Stoking the antibiotic pipeline,’ BMJ 340(2010): c2115.
40 M. Chan, Secondary Antimicrobial Resistance in the European Union and the World (Geneva: 
World Health Organization, 2012), available at: http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2012/
amr_20120314/en/ (accessed September 29, 2017).
41 L.L.  Ling, et  al., ‘A new antibiotic kills pathogens without detectable resistance,’ Nature 
517(2015): 455–59.
42 R. Laxminarayan, P. Matsoso, S Pant, C. Brower, J.A. Røttingen, K. Klugman and S. Davies, 
‘Access to effective antimicrobials: a worldwide challenge,’ Lancet 387(2016): 168–175; 
K. Outterson, et al., ‘Delinking Investment in Antibiotic Research and Development from Sales 
Revenues: The Challenges of Transforming a Promising Idea into Reality,’ PLOS Medicine 
13(2016): e1002043. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002043.
43 K.D. Brown, et al., ‘Occurrence of antibiotics in hospital, residential, and dairy effluent, munici-
pal wastewater, and the Rio Grande in New Mexico,’ Science of the Total Environment 366(2006): 
772–783; J. Fick, et al., ‘Contamination of surface, ground, and drinking water from pharmaceuti-
cal production,’ Environ Toxicol Chem 28(2009): 2522–7; D.G.J. Larsson, ‘Pollution from drug 
manufacturing: review and perspectives. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 369(2014): 20130571; Changing 
Markets Foundation, Superbugs in the Supply Chain: How Pollution from Antibiotics Factories in 
India and China is Fuelling the Global Rise of Drug-Resistant Infections (Utrecht: Changing 
Markets Foundation, 2016); R.  Laxminarayan and R.R.  Chaudhury, ‘Antibiotic Resistance in 
India: Drivers and Opportunities for Action,’ PLoS Medicine 3(2016): e1001974; C.  Lübbert, 
et al., ‘Environmental pollution with antimicrobial agents from bulk drug manufacturing industries 
in Hyderabad, South India, is associated with dissemination of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase 
and carbapenemase-producing pathogens,’ Infection 45(2017): 479–491.
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• Patients who are prescribed antibiotics often fail to adhere to treatment recom-
mendations. This problem is exacerbated in countries where antibiotics are avail-
able for purchase over the counter, and patients may be unable to afford or have 
access to a health care professional who can prescribe and dispense the appropri-
ate drug.44
• Food Producers and Sellers must continue to take significant steps to reduce the 
use of antibiotics as growth promoters and adopt practices that reduce the extent 
to which the food chain continues to be a key pathway for the transmission of 
resistant pathogens.45 We also need to ensure AMR surveillance systems include 
resistance levels in animal stocks and food systems.
• Governments and intergovernmental organizations still lack the requisite regula-
tion and governance structures to address the complexity associated with AMR 
and remain focused on multilateral and bilateral agreements that were commonly 
used in the middle of the twentieth century.46
The various and complex interacting contributions to the spread of AMR make it 
difficult (though certainly not impossible) to attribute causal responsibility to past 
action, including a failure to act. This also raises important questions about how our 
policy response should hold individuals, groups and institutions morally responsi-
ble for their complicity or causal contribution to AMR in any accountability mecha-
nisms developed going forward.
26.2.3  Criterion 3: Central Authorities to Address the Problem 
Are either Weak or Non-existent
There is currently a lack of institutional structures that can meet the challenge of 
AMR effectively and at all policy levels. While international organizations, such as 
WHO or ECDC, have developed guidelines for prudent use of antibiotics, as well as 
44 M.B. Planta, ‘The Role of Poverty in Antimicrobial Resistance’ J Am Board Fam Med, 20:6 
(2007):533–39; I.N. Okeke, A. Lamikanra, R. Edelman, ‘Socioeconomic and behavioral factors 
leading to acquired bacterial resistance to antibiotics in developing countries,’ Emerging Infectious 
Diseases 5(1999): 18–27; D.J.  Morgan, I.N.  Okeke, R.  Laxminarayan, E.N.  Perencevich and 
S. Weisenberg, ‘Non-prescription antimicrobial use worldwide: a systematic review,’ The Lancet 
Infectious Diseases 11(2011): 692–701.
45 C. Verraes, et al., ‘Antimicrobial Resistance in the Food Chain: A Review,’ International Journal 
of Environmental Research and Public Health 10(2013): 2643–2669; T. P. Van Boeckel, et  al., 
‘Global trends in antimicrobial use in food animals,’ Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America 112(2015): 5649–5654; T. P. Van Boeckel, et al. ‘Reducing 
antimicrobial use in food animals,’ Science 357(2017): 1350–1352.
46 A. C. Singer, et al. ‘Review of Antimicrobial Resistance in the Environment and Its Relevance to 
Environmental Regulators,’ Frontiers in Microbiology 7(2016):1728; Gabriel Birgand, et  al., 
‘Comparison of governance approaches for the control of antimicrobial resistance: Analysis of 
three European countries,’ Antimicrobial Resistance & Infection Control 7(2018): 28. More is 
written regarding the role of these stakeholders below, under criterion 3.
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programs for co-operation and data sharing, their implementation lies with the 
respective national governments and adherence cannot be enforced.47 Failure to fol-
low these recommendations is not necessarily a matter of ignorance or antipathy – 
in many instances countries may simply lack the control mechanisms, infrastructure, 
expertise, or resources to meet all requirements and recommendations of best- 
practice guidelines. It is also being increasingly recognized that poor governance 
and political corruption make major contributions to our inability to effectively 
respond to AMR.48 However, since drug resistance cannot be confined by national 
borders, these discrepancies and deficiencies in national health systems and policies 
inevitably threatens the effectiveness of antibiotics and control of drug-resistant 
infections, even in countries that strictly enforce measures to reduce and control the 
use of antibiotics and mitigate the spread of AMR. More recently, the United 
Nations has sought to address AMR more comprehensively across sectors and pol-
icy areas, both by establishing a temporary interagency coordination group, and by 
strengthening the tripartite, a coordinating forum comprised of WHO, FAO, OIE, 
and UN Environment.49 Nevertheless, coordination between international mecha-
nisms and national institutions remains a voluntary process, for which few dedi-
cated resources are available.
This raises important questions about, for instance, who should take ultimate 
responsibility for antimicrobial stewardship when there are no central authorities or 
where jurisdictions lack the resources or infrastructure to undertake stewardship 
activities in accordance with international recommendations.50 Indeed, the effect of 
the absence of authorities and resources in the face of the inherent complexity of 
global health governance has gained greater and greater traction in the global health 
arena. In particular, we are starting to see more of a role for formal and informal 
stakeholders (e.g., Wellcome Trust, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, World 
Bank, corporations) increasingly shaping and guiding global health activity through 
many channels – many of which are no longer transparent nor are the varied values 
and interests of these stakeholders always easy to fully comprehend.51 As such, the 
super-wicked problem of AMR sits within a much broader complex challenge that 
47 See e.g. the World Health Organization’s Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance 
(Geneva: WHO, 2015).
48 P. Collignon, et al., ‘Antimicrobial Resistance: The Major Contribution of Poor Governance and 
Corruption to this Growing Problem,’ PLoS One 10(2015): e0116746; B.  Rönnerstrand and 
V. Lapuente, ‘Corruption and use of antibiotics in regions of Europe,’ Health Policy 121(2017): 
250–256.
49 See World Health Organization, ‘Interagency Coordination Group on Antimicrobial Resistance 
(IACG), https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/interagency-coordination-group/en/ 
(accessed October 10, 2018), and World Health Organization, FAO, OIE, WHO  – Tripartite 
Concept Note (Geneva: WHO, 2010) http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/zoonose/con-
cept-note/en/ (accessed October 10, 2018).
50 B. Bennett and J. Iredell, “Global health governance and antimicrobial resistance” In Ethics and 
Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health. Springer, Cham.
51 C. Clinton and D. Sridhar, Governing Global Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); 
J.  Youde. Global Health Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012); Nora Kenworthy, Ross 
J. Littmann et al.
431
is making sense of, and impacting, global health governance, thus amplifying and 
multiplying the complexity of addressing AMR.
26.2.4  Criterion 4: Current Policies Discount 
the Future Irrationally
There is a notable disparity between the enormous significance that antibiotics have 
in today’s health care systems and the lack of a comprehensive and realistically 
implementable global strategy to protect them as a resource for current and future 
generations.52 Indeed, while the impact of AMR on health outcomes today and in 
the future is increasingly recognized, there remains a lack of coordination and suf-
ficient funding to address the problem. When the health ministers of the G20 coun-
tries met for the first time in 2017, they declared “AMR has the potential to have a 
major negative impact on public health as well as on growth and global economic 
stability”.53 Other impact assessments have come to similar conclusions.54 Since 
modern medicine relies so heavily on antibiotics as a prophylactic for standard sur-
gical procedures, the further progression of AMR would be detrimental not only for 
infectious disease policy, it would also affect the outcome of surgical care or the 
survival chances of cancer patients. In short, AMR has become a wider health sys-
tem issue.55 It is therefore all the more surprising that current policies do not place 
greater emphasis on long-term strategies to preserve antibiotic effectiveness and 
best-case policy scenarios consist in the preservation of some level of antibiotic 
effectiveness in the short run, without a comprehensive replacement strategy for 
ineffective drugs.56
Due to the complexity of the drivers of AMR, its costs are extremely difficult to 
assess, even if they are only measured locally or in the short run.57 A number of 
recent economic models have attempted to model the long-term costs, but due to the 
MacKenzie, and Kelley Lee (eds.), Case Studies on Corporations and Global Health Governance: 
Impacts, Influence and Accountability (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).
52 M. Millar M, ‘Can antibiotic use be both just and sustainable... or only more or less so?’ Journal 
of Medical Ethics 37(2011): 153–7; L. Leibovici, M. Paul and O. Ezra, ‘Ethical dilemmas in anti-
biotic treatment,’ Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 67(2012): 12–16.
53 Berlin Declaration of the G20 Health Ministers, Berlin 2017, p. 5 https://www.bundesgesund-
heitsministerium.de/fileadmin/Dateien/3_Downloads/G/G20-Gesundheitsministertreffen/G20_
Health_Ministers_Declaration_engl.pdf (accessed on September 25, 2017).
54 O. Adeyi. et al., Drug-resistant infections: A threat to our economic future, Volume 2 (Washington, 
D.C: World Bank, 2017), available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/323311493396993758/final-report
55 R. Smith and J. Coast, ‘The true cost of antimicrobial resistance,’ BMJ 346(2013): f1493.
56 A.J.  Alanis, ‘Resistance to Antibiotics: Are We in the Post-Antibiotic Era?’ Arch Med Res 
36(2005): 687–705.
57 D.H. Howard, R.D. Scott, ‘The Economic Burden of Drug Resistance,’ Clin Infect Dis 41(2005): 
S283-S86; R. Smith and J. Coast, ‘The true cost of antimicrobial resistance,’ BMJ 346(2013): f1493.
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complexity of AMR, they inevitably have to restrict their analysis to a select number 
of bacterial pathogens or consider a limited number of potential cost factors.58 As a 
result, existing cost models likely underestimate the long-term effects of 
AMR. However, even these conservative cost models, which – by their own admis-
sion – systematically underestimate some of the costs associated with drug resis-
tance, come to the conclusion that the cost of AMR (including resistance to antiviral 
drugs) may exceed $100 trillion in total GDP loss by 2050.59 What this shows quite 
clearly is that current efforts to address AMR are simply not proportionate to the 
magnitude of the challenge at hand.
This also raises questions about the proportionality of our policy responses – in 
a moral and legal sense – in light of how it will be legitimate for us to act given the 
seriousness of the challenge faced. If the spread and magnitude of harm of AMR 
will be as predicted, what could be currently seen as a disproportionate response – 
for instance, what might be seen as overly paternalistic or coercive measures – may 
be seen to be justified as the problem worsens. Nevertheless, if the long game here 
is about keeping AMR at bay for as long as possible, should we actually have to wait 
until the problem gets much worse before we are justified in utilizing more paternal-
istic or coercive measures to achieve the same goal? The moral and legal calculus 
involved – and the extent to which the legitimacy of our responses should be deter-
mined in proportion to the risk of harm – could signal, for example, the develop-
ment of new or more stringent stewardship obligations, the imposition of more risk 
on individuals (even without consent) and potential limitations on once established 
and uncontroversial entitlements and rights.60 The nature of super-wicked problems 
are such that we must consider not only what norms and values should advance 
particular social, medical and public health goals, but also how such norms and 
values can set constraints or limits on these goals.
58 J. Taylor, et al., Estimating the economic costs of antimicrobial resistance: models and results 
(Cambridge, UK: RAND Europe, 2014); KPMG, The global economic impact of antimicrobial 
resistance (London: KPMG: 2014).
59 J. O’Neill et al., Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally: Final Report and Recommendations. 
(London: Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, 2016), available at https://amr-review.org/sites/
default/files/160518_Final%20paper_with%20cover.pdf (accessed September 29, 2017).
60 Gro Harlem Brundtland, who served three terms as Prime Minister of Norway and as Director-
General of the World Health Organization from 1998 to 2003, maintained that “AMR is just as 
much about human rights and justice as it is about health” [http://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2017/12/06/
gro-harlem-brundtland-new-who-guidelines-are-crucial-step-to-fighting-antimicrobial-
resistance/]
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26.3  How Conceptualizing AMR as a Super-Wicked Problem 
Can Inform Policy Making
The account of AMR as a super-wicked problem is not merely descriptive, but offers 
a framework for assessing the expected impact of policy making. Understanding 
AMR as a super-wicked problem underlines three important facts. First, it high-
lights the tendency of current policies to focus on preserving antibiotic effective-
ness, while failing to reduce the future need for antibiotics. Second, it explains why 
traditional instruments, such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA), are unsuited to deter-
mining an appropriate policy response. Third, it helps bring to light how the com-
plex interaction of ethical considerations will contribute to shaping which policy 
options will be viewed as acceptable.
Many of the existing policies that address AMR (and a considerable portion of 
the academic literature) emphasize the need for new antibiotics, as well as the cost- 
effective and prudent use of available resources.61 The policy focus is thus on 
addressing problems on the supply side, and the creation of new resources, where a 
broad number of policy campaigns already exist.62 However, if AMR is understood 
as a super-wicked problem, it becomes apparent that such approaches – while a 
necessary contribution – will ultimately and inevitably fall short of the goal of effec-
tively controlling AMR in the long run. Consideration must take place of the relative 
value of focusing on upstream versus downstream determinants of drug-resistant 
infections, and the extent to which values other than efficiency or innovation (e.g., 
health equity) should guide both which drivers of resistance we focus on as well as 
which preventive and therapeutic responses we should pursue.
Framing AMR as a super-wicked problem should lead policy makers to place a 
much stronger emphasis on those policies, which – to paraphrase Levin et al. – gen-
erate a shift in path dependencies.63 The concept of path dependencies explains 
current policies in light of their development of time, and as a result of earlier deci-
sion.64 A given policy may therefore be more influenced by legacy decisions than by 
61 E.  Mossialos, et al, Policies and incentives for promoting innovation in antibiotic research 
(Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2008); T. Groves, ‘Back to 
basics with the three Rs,’ BMJ 344(2012); R.  Laxminarayan and G.M.  Brown, Economics of 
Antibiotic Resistance: A Theory of Optimal Use (Washington D.C.  Resources for the Future, 
2001); C. Morel and E. Mossialos, ‘Stoking the antibiotic pipeline,’ BMJ 340(2010): c2115.
62 L.D. Högberg, A. Heddini, and O. Cars, ‘The global need for effective antibiotics: challenges and 
recent advances’ Trends Pharmacol Sci 31(2010): 509–15.
63 K. Levin, et  al., ‘Overcoming the tragedy of super wicked problems: constraining our future 
selves to ameliorate global climate change,’ Policy Sciences 45(2012): 123–52.
64 A more complete definition of path dependence is as follows: ‘Path dependence is the idea that 
decisions we are faced with depend on past knowledge trajectory and decisions made, and are thus 
limited by the current competence base. In other words, history matters for current decision-mak-
ing situations and has a strong influence on strategic planning… A well-known example is the 
QWERTY layout for typewriters. Despite the fact that different keyboard layouts in modern com-
puter keyboards would allow faster typing, the QWERTY layout prevails.’ Financial Times Lexicon 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=path-dependence (accessed September 30, 2017).
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the current state of affairs and the latest available evidence. A shift in path depen-
dencies is necessary once it has become apparent that the trajectory of earlier policy 
decisions is leading to an unsustainable outcome in the long run. In the case of cli-
mate change, for example, such path dependency is exemplified by the widespread 
and continued reliance on fossil fuels.65 In the case of AMR, this path dependency 
is reflected by the reliance on antibiotics as not only a treatment against acute infec-
tion, but also as a tool for infection prevention in both clinical and veterinary set-
tings. This dependency is replicated in most current policies that focus on pulling on 
the same levers, which aim at either increasing the availability of antibiotics or 
decreasing the use of antibiotics. What is crucially missing is sufficient emphasis on 
infection prevention and control measures that reduce the need for antibiotics in the 
first place.
Consequently, current policies do not offer a long-term fix to the problem of 
AMR and create, at best, a “faux paradigmatic change”, in which the implementa-
tion of policy only makes small corrections to a previous policy failure temporari-
ly.66 The most obvious example for a faux paradigmatic shift is the reliance on 
future developments of new antibiotics, which are effective against resistant bacte-
ria. While such a development will provide significant short-term improvements, 
past experience suggests that bacteria will ultimately develop resistance to new 
classes of antibiotics, as well. Consequently, as Spellberg has observed, “we will 
never truly defeat microbial resistance; we can only keep pace with it.”67 In the 
absence of a realistic option for true paradigmatic change (i.e., a technological 
method to avoid the further emergence and spread of AMR altogether), it appears 
advisable to abandon ambitions to outpace the adaptation of microbes to new anti-
biotics, and instead focus on the creation of incremental but transformative changes, 
which no longer follow the same policy trajectory and instead reduce the  dependence 
on antibiotics. In particular, this new trajectory must have as a chief focus policy 
options that can be effectively implemented in LMICs.
One analogy that summarizes this situation, and which has been used repeatedly 
to describe the problem at hand, is that of a “leaky bucket”.68 If we think of antibi-
otic effectiveness as a resource contained in a bucket, the emergence of resistance is 
65 G.  Unruh, ‘Understanding Carbon Lock-In,’ Energy Policy 28(2000): 817–30; P.  Aghion, 
C. Hepburn, A. Teytelboym, and D. Zenghelis, Path dependence, innovation and the economics of 
climate change (London: Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Grantham Research 
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 2014) http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/
wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Aghion_et_al_policy_paper_Nov20141.pdf (accessed September 
29, 2017).
66 B.  Cashore and M.  Howlett, ‘Punctuating Which Equilibrium? Understanding Thermostatic 
Policy Dynamics in Pacific Northwest Forestry,’ Am J Pol Sci 51(2007): 532–51; K. Levin, et al. 
‘Overcoming the tragedy of super wicked problems: constraining our future selves to ameliorate 
global climate change,’ Policy Sciences 45(2012): 123–52.
67 H.W.  Boucher, et  al. ‘Bad Bugs, No Drugs: No ESKAPE! An Update from the Infectious 
Diseases Society of America,’ Clin Infect Dis 48(2009): 1–2.
68 This analogy was originally proposed by Prof. Otto Cars, ReAct-Action on Antimicrobial 
Resistance, Uppsala University Sweden.
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akin to holes in this bucket, slowly draining the effectiveness of available drugs. The 
development of a new drug would effectively add water to the leaking bucket. But, 
in the absence of a realistic option to develop antibiotics that avoid the subsequent 
emergence of resistance, this will only have a temporary effect and not address the 
underlying problem; namely, the holes in the bucket. Thus, not only are the antibiot-
ics currently in clinical development not adequate to counter the increasing preva-
lence of AMR, it is unlike they ever could be.69
A second argument for framing AMR as a super-wicked problem is that this 
approach discourages a reliance on CBA in policy making. Super-wicked prob-
lems – by their nature – are not easily solvable with standard CBA tools because 
they describe scenarios in which the cost of inaction will be very high, yet occur at 
some point in the distant future. Consequently, CBA will usually recommend an 
insufficiently large commitment of resources to address super-wicked problems 
because costs incurred today are pitted against benefits at a later stage for which 
neither magnitude nor time frame are known.70 As outlined earlier, existing cost- 
models for the assessment of the economic burden of AMR systematically underes-
timate the true cost of AMR because, as Smith and Coast argue, “[none] considered 
the bigger picture – a world in which there are no effective antibiotics for situations 
where they are currently used routinely”.71 And where it has been attempted to take 
these wider costs into consideration, the complexity of AMR has usually forced 
analysts to restrict their models to pathogens and geographical regions for which 
reliable data exists.72 One response to this criticism of CBA in policy-making is to 
suggest that a bad estimate of cost is still better than no estimate at all. However, as 
Jamieson rightly points out, this response overlooks that whenever uncertainties 
about future developments are great, relying on the supposedly neutral judgment of 
a bad cost-estimate is a leap of faith – and it may prompt us to reach policy decisions 
that, in the long run, are far worse than the ones we might have considered had we 
not aimed for cost-efficiency based on unreliable or incomplete information.73
A final argument for framing AMR as a super-wicked problem is that this 
approach provides a greater prominence on the importance of the values and norms 
that should inform what would make particular policy options more or less 
69 World Health Organization, Antibacterial Agents in Clinical Development: An Analysis of the 
Antibacterial Clinical Development Pipeline, including Tuberculosis (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2017).
70 R. Lazarus, ‘Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to liberate the 
future,’ Cornell Law Review 94(2009): 1153–234.
71 R.D. Smith and J. Coast, ‘The true cost of antimicrobial resistance’. BMJ 2013; 346: f1493. Also 
cf. J. Coast and R.D. Smith, ‘Distributional Considerations in Economic Responses to Antimicrobial 
Resistance,’ Public Health Ethics 8(2015): 225–237.
72 See e.g. the RAND corporations cost model for O’Neill’s AMR review: https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR911.html (accessed September 29, 2017).
73 D. Jamieson, ‘Ethics, Public Policy and Global Warming,’ in S.M. Gardiner, et al. (eds.) Climate 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.  77–86. Also cf. A.  Williams, ‘Cost-
effectiveness analysis: is it ethical?’ Journal of Medical Ethics 18(1992): 7–11.
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acceptable.74 Through diminishing an analysis of the cost of AMR in primarily eco-
nomic terms, it helps bring to light the non-economic costs and values involved in 
shaping which policy options will be viewed as acceptable. By emphasizing the 
need for shifts in path dependencies, and the resultant changes in our approaches 
and responses, it also emphasizes the need to re-evaluate the values and norms 
which underpinned our previous policies and activities. To put it another way, 
through framing AMR as a super-wicked problem, we not only acknowledge that 
previous approaches are unlikely to be sustainable in the long run, but we are also 
forced to ask what sort of values and norms could justify new policy options that 
would not only be effective but also ethical. This is all the more relevant because 
understanding AMR as more than a scientific or technical issue is a relatively new 
perspective. For most of the existence of antibiotics, their use has been primarily 
viewed as a medical or microbiological issue, and was governed accordingly. This 
means that value judgments were commonly only implicit and often incoherent. We 
have seen that these technical or medical matters do not exhaust all of the relevant 
considerations, and much of the decision-making and policy-making around AMR 
concerned matters that were inherently and inescapably ethical. Acting as an anti-
microbial steward, for instance, often involves making moral judgments, promoting 
particular values and prioritising different aims  – which are normative, and not 
merely technical, activities. In viewing AMR as a societal challenge, we can see the 
failings of earlier approaches that had not considered the normative significance this 
shift implies.
26.4  Incrementally Creating Transformative Shifts in Path 
Dependency: Alternative Strategies
Creating transformative changes in path dependency will require adjustments on all 
types and levels of antibiotic use, and is unlikely to come in the shape of a single 
intervention. While there are no formulaic strategies to address wicked and super- 
wicked problems, different kinds of policy response will be suited to different time 
frames and address different aspects of the challenge that AMR presents. Nancy 
Roberts distinguishes between three possible approaches to super-wicked prob-
lems: authoritative, competitive and collaborative strategies.75
74 For different ways in which framing the problem of AMR can have ethical and political implica-
tions, see, for instance, A.M. Viens and Jasper Littmann, ‘Is Antimicrobial Resistance a Slowly 
Emerging Disaster?’ Public Health Ethics 8(2015): 255–265.
75 N. Roberts, ‘Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution,’ Int Public Manag Rev 
1(2000): 1–19.
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26.4.1  Authoritative Strategies
These strategies involve a small number of decision-makers who develop policy 
solutions, which are then implemented by others. Such approaches require that 
decision-makers have the ability to enforce the implementation of their chosen strat-
egy. The advantage of such a policy is that decision-making complexity is reduced, 
and policies can be implemented and adjusted relatively quickly. On the other hand, 
such approaches to solving super-wicked problems are likely to alienate a large 
proportion of stakeholders and they depend on the existence of power structures 
where they can be enforced.76 To this end, recent proposals for international legal 
frameworks and an intergovernmental panel have been put forward.77 However, the 
question how adherence at the local level could be controlled and, where necessary, 
enforced – let alone sufficiently resourced – make such centralized and costly pro-
posals very difficult to implement. Authoritative strategies may therefore be of 
greater use at the national or regional level. At the global level, however, the current 
lack of adequate resource, governance and accountability structures, which could 
help to effectively implement them, is likely to limit their usefulness in addressing 
the challenge of AMR.
26.4.2  Competitive Strategies
These strategies let different stakeholders or corporations compete for the creation 
of (market-based) solutions and often lead to creative approaches to problem solv-
ing.78 However, the commitment of stakeholders will largely depend on the strength 
of incentives to focus on a given policy area. In the case of AMR, the absence of 
sufficient market incentives has led to minimal investments into R&D for new anti-
biotics, which lies well below a socially optimal level.79 Recent initiatives such as 
76 L.  Briggs, ‘Tackling Wicked Problems  – A Public Policy Perspective,’ in Contemporary 
Government Challenges (Australian Public Service Commission, 2007).
77 J. Anomaly, ‘Combating Resistance: The Case for a Global Antibiotics Treaty,’ Public Health 
Ethics 3(2010): 13–22; M. Woolhouse and J. Farrar, ‘Policy: An intergovernmental panel on anti-
microbial resistance,’ Nature 509(2014): 555–557; Steven J.  Hoffman, ‘An international legal 
framework to address antimicrobial resistance,’ Bulletin of the World Health Organization 
93(2015): 66; S.J. Hoffman, J-A. Røttingen and J. Frenk, ‘International Law Has a Role to Play in 
Addressing Antibiotic Resistance,’ Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 43(2015): 65–67; A.D So, 
et al., ‘An integrated systems approach is needed to ensure the sustainability of antibiotic effective-
ness for both humans and animals,’ J Law Med Ethics. 2015:43(Suppl 3):38–45; N. Gulati, et al., 
Using International Instruments to Address Antimicrobial Resistance (Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa Global Strategy Lab, 2016).
78 N. Roberts, ‘Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution,’ Int Public Manag Rev 
1(2000): 1–19.
79 E.  Mossialos, et  al., Policies and incentives for promoting innovation in antibiotic research 
(Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2008).
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the US Generating New Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act or the European 
Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) are trying to address this, but even if success-
ful, their overall budget does not permit any kind of paradigmatic shift to current 
antibiotic use policy.80 Other strategies which have been offered, such as antibiotic 
de-linkage schemes,81 health impact funds,82 public-private partnerships,83 innova-
tion prizes84 and other mechanisms85 have mostly sought to replicate the old 
approach of developing new antibiotics in the hopes of outpacing resistance. While 
some AMR funding streams now include calls for projects in behavioral science, 
communication and education, their funding remains a miniscule fraction of what is 
currently being invested into drug development. From an ethical perspective, this 
creates additional problems. New drugs are likely to disproportionately benefit 
high-income countries (HICs), despite LMICs having the greatest burden of drug- 
resistant infections. Behavioural science research is also predominantly focused on 
HICs. We currently lack sufficient behaviour change research into what can be 
effectively achieved in regions with high levels of resistance and limited resources, 
e.g. some African countries, India, or countries in South East Asia. Competitive 
strategies are unlikely to change this as they are currently structured and incentivized.
26.4.3  Collaborative Strategies
These strategies involve a large number of stakeholders, especially in cases where 
responsibility and decision-making power are widely dispersed. While more diffi-
cult to establish than top-down authoritative approaches, collaborative strategies are 
widely considered to be the most suitable approach to dealing with wicked and 
80 J.P.  Roberts, ‘Incentives aim to boost antibiotic development,’ Nature Biotechnology 30:8 
(2012):735.
81 C. Clift, et al. (eds.), Towards a New Global Business Model for Antibiotics: Delinking Revenues 
from Sales (London: Chatham House, 2015).
82 K. Outterson, T. Pogge and A. Hollis, ‘Combating Antibiotic Resistance Through the Health 
Impact Fund,’ in I. Glenn Cohen (ed.), The Globalization of Health Care: Legal and Ethical Issues 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), pp. 318–338.
83 For example, DRIVE-AB (Driving reinvestment in research and development and responsible 
antibiotic use), available from: http://drive-ab.eu; CARB-X (Combating antibiotic resistant bacte-
ria biopharmaceutical accelerator), available from: http://www.carb-x.org
84 For example, the Longitude Prize, available at: https://longitudeprize.org; Antimicrobial 
Resistance Diagnostic Challenge, available at: https://dpcpsi.nih.gov/AMRChallenge. Also see 
J. Love and T. Hubbard, ‘The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines,’ Chicago-
Kent Law Review 82(2007): 1519–1554.
85 K. Outterson, J.H. Powers, G.W. Daniel, and M.B. McClellan, ‘Repairing the Broken Market for 
Antibiotic Innovation,’ Health Affairs 34(2015): 277–285; M.J.  Renwick, D.M.  Brogan and 
E. Mossialos, ‘A Systematic Review and Critical Assessment of Incentive Strategies for Discovery 
and Development of Novel Antibiotics,’ The Journal of Antibiotics 69(2016): 73–88; R.D. Smith, 
and J. Coast. ‘The economics of resistance through and ethical lens,’ In Ethics and Drug Resistance: 
Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health. Springer, Cham.
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super-wicked problems, especially in the absence of a strong global planning 
authority to address the challenge.86 Collaborative strategies can and are already 
being used at different levels, from UN initiatives to regional local campaigns that 
focus on raising awareness or improve prescribing.87
These three strategies are not mutually exclusive and different approaches can 
and should be combined, where viable and appropriate. Viewing AMR as a super- 
wicked problem suggests that sustainable change is most likely to result from col-
laborative strategies focusing on multiple drivers, yet the urgency with which a 
response to AMR must be found may necessitate, for example, the inclusion of 
competitive strategies to develop new drugs and authoritative strategies at the 
national level to enforce strict prescribing guidelines or prohibitions on using anti-
biotics in farm animals as growth promoters. However, the critical reader will also 
notice that, for the most part, present efforts to address AMR can already be catego-
rized as authoritative, competitive or collaborative strategies respectively. This begs 
a question as to whether framing AMR as a super-wicked problem can be of any 
further help in developing novel and effective strategies to combat drug resistance. 
In the paper’s penultimate section, we canvass a few potential ways in which the 
super-wicked problem frame can impact on current AMR policy going forward.
26.5  Shifting Path Dependencies – The Way Forward
Understanding AMR as a super-wicked problem itself does not, unfortunately, gen-
erate a set of novel, easily implementable policy solutions. Yet, as outlined before, 
the complexity of AMR, as well as the countless factors that contribute to it, make 
one-stop solutions highly unlikely in the first place.
While it does not offer any immediate solution to the problem, the understanding 
of AMR as a super-wicked problem may, however, achieve another goal – namely, 
to prompt a reconsideration of the relative importance of different responses to drug 
resistance. One of the most important insights of framing AMR as a super-wicked 
problem is that there is no technological fix we can engineer, nor any simple market- 
based solution that will avoid the impending scarcity of effective antibiotics in the 
future. Any responses that will help us keep AMR at bay in a significant way will 
involve a delicate balancing of benefits and burdens that will require difficult choices 
and restrictions to be imposed on individuals and populations. This insight is at odds 
with current research funding in the area of AMR, which is heavily skewed towards 
drug development.88 Moreover, given the global scale of the problem, success in one 
86 L.  Briggs, ‘Tackling Wicked Problems  - A Public Policy Perspectiv,’ in Contemporary 
Government Challenges (series) (Australian Public Service Commission, 2007).
87 For a selection of local initiatives see for example the ReAct Toolbox, https://www.reactgroup.
org/toolbox/
88 R. Kelly, et al., ‘Public funding for research on antibacterial resistance in the JPIAMR countries, 
the European Commission, and related European Union agencies: a systematic observational anal-
ysis,’ The Lancet Infectious Diseases 16(2016): 431–440.
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part of the world will likely only be temporary, given the drivers brought and accel-
erated by globalization. Framing AMR as such a fundamentally unsolvable policy 
challenge may appear to be defeatist. However, the point is not to admit defeat, but 
to focus on those interventions that may be of greatest use in the long run – even if 
we can never overcome the vicious cycle of bacterial resistance and antibiotic obso-
lescence.89 It may come as good news at this stage that many potential candidates 
for such a strategy already exist, but have simply not have been implemented 
properly.
The most obvious example in this context is infection control and prevention and 
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). While ultimately decisive for the control of 
nosocomial infections, hospital and healthcare hygiene and infection prevention 
have often appeared to be more of an afterthought in recent policy discussion. 
However, they remain of crucial importance for the prevention of infections, in both 
high- and low-income settings.90 Similarly, many of the ongoing efforts for the cre-
ation of broader public awareness for the problem and causes of AMR have not yet 
achieved their desired goals.91 Education and hygiene measures are no silver bul-
lets – and have their own issues with compliance and recalcitrance – but if AMR is 
understood as a super-wicked problem, these policies should receive much greater 
recognition as a crucial part of an effective AMR strategy. Indeed, these are just 
some of the many different behaviour change interventions  – aimed at both 
 professionals and the public – that should comprise a multipronged and diversified 
response to AMR.92 Of course, the success of such behavior change interventions 
will itself be dependent upon fixing even more fundamental problems plaguing 
global health, including poverty and extreme income inequality, since many 
89 A.E. Aiello, N.B. King and B. Foxman, ‘Ethical Conflicts in Public Health Research and Practice 
Antimicrobial Resistance and the Ethics of Drug Development,’ American Journal of Public 
Health, 96(2006): 1910–1914; B.  Spellberg, J.G.  Bartlett and D.N.  Gilbert, ‘The Future of 
Antibiotics and Resistance,’ New England Journal of Medicine 368(2013): 299–302.
90 S. Harbarth, et al., ‘Antimicrobial resistance: one world, one fight!’ Antimicrobial Resistance and 
Infection Control 4(2015): 49  – https://doi.org/10.1186/s13756-015-0091-2; Peter Collingon, 
et al., ‘Anthropological and socioeconomic factors contributing to global antimicrobial resistance: 
a univariate and multivariable analysis,’ The Lancet Planetary Health 2018; 2: e398–405. Also 
World Health Organization, Guidelines on Sanitation and Health (Geneva: WHO, 2018).
91 Special Eurobarometer, Antimicrobial Resistance Report, May  – June 2013 (Brussels: EU 
Directorate-General Communication, 2013).
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technical and behavioral interventions are limited by adverse social, economic, and 
political contexts.93 Tackling AMR will require those working in global health to 
directly address injustices, however one conceives of justice. Here, for our pur-
poses, any conception of justice will do since the problem of injustices in global 
health are theoretically overdetermined.94 In other words, practically speaking, tack-
ling the levers that make AMR a super-wicked problem will have to include making 
real efforts to address global injustices for the various ways in which they contribute 
to the level of drug-resistant pathogens around the world.
Finally, understanding AMR as a super-wicked problem and thereby as a global 
challenge that defies simple solutions by any one party suggests that a much greater 
part of our efforts must be directed towards increasing standards of access and qual-
ity of prescribing in those regions where resources continue to be limited. We have 
not yet managed to ensure the provision of adequate access to antibiotics in many 
regions of the world, where the price of drugs is often prohibitive for patients and 
where over-the-counter sales have led to an unregulated and uncontrolled use of 
antibiotics.95 We are, therefore, faced with a situation in which we have to reduce the 
excessive use of antibiotics in some regions of the world while ensuring greater 
access in others.96 As Daulaire et al. maintain, ‘meaningful access is dependent on 
good stewardship and vice versa.’97 Nevertheless, this will require us to successfully 
confront and find answers to difficult distributive questions about when access 
should be increased or limited, and how to maintain sustainable fair access in a way 
that attempts to diminish the rate of AMR as long as possible. Stewardship to pro-
tect the effectiveness of antibiotics presupposes a functioning healthcare and legal 
system with sufficient oversight to regulate antibiotic usage adequately. New drugs, 
especially against Gram-negative bacteria, are badly needed and if resistance against 
drugs of last resort (e.g., carbapenems, colistin) further increases, we are officially 
out of options for treatment. In many of the countries that require greater access, it 
is difficult to guarantee even the most basic stewardship mechanisms. As a result, 
there is a need to explore different ways of approaching antibiotic governance in a 
global setting as part of responding to this super-wicked problem that genuinely 
93 S. Gill and I. Bakker, ‘The global crisis and global health,’ in S. Benatar and G. Brock (eds.), 
Global Health and Global Health Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
pp. 221–238.
94 See, for example, L. Reid “Antimicrobial resistance and social inequalities in health: consider-
ations of justice” In Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public 
Health. Springer, Cham, where the author provides an egalitarian argument toward this conclusion.
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13:12 (2013): 1057–98.
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empowers local and regional stakeholders to shape the path dependencies that guide 
our response.
26.6  Conclusion
While AMR is a complex and arduous challenge, understanding it as a super-wicked 
problem does not mean it is intractable or that the multitude of drivers and stake-
holders defy making substantial progress. The discussion of potential initiators of 
path dependency in this paper serves as an illustration of possible scenarios rather 
than as a comprehensive list of recommendations, but it highlights that recognizing 
AMR as a super-wicked problem would indeed have policy implications and should 
lead us to reconsider our values and priorities in responding to AMR.
This will also include a discussion of ethical norms and standards that should be 
met in addressing the problem of drug resistance. Given that AMR has only recently 
moved from being a purely clinical (or veterinary) problem into the realm of global 
challenges that require a broader societal response, there exists currently little 
research, and even less agreement on what the most important ethical issues in 
AMR are, and what we should do about them.98 Ethicists should weigh in on such 
complex and wicked problems,99 but they must also be aware of the fact that this is 
not an abstract problem, but already a health challenge on a global scale.
Understanding AMR as a super-wicked problem is not merely a matter of cate-
gorization. Instead, it should lead us to reconsider current policy approaches in light 
of their expected usefulness and likely success of implementation. New approaches 
to tacking AMR should seek to avoid replicating earlier patterns and problems of 
jumping between ‘one-best-way’ approaches or ‘one-size-fits-all’ interventions – 
both empirically and ethically. If AMR does indeed present a super-wicked prob-
lem, policy efforts should be primarily directed at shifting path dependencies. As 
such, the aim is not ‘solving’ AMR but to make progress towards better mitigation 
and management through these shifts. Current policies, for instance, which promote 
infection prevention and control, antimicrobial stewardship and the development of 
new drugs, are a crucial contribution to curbing AMR because they prolong antibi-
otic effectiveness and prevent infections in the first place. However, they are clearly 
insufficient as answers in the medium to long run, and should therefore only consti-
tute a first step in initiating more fundamental changes to public health policy to 
reduce future dependence on antibiotics and more general social policy affecting the 
drivers of drug resistance.
98 J. Littmann J and A.M. Viens, ‘The Ethical Significance of Antimicrobial Resistance,’ Public 
Health Ethics 8(2015): 209–224.
99 D.S. Silva, M.J. Smith MJ, and C.D. Norman, ‘Systems thinking and ethics in public health: a 
necessary and mutually beneficial partnership,’ Monash Bioethics Review 2018 Jun 13. doi: https://
doi.org/10.1007/s40592-018-0082-1. [Epub ahead of print].
J. Littmann et al.
443
Framing AMR as a super-wicked problem also emphasizes the importance of 
ongoing trends towards more integrated collaborations across sectors and research 
disciplines. It should help in creating greater awareness for the true scope of the 
problem we are faced with and the urgency with which we must address it.
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